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In recent times, social protection has been one of the most popular instruments 
for promoting human development in the Global South.1 Understanding 
contemporary social protection in countries of the Global South requires 
a deep comprehension of its historical roots and the conditions under 
which welfare institutions emerged. However, as most research on social 
protection continues to focus on the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) world, our knowledge of drivers, 
characteristics and outcomes of social protection in the Global South is 
still limited. The existing narrative of welfare state  emergence, developed 
1 Global South is not a clearly defined term in the literature. In this book volume, we follow the 
definition by the UN and the World Bank which use the term for low- and middle-income 
countries.
C. Schmitt (*) 
SOCIUM Research Center on Inequality and Social Policy,  
University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
e-mail: carina.schmitt@uni-bremen.de
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for rich democracies with an emphasis on domestic structural conditions 
and national actors, provides only partial insight into the emergence and 
structure of social protection systems in other regions of the world. 
Several studies analyzing social protection in the Global South have 
emphasized the influence of external national and transnational actors for 
contemporary social policy-making (Kaasch and Martens 2015; Yeates 
2009; Deacon 2007). International bilateral donors, multilateral 
agencies, international financial institutions, non- governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and influential nation states are assumed to influence 
social protection pathways in the Global South.
However, the transnational nature of social protection arrangements in 
the Global South is also not a new phenomenon. From the very 
beginning, when social protection was put on the global agenda, espe-
cially during and after World War II, social protection arrangements in 
the Global South have been shaped by external actors. In those days, the 
international landscape was still characterized by colonial empires 
(Abernethy 2000), and the great majority of countries in the Global 
South were still dependent territories. In the course of the twentieth 
century, colonial powers became more and more engaged in social 
policies in their colonies because of the pressure from inside the colonies 
in the form of rising demands for social protection, but also from the 
outside in the form of soft pressure by international organizations 
(Schmitt 2015). Following the end of the colonial era and the process of 
decolonization, the former colonies and other countries of the Global 
South became major battlegrounds for regime competition between the 
capitalist and the communist regime during the Cold War. The US, 
China and the Soviet Union as big global powers tried to bring the emerging 
nation states into their respective influential spheres. Hence, social policy- 
making in those days was interfered by the interests and interventions of 
colonial empires or the communist and Western superpowers.
The influence of external actors did not stop with the end of the Cold 
War. Even today, social protection in the Global South is influenced by 
interests and paradigms of international organizations and donors, 
such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World 
Bank. Due to their financial resources and administrative capacity, 
these actors often support social protection programs and legislations 
 C. Schmitt
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(Kott and Droux 2013; Surender 2013). In fact, international actors have 
been the “primary and most consistent advocates for expansionism [of social 
protection, the editor] across the developing world” (Rudra 2015, 464).
However, not all countries react to external pressure in the same way. 
Social policy models pushed and promoted by external actors have not 
been simply translated into national policies and institutions but have 
rather been adapted, mediated and transformed according to national 
and local conditions. Policy-makers in the Global South have had to find 
ways of managing, negotiating and asserting themselves when designing 
social protection systems in a context where often more powerful external 
actors have been present from the outset. In some countries, national 
policy-makers withstand the pressure exerted by external actors or even 
explicitly deviate from policies they were supposed to implement by 
external actors. Whether and how external actors shape social protection 
is therefore conditioned by the strength of local political parties, labor 
unions, but also by domestic financial, administrative and political 
circumstances. It is therefore important to consider the interplay between 
external actors and national factors when analyzing social protection 
pathways in countries of the Global South.
But what exactly does the influence of external actors look like? And 
how is the influence translated by national factors? Do external actors 
really shape social protection pathways in a significant way or is their 
influence overemphasized?
In this volume, we ask whether and how external actors and transna-
tional relationships have influenced the formation, development and 
transformation of social protection in the developing world. We use a 
broad definition of social protection, including health and education 
policies, but also, for example, famine relief and food security programs. 
A broad definition is more suitable for covering the range of social protec-
tion programs existent in the Global South which goes beyond the classi-
cal social security programs mainly introduced in Western countries. The 
edited volume addresses the need to systematically integrate external 
actors into the narrative of social policy-making in the Global South to 
enhance our understanding and knowledge of welfare institutions in 
regions beyond the OECD.
1 External Actors and Social Protection in the Global South… 
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In this book, we focus on a selective range of actors to make cross-case 
comparisons possible. We elucidate the influence of colonial and Cold 
War superpowers as examples of the long-lasting influence of external 
actors on social protection pathways. The book provides insights into 
how colonial powers and the Cold War superpowers shaped social protec-
tion arrangements, for example in order to serve their objectives such as 
fighting communism or maintain the imperial order. Moreover, we focus 
on the role of international donors and international financial institu-
tions as the most important contemporary external actors developing and 
promoting social policies in the Global South. In this volume, scholars 
applying quantitative frameworks are brought together with others using 
qualitative techniques. The quantitative analyses provide broad brush 
pictures that are necessary for evaluating the role of external actors in the 
transnational social protection arrangements for a larger country sample. 
The qualitative case studies, in contrast, are essential for identifying how 
external actors have to be integrated into the social protection actor net-
work, how they intervene in social protection-making, but also to assess 
the limitations of their influence. We moreover combine historical as well 
as social science approaches to show how social protection arrangements 
have ever since been shaped by external actors. This is especially important 
as knowledge is scarce when analyzing the influence of external actors 
further back in history. The edited volume furthermore contributes to the 
literature by explicitly analyzing the interplay between external actors 
and national conditions as well as by critically assessing the explanatory 
power of external actors for social protection pathways in the Global 
South. The volume shows that social policy-making in most countries of 
the Global South has never been a strictly national story. External actors 
have been part of social protection decisions from the very outset. 
However, the influence of external actors has always been translated by 
national actors and domestic circumstances into social policies and 
institutions. After all, the volume offers a critical assessment of the role of 
external actors and discusses ideational and institutional approaches to 
systematically integrate external actors into the domestic arena of social 
protection-making in the Global South.
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 External Actors and Social Protection 
in the Global South: State of the Art
The field of social protection in the Global South has attracted growing 
interest of scholars since the beginning of this century. Several scholars 
have in the meantime outlined and discussed social protection trajecto-
ries in the Global South and provided valuable insights into different 
social protection pathways in different regions of the world (e.g. Haggard 
and Kaufman 2008; Huber and Stephens 2012; Rudra 2008; Gough and 
Wood 2004; Barrientos 2013; Surender and Walker 2013; Midgley and 
Piachaud 2011). They show that most countries in the Global South have 
implemented social insurance programs in the first place and demon-
strate how social assistance programs have in recent decades spread across 
countries (Schmitt, Chap. 6, this volume). These studies, mainly stem-
ming from Comparative social policy research, emphasize the role of 
national actors in social policy- making. Differences in national social 
protection trajectories have been mainly traced back to different national 
actor constellations and class coalition building processes. The power 
resource theory (Korpi 1983) and the closely related partisan theory 
(Hibbs 1977) argue that labor unions and political parties shape social 
policy dynamics. Strong left power resources in the executive and legisla-
tive are assumed to be key drivers of generous social protection schemes 
(Castles 1978). Partisan theory (Castles 1982; Schmidt 1982) addition-
ally stresses the importance of Christian democratic parties and political 
Catholicism for encompassing social policies (van Kersbergen 1995; van 
Kersbergen and Manow 2009; Manow 2015). Furthermore, the political 
economy literature argues that political leaders make use of public poli-
cies in general and social policies in particular to create winning coali-
tions and secure regime survival (Knutsen and Rasmussen 2014). In this 
view, social protection is an important instrument for governments, espe-
cially in authoritarian contexts of non-liberal states, to secure elite privi-
leges in recompense for political loyalty and to legitimate the political 
system (Magaloni et al. 2007; Rudra and Haggard 2005; Wibbels and 
Ahlquist 2011). Research on non-Western countries additionally 
emphasizes that substantial cross- national differences in social policy 
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priorities are related to distinct  post- war development strategies, such as 
import-substitution industrialization and export-oriented industrializa-
tion (Rudra 2002, 2007, 2008; Avelino et  al. 2005; Barrientos and 
Santibáñez 2009; Wibbels and Ahlquist 2011). In the context of this 
tradition, external actors have not been systematically considered or only 
in a very general and superficial way.
Global social policy as another relevant strand of literature for this 
book volume, in contrast, takes external actors as the point of departure. 
Global social policy research has drawn our attention to a broad array of 
individual and corporate global social policy actors, ranging from inter-
nationally operating intergovernmental organizations, in particular the 
World Bank (Orenstein 2010), the ILO (Supiot 2006; Maupain 2009; 
Deacon 2013), the OECD (Mahon 2009; Martens and Jakobi 2010) or 
the EU (Walkenhorst 2008; Lamping and Steffen 2009; Natali 2009), to 
states formations, such as the G20, as well as South-South relations such 
as BRICS (Surender 2013) and to NGOs (Martens and Kruse 2015; 
Stubbs 2003) or business actors (Farnsworth 2012). Studies in this field 
elucidate the role of international, supranational and transnational 
organizations. They address the questions of how these organizations 
have shaped international standards and norms regarding social policy 
and how these global norms and recommendations feed into the domestic 
social policy arena (Orenstein 2010; Yeates 2009; Deacon 2013, 2007; 
Kaasch and Martens 2015). One major strong point of global social 
policy research is that it has brought forward scholarship on how interna-
tional organizations produce and disseminate policy ideas across 
countries and regions. Some contributions, often based on constructivist 
approaches, have developed conceptualizations of how international 
organizations exert influence, taking into account that most international 
organizations, in particular in the field of social policy, are not able to 
apply hard governance but rather use soft governance mechanisms 
(Abbott and Snidal 2000). Global social policy research has advanced the 
understanding that social issues transcend borders, explaining why inter-
national organizations can be influential actors (Hulme and Hulme 2008; 
Jenson 2010). However, the interdependencies between actors at the 
global and national level have been neither fully grasped in a coherent 
conceptual manner nor comprehensively and systematically in their 
empirical existence. Nevertheless, global social policy research reveals the 
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tension between the global perspective of social problem identification 
and the implementation of social policies at the national level, which we 
take up in this paper.
In sum, the existing literature offers valuable insights to understand 
social protection in contexts where powerful external actors have been 
present from the very outset. However, in each individual case and 
isolated from each other these approaches are not sufficient for capturing 
and appropriately situating all actors that are relevant for social protec-
tion arrangements. Comparative social policy research mainly focuses on 
national actors and their preferences and, if at all, only very roughly inte-
grates external economic and political influences. In contrast, global 
social policy research rather focuses on transnational and international 
actors relevant for social protection without elucidating domestic politics 
at the national level. It mainly analyzes the influence of external actors 
from the perspective of the international organizations, but not from the 
perspective of the developing countries themselves. What is missing are 
studies linking both strands of research. Moreover, most of the studies 
focus on contemporary external actors and social protection, while the 
historical dimension of external influences on social protection, such as 
colonialism and Cold War, is almost completely left out of the equation 
in both strands of literature (e.g. Deacon 2007; Brooks 2015; Rudra 
2008) Hence, even though scholars across a range of disciplines have 
acknowledged and demonstrated the inherently transnational nature of 
social protection arrangements, our knowledge of the potential and limits 
of external national and transnational actors as explanatory factors 
and drivers of social policy-making in the Global South is scarce. This 
especially applies when going further back in history, to the mid-twenti-
eth century when social protection was put on the global agenda. This 
volume contributes to existing scholarship by addressing the mentioned 
shortcomings. In contrast to the existing work, it explicitly focuses on the 
role of external actors in different periods of time and in relationship 
to each national context. The book integrates external actors and their 
interplay with national conditions into the narrative of social policy-
making in the Global South to understand the conditions under which 
social protection has emerged historically and is expanding in the devel-
oping world today.
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 External Actors from Colonialism 
to International Aid: Types, Strategies 
and Objectives
In the literature, different external actors are assumed to influence social 
protection pathways in the Global South. In this volume we apply a broad 
notion of what an external actor is. External actors in a broad sense can be 
understood as collectives of individuals who share an interest in and ability 
to act together toward a common end. Moreover, they are mainly based 
outside the territory which they aim to influence (Pontusson 1995; Huber 
and Stephens 2010). Even though there is no systematic classification of 
external actors, there are several possible dimensions along which they can 
be categorized. For example, external actors can be separated according to 
whether they are governmental or intergovernmental, public or private, or 
whether they provide technical expertise or financial leverage.
Most of the recent literature within global social policy research, but 
also within comparative welfare state research, focuses on the role of 
international donors, international governmental and NGOs. Most of 
these actors, however, were not always as widely spread as they are today. 
Especially intergovernmental organizations have been established only in 
recent decades. When going back further in history, to the colonial and 
the Cold War era, external actors were very often powerful individual 
nation states which made use of the power asymmetries to influence 
policy- making in dependent territories or in their spheres of influence.
Not only the types of actors might have changed over time but also the 
mechanisms or strategies through which external actors have tried to 
influence and shape national social protection pathways. Many studies 
focusing on the role of contemporary international financial institutions, 
international organizations and governmental donors emphasize the 
production and spread of knowledge and the provision of technical and 
financial support (Orenstein 2010; Deacon 2013; Kott and Droux 2013). 
These strategies can rather be classified as “soft” than as “hard” power 
instruments, as at least on the surface they do not force domestic actors 
to implement specific social protection policies against their will. 
However, during colonial and Cold War times, other strategies might 
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have been important. France, for example, imposed the Code du Travail 
in all its African colonies in 1952. This labor code, strongly related to the 
social insurance principle, was the basis for initial social security systems 
in all French African colonies. This strategy can be regarded as a hard 
form of exerting influence on social protection pathways.
Changes and continuities are not only observable with regard to the 
type of relevant external actors and their strategies but also with regard to 
the objectives and preferences connected to social protection. For example, 
in the aftermath of World War II, the ILO mainly pushed social security 
legislations strongly related to waged labor. At that time, social security 
was supposed to protect the worker against risks of unemployment, work 
accidents, old age or sickness. The colonial powers at least after World 
War II also emphasized social protection being strongly linked to the 
workforce. For the superpowers during the Cold War period, however, 
social reforms often constituted part of anti- communism strategies 
(Obinger and Schmitt 2011). Nowadays the ILO supports a more social 
rights-based approach to social protection as it finds expression by the 
ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation. The World Bank, in 
contrast, rather pushes means-tested social assistance. This exemplifies 
how external actors differ with regard to the specific social protection 
policies they prefer and with regard to the objectives to be realized by way 
of social protection.
However, social policy models supported by external actors have 
almost never been directly translated into national policies and institu-
tions but have rather been adapted, mediated and transformed by national 
and local conditions. For example, the influence of colonial powers might 
depend on the domestic factors of the dependent territories, such as eco-
nomic structure, geographic position and strength of political leaders. In 
the case of the Cold War superpowers, some political leaders resisted the 
influence of the Cold War superpowers; others played off both sides 
against one another, or explicitly deviated from what they were supposed 
to do. In present times, especially countries that are politically weak or 
financially dependent might be receptive to the influence of external 
actors. Tracing this interplay between national conditions and external 
actors should elucidate some of the domestic framework conditions for 
the influence of external actors.
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In sum, in this book volume we aim at elucidating changes and continuities 
with regard to types of external actors, their strategies, objectives and 
social policy preferences as well as their interplay with national factors, 
from colonialism to international aid.
 Structure of the Book
This volume contains four parts addressing the long-lasting and contem-
porary role of external actors for social protection-making in the Global 
South from the post-war period until today.
Part I provides a systematic introduction to the analysis of external 
actors of social policy-making in the Global South. Apart from this intro-
duction, then following Chap. 2 by Shriwise addresses existing theoretical 
approaches to the analysis of external actors and outlines the theoretical 
implications of understanding social protection in transnational relief.
Part II addresses the long-lasting influence of colonial and Cold War 
superpowers on early and contemporary social protection-making in 
developing countries. Part II consists of five chapters. The first three con-
tributions pursue a qualitative approach, while the final two provide sta-
tistical analyses. In Chap. 3 Michele Mioni and Klaus Petersen shed light 
on how social reforms were used as an instrument to fight against the 
respective competing regime in the early Cold War period. To address 
this question, the authors historically analyze two Asian countries, that is, 
Burma and Malaysia. They show how debates on the concepts of welfare 
and social protection in both countries were influenced and challenged 
by the Cold War logic. In the subsequent Chap. 4 Daniel Künzler assesses 
the influence of colonial powers and donors on social protection arrange-
ments, comparing Kenya and Tanzania. Even though both were British 
colonies, colonial Kenya was considered a labor reserve, whereas Tanzania 
was rather a cash crop economy for the British officials. Künzler comes to 
the conclusion that even though both countries follow similar social pro-
tection pathways at the first glance, the scope and extent of social policy 
instruments differ between both countries. In Chap. 5 Jeremy Seekings 
addresses the role of the British welfare model for social policy-making in 
colonial and post-colonial times in Botswana and South Africa in the past 
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70  years. He demonstrates that in neither South Africa nor Botswana 
foreign models have been imposed but rather considerably adapted to 
local norms and conditions. External influences entailed primarily the 
diffusion of ideas which were combined with local ideas to shape policy 
outcomes. In Chap. 6 Schmitt addresses the long-lasting influence of the 
colonial legacy on contemporary social policy-making for a large country 
sample including around 100 low- and middle-income countries. 
Applying a quantitative framework, she shows how the recent rise of 
social assistance in the Global South depends on the colonial heritage of 
a country. Social assistance programs are by far more frequent in British 
colonies than elsewhere, while in former French colonies social assistance 
is almost completely absent. This is traced back to different notions of 
both colonial powers regarding social protection. In Chap. 7 Becker in his 
contribution investigates how colonial legacies shape contemporary 
international aid patterns. He also uses a quantitative framework to 
answer whether former colonial ties affected aid priorities and whether 
aid priorities differ between former colonial powers. He demonstrates 
that former colonial ties become manifest by increased efforts toward 
supporting social policy projects. Moreover, he shows that these institu-
tional patterns are most visible with regard to the French aid system.
Part III elucidates international donors and international financial insti-
tutions as important players in the transnational social policy arena of 
today. In Chap. 8, by Marina Dodlova, the question of how the World 
Bank and international donors have influenced the spread of non- 
contributory social transfer programs throughout the countries of the 
Global South is addressed. She applies a quantitative framework to analyze 
how donors drive the diffusion of social policy and how they influence the 
design of social transfer programs, particularly the targeting method used 
to determine the beneficiary base. Rahmi Çemen and Erdem Yörük investi-
gate in Chap. 9 whether transnational actors such as the World Bank influ-
ence the way in which domestic social unrest is translated into social policy. 
Their empirical analysis contains a sample of 42 countries from 1989 until 
2015. Their results show that efforts on social assistance are larger in coun-
tries with high levels of social unrest. In contrast, the influence of the World 
Bank is limited and only visible in countries with high levels of social 
unrest. In Chap. 10 Isaac Chinyoka and Marianne Ulriksen analyze how 
international donors have attempted to influence child welfare policies in 
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Botswana. Their analysis highlights that although transnational actors have 
succeeded with persuading the government in Botswana to change certain 
policy aspects, they have been unable to fundamentally sway the govern-
ment to pursue an individual, rights-focused welfare policy paradigm. In 
Chap. 11 Stephen Devereux and Samuel Kapingidza analyze whether social 
protection-making is nationally owned or donor-driven. The international 
development community has invested heavily in propagating social protec-
tion policies and programs throughout Africa in the past 20  years. The 
authors use the case of Zimbabwe to investigate whether donor agendas on 
social protection are aligned or in conflict with national priorities. They 
offer several indicators that allow for evaluating whether a social policy 
process is nationally defined or donor-driven. All contributions in Parts II 
and III discuss not only the role of external actors for social policy-making 
but also their interplay with domestic factors.
Part IV critically evaluates the potential and limits of institutionalist 
and ideational approaches to the influence of transnational actors. It 
starts with Chap. 12, by Daniel Béland and Priva Haang’andu, who 
propose an ideational approach for elucidating the influence of transna-
tional actors on social policies. Their proposed framework determines the 
circumstances under which external actors succeed and/or fail to diffuse 
transnational norms in an ideationally charged socio-political environ-
ment. In Chap. 13 Armando Barrientos critically assesses the influence of 
external actors and donors in low and middle-income countries. He asks 
whether donor agencies are actually shaping social assistance institutions 
in the Global South or whether their influence has been overrated. The 
dominance of donor organizations and their global policy agendas as 
opposed to domestic policy has delayed the theorization of the rapid 
development of welfare institutions in developing countries. The volume 
is completed by Chap. 14, by Carina Schmitt, Bastian Becker, Judith 
Ebeling and Amanda Shriwise who summarize the main insights pre-
sented by the book. This chapter critically evaluates all contributions of 
this book volume researching the role of external actors for social pro-
tection-making and their interplay with domestic influences. It provides a 
balanced summary of the relative contributions of external actors and 
domestic factors to the explanation of social policy-making in the Global 
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Advancing Transnational Approaches 
to Social Protection in the Global South
Amanda Shriwise
 Introduction
The suggestion that social protection arrangements have transnational 
underpinnings is not new (e.g. Yeates 2001). An increasing number of 
social scientists have recognized the extent to which transnational dynam-
ics, including those surrounding colonialism and conflicts (Obinger et al. 
2018; Schmitt 2015; Obinger and Schmitt 2011), have affected the 
emergence of social protection systems and welfare regimes (Wood and 
Gough 2006). Transnational actors, such as international non- 
governmental organizations, multi- and transnational corporations, trade 
unions and Churches, continue to impact social protection arrangements 
in the Global South as they have since colonial times, and indeed much 
of the literature on social protection has focused on the role of these 
actors (Deacon 2007, 2013a, b). Furthermore, both national (Slaughter 
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2004) and intergovernmental (Cronin 2002) actors have been recognized 
as having the ability to act transnationally, despite their respective national 
and international governance arrangements.
Transnational perspectives are not meant to replace a focus on national 
actors and domestic conditions but rather to complement them and to 
promote a more comprehensive understanding of social policymaking, 
particularly in cases where external actors may be pivotal. While recog-
nizing the transnational nature of a number of social problems, intergov-
ernmental efforts to address them rightly acknowledge the continued 
salience of the nation state and national actors. Both the International 
Labour Organization’s emphasis on establishing social protection floors 
and the World Health Organization’s push to achieve universal health 
coverage focus on working with countries to achieve these goals in the 
context of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. Equally, the 2030 Agenda stresses the need to build strong 
partnerships and institutions to support implementation efforts in coun-
tries by working transnationally, including through the promotion of 
effective public-private partnerships as well as through partnerships with 
international non-governmental and civil society organizations (United 
Nations General Assembly 2017).
This chapter examines how transnational approaches to social protec-
tion can advance our understanding of welfare arrangements in the 
Global South in a way that maximizes contributions to theory-building. 
Using a transnational lens to examine the key actors and institutions 
affecting social protection arrangements can help to illuminate the ori-
gins, asymmetries and ideas that have impacted these arrangements in the 
Global South. The chapter argues that transnational approaches must 
move beyond a recognition that context matters in policymaking to iden-
tifying causal patterns that can inform social policymaking on a global 
scale. While transnational perspectives are not a panacea for problems 
within the social policy literature, they are a necessary first step toward 
advancing theoretical development in ways that are empirically grounded 
and relevant for policymaking in the present.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it reviews understandings of the 
transnational across relevant disciplines to find common ground. Then, 
in the third section, the chapter defines transnational actors and their 
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relationship to global institutions with respect to social protection. The 
fourth section examines how analyzing the dynamics of transnational 
actor constellations might contribute to theory-building by identifying 
causal patterns across country cases in relation to recent advances in social 
protection in the Global South. The final section concludes by summariz-
ing these interdisciplinary insights and reflecting on how they can best 
support theory and practice in the area of social protection.
 Understandings of the Transnational: Finding 
Common Ground
Transnational approaches to social policy have been described as a “means 
of revealing the constructed parameters of the ‘national’” (Yeates and 
Irving 2005, 403). As argued by Clarke (2005, 414), “The idea of the 
transnational draws our attention to processes that work in and across 
nations”. As an inherently interdisciplinary area of study, viewing social 
policy through a transnational lens can mean different things to scholars 
from different disciplines. This section explores the range of definitions of 
the transnational employed by sociologists, political scientists and inter-
national relations (IR) as well as legal scholars that are relevant for under-
standing the emergence of social protection in the Global South.
Sociologists take a broad approach to the transnational, understanding 
it as the study of social structures and processes that transcend or go 
beyond the national, often with a focus on the way in which the global 
and the national are constituent parts of each other. For example, as 
described by Sassen (2006, 2010, 1–2), “the global—whether an institu-
tion, a process, a discursive practice, an imaginary—both transcends the 
elusive framing of national states and also partly emerges and operates 
within that framing. … Further, if the global gets partly structured inside 
the national, then the methodological and theoretical challenges to state- 
centric social sciences will be different from those posed by the common 
binary of global vs. national.”
Sociologists also make strong distinctions between state and society, 
which opens up space for considering: (1) societal relationships beyond 
2 Advancing Transnational Approaches to Social Protection… 
22
national borders, (2) how national actors impact social protection beyond 
their geo-political boundaries and (3) how transnational actors and trans-
national social movements affect policymaking. The need to view social 
protection through a transnational lens has been emphasized by migra-
tion scholars in particular, whose work stems largely from a recognition 
that a growing number of individuals and families are socially embedded 
in multiple societies across national boundaries (Levitt and Jaworsky 
2007; Levitt and Nyberg-Sørensen 2004; Levitt 2001). This research illu-
minates how the production and acquisition of social protection is dis-
tinct for individuals and families living transnational lives in ways that 
concepts such as social citizenship and the study of national welfare 
regimes does not fully capture and may even occlude (Faist et al. 2015; 
Levitt et al. 2017).
When examining transnational dynamics, political scientists and IR 
scholars focus on governance and have increasingly taken an actor-centric 
approach. Global social governance has been defined as “a multi-actored 
process of shaping global and national social policies” (Kaasch and Martens 
2015, 7). Here, the global and national are distinguished by both the level 
at which such policymaking processes take place and the scale on which 
they seek to make an impact. In a global governance context, policymak-
ing occurs within “political arrangements which rely primarily on non-
hierarchical forms of steering. … In other words, governance beyond the 
nation-state means creating political order in the absence of a state with a 
legitimate monopoly over the use of force and the capacity to enforce the 
law and other rules authoritatively” (Risse 2006, 180).
The IR literature distinguishes between two types of global governance 
arrangements affecting global and national policymaking, depending on 
the actors involved: intergovernmental and transnational. Intergovern-
mental governance refers to processes in which states seek to move behav-
ior toward a shared public goal; transnational governance refers to the 
same process but for non-state actors (Roger and Dauvergne 2016). 
Similar to the way in which the welfare mix recognizes both the public 
and private dimensions of national social policies, the umbrella of global 
social governance includes both intergovernmental and transnational 
governance arrangements with respect to social policy. The strong affinity 
between what is considered to be private and transnational within the 
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IR literature has three key effects. First, it narrows understandings of the 
transnational compared to sociological understandings. Second, the 
notion of transnational as private can imply that what is transnational is 
not public and is therefore separate, beyond and/or exempt from govern-
mental intervention. Third, it siloes discussions of intergovernmental and 
transnational governance mechanisms and obscures links between them. 
This makes it more difficult to discern the transnational dynamics under-
pinning social protection arrangements, particularly in developing coun-
try contexts.
Like social policy, legal scholarship is inherently interdisciplinary, and 
broad and narrow understandings of the transnational exist within this 
literature as well. Similar to the way in which migration scholars shed 
light on the unique nature of social protection arrangements for indi-
viduals and families living transnational lives, a recognition of transna-
tional law has arisen in part because of the emergence of legal problems 
that are not solely national, international, public or private. Some legal 
scholars treat transnational law as pertaining predominantly to private 
actors, but in ways that transcend national understandings of both the 
“state” and “market” (Calliess 2007; Calliess and Zumbansen 2010; 
Zumbansen 2011). Alternatively, Jessup (2006, 45) defines transnational 
law broadly as “all law which regulates actions or events that transcend 
national frontiers” (Cotterrell 2012, 501). Under this definition, transna-
tional law can address a range of public and private actors, including 
states, intergovernmental organizations, international and national non- 
governmental organizations, civil society organizations and families.
In a fashion somewhat akin to distinctions between social policies and 
social policymaking, transnational legal scholars recognize transnational 
law as substantive, part of an ongoing process and inherently normative. 
Substantive understandings of transnational law “emphasize the way reg-
ulatory regimes seek uniformity across limited (usually functionally 
defined) transnational operational spheres” (Cotterrell 2012, 501). This 
can be achieved either by harmonizing unique sets of national, interna-
tional, public and private laws that pertain to transnational activities in a 
way that promotes legal pluralism (Zumbansen 2011) or in a way that 
promotes convergence and universal approaches toward transactions that 
“move[s] toward a ‘world law’” (Cotterrell 2012, 501). Process-based 
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understandings of transnational law tend to be broader and have been 
defined as “the theory and practice of how public and private actors—
nation-states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, 
non-governmental organizations, and private individuals—interact in a 
variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to make, 
interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law” 
(Koh 1996, 183). Finally, both substantive and process-based under-
standings of transnational law stress the importance of norms for bring-
ing actors into compliance. While an actor may choose not to comply 
with transnational rules and standards at a given point in time, norms 
may affect the degree to which an actor will deviate from established 
norms, and most actors will align with dominant norms over time—a 
testament both to the durability of the substance of the law and to the 
legitimacy of the process through which laws have been created. In the 
case of social protection, this perspective suggests that just because every 
country does not yet have a social protection floor does not mean that 
they will never have one, nor does it mean that the Social Protection 
Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202) is without teeth.
Understanding social policy from a transnational perspective can mean 
many different things to different scholars, depending largely on one’s 
disciplinary vantage point. Sociologists are likely to focus on the ways in 
which the social transcends the national, as in the case of transnational 
migration, and also on the ways in which global social policies, such as 
social protection floors, are both constitutive of, and constituted by, 
national actors and interests. For political scientists and IR scholars, there 
is a close affinity between the private and the transnational, which makes 
it difficult to discern how transnational governance arrangements impact 
social protection. While some legal scholars also view transnational law as 
pertaining predominantly to private actors, there is broad agreement that 
transnational law pertains to cross-border activities for which there is no 
singular approach by the state. From a process view, transnational law 
recognizes that national, international, public and private actors all play 
a role in its emergence and realization. Building on Koh (1996, 184), 
understanding social policy from a transnational perspective suggests that 
social protection arrangements in the Global South may be: (1) pluralis-
tic; (2) non-statist, but may include state actors; (3) dynamic and mutu-
ally constitutive; and (4) normative.
 A. Shriwise
25
 Transnational Actors and Social Protection
It is important to distinguish between viewing social protection through 
a transnational lens and understanding the role of transnational actors in 
social protection arrangements throughout the Global South. As dis-
cussed later in this volume by Barrientos (Chap. 13), transnational actors 
have received a great deal, arguably a disproportionate amount, of atten-
tion within the literature on social protection. Here, the focus on trans-
national actors is not meant to suggest that both domestic and indigenous 
actors and domestically driven, state-oriented processes have not played a 
critical or even determining role in social protection in the Global South, 
because indeed they have. Furthermore, while there are many transna-
tional underpinnings of social protection in the Global South, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that social protection continues to be framed 
predominantly as a national policy issue, not least because the nation 
state remains the political unit of the international system. These trends 
are stated explicitly in the 2030 Agenda, which encourages the imple-
mentation of “nationally appropriate social protection systems and mea-
sures for all, including floors” (United Nations General Assembly 
2017, 1).
The application of a transnational lens to policymaking processes and 
more detailed understandings of the inner workings of intergovernmen-
tal organizations have challenged traditional definitions of transnational 
actors as private, non-state actors affecting global politics. Under tradi-
tional definitions, key transnational actors in relation to social protection 
in the Global South include firms, Churches and missionaries, trade 
unions and other non-governmental organizations. However, scholars 
such as Cronin (2002) illustrate how attention to the way in which UN 
agencies approach policy implementation across countries swiftly blurs 
the boundaries IR scholars have established between intergovernmen-
talism and transnationalism. Whether through contracting non- 
governmental organizations or consultants, creating expert advisory 
groups, facilitating trainings and capacity building or accepting funding 
from large philanthropic foundations, these activities regularly involve 
parties beyond governments alone. The need to work with and through 
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non-governmental agencies is even emphasized in the current 2030 
Agenda which aims to “encourage and promote effective public, public- 
private and civil society partnerships” arrangements (United Nations 
General Assembly 2017, 21), including in the implementation of social 
protection arrangements. In sum, while the governance mechanisms 
underpinning intergovernmental and private transnational actors may 
differ, the way in which these entities act and approach social policy 
implementation across borders may be much more similar than different. 
For this reason, it is important to recognize transnational actors as a 
group that is broader than and distinct from the governance arrange-
ments that underpin them.
Second, the behavior of transnational actors is often difficult to char-
acterize and predict. As illustrated above, transnational actors are autono-
mous entities capable of exercising agency and taking purposive action 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004). This enables transnational actors to act 
not only in the interest of their members states as recognized by political 
scientists but also according to their own interests. It also enables them to 
play a particularly influential role in establishing global norms and fixing 
meanings (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). As a result of their dual politi-
cal character, transnational actors may begin to decouple what they say 
and do about a given policy problem, resulting in incoherence (Bromley 
and Powell 2012; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Decoupling may happen 
unintentionally, particularly in situations where there is a lack of clarity 
or internal disagreement on the interests of a given transnational actor. 
Alternatively, transnational actors, such as the World Bank (Weaver 
2008), may engage in organized hypocrisy (Brunsson 2002, 2007), or the 
utilization of decoupling as part of a strategy for managing a diverse range 
of interests. This can make it difficult to discern whether changes in the 
discourse on social protection among transnational actors bear a relation 
to substantive policy changes (Shriwise et al. forthcoming).
The dualistic nature of transnational actors, which are mutually consti-
tuted on the one hand and yet able to act autonomously on the other, is 
explained differently by sociologists, political scientists and IR scholars. 
Sociologists tend to view transnational actors as embedded within sys-
tems of global cultural production (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 
1997), or a mutually constitutive process where “actors are treated not as 
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unanalyzed ‘givens’ but as entities constructed and motivated by enveloping 
frames (Jepperson 1992)” (Boli and Thomas 1997, 172). From this view, 
transnational actors are defined by their unique blend of constituent 
frames; by extension, this literature places “the institutional character of 
transnational development front and center” (Boli and Thomas 1997, 
172). The institutions at the heart of global cultural production are pre-
sumed to be universally valid and applicable across nation states, and the 
transnational actors embedded within this mutually constitutive system 
are considered impervious to vested interests, or more simply put, as 
“objective disinterested others” (Meyer et al. 1997, 160).
Systems of global cultural production also result in the emergence and 
institutionalization of global norms through an iterative process of inter- 
organizational exchange predominantly between states, intergovernmen-
tal organizations and international non-governmental organizations 
(Kentikelenis and Seabrooke 2017; Babb 2013; Babb and Chorev 2016; 
Chorev 2012; Halliday and Carruthers 2007). Global social policy schol-
ars have long recognized the politics inherent in these exchanges (e.g. 
Deacon et al. 1997 and more recently Kaasch 2013), with a recent focus 
on how international organizations construct social policy proposals 
(Berten and Leisering 2016). In the case of social protection, the exchange 
of policy ideas between international organizations has resulted in the 
emergence of models, or micro-paradigms, of social cash transfers, repre-
senting what von Gliszczynski and Leisering (2016, 325) refer to as a 
“fragmented and incomplete universalism”. In other cases, transnational 
actors produce policy scripts for countries to follow in order to achieve 
nationally and internationally agreed aims, goals and targets; in the case 
of the International Monetary Fund, evidence suggests that the 
 implementation of scripts focused on various aspects of economic policy 
have had substantial and long-lasting effects on social protection systems 
in the Global South (Kentikelenis and Seabrooke 2017; Kentikelenis 
et  al. 2014, 2016; Kentikelenis 2017; Kentikelenis and Papanicolas 
2011). The global diffusion of these policies is thought to take place 
through a number of mechanisms (Dobbin et al. 2007), and in the case 
of social protection in the Global South, to be driven by a unique set of 
factors, including jobless agrarianization, heterogeneous political paths 
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amid a range of democratic and autocratic regimes, and shifts in the 
global ideational context (Böger and Leisering 2018).
While sociologists examining systems of global cultural production 
view nation states as simply another actor defined by its unique set of 
constituent frames, political scientists and IR scholars recognize that 
national and transnational actors have different resource bases, interests, 
capabilities, histories and governance structures that result in power asym-
metries. The key insight here is that some actors have played a more influ-
ential role than others in shaping the institutional context in which 
strategic interactions take place. For instance, many national actors in the 
Global North played an active role in shaping the UN system after World 
War II, while formerly dependent territories throughout the Global South 
were instead strongly shaped by notions of sovereignty practiced and per-
petuated by this system. Further still, the asymmetries that persist within 
the international system enable some actors to influence the shape of 
global institutions themselves—or to change the rules of the game—more 
than others, resulting in distinct advantages in situations where coopera-
tion is desired (Axelrod and Keohane 1985).
For political scientists and IR scholars, transnational actors are con-
stituent parts of global institutions, defined as “persistent and connected 
sets of rules that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations” (Keohane 1988, 386). They can be understood in multiple 
ways. Realist view transnational actors as epiphenomena or as represen-
tations of the current balance of power (Strange 1982). This view sug-
gests that powerful, self-interested, rational actors dictate the structure 
of global institutions and the transnational actors within them, not the 
other way round. Simply put, many realists see transnational actors as 
“merely instruments of governments, and therefore unimportant in their 
own right” (Keohane and Nye 1974). A slightly modified realist perspec-
tive is that transnational actors may matter in their own right and prove 
to be more robust over time when they facilitate and support coordina-
tion of an issue area in a way that aligns with the interests of powerful 
states (Krasner 1982). Finally, transnational actors may be viewed as 
embedded within a socio-political environment where repeated patterns 
of behavior result in the emergence of norms that shape and constrain 
the behavior of actors (Ruggie 1982). While much more aligned with 
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sociological understandings of global institutions, these scholars recog-
nize the extent to which global norms both constitute and are consti-
tuted by powerful actors, but with a greater stress on the influence of 
national actors. In other words, the international order itself is an insti-
tutional formation in which transnational actors serve as key pillars that 
uphold asymmetries and guarantee key functions in line with the inter-
ests of powerful nation states over time (Ikenberry 2018; 
Huntington 1973).
Within this context, the set of global institutions in a particular issue 
area have been referred to across disciplines as regimes, or “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making pro-
cedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations” (Krasner 1982, 186). This approach has been 
applied to welfare as an issue area, both by Esping-Andersen (1990) in 
his seminal classification of welfare state regimes in the Global North 
and by Wood and Gough (2006) who extended this work on a global 
scale. Wood and Gough (2006, 1708) argue that countries can be clas-
sified as belonging predominantly to one of three types of welfare 
regimes: welfare state regimes, informal security regimes or insecurity 
regimes depending on their degree of de-clientelization, or “the process 
of de-linking client dependents from their personalized, arbitrary and 
discretionary entrapment to persons with intimate power over them”. 
While this work recognizes that welfare regimes may “spill over national 
boundaries” (Wood and Gough 2006, 1707) and that multiple welfare 
regimes may be layered within one country, it falls short of applying a 
transnational lens to the historical emergence of welfare institutions 
from the perspective of countries in the Global South, giving this typol-
ogy more descriptive than explanatory power. Furthermore, the way in 
which this work extends an institutional approach to welfare devised 
for rich countries on a global scale divorces an understanding of welfare 
regimes in the Global South from their micro-foundations. This runs 
the risk of obscuring rather than clarifying the nature of social policy 
dynamics in these countries, particularly from the perspective of 
the domestic and indigenous actors within them.
Finally, political scientists recognize the role of ideas in relation to 
global institutions and policymaking beyond the establishment of norms 
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alone (Béland 2005). As illustrated by Lavers and Hickey (2016, 391), 
“comparative analysis of social protection interventions in developing 
countries suggests that ideology has played a significant role, including 
popular attitudes on who deserves assistance (Graham 2002) and ideas 
around the responsibility of the state towards its citizens (Hickey 2012)”. 
Furthermore, ideas are inextricably linked to policy implementation pref-
erences and approaches (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2007), with 
implications for the kinds of policy change the introduction of social 
protection arrangements  represents (Hall 1993). Within the realm of 
social protection, these debates have centered largely on whether condi-
tional or unconditional cash transfers are most appropriate, which mem-
ber of the household should receive such transfers and whether health, 
education and broader forces such as climate change should be consid-
ered as integral to social protection arrangements.
In sum, transnational actors appear to be chameleons. Their behavior 
may be neither coherent nor unitary. They may act independently in line 
with their own interests or as instruments of powerful nation states, and 
they may also act in line with broader institutional norms and practices 
over time. While being influential and present across countries, their 
presence is not enough to assume that they cause or determine social 
policy or welfare outcomes in any one country case. Furthermore, the 
dynamic relationship between transnational actors and global institu-
tions has led both to an interdisciplinary consensus that institutions and 
norms matter (e.g. Hall and Taylor 1996) and also to varying interpreta-
tions of the relationship between transnational actors and global institu-
tions among sociologists on the one hand and political scientists and IR 
scholars on the other.
However, the consensus that global institutions and norms matter has 
obscured two key issues: (1) the way in which transnational actors, 
including intergovernmental organizations, are embedded in national 
and sub-national structures in ways that can affect social protection 
(Tarrow 2001); and (2) the impact of domestic actors and conditions on 
the emergence of social protection arrangements. These problems are rep-
resentative of the way in which methodological nationalism has affected 
the examination of social protection across disciplines, where nation 
states were reified as equal containers and reduced to unitary actors in the 
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international order. This is particularly problematic when it comes to 
understanding policymaking in the Global South, where asymmetries 
between external and domestic as well as indigenous actors have had criti-
cal, at times detrimental, and potentially long-lasting effects on the state 
of social protection dating back to colonialism. There are exceptions to 
the rule, such as research examining the domestic politics of social protec-
tion arrangements in emerging economies in Latin American (Huber and 
Stephens 2012). However, substantial gaps remain in properly joining up 
the micro-foundations of policymaking at the level of actors within coun-
tries in the Global South with what is known about transnational actors 
and global institutions across disciplines. The question then remains: 
How can transnational approaches help scholarship move beyond meth-
odological nationalism and strengthen its micro-foundations so as not to 
perpetuate global institutional and ideational determinism when seeking 
to explain social protection arrangements in the Global South?
 From Context to Causation: Analyzing 
Transnational Actor Constellations
To better understand the transnational policymaking dynamics under-
pinning social protection arrangements, one useful tactic is to move one 
level below institutions, both global and national, and to focus instead on 
the transnational actor constellations affecting social protection from the 
perspective of countries in the Global South. A transnational actor con-
stellation can be defined as a group or network of actors involved in 
policy interactions that either includes transnational actors or is impacted 
substantially by transnational relationships, with the assumption that “a 
thorough understanding of the underlying constellation is an essential 
precondition for the explanation and prediction of interaction outcomes” 
(Scharpf 1997, 16). While every actor or relational element that consti-
tutes an actor constellation need not be transnational, the presence of 
transnational actors and relations that affect the dynamic of these con-
stellations is what identifies them as transnational. Equally, it should be 
2 Advancing Transnational Approaches to Social Protection… 
32
noted that a transnational approach is defined by consideration of the 
possibility of transnational actors and relationships being substantial 
elements of a policy process; if neither of these criteria proves to be true 
empirically, the relevant actor constellation might best be described as 
national or global or urban, depending on definitions and empirics. In 
these cases, the consideration that actor constellations may be transna-
tional amounts to necessary due diligence in line with what is expected 
from working hypotheses and the possibilities suggested by existing 
literature.
At least two analytical challenges appear when using transnational 
actor constellations as a unit of analysis: identifying the actors and deter-
mining causation. Developing strong criteria for actor identification is 
critical, not least because it shapes the data and information considered 
when describing transnational actor constellations from the outset and 
subsequently the findings and conclusions that can be drawn concerning 
their dynamics. Current literature on global social policy provides actor 
matrices that can be used as deductive frames for identifying key actors 
involved in social policymaking to avoid biasing analyses based on data 
availability and available literature. Building on the work of Esping- 
Andersen (1990), both Wood and Gough (2006, 1701) as well as Yeates 
(2001) recognize the importance of considering both domestic and trans-
national actors and institutions central to the operation of states, mar-
kets, communities and families in order to understand the social policy 
dynamics within countries across the Global South. For the purpose of 
identifying actors relevant for social protection, these deductive frames 
should be as inclusive as possible, and when key actors and institutions 
not previously considered are found to have causal effects on social pro-
tection arrangements, these new elements should be incorporated into 
future deductive frames.
Determining how to understand causation within these constellations 
is a much more difficult matter. While the study of transnational phe-
nomena has been largely interdisciplinary, it has also been described as 
“‘undisciplined’ in its use of diverse concepts, theories and literature. … 
Besides a few exceptions … shared theoretical frameworks or concepts on 
transnational processes across the subfields are comparably lacking” (Go 
and Krause 2016, 6). Indeed, understandings of the dynamics of these 
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constellations are likely to differ according to disciplinary understandings 
of the relationship between transnational actors and global institutions as 
discussed above. Furthermore, as highlighted by Obinger et  al. (2013, 
121), “comparative welfare state research has only recently begun to sys-
tematically study relational policy processes”. In this area, transnational 
legal scholarship has parallels with social policy in the way it is conceptu-
alizing transnational processes. Koh (2006, 745–746) suggests that law is 
either downloaded from international to domestic law, uploaded from 
domestic law to international law or horizontally transferred from one 
national system to another. This aligns closely with the concluding obser-
vation from Obinger et al. (2013, 124) that “the systematic combination 
of processes of horizontal spatial interdependencies with vertical relation-
ships between international and supranational institutions and their 
member states … is perhaps the biggest challenge for future research”. As 
a unit of analysis, transnational actor constellations bring these processes 
and their component parts into focus in order to better understand their 
dynamics.
There is a plethora of information on country experiences in relation 
to social protection in the Global South from intergovernmental organi-
zations, international non-governmental organizations, think tanks, con-
sultancies, country reports and academic literature. However, all too 
frequently, case studies attribute their unique or distinguishing features 
to differences in country context, without a serious and detailed explora-
tion of what this means and what, if any, theoretical implications these 
claims have. To break through this impasse, it will be necessary for global 
social policy scholarship: (1) to continue to develop a coherent and plu-
ralistic discourse on the theoretical and conceptual frameworks being 
used to support the analysis of transnational actor constellations with 
respect to social policy in the Global South; and (2) for case studies to be 
both better harnessed and more specifically designed to contribute to 
theoretical and conceptual development.
Process tracing supports the discovery and re-construction of how pol-
icy dynamics play out in practice. Within the context of transnational 
actor constellations, tracing the development and implementation of 
social protection arrangements can contribute both to theory-building 
and, in carefully selected cases, to theory testing (Beach 2016). Ulriksen 
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and Dadalauri (2016, 223) illustrate how well-designed single case studies 
can “contribute to the testing and modification of solid theoretical frame-
works undertaken through a rigorous research design that ensures sub-
stantial empirical leverage and constructive conclusions”. The use of case 
studies in this way is both possible and important for at least two related 
reasons. First, using process tracing in a single, most crucial case (Gerring 
2007) provides a means of evaluating “theoretically specified causal 
mechanisms that link variables in a comprehensive and temporal expla-
nation of interesting societal phenomena” (Ulriksen and Dadalauri 2016, 
225). While this use of case studies should complement and cannot 
replace testing focused on explaining variance between an independent 
and dependent variable, confirming and specifying the causal mecha-
nisms at play has implications for policy practice. Uncovering causal 
mechanisms within a transnational actor constellation with regard to 
social protection provides policymakers with critical information and 
perspective about the context in which they are operating and  can, at 
best, enable them to respond with agility and ingenuity to challenges and 
barriers. Moreover, if policymakers are better informed and able to act on 
the best available knowledge, their experiences are also better able to 
inform theoretical development, creating a much more productive and 
mutually beneficial relationship between academic research and pol-
icy practice with respect to social protection.
 Conclusion
Across disciplines, scholars have focused increasingly on the ways in 
which transnational dynamics have affected social protection in the 
Global South. Together, research across disciplines suggests that social 
protection arrangements in the Global South will be: pluralistic; non- 
statist, but may include state actors; dynamic and mutually constitutive; 
and normative. While a transnational approach is not a substitute or 
replacement for a focus on national actors and domestic conditions, it 
draws attention to the role of transnational actors in social policymaking, 
encouraging critical engagement and examination of their behavior and 
activities. Literature from across disciplines reveals that these actors 
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appear to be chameleons. Their behavior may not be coherent or unitary, 
and they may behave in line with their own interests or as instruments of 
powerful nation states that govern them. Examination of these actors and 
the ways in which they impact and are impacted by global institutions 
has resulted in an interdisciplinary consensus that global institutions and 
norms matter. However, the methodological nationalism inherent in 
much of this work has masked the relationship between global institu-
tions and norms and national and sub-national environments and struc-
tures as well as the impact of domestic actors and conditions on the 
emergence of social protection arrangements.
Identifying and analyzing transnational actor constellations is one way 
of encouraging the development of stronger micro-foundations in global 
social policy research in order to gain a much more specific understand-
ing of the interplay between external actors and domestic conditions 
when it comes to social protection. As policies have proven to ‘work’ in 
some country contexts and not in others, policymakers and academics 
alike continue to espouse the need to tailor and adapt policies to their 
particular political and institutional contexts, and this rightly remains a 
hallmark of global policymaking to date. However, this leaves a critical 
theoretical and practical gap, as attention to context does not help to 
determine causality. Given the inherently interdisciplinary nature of 
global social policy research, it is critical that scholars continue to develop 
a coherent and pluralistic discourse on the theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks being used to analyze transnational actor constellations and 
social protection arrangements in the Global South. Within this frame, 
the plethora of information on country cases and social protection can be 
better harnessed, and carefully designed case studies and process tracing 
can be conducted in ways that can help to build, revise and test theories. 
This is a necessary complement to cross-country quantitative research, as 
thorough and more specific understandings of the dynamics of transna-
tional actor constellations are critical to informing policy practice, and 
ideally by extension, to enhancing social protection. From a theoretical 
standpoint, the study of transnational actor constellations in relation to 
social protection can promote a better understanding of the relational 
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elements underpinning social protection arrangements in the Global 
South, which has been identified as “perhaps the biggest challenge for 
future research” (Obinger et al. 2013, 124).
Understanding social policy from a transnational perspective is becom-
ing increasingly important in the context of the 2030 Agenda. The ways 
in which social protection is affected by cross-border social problems, 
ranging from disease to migration to environmental degradation, is dem-
onstrated on an almost daily basis. Broader understandings of the trans-
national could advance global social governance  and policymaking by 
illuminating the relationships and divisions between intergovernmental 
and transnational governance mechanisms. Looking at how both of these 
sets of governance mechanisms impact each other with regard to social 
rights, redistribution and regulation may lead to particularly insightful 
findings related to social protection. Also, the chameleon-like behavior of 
transnational actors makes them an intriguing focal point for interdisci-
plinary researchers, as they present conceptual and analytical challenges 
that appear to defy explanation from the dispositions of sociologists as 
well as political scientists and IR scholars alone. Such work is of critical 
and timely importance. Theory-driven research, in addition to being 
important in its own right, has the potential to better inform policy prac-
tice and to support efforts to ensure that no one is left behind when it 
comes to social protection.
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It is often said that the Cold War was a battle of hearts and minds—a 
conflict between two rival models for society battling to become the legit-
imate and preferred horizon of the future for people. Whereas the Iron 
Curtain during the early Cold War remained a stable line of division 
through Europe, for emerging countries outside Europe the battle was 
more intense and open. This was not least the case in formerly colonized 
countries. Following the Communist victory in China in 1949, US 
policy- makers certainly considered South East Asia (SEA) a Cold War 
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hotspot and a pivotal case for containing the spread of Communism 
(Westad 2017).
Cold War studies have focused mainly on military aspects, foreign 
policies and various forms of cultural diplomacy. Less attention has been 
directed toward the links between the Cold War and welfare state devel-
opment. Obinger and Schmitt (2011) showed that systemic competition 
is one important explanatory factor for the growth in social spending in 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)-world since 1945. However, we still know very little about the 
mechanisms behind this (for a discussion, see Petersen 2013). In this 
chapter, we scrutinize the ways in which Western actors integrated social 
reforms as part of an anti-Communist strategy in SEA and how this was 
reflected in the domestic context. We will notably consider the actions of 
Britain, the US and the International Labour Office.
One of the classical explanations of the origins of the welfare state 
considers social reforms as a bulwark against social unrest and revolution-
ary movements. Social policy mitigated the socio-political effects of eco-
nomic and industrial changes and ensured political consensus and 
legitimation (Spitzer 1962). This anti-revolutionary strategy triggered 
reforms even in the colonies (Seekings 2011; see Schmitt, Chap. 6, this 
volume), playing an important role also in the Cold War. Social reforms 
were an effective way to hamper Communism and other revolutionary 
movements, legitimizing the existing power relations and building state 
structures. IR-scholar Klaus Knorr picked up this point already in 1950; 
speaking mainly to an US audience, Knorr presented the European wel-
fare state and ended up arguing for it as a domestic defense strategy:
it is plausible that the democratic welfare state is the most constructive 
defense of the free world against Communist expansion, for it offers to 
many societies, rightly or wrongly dissatisfied with the free-enterprise 
economy they had, an alternative to the attractions of Communism. 
(Knorr 1950, 448)
As we will argue, the early social security and welfare reforms in SEA 
were no stranger to these considerations. This line of argumentation does 
not exclude competing explanations on welfare state growth, such as 
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modernization and democratization. On the contrary, in the 1950s mod-
ernization discourses provided the theoretical and political tools for 
Western interventions and state-building (Gilman 2003). Modernization, 
social security and political stabilization complemented the struggle 
against Communism in the area. Cold War was a crosscutting moment of 
competition, which affected or triggered social reforms. The Cold War 
led to reconsidering social reforms as part of modernization strategies, 
state-building and the anti-Communist struggle. Domestic policy- 
makers either agreed upon or made use of reform agendas, to carry on 
their own political agendas which often had a nationalistic and Socialist 
bend that did not necessarily fit with the goals and economic paradigms 
of the Western powers.
Recent trends in Cold War historiography have focused on the inter-
play of the two superpowers with other international and regional actors 
(Westad 2005, 2017; Bradley 2010). Similarly, we consider the interac-
tion of Western interests and the emerging non-Communist ruling classes 
in the two former Southeast Asian colonies of Burma and Malaysia. Both 
countries shared a common British colonial heritage and there, according 
to some observers of the time, “labor movements were comparatively well 
delineated before the war and [where] subsequent conditions have com-
bined to further their growth. […] At the present time Malaya and Burma 
have the only labor movements in the area worthy of the name” 
(Thompson 1947, 14). While the decolonization was the historical con-
text of these reforms, the local and international policy-makers operated 
within two different institutional frameworks, as Burma was indepen-
dent since 1947, while Malaya gained independence only ten years later. 
The common ground of social security reforms was rather geopolitical 
concerns connected to the Cold War.
The chapter looks at how the new international paradigms of “social 
security” were introduced in SEA and inspired both Western experts and 
local policy-makers to projects of state-building. During and immedi-
ately after the war, indeed, the Western powers, the newly born United 
Nations and the ILO contributed to put “social security” at the very 
foundations of reconstruction policies (ILO 1944). Welfare state devel-
opment in Burma and Malaysia was structured by a number of factors, of 
which anti-Communism was only one (others being ethnic cleavages, 
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religion, political parties, economic growth or state capacity). Yet, the 
idea of social welfare reforms became integrated into the Cold War strug-
gle for hearts and minds.1 Our study connects to the ongoing debate 
about colonial legacies in social policy development (see Cooper 1996; 
Eckert 2006). However, whereas this strand of literature emphasizes the 
variations among former Western colonies, we argue that the Cold War 
was a crosscutting factor that put social reforms on the agenda and influ-
enced the timing of reform.
However, this is not meant to say that the Western powers spoke with 
one voice or acted in unison in this respect. Especially in the US the “wel-
fare state” did not have a good press, labeled as “Socialism”, and in 1951 
President Truman declared it a “scare word” (Petersen 2013, 231). Even 
among the advocates of a socio-economic soft-power strategy we find a 
conflict between those, like the US State Department, favoring economic 
growth and modernization, and others (like the ILO) with a broader 
reform agenda, including social security. The social reforms in Malaysia 
were still promoted by the British under the paradigms and rules of colo-
nial development. On the contrary, the US—and to a certain extent the 
ILO—already framed their aid and assistance to Burma in a post-colonial 
understanding of socio-economic development. SEA was therefore also 
the ground for a competition between the various Western actors; the 
ILO’s assistance programs were in line with US President Truman’s doc-
trine on foreign aid, whereas Britain did not look favorably at the inter-
ferences of the international organizations in its dependent territories. 
These perspectives were not necessarily mutually exclusive; often the 
rhetoric of development complemented the promotion of social security 
schemes and other social services.
The chapter starts with a comparative overview of the geopolitical con-
ditions under which Burma and Malaysia gained independence and with 
the importance of the perceived Communist threat in shaping their insti-
tutional and political settings. In the following section, we discuss how 
1 In this chapter, we decided to consider exclusively the former British colonies, except for the 
Indian case, which should be dealt separately. In order to stress the Anglo-American strategy with 
regard to the nexus Cold War/welfare state during decolonization, we also left out the case of 
French colonies. Anyway we intend to deal more systematically with this subject with further stud-
ies on the field.
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Western anti-Communist strategies in SEA entailed different approaches, 
including economic aid, industrialization and social reform. These even-
tually came to define a Western way of promoting a model of develop-
ment to counter the spread of Communism in the area. In the third 
section, we briefly look at the major social reforms introduced in both 
countries, to assess the way in which they might be framed as anti- 
Communist policies. Finally, we draw some conclusions on how welfare 
social policies became part of a strategy allowing for a progressive non- 
Communist strategy that signaled an anti-colonialist third-way position 
between Communism and US capitalism. We base our analysis on a 
mixed bag of sources: archival documents and published sources, such as 
academic articles and studies by contemporary observers and scholars. 
We will use this literature as a primary source to account for the Western 
takes on the “e base question” in SEA, which was interwoven with the rise 
of Communism in the context of decolonization.2
 Burma and Malaysia: From British Colonies 
to Independent States
World War II (WWII) signaled a watershed for the process of decoloniza-
tion. The war fueled nationalism in the colonies and weakened the colo-
nial powers. In the Atlantic Charter (1941, §3), Churchill and Roosevelt 
promised “to respect the right of all people to choose the form of govern-
ment under which they will live”, and these ideas were echoed by De 
Gaulle at the Brazzaville Conference of 1944. In the following years, the 
United Nations became a platform for decolonization debates; the UN 
Charter (Chapter IX, articles 73–74) defended the right to self- 
determination, and served as a platform for national liberation move-
ments, denouncing colonial powers (see Jensen 2016). The process of 
decolonization varied from country to country. In most cases, the Cold 
2 For interpretive and practical reasons, we focus on Anglo-American views and strategies concern-
ing the use of social security in Burma and Malaysia, rather than on the systematic tracing of the 
policy process behind reforms within the two countries.
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War framed and influenced the path to independence, and the two coun-
tries under scrutiny make no exception.
Burma had been a British colony since 1886; the British made Burma 
an Indian province that experienced a period of economic growth and 
modernization. However, as this was mainly to the benefit of British 
companies and migrant communities from India or Britain, it triggered a 
nationalist movement in Burma, resulting in growing social and political 
unrest. In 1937, Burma again separated from India and was granted a 
constitution with a fully elected assembly. However, this did neither end 
the nationalist striving for independence nor the conflicts with the 
British. One of the driving forces of the protest was the strong Burmese 
Communist movement whose ranks were swollen during the Japanese 
occupation. Granting independence to Burma in 1947 was mainly the 
result of British problems with controlling the situation in the colony, 
and, as the country did not join the Commonwealth, direct British influ-
ence in Burma was limited.
The 1947 constitution included a Western-style liberal democratic 
parliament and political system, with a welfare-statist outlook including 
ideas of economic planning, state ownership of public utilities, while still 
guaranteeing private business (Trager 1958, 4–5). In the British House of 
Lords the new constitution was labeled as a blueprint for the develop-
ment of a welfare state:
The new Constitution of Burma […] proclaims a more varied list of indi-
vidual rights, both male and female, than the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man or the Constitution of the United States of America and its accep-
tance of the duties of the State to secure the fulfilment of these rights is in 
complete accordance with the modern view of the functions of a wel-
fare state.3
However, the realization of these promises of a welfare state future was 
not easily achieved, due to internal political conflicts, lack of resources 
and a weak state (Taylor 1987, Chap. 4). Burma witnessed political 
3 HMSO, Burma Independence Bill, 25 November 1947, vol. 152 cc. 846–924, London, 1947. 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1947/nov/25/burma-independence-bill# 
S5LV0152P0_19471125_HOL_58.
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 turmoil and domestic rebellions by Communist and ethnic groups that 
threatened the basic functions of the state—and at the same time called 
for a positive political reform agenda to strengthen the legitimacy of the 
politically dominant Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL)—a 
Socialist coalition of anti-colonial movements. Aung San, the leader of 
the Burmese independence movement, was a former Communist who 
had turned increasingly nationalistic and cooperated with the Japanese 
during the war. In the spring of 1945 he founded the AFPFL together 
with the Burmese Communist Party.
Burmese non-alignment was driven more by domestic factors than 
idealism. Anti-colonialism was widespread in Burma, something also 
clearly stated by numerous reports by British and US intelligence agen-
cies, and neutralism allowed the government to demonstrate its indepen-
dence of Western powers (Than 2013). This emphasis on Burmese 
independence appealed to Socialists within the government, workers and 
the rural population, and defended the government against Communist 
accusations of being Anglo-American puppets. The Burmese govern-
ments were thus in a difficult situation, as foreign aid was very much 
needed but almost impossible to accept. A Commonwealth loan of 1950 
was never used, and in 1954 Burma declined assistance through the 
Colombo-Plan (Adeleke 2004).
Things turned out differently in Malaysia. From the late nineteenth 
century on the country had gradually become part of the British Empire. 
Growing exports of rubber and tin supported the economy but also 
fueled nationalist protests, as the economic development benefitted 
mainly British and immigrant groups. During WWII Malaya was occu-
pied by Japan. The defeat of the British Empire contributed to the grow-
ing anti-colonial sentiments, and the occupation had strong negative 
effects on rubber and tin production, leaving the Malaysian economy in 
a bad shape.
Malaysian independence was more troublesome, and divorce from the 
colonizers took a long time. After the defeat of Japan in 1945, colonial 
rule was restored. British initiatives for democratic reform triggered wide-
spread protest from the Malay population, as the reform granted citizen-
ship and equal rights also to Chinese and Indian residents. Consequently, 
in 1948, the idea of universal citizenship was given up, and political 
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 turmoil turned into open insurrection; from 1948 to 1960 the British 
and the Commonwealth armies were engaged in guerrilla warfare against 
the Communist insurgency triggered by the Malayan National Liberation 
Army (MNLA), the military arm of the Malaysian Communist 
Party (MCP).
The timing of the social legislation reforms in Malaysia followed this 
change of the British strategy against the MNLA, opening up to political 
and social enhancement to win both the “hearts” (the emotional support 
of the people) and the “minds” (the consensus of the people motivated by 
“rational self-interest”). Even though the threat of Communism (and 
Communist China) remained a factor in the country, the British suc-
ceeded with establishing an inter-ethnic and mildly reformist “Alliance”, 
built around the dominating party, United Malays National Organization 
(UMNO), with the non-Communist Malayan Chinese Association 
(MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) participating. They 
won the national elections of 1955 and formed the first government after 
independence in 1957. Immediately after independence, though, revolts 
by MNLA insurgents went on until 1989, but mostly these were local 
outbreaks, increasingly characterized by ethnical claims (Boon 
Kheng 2009).
Burma and Malaysia differed in size and economic capacity but also 
shared many characteristics. Being former British colonies close to China 
and following a non-alignment policy in international affairs (more pro-
nounced in Burma than in Malaysia), the countries were dominated by 
agriculture and had limited state capacity. Politically, both countries 
became dominated by party-alliances growing out of the struggle for 
independence and uniting both nationalist and Socialist groups. Both 
countries engaged in strategies for economic modernization and the 
development of industrial production.
In the 1940s and 1950s they also developed ambitious social reform 
agendas. Even if not fully realized, they included the gradual expansion 
of social protection schemes inspired by social security as well as land 
reforms, educational reforms and developing industrial relations. In the 
long run, the goal was to start a genuine process of modernization; in the 
short run, these plans and the promises they made served to limit the 
Communist appeal to the national publics. As argued by Dean (1950, 
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200), the military security outlook of the US and British policy-makers 
aligned well with these domestic goals: “For if the Asian nations, still as a 
low level of development, are now to devote their meager resources to the 
building up of a war machine, will this not mean the indefinite postpone-
ment of the economic and social improvements which, in their opinion, 
would prove the only effective bulwark against Communism?” (see also 
Chancellor 1951 for a similar argument).
In both countries, the Communists had played important roles in the 
struggle for independence, and the parties participated in democratic 
elections and had regional influence. Likewise, the local ruling parties 
had a clearly—but not always outspoken—anti-Communist profile. This 
was also recognized by American and British observers. The foreign pol-
icy doctrine of non-alignment (especially in Burma) left the door open 
for cooperation with both China and the USSR, while both AFPFL in 
Burma and the “Alliance” in Malaysia had moderate Socialist platforms at 
home. Yet, Communism was generally considered a threat in terms of the 
stability and legitimacy of the state by both parties. It was considered a 
possible competitor for the support of the industrial working class, small- 
scale farmers and intellectuals.
In Burma, the first years of independence were characterized by strong 
political and military conflicts between rivaling Communist and ethnic 
groups (Taylor 1987). Following the Communist victory in China in 
1949, the northern areas of Burma were controlled by Kuomintang 
troops and consequently attracted the attention of both China and the 
US.  Until the early 1950s, rebelling Communist groups controlled 
northern parts of the country, resulting in direct military conflicts with 
government troops. However, the Communists also appeared as a legal 
party, as competitors to AFPFL on the domestic parliamentary scene. 
The Burmese governments thus had the triple task of controlling the 
state, modernizing the country, ensuring the unity of the Burmese terri-
tory. Political turmoil in Burma led to the establishment of a military 
regime in 1962, led by Ne Win and his Burma Socialist Program Party, 
advocating the “Burmese way to Socialism”. With the introduction of a 
one-party regime Burma was lost for democracy for the coming decades.
The “Malaysian Emergency” was instead a major anti-colonial guerilla 
warfare, where Communist stances mixed with ethnic rivalries; the 
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MNLA was mainly mobilizing the ethnic and unassimilated Chinese 
minority (almost 38% of the population) but also some ethnic Malayans. 
However, the insurgency did not ground on merely ethnic bases, as the 
MNLA proselytized among the rural lower classes and the dispossessed. 
The rebellion spread outside the great cities and had in the countryside 
and jungle the material bases where to develop. The MNLA mainly 
attacked infrastructure, rubber plantations and tin industries, which con-
stituted the framework of Malaysian economy, also directly affecting 
British economic interests. Albeit the insurgency never stepped up into a 
mass uprising, it turned out as an escalade of insurgent incidents that 
reached their peak in 1951–1952, when the rebellion lost momentum 
(Komer 1972).
The British stick-and-carrot response aimed at separating the rebels 
from their social basis. The British operated coercive measures such as 
resettlement and food control, while launching programs for improving 
social services and living standards in the most underdeveloped areas, 
which were implemented from 1950 onward. These included the support 
of inter-ethnic national trade unions, educational reform and a thorough 
plan of social security, comprehensive of social insurances, healthcare, 
regulation of working hours and public housing (Mackenzie 1952). 
Alongside social reform the government passed, under the supervision of 
the British colonial offices, several projects of economic development and 
planning, such as the Rural Industrial Development Authority and the 
Draft Development Plan, which introduced elements of Keynesian plan-
ning and favored the growth of public social services through a policy of 
investments (Rudner 1972).
 The Western Actors and the Anti-Communist 
Strategies in South East Asia: Economic 
Development and Social Security
SEA quickly became a hotspot of the Cold War. Communist China, the 
US-led rebuilding of Japan and the Korean War (1950–1953) signaled 
the importance of the region for the superpowers. US analysts  particularly 
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saw in the Communist seizure of power the beginning of a Communist 
offensive in the region to be countered through “the necessary combina-
tion of political and military means” (Sacks 1950, 247). The American 
government kept the position acquired in the Pacific during WWII in 
order to control the spread of Communism. According to the “domino 
theory”, the collapse of non-Communist regimes in Burma and Malaysia 
and their turning toward the Socialist bloc would cause a serious threat to 
US security interests: “If Burma or Indochina can be held against 
communism, we can probably hold all of Southeast Asia. If either Burma 
or Indochina falls, Siam would probably follow, and Southeast Asia 
would be practically defenseless against the onrush of communism.”4 
Consequently, the Western powers closely monitored domestic develop-
ments in SEA countries. The major powers shared an interest in stabilizing 
the new democracies and in fighting the threat of Communism, leading 
to a high level of coordination and sharing of information.5
The American experts were aware of the relevancy of the “social ques-
tion” to understand the spread of Communism in the area and the multi- 
faceted quests for social enhancement and higher standards of living 
among the local population (Thompson and Adloff 1950). For this rea-
son, the Western policy advisors stressed the importance to carry on a 
state-building process through circumscribed social services (mostly 
healthcare and limited measures of social protection) and an assisted 
program of development and industrialization. This was supposed to 
ensure the creation of the financial bases for the development of sounder 
welfare states along the Western lines (Mills 1949; Buss 1949).
British ILO civil servant Wilfrid Benson recommended the stabilization 
of the whole area through an incremental social policy including social 
services and healthcare, labor legislations, the creation and support of 
reformist workers’ organizations. By the help of Western aid, these policies 
were supposed to accompany economic development and industrialization 
4 FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6, document 115, ‘Policy Statement prepared in the Department of State, 16 
June 1950’.
5 TNA, Cabinet Papers, CAB 129/29, ‘Survey of Communism in Countries outside the Soviet 
Orbit, 13 September 1948’.
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(see Becker, Chap. 7, this volume). They were of capital importance for 
geopolitical considerations, as “the countries of SEA will be unable to 
play their part in the peace of prosperity of the world without drastic 
improvements in the economic and social life of their peoples. […] The 
change is that the countries will need economic and social assistance 
which can aid their political evolution” (Benson 1947, VIII). He also 
suggested to gradually implement public policies that met the workers’ 
specific social needs and universal social welfare: 
an improved standard of living is one of the essentials for stability in Southeast 
Asia. […] The change would help to close the gap between the employed and 
the rest of the population, and, with that pride which newly won self- 
government can often inspire, the assumption by national governments of 
the direction of social services may lead to an unexpected response in the 
desire of the peoples for higher standards of living. (Benson 1947, X–XI)
However, the implementation of this strategy had to be deployed on a 
case-by-case basis. In Burma, numerous reports underlined the strong 
skepticism against foreign aid and support from the Western powers, 
even though material welfare and social development were needed. As 
stated in a report from the US consul in Rangoon in September 1946 on 
the Burmese government, “they cannot produce rabbits from an empty 
hat”.6 In November 1947, the US chargé in Rangoon pointed out that, 
taking the strong anti-US opinion in Burma into account, the best coun-
teroffensive might be “concrete US assistance maternal and infant welfare 
as the most efficient means of winning the masses”.7 In the following 
months a bilateral agreement between Burma and the US on educational 
exchange was established, while also technical equipment (for civil pur-
poses) was made available.8 In a policy statement by the Department of 
State of June 1950 it was explained that “if this present cabinet can, with 
the help of American technical experts, initiate and successfully carry out 
6 FRUS, 1946, Vol. 8, document 5, ‘Telegram from the Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to 
Department of State, 28 September 1946’. See also document 8, ‘Telegram from the Acting 
Secretary of State to the Chargé in United Kingdom (Gallman), 8 November 1946’.
7 FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6, document 54, ‘Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the Consul 
General at Rangoon, 21 August 1947’.
8 FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6, document 55, ‘Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy 
in Burma, 19 December 1947’.
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a few economic development and public welfare schemes, its policy of 
looking to the US and the Commonwealth for aid might gain popular 
acceptance”.9
The use of technical and material assistance while enhancing national 
traditions in the fight against Communism aligned with the political 
strategy of the Burmese government after the military defeat of the 
Communist rebels in 1950–1951. From the late 1940s on and into the 
1950s there was a growing awareness that the weak Burmese state 
depended on external help, even though, for domestic political reasons, 
Burmese leaders were very reluctant with receiving it.10 On top of this, 
the US (covert) support to the Kuomintang troops in the northern 
regions of Burma did not go down well with the political elite in 
Rangoon.11
The US crusade against Communism in SEA included soft policies 
such as cultural diplomacy and financial aid to covert operations, coop-
eration with authoritarian local leaders and even direct military involve-
ment. The need of social reform was framed within a dominant 
anti-Communist paradigm, and this favored short-term policies typically 
focusing on power relations. This created a trade-off, where the fight for 
security in the short run threatened the long-term goal of stabilizing SEA 
societies. This was acknowledged even by US observers in the early 1960s, 
asking the question: “How effectively has the United States employed its 
power and influence to promote meaningful, economic, and social reform 
in the region?” (Henderson 1963, 260; see also Fifield 1963). The rheto-
ric of “development” stepped up the US strategy of accompanying social 
security with anti-Communism in the area. President Truman, in his 
inaugural message, stated that: “We must embark upon a bold new pro-
gram for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial 
progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped 
areas. […] Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the 
9 FRUS, 1950. Vol. 6, document 115, ‘Policy Statement prepared in the Department of State, 16 
June 1950’.
10 See for example FRUS, 1951, Vol. 8, document 131, ‘Memorandum by the Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1 August 1951’.
11 In the US reports this is a frequent topic: The Burmese leadership points out to this as a fact, the 
US officials deny any support and the debate goes on, creating frustration especially in Rangoon.
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peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against their 
human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies—hunger, mis-
ery, and despair” (Truman 1949, 2).
For Britain, “development” became a key concept in its strategies for 
maintaining the British Empire, now in the form of the Commonwealth, 
and for checking the spread of Communism. The British parliament 
debated Burma and Malaysia on several occasions, including the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1950.12 There was a shared understanding 
that modernization and “a higher standard of life there will do more to 
combat Communism than militarism”.13 However, there was some 
disagreement on the question if British support for colonies (including 
former territories such as Burma) should aim at economic development 
or social welfare (see Schmitt, Chap. 6, this volume). The proponents of 
the former argued that economic growth would lead to growing social 
stability and warned that throwing in social reforms would include an 
economic burden the countries could not bear. This strategy had also the 
advantage of serving British economic interests in these countries as well. 
On the other hand, the advocates of a more welfarist strategy did not 
deny the need for economic development but emphasized the virtues of 
also including social reform:
Let us strengthen our friendship with these people by developing social 
schemes, and at the same time ensuring a more equitable distribution of 
the wealth that is being won in the Colonies. A higher standard of life there 
will do more to combat Communism than militarism. We cannot destroy 
Communism by militarism any more than we can destroy a plague by 
power; it knows no frontiers. But we can destroy an ideology by a better 
and a nobler one.14
Whereas the British came to terms with Burma’s independence and 
sensibility toward outside interference, they could pursue a more active 
strategy in Malaysia where several welfare reforms had been introduced 
12 HMSO, Colonial Development and Welfare Bill, 1950, vol. 480  cc 1135–251. http://hansard.
millbanksystems.com/commons/1950/nov/09/colonial-development-and-welfare-bill.
13 Ivi. § 1176.
14 Ibidem.
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prior to independence in 1957. Britain also acted through the 
Commonwealth, as exemplified by the Colombo-Plan of 1950 (Oakman 
2010). This Australian initiative created a lasting regional organization 
with the purpose of strengthening economic and social development in 
the Asia-Pacific region. The idea of the plans was, according to Adeleke 
(2004, 594), to “resolve the correlation between poverty and commu-
nism”. It allowed the UK (and the US) to assist indirectly through a 
regional organization and served as an element of the regional contain-
ment of Communism (Lowe 2009).
It is important to note, however, that also for Britain military and 
social spending were two competing strategies in securing Asia against 
Communism. In his Security in the Colonies report to the British govern-
ment, General Sir Gerald Templer—the most important advocate of the 
“hearts and minds” strategy in Malaysia—pointed out that:
Apart from the problem of raising money from the Treasury, there is the 
problem of seeing that Colonial territories spend their own money to the 
best effect. Here of course one comes up at once against the old constitu-
tional snag; they can spend it as they please. But there is one aspect of 
public finance in the Colonies which is directly relevant to this Report, and 
that is the conflict between the claims of “welfare” and “law and order”. 
There are two main ways of tackling Communism—economic action, to 
prevent or check it at the source, and police action, to contain or suppress 
it. In the Colonies the emphasis has hitherto been on the first approach, 
which is obviously the only constructive one. But if Malaya had spent on 
law and order a fair proportion of the large sums she was devoting to wel-
fare, the present emergency, with the attendant colossal expenses, might 
well have been avoided. I submit, therefore, that the state of the cold war 
to-day and of our defences against it, may call for a temporary change of 
emphasis. Improving economic conditions do not always mean political 
tranquility; on the contrary, the desire to see improvement accelerated is a 
potent source of unrest. In the process of evolution, the development of 
welfare must not allow the preserving of public order—a primary function 
of the government—to go neglected. The Romans put communications 
and policing first; and it is still true that, unless these are sound, social and 
political development cannot be given full rein. This truth should be driven 
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home, in whatever ways are most appropriate, to Colonial 
administrations.15
The US and Britain were not the only international players advocating 
social reform as a way of achieving socio-political stability. France, the 
other major colonial power in the region, played the Cold War card to 
internationalize its own conflict with the Viet Minh, at the time when the 
Communist Party was seizing power in China. While the British and 
French approaches regarding decolonization changed on a case-by-case 
basis, in the years 1947–1948 both identified the struggle against the 
national liberation movements with the international conflict with 
Communism. This strategy was meant to justify military commitment in 
the area toward the international public opinion and to ensure US 
support.
The contacts between the three Western powers resulted in the attempt 
to establish informal tripartite consultation bodies. They were meant to 
share information and coordinate actions in the area to secure the “free-
dom” of the region, by military assistance and by “favoring the economic 
development and standards of living of the Southern Asian countries. 
[The powers] will jointly carry on the implementation of measures that 
could ensure economic balance and social progress.”16 Eventually, also for 
France the issue of “development”, meant both in its economic (infra-
structures, industry, trade) and social (assistance, social insurances, 
healthcare) aspects, became fundamental for containing Communism. In 
divided Viet Nam, both the French and the Americans promoted eco-
nomic assistance in the 1950s to counter the Communist influence com-
ing from the North. In the words of an analyst of the time, indeed, “with 
the achievement of independence, political stability and the beginnings 
of economic development in the south, there is every reason to believe 
that unity, when it comes, will be established on nationalist and not on 
Communist terms” (Hammer 1957, 235).
15 TNA, Cabinet Papers, CAB/129/76, ‘Security in the Colonies, Report by general Templer to 
Government Committee, July 1955’, p. 11.
16 MAE, E/170/5, ‘Défense de l’Indochine. Stratégie Commune, Janvier 1952–Juin 1952’.
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International organizations, regional institutions and non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs) (such as the Rockefeller and Ford 
Foundations from the US) were equally involved in social reform in 
SEA. After WWII the ILO accompanied its traditional action of promot-
ing tripartism and social collaboration, with a greater emphasis on mod-
ernization and social security. From the end of the war on, the ILO also 
focused more on SEA. This was due to the persistence of structural back-
wardness in the region: a huge mass of seasonal agricultural workers and 
seasonal unemployment; slow industrialization and poor levels of protec-
tion for workers (including women and children); generally low stan-
dards of living, low wages and low productivity, and demographic 
pressure. All these factors represented a threat as well as an opportunity 
to lead the integration of SEA in the world economy, as also the local 
modernizing elites recognized:
Not only the prosperity of Asia but abiding world prosperity is bound up 
with rapid economic development in Asia and an appreciable rise in “the 
standards of living and the purchasing power of the Asian peoples”. […] 
Many Asian countries have in hands, or propose to take up shortly, the 
preparation and execution of far-reaching programmes of economic devel-
opment and social reform. Their task will be considerably facilitated and 
world economic development on sound lines effectively ensured if they 
were able to secure assistance from such international agencies as the Social 
and Economic Council of the United Nations, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the I.L.O. (ICWA 1947, 16)
The organization of the 1947 Asiatic Regional Conference, two years 
after WWII, was more important in the eyes of the ILO experts, who 
were confident that local governments wanted to take advantage of their 
expertise to set up national programs for social and economic develop-
ment. The Conference brought together Western and local policy-makers 
to discuss ways of raising the living standards of the people, by introduc-
ing guidelines for social security, healthcare, social services and employ-
ment policy reforms. At the same time the Conference highlighted the 
emergence of the Asian countries as independent actors on the interna-
tional stage. SEA was a pivotal region in determining domestic and 
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 international stabilization through freedom and social justice. Indian 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stressed that greater social inclusion 
and the progress of the newly independent or still colonial territories 
would grant international stability and economic growth. Recalling the 
1944 Philadelphia Declaration, he stated that this would assure a new 
world order based on common social outlooks: “the well-being of the 
people living in those regions was exceedingly important. It was not a 
question of rich and powerful countries being generous. It was in their 
own interest to prevent infectious disease and poverty. Poverty anywhere 
was a danger to prosperity anywhere.”17
The recommendations of the Conference moved in this direction. 
Social security was set as the first item on the agenda. Its implementation 
was conditional to measures “providing for an adequate growth and sup-
ply of essential foodstuffs sufficient to meet the accepted standards of 
subsistence and nutrition, a living wage, decent housing and a healthy 
environment and free and compulsory education” (ILO 1947, 273). The 
general guidance on social security reform was modeled on general prin-
ciples and administrative arrangements that recalled common European 
standards: “security for all” and “income maintenance”, to be achieved 
through an integral and long-term plan of tripartite-funded social insur-
ances, employment injury benefits (both industrial and agricultural), 
maternity benefits, old-age pensions and medical care services. The 
Director-General’s report to the Conference, however, recommended 
proceeding with a gradual approach, attentive to regional differences in 
the social and occupational stratifications (Phelan 1947).
The Technical Assistance Programmes (TAP) started in SEA soon 
thereafter. They were meant to provide ILO’s technical expertise in the 
drafting of comprehensive socio-economic reform to the governments 
that formally requested it. They were full-fledged state-building programs 
in “the Western way”, which included social security, employment poli-
cies, vocational training, manpower organization and so forth. The ILO 
put in place a sequence of TAP in almost all the countries of the region at 
least until the early 1960s. Newly independent Burma was the first 
17 ILOA, RC/158-1, ‘The Indian Information Service, Conference of Historic Significance in New 
Delhi, 31/10/1947’, p. 1.
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 government that joined the extended programs in 1952 and for the whole 
decade (ILO 1952, 1958), and the Burmese TAP became the pilot pro-
gram for the others, those for Viet Nam (ILO 1956, 1959) and Malaysia 
(ILO 1960) probably being the most extended and long lasting of all.
The TAP did not have ideological goals in the stricter sense; individual 
ILO officials might have had different views on the goals of social reform, 
but the archival documentation does not reveal any direct political 
involvement in the elaboration of social security programs. According to 
historian Daniel Maul, however, such programs were far from providing 
merely neutral technical assistance. On the contrary, created by American 
ILO Director-General David Morse, the TAP were “motivated by the 
looming Cold War and the nation-building imperatives generated by 
decolonization in Asia” and they were designed to be “an effective means 
of shaping the domestic policies of the ‘developing countries’ in such a 
way—basically by raising the productivity of their economies—as to ren-
der them immune to the rise of Communism” (Maul 2016, 110–111).
The assistance programs for social enhancement contributed to the 
Western rhetorical arsenal of human rights and development, which was 
also used in the 1960s in the competition against Soviet Russia during 
decolonization in Africa (Maul 2012; Hilger 2017; Lorenzini 2017). In 
the harshest years of the Cold War, ILO stood on the side of the Western 
powers. The active promotion of social security in SEA since 1945 was 
functional to the strategy of the Western powers to counter Communist 
influence. It offered attractive prospects for newly independent countries 
to maintain democratic institutions while supporting social enhance-
ment. And, by doing so, to stay in the Western orbit.
There was a shared concern among the major Western powers and 
agencies of the possible spread of Communism in SEA in the late 1940s 
and 1950s. As we have shown, there was also a recognition that the battle 
against Communism could not be won only with military means. Social 
reform and economic modernization thus became a key element of the 
strategies for state-building and keeping SEA safe against Communism. 
The multiple actors, of course, had slightly different views on this. For the 
US, it was mainly geo-strategical concerns related to the global Cold War, 
with some variations between State Department and other groups of 
experts. For the British, it was also a matter of colonial power and legacies 
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within the framework of the Commonwealth. The ILO generally had a 
more specific and technical agenda, reflecting the narrower purpose of 
the organization. However, as we will see in the next section, such ideas 
also drew from the domestic level. Domestic actors and the interaction 
between the international Cold War and domestic policy-making have to 
be included in the shaping of early welfare state in SEA.
 The Local Actors and the Welfare Legislation: 
Hampering Communism and Building 
State Policies
The state-building of newly independent political elites (Burma) or by 
gatekeeper colonial governments (Federation of Malaysia) required polit-
ical legitimization through social inclusiveness. Local elites sought for it 
regardless of the great powers’ international political considerations. In 
both countries, some policy areas enforced the “hearths and minds” asset 
of the struggle against Communism: public schemes to bolster the loyalty 
of civil servants and public sector as well as social insurances for farm and 
industrial workers; programs that favored socio-economic development 
(e.g. land reforms); health policy and medical care; and education. These 
actions were expected to bring political stability through economic mod-
ernization and social security.
Already since the late 1940s, the concept of “welfare state” was linked 
to the new Burmese state. As we have seen, British politicians and news-
papers labeled the new Burmese constitution a welfare state constitution. 
The concept gained more political leverage as it became the key concept 
for the modernization strategies of the early 1950s. Several books and 
articles by international observers described Burma as an emerging wel-
fare state (Trager 1958, 1959; Lockwood 1958; H.T. 1955). The first 
Burmese “two-year plan” (the “Sorrento Villa Plan”, 1947–1948) had 
only limited effect because of the many Communist and ethnic insurgen-
cies. The plan included a land reform and fostered the growth of the 
public sector within the field of infrastructure and public utilities; 
employment in the public sector rose from just above 50,000  in the 
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1940s to 250,000 in the 1950s (Taylor 1987). The background was the 
intense struggle against the Communists, amplified by the influence of 
Communist China on the Chinese minority, to such an extent that “win-
ning the hearts and minds of the rural poor meant winning the then 
ongoing battle against the communist” (Than 2013, 639). However, day- 
to- day war on Communist insurgents prevented long-term strategic con-
siderations and the steady strengthening of Burmese state’s structures 
(Taylor 1987).
In 1951–1952, with the stabilization of domestic security, the Nu gov-
ernment started more consistent social and economic development pro-
grams (Lockwood 1958, 391; Trager 1958). The government cooperated 
with UN agencies and, despite stern skepticism toward the US, it also 
invited, in 1951, the American consulting firm Knappen Tippetts Abbett 
McCarthy (KTA) to work out a comprehensive analysis of the challenges 
and potentials of economic modernization in Burma. The report was 
financed by the US Technical Cooperation Administration and produced 
a detailed (more than 800 pages) analysis that was submitted to the gov-
ernment in 1953.18 Based on the drafts of the report, the Nu government 
launched the development plan, called New Burma Program in 1954, 
which spelled out the so-called Pyidawtha-plan, which was presented to 
thousands of AFPFL delegates from all over the country in 1952. The 
preamble declared that “Burma can become one of the most prosperous 
nations of all Asia. In this New Burma we can enjoy a high standard of 
living, health and security for our people, social justice for all.”19 The plan 
included ten overarching policy areas: regional development, health, edu-
cation, economy, nationalization (of arable lands), transportation, wel-
fare, democratic local councils, development of frontier areas and 
rebuilding. Public welfare and utilities were at the heart of the plan, even 
18 Economic and Engineering Development of Burma. Prepared for the Government of the Union of 
Burma by Knappen, Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy in Association with Pierce Management and 
Robert R. Nathan Associates, Aylesbury 1953. Online version see: https://www.nathaninc.com/
insight/economic-and-engineering-development-of-burma-1953/.
19 See Manual Instructions for Executions of Pyidawtha Plans (Rangoon 1952). Online version see: 
https://digital.soas.ac.uk/content/LO/AC/00/00/74/00001/PDF.pdf. See also PYIDAWTA. The 
new Burma. A report from the Government to the People of the Union of Burma on our long-term 
program for Economic and Social Development (1954). For an online version see: https://www.
nathaninc.com/insight/economic-and-engineering-development-of-burma-1953/.
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though it also had an undertone of economic modernization as a precon-
dition for welfare reform. The project covered rural health centers, new 
hospitals, more and better buildings for schools, high schools and voca-
tional schools, public housing program, nurseries and child guidance 
clinics, training of social workers and so forth.
The comparison between the English and the Burmese version of the 
documents testifies to the domestic political use made of the plan. The 
semantic strategy made modernization safe for the Burmese, limiting the 
room for Communist criticism at home, while appealing to foreign capi-
tal (Than 2013, 650). Whereas the English version speaks the language of 
modernization theory and social engineering, the Burmese version, 
meant for domestic use and addressing the population, featured a much 
more delicate use of local references. The main challenge for Nu was not 
to give the impression of importing Anglo-American ideas of develop-
ment, which would fuel accusations of dependence and imperialism by 
the public opinion at home. Especially as the plan included ideas of 
opening Burma toward foreign capital, this could be negatively inter-
preted as inviting new colonizers. Words such as “aid” or “foreign aid” 
were left out for the Burmese audience; even the title Pyidawtha, often 
translated as “welfare state” (Trager 1958), is, according to Than (2013, 
647) “a unique Burmanization of the word development” that included 
references to the country’s national traditions and underpinned an idea of 
prosperity. In this way it linked Burma’s glorious history with a modern-
ization strategy and promises of a brighter future. The link between the 
past and the future was also emphasized in public speeches and cam-
paigns for the program and included references to history and Buddhism, 
anticipating the Buddhist revival of the early 1950s, also fostered by US 
observers.20
The English-language version of the plan was more aligned with the 
technical language used in the KTA-report and by international experts. 
The Pyidawtha-plan had a threefold effect. First, it provided a strategy for 
Burmese modernization that allowed the country to receive aid and sup-
port from the outside: financial support from the US and the 
20 FRUS, 1951, Vol. 8, document 167, ‘Memorandum by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far 
eastern Affairs (Allison) to Acting Secretary of State, 27 December 1951’. See also Trager (1958, 10).
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Commonwealth; technical advice from US, American foundations, the 
ILO; aid from both regional powers such as India and the Eastern Bloc 
(Lockwood 1958, 397). Second, by portraying this as a national strategy 
it promised an avenue of reform that confronted the Communists and 
could strengthen loyalty to the state. Third, the plan was consistent with 
the Burmese policy of non-alignment.
In line with the new party-slogan “Towards the welfare state” (Trager 
1958, 26) and the indicators set in the Pyidawtha-plan, the Burmese gov-
ernment in the following years presented a number of social reforms (see 
Lockwood 1958 for more details). The 1956 social security program was 
designed with the assistance of the above-mentioned TAP.  It required 
very low contributions by industrial workers (1% of salary), offering 
short-term insurance for medical and disability cases. Following ILO rec-
ommendations, it was first introduced in Rangoon and only gradually 
spread to the rest of the country. Still with the support of international 
agencies, the government undertook public health initiatives including 
anti-malaria programs and the establishment of the Burma Pharmaceutical 
Industry in 1954, securing the supply of vaccines and medication. By 
1958, the Burmese Secretary to the Social Security Board assessed posi-
tively the outcomes of the governmental actions, as “the pilot scheme of 
social security in Burma has proved a most satisfactory beginning to the 
setting up of a Welfare State” (Sein 1957, 60). The report also recognized 
that the scheme also enjoyed positive publicity among the population 
and, most importantly, ensured the collaboration of workers and employ-
ers, with a few exceptions.
The strategy of the Burmese governments in the late 1940s and 1950s 
attired to take an autonomous path from both Western and Chinese 
influences, a “third way” between liberal capitalism and Communism. 
Most of the promises of the Pyidawtha-plan were only partially realized; 
Burma lacked the resources, the administrative capacity and the political 
stability needed. As noted by an international observer, “the road to 
Pyidawtha lies through a maze” (Lockwood 1958, 440). In 1956 a new, 
revised plan was presented, with a less ambitious and more pragmatic 
approach to the modernization of the country, while in 1962 the whole 
process was halted, as a direct result of the military coup and regime 
change in Burma (Maung 1964, 1187–1189; Taylor 1987, Chap. 5).
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In Malaysia, the early welfare development started under British rule. 
The understanding of the British was that the key to legitimacy for the 
UMNO and the Alliance coalition was that “a successful effort is made to 
relieve the very serious state of poverty and distress among the peasants” 
(quoted from Stockwell 1977, 511), and control of the industrial workers 
through trade unions which, as seen above, covered the workers of all the 
three main ethnicities of the country.
The reforms were a comprehensive package of social security measures 
that complemented the effort to boost economic growth and modernize 
the industrial structures of the country. Between 1950 and 1960, two 
plans were implemented. The above-mentioned Draft Development Plan 
(1950–1955) was elaborated in coordination with the British in the 
framework of the Colombo-Plan. It focused on social services, social 
security, development of infrastructures and trade. From 1956 to 1960, 
instead, the First Malayan Plan focused more on rural and industrial 
development, as well as national security (Lee and Chew-Ging 2017). 
During the same period, the government invited the ILO to carry out a 
more detailed survey on social security reform proposals. Only the subse-
quent Five-Years Plan, in the mid-1960s, gave new impetus for social 
legislation enhancement. In the industrial relations, the role of trade 
unions was highly regulated through the 1950 Trade Union Act, leaving 
their recognition to a centralized authority. Designed as a way of prevent-
ing trade unions from becoming a stronghold of Communist partisans, 
the act defused industrial conflict for the years to come.21 The Malaysian 
trade unions indeed remained relatively small, without much influence, 
and did not push forward expanded social rights, but on the contrary 
regimented industrial conflict and centralized the workers’ movement 
(Zin et al. 2002, 128).
The core of the first wave of social reform took place in 1951–1952, 
simultaneously with the change of tides of guerrilla warfare against the 
MNLA. In 1951, a program of public pensions covered specific working 
categories. The Civil Service Pension was a generous non-contributory 
scheme for civil servants funded by the state (through taxes), also 
21 See also: TNA, Cabinet Papers, CAB 129/76, ‘Security in the Colonies, Report by General Templer 
to Government Committee, July 1955’, p. 64.
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 including benefits for work injuries, disability and dependent’s pensions. 
The Employee Provident Fund covered workers not included in the former 
scheme. Until 1970, the contribution was 5% of the salary, paid by both 
employer and employee; 60% of savings to be withdrawn at the age of 55 
(as a lump sum), and the remaining can be withdrawn for housing, edu-
cation or (10% of savings) for medical expenses. In 1952 the Employer’s 
Liability Scheme, covering employment injuries, required employers to 
insure their companies against accidents. This scheme did not become 
fully developed or significant, as it was still based on employer’s liability, 
while many other countries had already shifted to a form of state insur-
ance (it was replaced by the Employees Social Security Act only in 1969). 
Three years later, the sickness and maternity benefits (as part of the 
Employment Act) allocated a paid sick leave of 14–22 days, depending on 
length of employment. Maternity leave was 60 days (for a maximum of 
five children), including a benefit similar to wage.
A relevant field of social reform in Malaysia was education. As noticed 
by the experts of the time, “since the war the British have been pursuing 
a more ‘enlightened’ social policy than formerly. This especially notable 
in social welfare activities, for which a new welfare department has been 
founded, and primary education, which within a ten-year period is to be 
free to children of all races” (Thompson and Adloff 1947, 112). The 
British government regarded a comprehensive and compulsory basic edu-
cation for all children as part of a “war of ideas” which supplemented the 
“war of arms”.22 In 1951 these ideas turned into more detailed policy 
actions, marking the beginning of a decade of re-organizing the educa-
tional system which, however, did not originally move on the ethnically 
universalist lines advocated by the British. The colonial government’s 
report recommended a national system with six years of primary educa-
tion in Malay or English; only after protests by the Chinese community, 
the largest ethnic group, Chinese tracks were introduced. In 1955, a new 
plan for a school system with Malay as the national language was pre-
sented and enacted in 1957, after independence.
22 TNA, Cabinet Papers, CAB 129/48, ‘Memorandum by the secretary of state for the colonies, 21 
December 1951’.
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In the first years since independence, the Malaysian development strat-
egy was about economic growth leading to increasing inequality and pov-
erty problems, particularly with regard to the living conditions in the 
rural areas (Zin et al. 2002, 127). The early social security system adopted 
some elements of universalism (the state pensions) while covering other 
risks in a piecemeal fashion. It aimed at winning the loyalty of specific 
sectors of the population through welfare policies; this was notably the 
case with the public sector and the growing industrial working class. At 
the same time social policy complied with ethnic cleavages, as demon-
strated by the educational reform.
By the first half of the 1960s the Communist threat had greatly dimin-
ished; with the end of British colonial rule, the external aid for social 
reforms in Malaysia became primarily a matter of international organiza-
tions (see Schmitt, Chap. 1, this volume). In 1958, after full indepen-
dence, the government required ILO assistance for an expanded program 
of social security; the expert in charge, a former civil servant of the British 
Ministry of Pension and National Insurance, recommended gradually 
strengthening the existing schemes set up in the beginning of the 1950s. 
The immediate amendments should enlarge the sickness and maternity 
benefits, by extending the provisions to the whole of the wage earners 
(slightly more than 50% of the active population) and, at a later stage, 
including specific categories of self-employed as well. It was also sug-
gested to turn the Employer’s Liability Scheme into a true state insurance 
and to launch pilot schemes for the improvement of medical care. The 
report was more cautious on unemployment benefits, due to the relative 
backwardness of the employment exchange service that made it impos-
sible to collect data to plan a national unemployment scheme (ILO 1960).
The use of social reform as a key element of anti-Communist strategies 
also existed in the local context. Western policy-makers and technical 
advisors pushing for social reform as part of the state-building of stable 
democratic socio-political institutions heavily influenced the political 
elites in the two countries. This was not only a transfer of ideas fostered 
in Washington, London or Geneva into the domestic context. Domestic 
politics also played an important role for understanding of the actual 
timing and content of the reform agenda. In both countries it was part of 
party politics, and it reflected both domestic ideological considerations 
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(for instance the Burmese non-alignment policy) and the existing ethnic 
cleavages and conflicts. In other words, Western Cold War concerns can-
not alone explain specifics such as why Burma, in 1952, launched its 
Pyidawtha-plan or the Malaysian educational reforms of the late 1950s. 
We must analyze it as a complex interplay between the international Cold 
War and domestic politics.
 Conclusions
This chapter reconsiders the relevancy of the Cold War context when 
explaining welfare development in the developing world (especially in the 
first decades after 1945). Albeit other elements such as economic devel-
opment, state capacity, political actors or colonial legacies are clearly rel-
evant factors in explaining both social policy development and outcomes, 
the Cold War clearly influenced (directly or indirectly) these standard 
explanations and provided a wider historical framework to explain the 
development in the area.
We argue that the timing of welfare reforms in Burma and Malaysia 
can be explained by looking at the larger context of the Cold War in 
SEA. The concerns of the Western powers about the spread of Communism 
in the region were even more important than those related to the decolo-
nization process. The two cases account for similar strategies implemented 
by the Western powers and by non-Communist local elites, in the pres-
ence of two different juridical statuses: Burma was formally independent, 
while the Federation of Malaysia was still a colony of Britain. The chapter 
focused on the multiple levels of making use of social security and welfare 
policies to counter Communism. Different institutions and political 
actors were involved in the remolding of social policies: international 
organizations such as the ILO, the Western powers (the US and the UK 
and—with a slightly different approach—France) and the domestic non- 
Communist establishments.
For the Western actors (including the ILO), social security was a plank 
in the process of state-building and in anchoring SEA in the Western 
political and economic institutions: providing economic development 
and social progress was deemed essential to prevent social unrest or a 
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Communist seizure of power in a strategically relevant area. While the 
colonial powers kept acting in a colonial development manner, the US 
and ILO rationale already underpinned a post-colonial approach to 
development and modernization (Gilman 2003; Maul 2016). The ILO’s 
less important role in outlining social reform in Malaysia than in newly 
independent Burma might be evidence of the competition between colo-
nial rulers and other external actors. Social security reforms were part of 
the Western “hearts and minds” approach that was expected to hamper 
the spread of Communism in SEA. There was a broad consensus on 
implementing social security among Western policy-makers and policy 
advisors in governmental bodies as well as in international 
organizations.
On the other hand, the local ruling classes used social reform rhetoric 
and policy for their own political legitimization through economic 
growth, development and social inclusiveness. Social welfare reforms also 
resulted from the interplay between Western and local political consider-
ations. In Burma, for the AFPFL and U Nu, social security comple-
mented rapid industrialization, land reform, healthcare improvements 
and free education. The national way to Socialism combined elements of 
social progress and a pronounced nationalism (Aung-Thwin and Myint-U 
1992). In Malaysia, the political goal was rather to lay the foundations of 
a more Unitarian national policy that could weaken ethnic cleavages and 
social discrimination. Urban and land development in the countryside, 
planning and social security reforms pointed at legitimizing the state in 
the transition from colonial rule to full independence.
As the chapter is exploratory and based on two case studies, we need to 
be careful when generalizing our interpretative hypotheses. However, it is 
not unlikely that the Cold War also served as an important frame for the 
social security development in other countries in SEA. Furthermore, we 
centered our analysis on the early Cold War, from 1945 to 1960. However, 
the 1960s were also a period of intense decolonization, and our analytical 
frame may also apply to case studies in the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, SEA 
attracted very strong concerns from the major Western powers during the 
early Cold War. More explorations on this subject may reveal that similar 
concerns drove policies in the African region. We need more systematic 
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and comparative research on the links between the Cold War and the 
welfare state in former colonial spaces.
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The Influence of Colonialism 




Kenya and Tanzania are two neighboring countries in East Africa that 
inspired a number of paired comparisons in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. 
Cliffe 1973; Barkan 1984).1 These mainly investigated the effects of dif-
ferent economic and political systems but neglected social policies. The 
comparisons were based on the assumption that the two countries are 
quite similar in terms of cultural heritage and natural setting: both are 
located on the East African coast, have a British colonial legacy and house 
significant pre-colonial Muslim populations. According to the literature, 
these similarities should produce a similar colonial tax income (Frankema 
1 Tanganyika is used for the colonial period and Tanzania for the period after independence, 
although Tanganyika gained independence under this name and was renamed United Republic of 
Tanzania three years later, with the unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
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and van Waijenburg 2014). A similar colonial tax income ought, in turn, 
to be linked to a similar post-colonial tax income and post-colonial social 
policy development (Mkandawire 2010, 2016).
However, a look at human development indicators reveals consider-
able differences between the two countries. In 2015, a Kenyan baby had 
a life expectancy of 62.2  years at birth and could expect to receive 
11.1 years of schooling (UNDP 2018). In neighboring Tanzania, a baby 
had a longer life expectancy (65.5 years) but could expect considerably 
less schooling (8.9 years). On average, each of the Kenyan baby’s parents 
had an income of US $2881 (purchasing power parity of 2011), while 
the Tanzanian baby’s parents were somewhat poorer, with an income of 
US $2467 each. The Kenyan parents are less likely to be poor, as 36% of 
the Kenyan population lives in poverty, compared to 66% in Tanzania.2
Thus, Kenya and Tanzania do not really fit the theory. This makes the 
longer-term social policy trajectories of Kenya and Tanzania a promising 
research gap for a comparative study. Such a study will help especially 
with achieving a better understanding of differences within British colo-
nialism and its legacies, assuming that the comparatively brief period of 
German colonialism in Tanganyika (1885–1918) is hardly formative for 
later social policies.3 However, colonialism was not the only form of 
external influence, and it is important to also look at key post-colonial 
periods. This paired comparison thus tackles the following research ques-
tion: What is the influence of external actors on social policies in Kenya 
and Tanzania?
Initially, the literature on colonial social policies and the empirical evi-
dence for Kenya and Tanganyika are presented. The following sections 
then deal with the influence of donors in post-colonial Kenya and 
Tanzania in the following key periods. The first key period especially rel-
evant for health care was during structural adjustment around the 1980s. 
The second key period begins with the turn of the millennium. It con-
cerns the fields of health care and education and finally also the fields of 
pension policies and cash transfers. Lastly, the interplay between external 
2 This comparison is based on the indicator “Population in multidimension poverty, head-
count (%)”.
3 The umbrella term “colonialism” is used here also for mandates, trusteeships and protectorates.
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actors and national factors and differences between Kenya and Tanzania 
are discussed in the section preceding the conclusion.
 Colonial Influences on Social Policies
 Theorizing International Influences on Domestic Social 
Policies: Differences Within British Colonial 
Social Policies
The first section looks at one key external influence: colonialism. Before 
presenting empirical evidence on colonial social policies in Kenya and 
Tanganyika, it starts by picking up some threads of the introduction and 
discussing the literature on colonial social policies more generally. In con-
trast to Frankema and van Waijenburg (2014), Mkandawire (2010, 
1652) claims colonial Kenya to have a higher per capita tax income than 
Tanganyika. The theoretical explanation for this claim is based on the 
literature and especially on Amin (1972) and points to the different ways 
these colonies were incorporated in the colonial economy. It is thus able 
to explain differences within British colonialism.
According to Mkandawire (2016), Kenya was a labor reserve economy. 
Concentrated in Southern and Eastern Africa, this type depended on 
cheap African waged labor. The education of Africans and independent 
forms of income were minimized; levels of land alienation and direct 
taxation were high, to push Africans toward waged labor. With the 
growth of the export industry, trade taxes became increasingly important 
but never completely substituted for direct taxation. High taxation was 
also necessary to finance the racially exclusive welfare regimes established 
for the white (male) population. As Künzler and Nollert (2017, 8) sum-
marize this theoretical argument: “The exploitation of labour was based 
on burdening its reproduction on rural communities kept at subsistence 
level. Social policy was dependent on employment in the formal sector of 
the economy. The poor non-employed urban population was kept to a 
minimum and social policies based on the English Poor Laws were tar-
geted at this group” (see also Schmitt, Chap. 6, this volume). In labor 
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reserve economies, the colonial state was strong. The post-colonial legacy 
of labor reserves includes high inequality, a higher HIV prevalence rate 
and racialized social policies, but also a broader tax base that can poten-
tially finance the extension of social policies.
In contrast, again according to Mkandawire (2016), Tanganyika was 
one of the few East African cash crop economies.4 This type is mainly 
located in West Africa and is characterized by smallholder peasant access 
to land. African peasants could control their agricultural production and 
participated directly in international commodity markets. This allowed 
them to invest in the education of their children. Mkandawire (2016) 
assumes that cash crop economies thus had higher school enrolment rates 
during colonial times and that social protection was informally provided 
and community-based. The final assumption is a post-colonial legacy of 
a weak tax base linked with lower social expenditures.
To summarize the theoretical argument, Tanzania was incorporated 
into the colonial economy as a cash crop economy. Theoretically, this 
should mean mainly informal or community-based forms of social pro-
tection in colonial times and low post-colonial social expenditures. In 
contrast, Kenya is classified as a labor reserve and expected to have a more 
elaborated system of social welfare for the white settlers. While social 
policies for Africans during colonial times were supposedly focused on 
formal employment and, in a very limited capacity, the urban poor, post- 
colonial social expenditures are expected to be higher. What is the empir-
ical evidence for these theoretical assumptions?
 Colonial Social Policies in Kenya and Tanganyika
This subsection will demonstrate that Kenya differs from the theoretical 
labor reserve model in two key aspects. First, it will demonstrate that 
agricultural production could support the rural poor and, second, that 
there was no significant welfare system for white settlers. It will then 
4 Amin (1972), on whose work Mkandawire (2016) builds, classified what he called German 
Tanganyika as a labor reserve, or more precisely as settler agriculture driving rural communities into 
reserves. However, in the subsequent literature colonial Tanganyika is described, in line with 
Mkandawire (2016), as a cash-crop economy (e.g. Cliffe 1973).
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show how the general orientation of colonial social policies in Kenya and 
Tanganyika was quite similar and also that some selected policy fields 
(old-age pensions, minimum wages) differed less than the theory assumes. 
It then looks at another policy field (education), where the empirical data 
do not really fit to the theoretical differences. Finally, this subsection 
points to the extent to which the responsibility of the central colonial 
state differed in Kenya and Tanganyika, a key difference that is in line 
with the theory.
The labor reserve model was developed with classic examples such as 
South Africa in mind. While colonial Kenya did indeed have a substan-
tial settler population and large-scale farms, it differed from the model in 
two key respects. First, the areas that supplied labor were also the centers 
of the production of cash crops by African farmers. This production went 
beyond what was needed for the reproduction of waged labor. It was ori-
ented toward domestic and international markets and continually 
expanded, not least during the Second World War, when both the settler 
farming sector and African farmers could capitalize upon the circum-
stances (Anderson and Throup 1985). Agricultural production could 
support the rural poor. While Mkandawire (2010, 6) acknowledges that 
“various forms of market incorporation took place within the same econ-
omy”, he did not name Kenya as an example. To a certain extent, 
Tanganyika too combined cash crop production with the supply of labor 
for plantations (see also Amin 1972). Second, while there was a dual 
policy of segregation in Kenya, there was no significant welfare system for 
white settlers, “presumably because there had never been a strong white 
working-class or a white urban poor demanding public welfare schemes” 
(Seekings 2005, 27).
In line with Mkandawire’s (2010, 2016) claim, colonial Kenya had a 
higher extractive capacity and a higher per capita tax income than 
Tanganyika (Frankema and van Waijenburg 2014, 383).5 The two colo-
nies had different financial resources. This should theoretically result in 
differences in colonial social policies. However, as agricultural produc-
tion in both colonies could support the rural poor, the general orienta-
tion of colonial social policies was surprisingly similar. In colonial Kenya, 
5 Mkandawire (2010, 1652) himself uses post-colonial data to substantiate his argument.
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officials attempted to preserve rural family and communal ties and revive 
them when economic changes put the idealized agrarian society under 
pressure (Lewis 2000; Seekings 2005). Increasing urbanization led to 
some urban welfare initiatives. Only with the return of African soldiers 
after the Second World War did the Colonial Office in London and colo-
nial officers in Nairobi see the need for intervention, but they “diverged 
in their visions” (Lewis 2000, 244) and met resistance from the white 
settlers. Finally, as in the rural areas, a logic focusing on family and com-
munal ties was applied and urban community development was pro-
moted. As part of the demobilization program, ex-servicemen were used 
as community development workers. The idea of offering gendered edu-
cation and literacy training in community centers had a short boom and 
was followed by a productivist turn, leaving social welfare to community 
initiatives.
What happened in the neighboring cash crop colony of Tanganyika 
was broadly similar, despite differences in detail. There were isolated colo-
nial welfare initiatives in urban areas before the Second World War. The 
engagement of the colonial state in the field of urban welfare in Tanganyika 
also increased in the context of returning African soldiers, when short- 
lived welfare centers were established with the aim of integrating ex- 
servicemen and offering gendered education and literacy training (Eckert 
2004). There were differences between London and colonial officials in 
Tanganyika concerning their respective visions. However, generally the 
policy of the colonial administration “attempted to strengthen the effi-
ciency and influence of traditional institutions in the field of social secu-
rity” (Eckert 2004, 475).
Within the scope of this chapter it is not possible to look in detail at 
all social policy fields. In the following, old-age pensions and minimum 
wages are discussed to show that these policy fields were less different 
than theory would assume. The picture would be similar for other policy 
fields, such as health care or social protection against employment injury. 
Concerning old-age pensions, workers in Kenyan government service 
had a certain coverage, but there was a fairly distinct racial divide on the 
formal labor market. There was a common agreement that a more com-
prehensive pension coverage was needed, but there were long debates 
about what the exact nature of such a pension scheme would be. A 
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committee appointed in 1953 to study social insurance (Clayton and 
Savage 1974) recommended a contributory pension fund. However, 
independence was imminent, and the matter was left. In Tanganyika, the 
colonial administration was also not supportive of a compulsory provi-
dent fund for non-governmental formal sector workers (Eckert 2004, 
475). Lower ranks of government service were covered by the provident 
fund of 1942 (Bossert 1985).6 Both Tanganyika and Kenya fit in the 
general pattern of British colonies, as more comprehensive social protec-
tion for old age was introduced only after independence (Schmitt 2015).
Old-age pensions were among the demands of Kenyan labor move-
ments in their frequent strikes (Singh 1969).7 However, the emphasis was 
more on the acceptance of unions, political participation of Africans and 
especially minimum wages, housing and working conditions (Singh 
1969; Clayton and Savage 1974). Especially after the Second World War 
there was a significant policy change: As a means of stabilizing the work-
force, the minimum wage was no longer deemed to be intended to pro-
vide for a bachelor but for an urban family and was raised considerably 
(Neubert 1986, 90–91). However, this minimum wage was based on a 
very narrow conception of a nuclear family and was also supposed to 
solve housing problems. Family allowances were not common in colonial 
Kenya, as they were considered to impede the competitivity of male 
workers with children on the labor market (Neubert 1986, 91). 
Tanganyika had a Minimum Wage Ordinance from 1939 on, but there 
was no mechanism for wage fixing and thus, in contrast to Kenya, de 
facto no minimum wage during the colonial period (Bryceson 1990).
Looking at another policy field, education, there are differences 
between Kenya and Tanganyika, but not in the way claimed by theory. 
According to Mkandawire (2016), enrolment should be higher in 
Tanganyika. This is not the case: At the end of the colonial period Kenya 
had higher primary and secondary education enrolment rates (Künzler 
2007, 75). But Kenyan enrolment was highly unequal, and a substantial 
6 In principle, higher ranks could expect pensions from 1932 on, but there were no Africans in such 
positions (Bossert 1985, 102).
7 Labor movements also referred to the ILO to back this claim.
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part of the education budget went to a small number of children of 
European settlers.
However, focusing too narrowly on colonial social policies might miss 
a more indirect effect linked to the lower extractive capacity of Tanganyika. 
The late colonial state in Tanganyika was more modest in spending and 
placed greater emphasis on engagement at the local level. In contrast, the 
colonial state in Kenya had a more top-down, interventionist manner 
and spent more. In line with other labor reserves (Mkandawire 2016), 
colonial Kenya introduced, in 1919, strong racially exclusive policy mea-
sures to manage labor migration by way of registration. “The registration 
system brought virtually the entire adult male African population under 
much more direct administrative control, and made it possible to trace 
back to the reserves and arrest deserters and other violators who failed to 
be properly signed off by an employer” (Berman and Lonsdale 1992, 
112–113). This registration system was a tool to raise African taxes, but 
proof of employment also exempted Africans from compulsory labor. 
The hated system was abolished in 1947, but a somewhat similar pass-
book system was introduced among ethnic groups mostly linked to the 
Mau Mau insurgency that officially lasted from 1952 to 1960. Also this 
insurgency contributed to the top-down interventionist nature of the 
colonial state.
In many ways, the legacy of the colonial period is not linked to differ-
ent social policies but rather to the differing extent to which the central 
colonial states were responsible for social policies. One example of this is 
famine relief. Colonial Kenya introduced measures such as free famine 
relief, free school meals, work-for-food programs or the provision of 
foodstuffs for markets on subnational levels. However, as early as 1918, 
reactions to food shortages were centrally coordinated by the colonial 
government (Maxon 1980). During the famine of 1960, too, the central 
administration became involved, and food for famine relief was imported 
in the context of a coordinated operation. By contrast, in Tanganyika 
famine relief was initially an ethical imperative for district-level adminis-
trators rather than a government obligation (Bryceson 1990). It was quite 
elementary and never a national task or a right.
Thus, contrary to the theoretical expectation, the general orientation 
of colonial social policies was surprisingly similar in Kenya and 
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Tanganyika. However, the central colonial state was less directly respon-
sible for social policies in Tanganyika. These differences in responsibility 
continued in the years following independence, and the emphasis on 
local-level engagement and questions of affordability were more impor-
tant in Tanzania than in Kenya.8 Within the scope of this chapter it is not 
possible to describe the 1960s and 1970s in detail, and these decades are 
skipped to have enough space for the following decades when the influ-
ence of international actors in the field of social policies is more perti-
nent. Indeed, the dominant models of social policies championed by 
international actors during the 1960s and 1970s were quite in line with 
domestic priorities, based on both a modernization framework that 
emphasized formal sector-based social security and government planning 
of social services. Thus, the next section picks up the thread starting in 
the 1980s, because this is a key period to discuss the influence of interna-
tional donors.
 The Influence of Donors During Structural 
Adjustments Around the 1980s
The second key influence after colonialism discussed in this chapter is 
international donors. Again, literature assumes them to be important 
drivers of social policy-making in the Global South (e.g. Niño-Zarazúa 
et al. 2012). There is ample empirical evidence that suggests that this was 
the case around the 1980s, for example when donors such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed national 
 governments to implement structural adjustment programs. They gener-
ally included the cutting of budgets for the civil service or for social 
expenditures and were accompanied by the introduction of official user 
fees in the health care and/or education sectors (e.g. Künzler 2007, 
2016c). Lacking viable alternatives, many sub-Saharan African countries 
8 The focus on the informal social welfare system of the community, described above for British 
colonies, continued after independence: The Kenyan Harambee movement asked communities to 
support social services with labor, building materials and money. In Tanzania the situation was dif-
ferent, as community participation in development was partly enforced top-down.
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were dependent on the financial backing of these international financial 
institutions and introduced such policies, sometimes backed by internal 
actors. However, there is also evidence of national governments only pay-
ing lip service to international obligations. There seem to be limits to 
donor influence.
Unfortunately, the observation by Boyle, Songora and Foss (2001, 
524) is still quite correct: “No comprehensive sociological theory explains 
this variation in the adoption of policies promoted through the interna-
tional system.” The World Polity Theory acknowledges differences in the 
adoption of global policy models under the label of “de-coupling” and 
points to the influence of two factors: relevance and leverage (Boyle et al. 
2001). A necessary condition for de-coupling to occur is adverse rele-
vance of a policy proposal for domestic key constituencies. However, de- 
coupling is more likely and greater in countries with more leverage in the 
international system.9 Richer countries have more leverage than poorer 
(e.g. post-conflict) countries, but geo-strategic importance also matters.
The empirical evidence for donor influence in Kenya and Tanzania 
after the late 1970s shows that Kenya indeed had more room for manoeu-
ver than Tanzania. After the death of President Kenyatta in 1978, the 
new president Moi pledged to follow the footsteps of his predecessor. 
Some of his early decisions were indeed reminiscent of earlier policies 
(increase of minimum wages, systematic hiring of graduates, national 
famine relief ). However, Kenya had increasing financial problems and 
became more dependent on international financial institutions. Kenya 
became one of the first countries to receive a structural adjustment loan 
after it had devaluated its currency and slowed down government hiring.
The Kenyan government announced user charges in two subsequent 
development plans (1979–1983 and 1983–1988), however, without 
introducing them. In the next development plan (1989–1993) this 
 commitment to introduce user charges was replicated, and finally user 
charges were announced. After a public outcry the government used the 
more acceptable term of “introduction of cost-sharing” to communicate 
the same thing: the end of free health care (Mwabu 1995, 248). A cost- 
sharing scheme was hastily introduced in 1989, under “considerable pres-
9 Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2012, 165) mention such a difference without much discussion.
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sure from donors” (Mwabu 1995, 248). After only nine months of 
implementation, the suspension of outpatient fees was abruptly commu-
nicated in the mass media. The reason was that media reported the disas-
trous effects of the fees on the poor and vulnerable and that the government 
came under pressure. It is unclear if the imminence of the first multiparty 
elections, of December 1992, also played a role. However, in April 1992, 
shortly after the suspension, the Kenyan government announced the 
reintroduction of facility-dependent outpatient fees, again through mass 
media (Mwabu 1995, 248). In reaction to earlier criticism, the new fees 
were to be charged after the patient was treated, and there were unclear 
exemptions. There were no protests anymore (Mwabu 1995, 252).
Tanzania also came under economic pressure and was confronted with 
international financial institutions and their technocratic structural 
adjustment demands. Like Kenya, Tanzania tried to manoeuver in the 
space available. In 1981, a domestically crafted program was launched. 
However, donors doubted the sincerity of the government and reduced 
aid. This pushed government, in 1982, to a structural adjustment pro-
gram that included the partial removal of maize price subsidies, cush-
ioned by a rise of the minimum wage. In contrast to the country’s first 
president Nyerere, his successor Mwinyi was less reluctant to introduce 
economic reforms (D’Arcy 2013, 233). In 1986, the donor-backed eco-
nomic recovery program introduced user fees for education. Other 
donor-backed programs followed and included the formal introduction 
of health care user fees in 1993, strongly pushed by donors and comple-
mented by an exemption and waiver policy. Politicians were hesitant, but 
there was some domestic support from bureaucrats (Pedersen and Jacob 
2018, 7). Multiparty elections were introduced only after this policy 
change, and the opposition unsuccessfully promised to abolish the 
user fees.
Thus, while both countries support the theoretical assumption that the 
influence of international donors was quite high during the period of 
structural adjustment, there were differences in terms of room for 
manoeuver. Tanzania has less leverage in the international system and was 
quickly sanctioned (see Devereux and Kapingidza, Chap. 11, this vol-
ume). The introduction of multiparty elections is another crucial effect of 
donor influence that had important consequences for later social policies 
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(D’Arcy 2013). This will become evident in the discussion of the influ-
ence of donors after 2000 in the fields of health care and education (next 
section) as well as pensions and cash transfers (following section).
 The Influence of Donors After 2000: 
The “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs)
After 2000, the MDGs received a great deal of attention from interna-
tional donors. Especially goals 2 to 5 became important for the domestic 
political agenda in Kenya and Tanzania. Goals 2 and 3 concerned educa-
tion and called for an expansion of enrolment to achieve universal pri-
mary education and gender equality in primary, secondary and later also 
tertiary education. Goals 4 and 5 focused on the reduction of child and 
maternal mortality rates. In contrast to the remaining goals, Goals 2–5 
are in line with two potential domestic priorities: they can be framed as 
being productivist and have a broad electoral appeal. However, there is an 
important difference between health care and educational goals. There 
are no clear models in global health care policies (Kaasch 2013), and 
countries therefore can choose different policies in the name of attaining 
global goals. This subsection will show that donors are somewhat influen-
tial, but the resulting national politics in the health care sector are quite 
varied and inconsistent. In the domain of education there was a wide 
international consensus that user fees had to be abolished in order to raise 
enrolment. Even the World Bank, deviating from its earlier cost-sharing 
policies, argued against user fees in primary education. As discussed 
below, both countries abolished user fees and followed the international 
prescription.
In Kenya, school fees were an important topic of the electoral cam-
paign in the run-up to the contested Kenyan presidential election of 
2002. The governing party wanted to reduce fees, while the oppositional 
coalition promised to abolish them. Shortly after winning the election, 
the new president, Kibaki, from the oppositional coalition summarily 
declared free primary education. This policy was financially supported by 
the World Bank and the UK Department for International Development 
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(DFID) and other donors. The government proposed a new “National 
Social Health Insurance Fund” (NSHIF) to replace the “National Health 
Insurance Fund” (NHIF), with advice by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the then Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (Künzler 2016a, 10). Parliament passed a highly 
controversial bill in December 2004, but President Kibaki declined to 
sign it into law, and the unsigned bill later lapsed. In parallel, government 
also partly removed health care user fees. Another significant reform was 
again summarily introduced shortly after the 2013 presidential election. 
The winner, Uhuru Kenyatta, represented a new coalition and shortly 
after the election declared that public maternity services would hence-
forth be for free (Künzler 2016a, 6–8). While there was no direct donor 
support for this policy, donors are generally quite important for the 
financing of the Kenyan health system. An important campaign issue of 
both the governing party and the main opposition coalition in the 2017 
election was free secondary education. After his re-election, Uhuru 
Kenyatta introduced this policy with effect from January 2018, until now 
without any known major donor support.
In Tanzania, in the run-up to the second multiparty presidential elec-
tions of 2000, several candidates, including the incumbent successor of 
Mwinyi, Mkapa, “promised to reduce or abolish primary school fees, 
which they perceived to be a widespread concern among voters” (Kjær 
and Therkildsen 2013, 597). D’Arcy (2013, 235) cites a civil society 
observer who described the promise as “definitely a vote winner” and 
concludes that the abolition of school fees would “yield a particularly 
high political return for the government”. After being elected for his sec-
ond term, Mkapa fulfilled his promise and re-introduced free primary 
education. While the political return of such a policy change was surely 
quite high for the government, there was also “public pressure during the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process and (…) active lobbying of the 
president by the World Bank Country Director, who was keen to repeat 
Uganda’s UPE [Universal Primary Education, dk] success in Tanzania” 
(Kjær and Therkildsen 2013, 597). However, pressure was associated 
with financial support through a World Bank loan in the form of debt 
relief for the social sectors. According to D’Arcy (2013, 236), “the 
removal of fees would not have been feasible without the help of donors”.
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Secondary education was also a topic in the 2005 presidential elec-
tions, as a result of which Kikwete succeeded Mkapa. However, the elec-
toral promise was an expansion of the lower secondary education 
infrastructure, pushed less by Kikwete than by Prime Minister Lowassa, 
who later became an oppositional presidential candidate (Languille 
2015). This policy choice does not follow the preference of international 
donors for the abolition of school fees but is still in line with the MDGs.10 
However, free secondary education was declared shortly after the election 
of the new president, Magufuli, in 2015 without major donor support.
As D’Arcy (2013) emphasizes, the government of Tanzania remained 
committed to cost-sharing in the health care sector. She explains this by 
the lack of significant donor funding for a fee-removal policy. While a 
few donors such as DFID and UNICEF were supportive of the removal 
of health care fees, others, including the World Bank, were more ambigu-
ous. The switch of DFID to General Budgetary Support in 2002 weak-
ened the fee abolition position. Yet other donors supported community 
(e.g. Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation) or national (GTZ) 
health insurance schemes. Consequently, the NHIF was introduced in 
1999, focusing on public sector employees and their dependents. In 
2001, the “Community Health Fund” was introduced for the informal 
sector. The term “community” refers to local involvement in the manage-
ment of the fund. From 2007 on the NHIF mandatory also covered 
formal sector workers in the private sector. There are discussions to make 
the NHIF compulsory for all Tanzanians. There are also patchwork 
attempts at reforms in the health sector without donor support, for 
example, by providing free health insurance cards to poor pregnant 
women and their households or by plans to make NHIF membership 
mandatory for all citizens.
In a nutshell, while national governments followed the clear interna-
tional prescriptions in the domain of education, this was not the case in 
the domain of health care, where there was more room for manoeuver.
10 It represented a rupture with the educational policy of Nyerere which strongly emphasized pri-
mary education and limited secondary education to a meritocratic elite (Languille 2015).
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 Pension Policies and Cash Transfers Since 
the Turn of the Millennium
 Pension Policies
There is also some room for manoeuver for national governments in the 
field of global pension policy, but for different reasons. In this field there 
is contestation between policy models (Kaasch 2013). The historically 
older model, social insurance, is pushed by an epistemic community 
around the International Labour Organization (ILO). The second model 
emerged around the World Bank and promoted a three-pillar pension 
system with a strong emphasis on privately funded and managed pension 
schemes. While the second model was for some years highly influential in 
Central and Eastern Europe, it was less influential in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Kpessa and Béland 2012). The World Bank later adapted its policy 
model and included social pensions. More recent publications are more 
cautious and no longer recommend a clear policy model (Künzler 2016c). 
The field of pension policies shows quite clearly that the prescriptions of 
international donors are not static but constantly revised and adapted. 
Different donors might favor contradictory policies at certain moments. 
Donor influence is higher when this is not the case (see Shriwise, Chap. 
2, this volume).
Both countries sought and followed ILO advice for pension reforms. 
In Kenya, the “National Social Security Fund” (NSSF) was in 2013 
turned from a lump-sum provision scheme into a pension scheme with 
monthly payments (Künzler 2016b). Early 2020, contributions to be 
deducted from civil servants’ pay were  announced. In Tanzania, the 
 transformation of the “National Provident Fund” (NPF) into the NSSF 
was decided in 1996. Monthly payments were introduced and coverage 
was extended to former non-pensionable employees of the central 
 government, the formal private sector and the self-employed. In 1999, 
the previous non-contributory pay-as-you-go pension system for employ-
ees of the central government was changed to a contributory scheme 
offering a monthly pension. However, in recent years the focus switched—
as it did in Kenya—to cash transfers, the topic of the next subsection.
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 Cash Transfers
Cash transfers are used in several policy fields, and different donors sup-
port different varieties of cash transfers. Empirical evidence shows that 
African countries with more financial resources (leverage) and also some 
poorer countries used their room of manoeuver and adopted uncondi-
tional cash transfer programs with the support of various donors (Simpson 
2018). In contrast, poorer countries more frequently adopted conditional 
cash transfer programs with support from the World Bank. Indeed, 
Kenya adopted unconditional cash transfers supported by the World 
Bank and other donors, while Tanzania introduced a conditional cash 
transfer with support of the World Bank and other donors.
In Kenya, UNICEF used the run-up to the 2002 elections to cam-
paign for orphans and vulnerable children and made parliamentary can-
didates sign a call to action (Alviar and Pearson 2009). More than 100 of 
them later became Members of Parliament, including the new president, 
Kibaki, and many ministers of his cabinet. After the elections, a pre-pilot 
and then a pilot for a “Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children” (CT-OVC) were started, both financed by donors such as the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), 
DFID, UNICEF, the United States Agency for International Development 
and World Bank. UNICEF also provided three technical advisors to the 
Kenyan government (Ouma and Adésínà 2019, 385). However, the 
influence of this kind of external actors is very difficult to assess. UNICEF 
continued lobbying, not least by financing study trips to Colombia and 
Jamaica where cash transfer programs existed. These trips made some key 
officials change their critical attitude toward cash transfer programs, 
including fears of dependency (Ikiara 2009, 21). Among the early key 
supporters was former Vice-President Awori. Conditionality was initially 
considered but then dropped. The Ministry of Finance considerably mul-
tiplied the initial budget allocation in subsequent years. This continued 
after the 2007 election, when opposition politicians were included in a 
Government of National Unity. The new Prime Minister Raila Odinga, 
who had narrowly lost the presidential elections to Kibaki, also became 
supportive after a study trip to India (Ikiara 2009, 21). Donors such as 
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the World Bank, DFID, UNICEF and SIDA contributed. However, the 
World Bank contribution is a credit facility that has to be repaid. In this 
sense, the notion of donor support is misleading. Cautious domestic 
voices warned against rising debts (Ikiara 2009, 17). The second major 
cash transfer program is the “Hunger Safety Net Programme” (HSNP) in 
2008, conceived and funded by DFID without much consultation with 
the Kenyan government (Ouma and Adésínà 2019, 386). Smaller pro-
grams include the “Older Persons Cash Transfer”, the “Disability Grant” 
and the “Urban Food Subsidy” (Künzler 2016b).
After the election of the new president, Uhuru Kenyatta, in 2013 the 
“Urban Food Subsidy”, advocated by NGOs Concern and Oxfam, was 
suspended in 2016. However, in February 2014 the “Disability Grant”, 
the pensions-tested “Older Persons Cash Transfer” and the CT-OVC 
were expanded and consolidated under the name of “Inua Jamii Cash 
Programme”. Remarkably, the HSNP, which was rather imposed on the 
Kenyan government, was not included. The “Inua Jamii Cash Programme” 
was again supported by a loan from the World Bank. In a speech on the 
occasion of its introduction, President Kenyatta presented this program 
as a responsibility of the government toward the population (RoK 2014). 
There were no references to questions of affordability or dependency of 
recipients. In recent years the program has been further expanded and an 
additional 500,000 Kenyans aged 70 years and above have been included 
by a top-down decision. The cash transfer program also includes NHIF 
cover for the elderly and aims at universal coverage of this age group. 
Finance Minister Rotich was cited by media in favor of this inclusion and 
without concerns regarding affordability or dependency (Nyataya 2017). 
Indeed, this quite remarkable expansion of social policies in Kenya did 
not trigger any significant public discussions about affordability and sus-
tainability. This is not to say that there are no discussions about the 
growth of government expenditures. However, cash transfer programs are 
generally not blamed for this. President Kenyatta even legitimized the 
proposed levy of value added tax on petroleum products with references 
to free education and cash transfers to the elderly.
Donor support clearly worked in favor of the introduction of the 
orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) and HSNP cash transfers. 
While several donors were involved, they pushed in the same direction. 
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However, there are important domestic co-drivers. It is hardly a coinci-
dence that cash transfers were introduced in the context of growing 
political competition. Since 2003, the country has been governed by 
presidents and vice-presidents from different, highly personality-driven 
and thus constantly changing political parties. They have a short-term 
focus on their (re)election. In 2013, decentralization was introduced 
and political competition on the subnational level intensified. The 
expansion of cash transfers gave national-level politicians important 
leverage at the local level, as the local Member of Parliament is involved 
in the selection of beneficiaries. In the context of term limits and per-
sonality-driven political parties, politicians have incentives to incur 
debts, as neither they nor their parties will necessarily be in power when 
the debts have to be repaid. Domestic priorities are thus important 
intermediary factors that shape the way global goals and donor priorities 
are translated into national policies.
In contrast to this Kenyan experience, concerns of affordability and 
long-term sustainability are more important in Tanzania. By way of illus-
tration, President Mkapa (2005, 61) called debts dangerous for the free-
dom of the country. This concern stems from the colonial past but is also 
reinforced by a political system where a dominant party has been in 
power since independence and has a self-conceived notion of its perpet-
ual responsibility for the country. In line with this is a preference for 
more restricted social policies.11 In 2008, donors such as the World Bank, 
Japan, the USA and Norway supported a pilot project of the “Tanzania 
Mainland Social Action Fund” (TASAF) that paid a cash transfer on con-
dition of regular school attendance by children or regular health checks 
for elderly (“Community-Based Conditional Cash Transfer”, CB-CCT). 
This pilot followed a World Bank-funded workshop in 2005 (Ulriksen 
2016a). Interestingly, the World Bank took officials on study trips to 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Jamaica, resulting in a different kind of policy learn-
ing than the Jamaica trip mentioned for the CT-OVC in Kenya. In 
Tanzania, key domestic players (politicians of the ruling party, Ministry 
11 One example is the program for most vulnerable children which, in contrast to Kenya, does not 
include a cash transfer but rather small in-kind transfers (Ulriksen 2016b, 5).
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of Finance, TASAF), the government and the World Bank alike favored 
conditional transfers and opted for scaling them up.
Concerning cash transfers, not much happened in the run-up to the 
2010 elections, when the image of the ruling party was marred by high- 
level corruption scandals. The focus of the ruling party was on fertilizer 
subsidies, whose coverage was expanded prior to the elections to include 
rice- and maize-growing districts (Kjær and Therkildsen 2013, 600). 
Members of the ruling party dominate the councils that choose the ben-
eficiaries of the subsidies. This is an interesting case of policy learning: 
“Interviews with (…) party officials show that the role of subsidies in the 
Malawi elections inspired the (…) leadership” (Kjær and Therkildsen 
2013, 601). The World Bank, previously against fertilizer subsidies, 
changed its stance and supported this expansion.
In 2012, the government approved the “Productive Social Safety Net” 
(PSSN) program that included a conditional cash transfer targeting the 
extremely poor population and a public work component (Ulriksen 
2016a). The cash transfer component is rooted in the CB-CCT men-
tioned above and supported by the World Bank and other donors such as 
DFID and SIDA. In contrast to Kenya, in Tanzania the World Bank has 
a strong preference for a restricted cash transfer program that is in line 
with domestic political priorities. The PSSN has a strong productivist 
touch (Ulriksen 2016b, 17). According to Ulriksen (2016a), the idea of 
productivity and co-responsibility was an important argument for an 
upscaling of the conditional cash transfer (CCT) program. This does not 
mean that the government did not toy with the idea of a universal social 
pension, at certain moments favored by DFID and other donors as well 
as the Ministry of Labour. Announced ahead of the 2015 election, it has 
yet to be introduced. Instead, the government supported conditional 
cash transfers, which helped to convince donors to support the PSSN 
(Ulriksen 2016a). From a donor perspective, an additional advantage of 
the PSSN as opposed to the social pension was that the PSSN was already 
operational. For the government, the timing of the identification of addi-
tional beneficiaries of the scaled-up PSSN just ahead of the 2015 elec-
tions was politically advantageous. Nevertheless, there is lacking financial 
commitment with the CCT component of the PSSN (Jacob and Pedersen 
2018, 21). Indeed, under the new president, Magufuli, the CCT compo-
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nent of the PSSN seems to have become less important than the public 
works element, in contrast to opposing donor preferences (Jacob and 
Pedersen 2018).
 The Interplay Between External Actors 
and National Factors
 The Interplay Between External Actors and Domestic 
Factors in the Colonial Period
This subsection attempts not only to compare the influence of colonial-
ism with regard to similarities and differences between social policies in 
Kenya and Tanzania but also to discuss the role of domestic actors. 
Neither colonial Kenya’s nor Tanganyika’s social policies fit very well to 
Mkandawire’s (2016) descriptions of labor reserve and cash crop econo-
mies. In Kenya there was a dual policy of segregation, imposed by par-
ticular colonial officials against the resistance of parts of the white settler 
population (Maxon 1980). However, there was no significant welfare 
system for white settlers. These settlers were in general often in conflict 
with colonial officers in Nairobi and the Colonial Office in London 
(Anderson and Throup 1985). However, they were less influential than 
their counterparts in classic examples of labor reserves such as South 
Africa. Against their interests, the colonial state intervened and encour-
aged African cash crop production alongside settler production. Thus, 
agricultural production could support the rural poor in colonial Kenya, 
as was the case in Tanganyika.
Consequently, the general orientation of colonial social policies was 
surprisingly similar, in contradiction to the theoretically expected differ-
ences. In both colonies there were isolated and short-lived colonial  welfare 
initiatives in urban centers. This was in line with the vision of the Colonial 
Office in London that favored educated and urban working- class Africans 
(see Seekings, Chap. 5, this volume). However, it was in conflict with the 
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rural focus of colonial officers in Kenya and Tanganyika.12 Local colonial 
officers impeded or even boycotted the initiatives of the disconnected 
Colonial Office (Lewis 2000; Eckert 2004). Concerned with the political 
legitimacy of colonial rule in rural areas, local colonial officers focused on 
efficient rural institutions that were able to provide social welfare.
The policy fields discussed were also less different than theory 
(Mkandawire 2016) assumes: Neither colony focused much on family 
allowances, and there were no comprehensive colonial pension schemes 
for formal sector workers outside the civil service. In these policy fields, 
local colonial officers and the Colonial Office in London shared quite 
similar positions. More in line with Mkandawire (2016), Kenya has a 
stronger focus on formal sector workers insofar as minimum wages were 
actually introduced. Also in support of Mkandawire’s (2010, 2016) 
claim, colonial Kenya had a higher extractive capacity and a higher per 
capita tax income. A more indirect effect linked to the lower extractive 
capacity of Tanganyika is that the late colonial state spent less and placed 
more emphasis on local-level engagement than Kenya. Exemplary in this 
respect was famine relief: While famine relief involved the central colo-
nial government in Kenya, it was not a government obligation but rather 
an ethical imperative at the district level in Tanganyika. This also shows 
that it is too simplistic to equate colonial influences with external influ-
ences, as in this policy field colonial officers based in Kenya and 
Tanganyika clearly mattered. Local actors are also important for other 
forms of external influence, as the next subsection will show.
 International Donors and Their Interplay 
with National Factors
Concerning the influence of international donors, both countries sup-
port the theoretical assumption that the influence of international donors 
was quite high during the period of structural adjustment. Both coun-
tries were in serious financial troubles, and there were no alternatives 
12 In Kenya, their opposition to urban welfare initiatives was strongly supported by white settlers 
(Lewis 2000, 244).
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available to avoid the introduction of user fees. However, there were dif-
ferences in terms of room for manoeuver. Tanzania was quite quickly 
sanctioned with a reduction in aid and pushed to introduce structural 
adjustment measures. Kenya had more leverage in the international sys-
tem, being an important ally of Western powers in a region with socialist 
governments and civil wars (see Mioni and Petersen, Chap. 3, this vol-
ume). While the introduction of user fees has been on the domestic 
agenda for several years, it took World Bank pressure to introduce them 
swiftly. However, Kenya could sway policies with regard to domestic con-
cerns without being sanctioned. Finally, another crucial effect of donor 
influence in both countries is the introduction of multiparty elections.
The empirical observations in the fields of health care and education 
after the turn of the millennium point to a number of conclusions. First, 
where donor policies were clear and significant support available (free 
primary education), countries were quick to follow the international pre-
scription. These prescriptions were important in electoral campaigns, as 
they have a universal electoral appeal. Where there was no significant 
donor support, countries nevertheless introduced policies in line with the 
international prescriptions (free secondary education), but with quite a 
significant time lag. No clear picture emerges where donor prescriptions 
are not clear and support is indirect or fragmented (health care). In both 
cases, domestic politics are important for the timing of social policy 
changes: They cluster around elections. Different social policy fields 
might be substitutes. There were never two major social policy changes 
around one election. However, there were also elections without major 
social policy reform. This concerned the second terms of Kibaki (2007) 
and Kikwete (2010), but not the second term of Kenyatta (2017). A final 
observation is that there is commitment to cost-sharing in the health sec-
tor in Tanzania, while Kenya introduced a policy of fee exemption 
policies.
The influence of international donors seems to be more limited in 
another social policy field that has also become more important since the 
turn of the millennium. Concerns with affordability shaped the way in 
which Tanzania made use of a World Bank credit for the introduction of 
a partly conditional cash transfer program. In Kenya, such concerns are 
quite absent, and unconditional cash transfers have been expanded in 
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recent years. This difference is also reinforced by the differences in the 
countries’ respective contemporary political systems. While there is elec-
toral pressure in Tanzania and the implementation of the PSSN was sped 
up before the 2015 elections, the ruling party has been in power since 
independence, and long-term financial sustainability is embedded in its 
self-conception. In contrast, since 2003 Kenya has been governed by 
presidents and vice-presidents from different, highly personality-driven 
and thus constantly changing political parties with short-term policies 
focused on the next elections. Kenya spends more on social assistance.13 
Consequently, the debt level is much higher in Kenya, where social poli-
cies are continuously expanded without much concern for affordability.14 
In addition to differences in the contemporary political systems and 
resulting different kinds of electoral pressure, this key difference between 
Kenya and Tanzania is rooted in the colonial past. In line with the expec-
tations of Mkandawire (2016), former colonial labor reserve Kenya has 
indeed got broader tax-financed social policies and is less concerned with 
affordability.
 Conclusion
This conclusion starts by discussing the influence of external actors in 
Kenya and Tanzania. In the colonial period, the Colonial Office in 
London tried to shape the general outline of social policies and developed 
a focus on educated and urban working-class Africans. Colonial officers 
in Kenya and Tanganyika subverted this vision with their rural focus. 
Consequently, colonial welfare initiatives in urban centers in Kenya and 
13 World Bank (2018b) data show that the total spending on social assistance as a percentage of 
GDP is clearly higher in Kenya (2.52% in 2010) compared to Tanzania (0.29% in 2009). More 
recent data will be higher in both countries, but the effects of the new cash transfer programs still 
have to be researched. Interestingly, again according to older data, Kenya’s social assistance spend-
ing is more pro-poor than Tanzania’s: 8% of the benefits went to the poorest quintile in Kenya, 
compared to 1% in Tanzania (World Bank 2018b). In both countries, a considerable part of gov-
ernment expenditure goes to civil service pensions.
14 Debt was at US $41.91 billion in June 2017, compared to US $23.69 billion in Tanzania (East 
African 2017). Looking at time series data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2018a), debt services have been higher in Kenya than in Tanzania throughout the period from 
1971 to 2016. Of course, this level of debt is not only caused by social policies.
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Tanganyika were surprisingly similar but isolated and short-lived. While 
white settlers and African actors also tried to shape social policies, local 
colonial officers were key. Concerning the absence of family allowances 
and of a comprehensive pension scheme for formal sector workers out-
side the civil service, there was no conflict of interests between local colo-
nial officers and the Colonial Office. In these policy fields, Kenya and 
Tanganyika fit very well into the general pattern of British colonies. 
Finally in another policy field, famine relief, local colonial actors acted 
without reference to the Colonial Office.
Concerning the influence of external actors in the post-colonial period, 
there is no systematic theory explaining how successful international 
donors are with influencing domestic social policies. The empirical evi-
dence for the room for manoeuver available to national governments is 
ambiguous. Donor influence varies between policy fields and is bigger if 
donor leverage is big and if donors support the same policies (e.g. during 
structural adjustment programs). Poorer countries have less leverage to 
resist policy recommendations of key international donors. The influence 
of international donors is limited if their policy proposals adversely affect 
the priorities of key domestic policy actors and especially if a country has 
leverage in the international system. Domestic political elites might have 
other priorities than international donors and might be reluctant to scale 
up pilot projects or assume financial responsibilities after donor funding 
has come to an end. Empirical evidence of domestic elite priorities 
includes a focus on economic growth and productivity and worries about 
dependency. In addition, domestic political elites might choose social 
policies because of their electoral appeal, without the support of interna-
tional donors. This underlines the importance of domestic factors for 
social policies.
In both the colonial and the post-colonial periods, certain local actors 
matter as mediators of external influences. In the colonial period, key 
colonial officers subverted the visions of the Colonial Office if they 
deemed them inappropriate. They also had scope for their own initia-
tives. In both cases, concerns with the legitimacy of colonial rule in rural 
areas were important motivations. White settlers and African actors are 
less able to shape colonial social policies. In the post-colonial period, 
domestic political elites (especially presidents and influential ministers) 
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are key. They resist and sometimes subvert donor initiatives if their priori-
ties are affected and donor leverage is limited. With or without donor 
support, domestic political elites have a certain preference for social poli-
cies that fit their priorities (focus on economic growth and productivity) 
and have an electoral appeal. These policies are not necessarily supported 
by the bureaucrats that have to implement them. Bureaucrats as well as 
other domestic actors, such as NGOs, seem to matter more for the tech-
nical aspects of social policies than landmark decisions.
An important result that indicates some research gaps is the more indi-
rect but lasting effect linked to the lower extractive capacity of Tanganyika. 
In line with the expectations of Mkandawire (2016), former colonial 
labor reserve Kenya does indeed have broader tax-financed social policies. 
It is less concerned with affordability. Zanzibar, another colonial labor 
reserve, shows a similar pattern. In 2016 it introduced a universal, tax- 
financed old-age pension (Seekings 2016). As in Kenya, the discourse 
centers more on government responsibility than on fears of dependence. 
Further research could focus on other countries of similar type that are 
less researched and might offer contrasting evidence, for example 
Burundi, Madagascar or Eswatini. Also worth analyzing are the countries 
belonging to what Amin (1972, 504) called the “Africa of the concession- 
owning companies”. Also Mkandawire (2016, 2) uses this term, without 
saying much about these countries concentrated in Central Africa. 
Indeed, as this group consists of Francophone and some Iberophone 
countries, they constitute an astonishing gap in the social policy literature.
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and Botswana
Jeremy Seekings
 Introduction: The Legacy of Colonialism 
on Social Protection
The boundaries of empire appear to have had a profound and lasting 
effect on social protection policy, even into the 2000s. Whether a terri-
tory was colonized by the Spanish, French, Germans, Portuguese, Italians 
or British—or the Russians, Japanese or Americans—seems to correlate 
with both the onset and the subsequent direction and pace of policy 
reforms. In 2011, Midgley and Piachaud asserted that “social policy in 
the developing world cannot be understood without examining the way 
welfare policies and programmes introduced during the imperial era have 
continued to influence current policy-making” (2011, 10). Their edited 
collection included suggestive case studies of colonial influence within 
the British Empire. Schmitt (2015) demonstrates that the timing of the 
adoption of different kinds of social security programs differed 
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systematically between French, British and Spanish colonies (and former 
colonies). French colonies were quick to introduce social insurance in the 
form of family allowances but rarely (even long after independence) 
introduced any old-age pensions. Spanish colonies were the first to intro-
duce old-age pensions. British colonies varied, but some of them at least 
were quick to provide for old age (often through non-contributory social 
assistance), and almost none introduced family allowances. In her chap-
ter in this volume, Schmitt (2019) shows that the probability of a former 
French colony having introduced any social assistance program is mas-
sively lower and the probability of a former British colony having done so 
is very much higher than in other countries across the Global South. In 
previous work, I also found that a history of British colonization was 
closely correlated with high expenditure on social assistance relative to 
expenditure on social insurance, that is, a characteristic of the British 
welfare regime (Seekings 2014). The apparently random geography of 
imperial conquest—that is, which imperial power colonized any particu-
lar territory—appears to have had an enduring effect on public policy.
There are three possible explanations for these enduring differences 
between social protection in different parts of the world. First, the impe-
rial power might have directly influenced policy during either the colo-
nial or post-colonial periods, and there was some form of path dependence 
thereafter. Second, the imperial power might have indirectly influenced 
policy, perhaps through shaping the institutional environment. Third, 
imperial conquest might not have been entirely random, in that local 
conditions differed between the imperial empires. There are reasons for 
taking seriously all three possible explanations.
The easy explanation for inter-imperial variation in policy legacies is 
that different imperial powers simply imposed their own models on their 
colonies and these models then persisted over time through some process 
of path dependency. For example, the French imposed their 1952 Code 
du Travail across the whole of their empire (Cooper 1996), which cer-
tainly helps to explain the enduring prevalence of child allowances in 
former French colonies (Schmitt 2015). The British, however, did not 
impose any similarly centralized, monolithic model on their colonies. As 
Schmitt (2015) emphasizes, Britain’s policy was to decentralize policy- 
making (and financial responsibility) to colonial governments. 
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Unsurprisingly, Schmitt shows, there was more variation for decades after 
independence between former British colonies than among former 
French colonies. Nonetheless, post-imperial aid flows—and the influence 
that accompanies these—track the former boundaries of empire (see 
Becker, Chap. 7, this volume). British aid and influence, through its 
Department for International Development (DFID), is thus concen-
trated in former British colonies. It would not be surprising if DFID’s 
policy preferences were most influential in former British colonies.
Imperial legacies might also reflect indirect influences. This appears to 
have been the case with respect to schooling. Most British colonies in 
Africa had much higher enrolment rates in the 1950s than either French 
or Portuguese colonies, and this had both direct and indirect effects long 
after independence. Close analysis reveals that this inter-imperial varia-
tion was due not so much to direct differences in expenditure on educa-
tion by colonial governments but rather to the indirect effects of colonial 
policies toward Christian missions. Crucially, it seems, British colonial 
governments allowed Christian missionaries to compete for converts, 
which they did in large part through expanding education through mis-
sion schools (Frankema 2012). Indirect influences might inform path 
dependence also. Lange (2009) suggests that variation—perhaps inter- 
imperial in origin—between direct and indirect rules had enduring con-
sequences on the character of the state, politics and public policy. Schmitt 
also suggests that colonialism “shaped the institutional arrangements of 
the state and the power and preferences of actors” (2015, 332).
Differences between former British, Spanish and French colonies 
might reflect exogenous differences in local conditions. The samples of 
territories analyzed by Schmitt (2015) comprised Spanish colonies in 
Latin America or the Caribbean, French colonies that were mostly in 
Africa and British colonies that were much more widely dispersed across 
the world. The more pronounced heterogeneity in the date of adoption 
of welfare programs in British colonies might reflect the greater variation 
in local conditions as well as the British policy of decentralizing policy- 
making. The challenges facing post-colonial states in Latin America were 
very different to those facing their peers in Eastern Europe and East Asia 
(Haggard and Kaufman 2008). Conditions across most of Africa (and 
parts of South Asia) were very different to those in these three regions. 
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Africa as a whole differed from large parts of Latin America in terms of 
the relative sizes of indigenous, slave and settler/immigrant populations. 
Across most of Africa, but only in some parts of Latin America, for exam-
ple, indigenous, peasant-based agrarian societies survived colonization. 
Even within Africa, conditions may have differed between those areas 
colonized by France and those colonized by Britain. The former had 
larger Islamic populations and contained a smaller proportion of fertile 
areas than the latter (which might help explain why there was weaker 
demand for education in French colonies than in British ones—see 
Frankema 2012; Cogneau and Moradi 2014; Dupraz 2017). Mkandawire 
(2015) found that taxation and social expenditure in Africa reflected the 
economic character of a colony, not the colonial power per se. The crucial 
difference was between cash crop economies, mostly in West Africa, and 
the “labor reserve” economies, mostly in East and Southern Africa. The 
kind of economy was clearly affected by colonial policies of settlement 
and development but also reflected natural and other differences that 
were exogenous to colonial policy. In Mkandawire’s analysis, the British 
cash-cropping colonial economies of West Africa resembled their French 
colonial neighbors, while Rwanda and Burundi resembled British labor 
reserve economies. The implication of this is that the evolution of a dis-
tinct model or models of social protection in Anglophone East and 
Southern Africa might reflect similarities in local conditions as much as 
or more than the fact that these territories were colonized by Britain.
This chapter examines these three categories of explanation—and 
hence when, how and why external actors have been influential—through 
two case studies of welfare policy-making over time. Both cases were part 
of the British Empire through the early and mid-twentieth century, and 
both were in labor reserves rather than cash-cropping territories. Both 
ended up, by the end of the twentieth century, with variants of the same 
kind of welfare regime, with a strong focus on means-tested social assis-
tance relative to social insurance (as well as largely tax-financed public 
health systems alongside large private health sectors). Yet the two cases 
reveal two very different routes to these outcomes, with external actors 
playing quite different roles.
First, I consider the case of South Africa which institutionalized a sys-
tem combining social assistance with “semi-social” insurance (explained 
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below) between the 1920s and 1940s and retains this basic system today, 
in the 2010s. The South African case is characterized by significant impe-
rial influence in the formative period, followed by strong path depen-
dence, such that the system survived hostility from both the governing 
National Party under apartheid (from 1948 to 1994) and the governing 
African National Congress (ANC) following democratic elections in 
1994. Second, the chapter examines the case of Botswana, whose welfare 
state originated in drought relief programs in the 1960s and later evolved 
into social assistance programs.
The cases of South Africa and Botswana illustrate two very different 
pathways toward welfare states, with some common characteristics 
(although the welfare state in Botswana remains more conservative than 
the South African one, in important respects). While both pathways were 
shaped by ideas circulating in primarily English-speaking networks, the 
mechanisms of influence were far more complex than any simple imposi-
tion of a British model. Both the initial design of public policies and their 
subsequent path-dependent expansion reflected the resonance of specific 
models to local conditions and ideas.
South Africa and Botswana ended up with social protection systems 
with important similarities—although the South African system is far 
more generous—and some common features with British models not 
because they copied British models, but because the basic ideas inform-
ing British public policy were shared by political elites in parts of Southern 
Africa. Crucially, in both South Africa and Botswana social protection 
policies evolved on the basis of a dominant elite ideology that states 
should leave activities to the market except if the market fails to provide 
adequately for deserving groups of poor people. This was “liberal” in the 
sense that the state’s role in social welfare (defined narrowly as transfers in 
cash or kind, but excluding public education) was conceived as being 
residual, provided only for people deemed deserving in that they were 
unable to provide for themselves (and lacked kin who could provide for 
them; see Chinyoka and Ulriksen, Chap. 10, this volume). In practice, 
this meant an emphasis on programmatic support for the specific catego-
ries of destitute people considered deserving (especially the elderly and 
disabled, and less often children, pregnant and breastfeeding mothers 
and single mothers) as well as (when necessary, especially during episodes 
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of drought) workfare for working-age, able-bodied adults. Local political 
imperatives drove these initially “residual” programs to expand into uni-
versal or quasi-universal ones.
This chapter suggests that all three explanations of the enduring differ-
ences in social protection have some relevance in Southern Africa. The 
case of South Africa suggests that foreign ideas shaped local policy 
debates, both prior to 1948 (when the most influential ideas came from 
the UK, Australia and New Zealand) and after 1948 (i.e. under apart-
heid, when neo-Calvinist theology from the Netherlands exerted signifi-
cant influence). The design of Botswana’s welfare state was also shaped by 
external ideas, through the World Food Programme (WFP). Institutional 
design mattered, indirectly, in that both elements of indirect rule and 
representative democracy ensured that elites were incentivized to intro-
duce and then conserve pro-poor programs. Both the first and second 
explanations contribute to understanding path dependency in these 
Southern African cases. Third, local conditions mattered in both South 
Africa and Botswana, as they posed specific challenges to the large num-
ber of small-scale farmers: climate and ecology (compounded by govern-
ment policy in the South African case) mattered, framing the expansion 
of social assistance programs in both cases.
 Imperial Influence in the Making of the South 
African Welfare State
South Africa has long been at the fore of welfare state-building in Africa. 
As early as 1937, the new Professor of Sociology at the University of the 
Witwatersrand proclaimed in his inaugural lecture that “Today the provi-
sion for [the] European population … is scarcely less complete than that 
of Great Britain” (Gray 1937, 270). He exaggerated somewhat, even with 
respect to the “European” minority. The African majority of the popula-
tion was almost entirely excluded. Nonetheless, the state paid means- 
tested pensions to elderly white men and women, pensions to white and 
colored people who were blind or otherwise disabled and cash grants-in- 
aid to poor people caring for children (as well as to institutions or 
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associations caring for children). During recessions, the state operated 
workfare programs for otherwise unemployed, mostly white men. Public 
education and hospital care for white people was financed almost entirely 
from taxes. In addition, nascent contributory pension schemes were 
beginning to provide for select groups of workers in formal employment.
While the Union of South Africa was self-governing (as a British 
“Dominion”), its political and bureaucratic elites were heavily influenced 
by the ideas and models concerning welfare policy that circulated through 
the British Empire during the first half of the twentieth century. 
Government commissions of inquiry and civil servants collected detailed 
information on the social insurance and social assistance programs in 
place across much of the world at the time, but they borrowed most from 
policies in Britain, as well as in the settler societies of Australia and New 
Zealand. The tax-financed, means-tested social pensions, introduced for 
white and colored people in 1928–1929, resembled the pensions intro-
duced in Britain itself in 1908 (see Schmitt, Chap. 6, this volume). 
Subsequent social assistance programs for the disabled and for single 
mothers and proposals for social insurance, first for pensions and later for 
unemployment and health also, drew on imperial precedents. Debate in 
Britain during the Second World War—including around the Beveridge 
Report, published in 1942—provided a strong impetus to the expansion 
of social assistance. In the early 1940s, ideas and models from New 
Zealand were also highly influential. In 1942, a member of parliament 
(MP) tabled a motion on social security, asking, “Can our government do 
what New Zealand has done?”1 One of the leading activists in civil soci-
ety in the early 1940s was from New Zealand (Seekings 2005).
The South African system was idiosyncratic, however, reflecting the 
adaptation of foreign models to local conditions and values. Policy- 
makers borrowed but did not copy. First, South Africa never imple-
mented a national system of social insurance (“national insurance”). The 
British model—providing for insurance against health and unemploy-
ment from 1911, and contributory pensions from 1925 (Boyer 2019)—
was rejected. The only social insurance was a very modest unemployment 
insurance program. Instead, successive governments required most white 
1 Hansard, 6 January 1942, col. 3304.
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workers to join government-regulated but privately operated, mostly 
sector-specific pension funds (i.e. “semi-social” insurance). Second, the 
South African social assistance programs were deeply racialized. African 
and Indian people were excluded entirely from social pensions until 
1944. When pensions were extended to them, they were discriminated 
against in terms of benefits. Social assistance programs were introduced 
originally by political parties representing white and “colored” voters 
with the goal of protecting white and colored South Africans from desti-
tution. For some Members of Parliament, this was motivated explicitly 
by the perceived need to preserve the racial income hierarchy. As one 
(white) Member of Parliament put it, “not a single white person should 
be allowed to go under” because the “small number of whites” had to 
stand together against the “uncivilised hoards”2 (Seekings 2007). 
Racialized solidarity entailed providing for white men, women and chil-
dren but excluding or discriminating deeply against the African majority 
of the population.
Social assistance was preferred to social insurance, in part because the 
leading (white) politicians, bureaucrats, academics, businessmen, trade 
unionists and other civil society activists were more firmly rooted in 
English-language circuits of ideas than in continental European models 
(although they were certainly aware of the latter, in part through the 
work of the International Labour Organization [ILO]). More strongly 
even than in Britain, Australia and New Zealand, the modernist ambi-
tions of socialist and “new liberal” welfare state-builders were reined in by 
the more classically liberal views of much of the white elite, with their 
preference for the market and a residual state. Modernist ambitions were 
also framed and contained by the overt or implicit racism of most white 
South Africans. “National” (i.e. social) insurance was supported by many 
technocrats, but the political leadership did not deem it necessary. 
Privately run pension funds provided sufficiently well for white workers 
who enjoyed privileged access to better-paid formal employment. As in 
Australia (Castles 1985), white workers were incorporated politically 
through the regulation of wages in the private sector as well as through 
public sector and parastatal employment, and through public services, 
2 Dr. Stals, Hansard, House of Assembly, 12 August 1924, col. 429–32.
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rather than through corporatist or Bismarckian models (Seekings and 
Nattrass 2005). This combination of wage regulation, “semi-social” 
insurance and social assistance made sense given that benefits were largely 
limited to the white minority.
“Poor whites” were politically important not only because elites sought 
to bolster a racialized solidarity among Afrikaners or white South Africans 
more broadly, but also because they had the vote in a highly competitive 
party system. Few black South Africans had any vote. Nonetheless, local 
conditions pushed the government to extend social pensions to black 
men and women in 1944. Just as “poor whites” were often the victims of 
deagrarianization, so the constraints on peasant agriculture in the 1940s 
were a major factor pushing local officials and even industrial employers 
to endorse the expansion of social pensions (Seekings 2005).
Policies were never imposed or simply transferred from Britain to 
South Africa. Officials in London had no direct influence in South Africa. 
But (white) reformers in the South African state, political parties and civil 
society officials were embedded in imperial networks through which both 
norms and policy models were diffused from both Britain and its other 
settler Dominions to South Africa. Models were adapted, however, to 
reflect the norms—including racialized and often racist norms—that 
were prevalent within the South African elite, as well as the political and 
economic conditions on the ground.
 Path Dependency and the Expansion of South 
Africa’s Welfare State
As of 2018/19, 90 years after the introduction of old-age pensions, South 
Africa’s welfare state remains a distinctive outlier in Africa. Monthly 
grants are paid to or for about 18 million elderly people, disabled people 
and children, or to one in three South Africans. These are paid for out of 
general taxation at a cost of about 3.5% of GDP. The state also operates 
by far the largest school feeding program in Africa, reaching 9 million 
children, as well as large workfare programs. Public education and health 
care are free for the poor. Contributory pension and medical aid schemes 
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cover many (but not all) people in formal employment (Seekings and 
Nattrass 2015). The ILO identifies South Africa as the “front runner” in 
Africa in terms of the coverage of social protection, with an “effective 
coverage” of 48% of the population (ILO 2017, 123).
While racial discrimination in eligibility and benefits has been abol-
ished, the basic design of the welfare state in the 2010s remains much the 
same as it did in the 1930s: the state supported the same categories of 
deserving poor through tax-financed, means-tested grants and able- 
bodied, working-age adults through workfare programs. Moreover, no 
social insurance had yet been introduced for either retirement or health 
care, and the unemployment insurance system covered very few of the 
unemployed. On the face of it, the post-apartheid welfare state in South 
Africa retained its original colonial-era design, with essentially parametric 
reforms that have allowed for the expansion of coverage of existing pro-
grams but not the introduction of new programs.
This apparent path dependence is especially striking given that the 
governing parties both under and after apartheid were ambivalent if not 
hostile toward the welfare state. In 1948, the more extreme wing of the 
National Party was elected into office. Not only was the National Party 
committed to the deepening of racial discrimination and segregation (i.e. 
apartheid), but its views on the welfare state were also deeply influenced 
by reformed Protestantism articulated by Dutch neo-Calvinist theolo-
gian and politician Abraham Kuyper. This foreign ideology was adapted 
to the local context in that the National Party rejected entirely the idea of 
a welfare state for the African population. On the basis of a variety of 
arguments—including that old-age pensions would encourage “the 
native to degenerate”,3 that they were culturally and socially inappropri-
ate and that they were paid for by white taxpayers—provision for African 
people was severely restricted. Even with respect to its white citizens, 
however, the National Party government was ambivalent about its welfare 
programs. Shaped by Kuyper’s ideas, the party’s leaders argued that fami-
lies should take responsibility for providing for family members: working 
people should save for their old age, adult children should take responsi-
bility for their aged parents and adult husbands and fathers should take 
3 Van Niekerk, Hansard, House of Assembly, 6 September 1948, col. 1593.
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responsibility for their wives and children. In this deeply conservative 
view, excessive public provision—that is, the “welfare state”—was “social-
istic”, undermined independence and responsibility and fostered instead 
dependency and delinquency. “Our State is a social welfare State as 
opposed to a socialist State”, one MP explained; “We must take care of 
the paupers, the indigents who need assistance. But do not let us give 
everyone the right to be taken care of, because we deprive our people of 
their sense of responsibility.”4 The National Party’s values were rooted in 
a neo-Calvinist conception of individual and familial responsibility, com-
bined with an emphasis on a racialized volk. This was much more conser-
vative than the kind of concern with social harmony that characterized 
social Catholicism and Christian Democracy at the same time in post- 
war Europe. Even the (white) opposition United Party retreated into a 
more conservative stance, advocating a residual welfare regime along 
American lines (Seekings 2020).
Despite their repeated declarations (influenced by religious ideas from 
Europe) that they were opposed to a welfare state, National Party govern-
ments for the most part expanded both social assistance and the semi- 
social insurance system, especially as they began to retreat from their 
grand apartheid project in the 1980s. While they sought to strengthen 
white families, they were unable to ensure that white families accommo-
dated and supported elderly parents. Expenditure grew rapidly on resi-
dential institutions for the elderly. Similarly, despite their enthusiasm to 
abolish social pensions for elderly African men and women, the impor-
tance of pensions to most African people created a very large vested inter-
est, while the apartheid-style devolution of responsibility to compliant 
African leaders gave an effective veto power to players whose modest 
legitimacy would vanish if they were complicit in the abolition of the 
pensions. As international and domestic pressure intensified on the apart-
heid state, persistent racial discrimination in benefits became less and less 
defensible. In the 1980s the National Party presided over major increases 
in the real value of the social pension paid to African people as it moved 
toward parity in benefits. Racial discrimination in benefits was finally 
ended in 1993, on the eve of the country’s first democratic elections 
4 De Wet, Hansard, House of Assembly, 22 February 1955, col. 1494–5.
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(although racial discrimination remained with respect to public expendi-
ture on education and health care). The semi-social insurance system 
expanded to accommodate most skilled and semi-skilled African workers 
in provident funds managed by newly legal trade unions. The existing 
programs thus not only created directly vested interests but also provided 
both symbolic and material incentives to groups of African people to 
demand their inclusion in the welfare state, creating even stronger vested 
interests.
When an ANC government was elected in South Africa’s first demo-
cratic elections, in 1994, it therefore inherited a welfare state designed 
more than 50 years earlier. While committed to the reduction of poverty 
among its mostly African support base, the ANC was ideologically ill- 
disposed to the idea of a welfare state. Without unmanageable debts and 
independent of foreign aid, the new government was not beholden to any 
international organizations or aid donors. It was, however, influenced by 
the developmentalist ideology that had been hegemonic across much of 
Africa since the 1950s. In his inaugural speech as newly elected President 
in May 1994, Nelson Mandela himself made it clear that the ANC would 
implement a developmental approach rather than distribute “handouts”. 
Repeatedly over the following 20-plus years, ANC leaders reiterated that 
South Africa needed a “developmental state” rather than a “welfare state”, 
valued the family over excessive individualism and worried about “depen-
dency”. ANC governments did rein in expenditure on residential institu-
tions for the elderly, considered abolishing grants for poor, single mothers 
and rejected calls for a basic income grant. They also proposed shifting 
the emphasis of social protection from social assistance and provident 
funds to social insurance, through national pension and health insurance 
programs. Civil society activists pushed for programmatic expansion. 
Faced with electoral competition, the ANC did expand massively grants 
for poor mothers (and other caregivers), but they rejected a series of other 
proposed reforms and (as of 2018) failed to implement their promised 
national insurance systems (Lund 2008; Proudlock 2011; Patel 2015; 
Seekings and Nattrass 2015; Button et al. 2018).
The ANC after 1994 found it as difficult as the National Party before 
1994 to resist the expansion of the welfare state. The dominant norms 
within the ruling party might be ambivalent or hostile to welfare statism, 
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but institutions, interests and popular ideas all contributed to path 
dependency. Institutionally, the consolidation of social assistance pro-
grams within the Department of Welfare (later renamed Social 
Development) created an institutional vested interest. ANC party struc-
tures (and MPs), fearing a popular backlash against programmatic 
retrenchment, wielded a potential veto. Faced with persistent poverty, the 
ANC expanded programs to maintain its electoral support. The existing 
programs created a massive vested interest in their continuation—except 
for residential institutions for elderly white people who comprised a 
politically weak constituency. Every suggestion that the trade union-run 
provident funds would be incorporated into a national pension fund sys-
tem was met with blanket opposition from the politically powerful trade 
unions. The promised national health insurance system was welcomed by 
the public sector unions but was resisted by the black as well as white 
middle classes, who had migrated to private health care after 1994, and 
prompted ambivalence even among sections of the working class who 
were covered by sector-specific or other medical aid schemes. Perhaps 
most importantly of all, the priority attached to deracialization generally 
meant that programs that had benefitted white South Africans primarily 
should be extended to all South Africans. The very idea of social assis-
tance had become so taken for granted that grants could be extended to 
African single mothers and even a basic income grant could be put on the 
agenda, despite widespread concern over the payment of grants to unde-
serving individuals.
At no point between the 1920s and 2010s did reforms to South Africa’s 
welfare state entail simple policy transfer from elsewhere. South African 
policy-makers were consistently determined to adapt foreign ideas and 
models to suit local circumstances. While foreign actors never had the 
power to impose their preferred policies, South African policy-makers 
were deeply influenced by foreign ideas. Between the 1920s and 1940s, 
policy-makers drew on some of the ideas and models in Britain (and 
other British Dominions) in introducing programs to provide primarily 
for South Africans of European descent. In the South African context, 
however, these programs served, inter alia, the racialized objective of 
securing white supremacy. In the early 1940s, debates in Britain and else-
where influenced some policy-makers to extend some programs to African 
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people, albeit on a discriminatory basis. From 1948, the National Party 
tried to reverse these reforms, in part because of the influence of a new set 
of foreign ideas, that is, deeply conservative neo-Calvinist ideas from the 
Netherlands. In the 1980s and 1990s global opprobrium over racial dis-
crimination contributed to the National Party’s slow deracialization of 
welfare programs. After 1994, ANC leaders drew on global developmen-
tal ideology (as well as their own conservative views about family) to resist 
the expansion of so-called handouts. Despite the ebbs and flows of ideas 
about welfare, the welfare programs introduced in the second quarter of 
the twentieth century were not only never retrenched to any significant 
extent but tended to expand through parametric reforms that extended 
the reach of existing programs. South Africa’s welfare state was reformed 
down a path that depended on its origins.
 External Actors, Drought Relief 
and State- Building in Botswana
The British colony (or, more precisely, Protectorate) of Bechuanaland 
(renamed Botswana at independence in 1966) was a very different con-
text to its neighbor South Africa. The territory was extremely poor and 
heavily dependent on remittances sent by migrant mineworkers in South 
Africa. There were very few European settlers or immigrants. Moreover, 
British colonial officials enjoyed considerable power until independence, 
although they chose to devolve considerable authority to Tswana chiefs 
under indirect rule. At the same time as South Africa was introducing 
and expanding welfare programs, the British colonial government in 
Bechuanaland made almost no provision for their subjects.
The absence of welfare programs in Bechuanaland was typical of British 
colonies in Africa. Britain might have devolved responsibility for policy- 
making to colonial officials on the ground, but it, nonetheless, generally 
provided those officials with clear guidance as to what policies they should 
make. When, during the Second World War, the Beveridge Report had 
prompted global interest in welfare state-building, Britain’s Colonial 
Office insisted that Beveridge’s proposals were inappropriate in societies 
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in “early stages of development” where the poor were provided for by kin 
or community and the priority was to increase agricultural output so as 
to raise the general standard of living. Even in some industrializing soci-
eties—such as the Copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia (later Zambia)—the 
fact that most industrial workers retired to rural villages obviated the 
need for “more sophisticated” social welfare programs. Only in societies 
where there was little or no peasant agriculture, as on islands such as 
Mauritius, might old-age pensions or other such programs be considered 
appropriate. In societies without large white settler or immigrant popula-
tions, the Colonial Office actively discouraged the kinds of reform already 
introduced in South Africa (and in some Caribbean colonies). The chal-
lenge of poverty among black people would be addressed primarily 
through agricultural and other economic development, which would 
generate the resources needed to expand the “social services”, that is, 
especially education and health care (Seekings 2013).
Colonial states were under pressure to protect colonial subjects against 
one specific risk: famine, which in Africa usually arose from drought and, 
more occasionally and locally, from pests (such as locusts) or flooding. 
The British Empire had a long experience with drought and famine in 
India. Official Famine Codes set out how colonial officials should respond 
to famine. Informed by nineteenth-century liberal thought in Britain, 
the Codes stipulated that free food should be distributed only to the truly 
“destitute” (including the elderly), while the able-bodied poor should 
earn minimal rations of food through food-for-work programs. The 
Famine Codes were sometimes catastrophically inadequate (as evident in 
the Bengal Famine of 1942) but were generally regarded as useful enough 
that they (and subsequent operational manuals) were embraced by Indian 
governments after independence. Colonial officials in Africa faced regu-
lar famines and sometimes responded with limited relief programs, 
although only in the Sudan did officials draft a Famine Code (De Waal 
1989; Iliffe 1990). British colonial officials replicated the kind of approach 
developed in India: wherever possible, drought should be addressed 
through the market, in that members of poor rural families could work 
for wages as migrant laborers, remit their earnings and their rural families 
could then buy food that had been supplied to rural areas by merchants; 
if this was insufficient, local authorities (typically chiefs) should intervene; 
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colonial governments themselves should intervene only in dire emer-
gency. In the mid-twentieth century this approach proved broadly effec-
tive in some territories (including Southern Rhodesia: see Iliffe 1990) 
but not in others (most notably Nyasaland/Malawi in 1949: see 
Vaughan 1987).
Bechuanaland, although especially vulnerable to drought, experienced 
no major droughts in the 1940s or 1950s. In the early 1960s, however, 
several years of drought threatened mass famine. The colonial govern-
ment—in the process of transferring power to local leaders—reacted very 
slowly. In 1965, the Bechuanaland (later Botswana) Democratic Party 
(BDP) headed by Seretse Khama and Quett Masire was elected as the 
territory’s new government, and the following year Botswana achieved 
independence. The BDP seized control of drought relief, securing mas-
sive food supplies from the WFP, a then newly established United Nations 
agency. Food aid was distributed to between one-third and one-half of 
the population through feeding schemes. The scale of these emergency 
programs was unprecedented in the territory.
It quickly became apparent that continued food aid from the WFP 
required a shift in approach. While the WFP could provide emergency 
assistance for only a limited period, it could support longer-lasting “devel-
opmental” programs that helped to increase production as well as keep 
people alive. The WFP was happy to support school and other feeding 
schemes for “vulnerable” groups (school and pre-school children, preg-
nant and breastfeeding mothers) and destitute rations for the elderly and 
disabled. It was unwilling to provide food to able-bodied adults. The new 
government of Botswana therefore introduced workfare programs, pro-
viding food for work to men and women, with the intention of support-
ing whole families. By the end of the 1960s, the Botswana government 
had put in place the key features of the Indian Famine Codes, although 
there is no evidence that it was even aware of them. Insofar as the design 
of the programs was influenced from elsewhere, it appears to have been 
the WFP rather than the Colonial Office in London (Seekings 2016a). 
While the WFP remains one of the least researched international organi-
zations (but see Shaw 2001), it appears that its approach was framed by 
the developmentalist ideology that was hegemonic at the time: food 
might be handed out in short-term emergencies, but the medium- and 
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long-term priority was “development” to improve long-term food 
security.
Seretse Khama, the first president of Botswana, was steeped in broadly 
liberal British values. He had been educated at a mission school, then at 
South African and British universities, had been living (in exile) in Britain 
for several years, married a British woman and employed British advisors 
and speech writers (Tlou et al. 1995). His ideology was, however, rooted 
in Tswana norms. In the late 1960s and 1970s (before his death in 1980), 
he articulated a benign conservative ideology of responsibility for the 
poor. He and his successor, Quett Masire, were respectful of the private 
sector and wary of enlarging the state. But they saw the new state as 
assuming the responsibilities for the deserving poor that chiefs, commu-
nities and kin had shouldered hitherto. In this ideology, the deserving 
poor were those poor people who were unable to support themselves: the 
destitute elderly and infirm, children and mothers. Expectations of reci-
procity underlay public responsibility. Anyone who could—that is, able- 
bodied adults—had a responsibility to work, to support their dependents 
and to contribute to the common good, hence the emphasis on workfare. 
This ideology of welfare was rooted in agrarian conditions. Historically, 
the availability of land meant that people’s welfare depended primarily on 
work, such that relief was required only when people could not work 
(and could not be supported by working kin) or when natural disasters 
such as drought meant that, in effect, there was no work. While the ideol-
ogy has some similarities to more liberal versions of conservatism in 
Britain (specifically, “one nation” conservatism), its roots lay in a society 
very different to British society (Seekings 2016b).
While most of the 1970s were years of good rains, Botswana persisted 
with the programs introduced in the previous decade: school and other 
feeding schemes (supported by the WFP), destitute rations and (when 
necessary) workfare. These welfare programs were integral not only to 
resilient support for the BDP among voters but also to the construction 
of a modern state. When drought recurred in 1978–1979, the govern-
ment and WFP together provided drought relief for about 80% of the 
population. The government formalized its public works program (as the 
Labour-Intensive Public Works Programme) and introduced a new 
National Policy on Destitute Persons.
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The construction of a welfare state in Botswana was driven forward by 
further drought in the 1980s. Although cattle died on a massive scale, not 
a single person died, as huge volumes of WFP food aid were brought into 
and distributed within Botswana. In 1985, in the middle of the drought, 
a study of drought relief programs concluded that:
Drought relief is coming to assume a role in Botswana politics comparable 
to education and welfare in the industrialised countries. Indeed, it is already 
so popular that the leaders of the BDP have resisted pressures for cuts from 
bureaucrats. It will be difficult for the Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning, which quite naturally concerns itself with balancing the budget, 
to find a politically acceptable way of reducing the various relief pro-
grammes, once the drought is over. (Holm and Morgan 1985, 476)
When the drought finally broke, in the late 1980s, the WFP resumed 
discussions with the government of Botswana about withdrawing from 
the country. By then, as Holm and Morgan had already recognized, it 
had become difficult for the government of Botswana to reverse or to step 
away from the path it had followed hitherto.
External resources and ideas were thus central to the origins of the 
welfare state in Botswana. WFP food aid and accompanying ideas shaped 
what the new state provided, for whom and with what conditions. This 
was a very different set of origins to those in neighboring South Africa. 
Programs in Botswana were not aimed at European immigrants or set-
tlers. They did not draw on legislation from Britain (or other settler soci-
eties). They were not linked to any racialized political project, but rather 
to indigenous African norms and values. Their relevance was rooted 
in local conditions: specifically, the risks of drought in an agrarian society 
comprising mostly small farmers. As in South Africa, however, they were 
associated with a modernist project of state-building, they were residual 
in that poverty reduction should be achieved primarily through economic 
growth (or “development”) and they were focused on deserving catego-
ries of people who could not support themselves (especially the elderly, 
disabled and children) and only on working-age adults through workfare.
 J. Seekings
127
 Path Dependency and the Institutionalization 
of Social Assistance in Botswana
Since the mid-2000s, foreign actors have played a key role in putting 
ideas about social assistance onto the agenda in many African countries. 
Scholars and activists have argued for “just giving money to the poor”, on 
the grounds that it reduces poverty, is “developmental” (or at least redis-
tributes resources in a sustainable way) and is politically “transformative” 
(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004; Hanlon et  al. 2010; Ferguson 
2015). International organizations and aid donors have funded consul-
tants to assist with writing policy documents, spent large sums on study 
tours, seminars and other events to build coalitions of reform-friendly 
politicians and officials and embedded advisors in government depart-
ments (see Devereux and Kapingindza, Chap. 11, this volume). They 
have funded programs and sometimes established parallel, quasi-state 
bureaucracies. Reform has often appeared to be driven by donors 
(Devereux 2010). While international organizations and aid donors have 
shared a common enthusiasm for social assistance, their priorities have 
varied. The World Bank has favored targeted (i.e. means-tested) and con-
ditional cash transfers. The ILO calls for “social protection floors”. 
UNICEF promotes support for children, while HelpAge International 
promotes pensions for the elderly (von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016). 
In many former British colonies, DFID became a powerful player in pro-
moting the social protection agenda, providing advice, financial aid and 
technical support. Its preferred model was the unconditional cash trans-
fer with broad reach, not unlike the social pensions and other social assis-
tance introduced in Britain itself in the first half of the twentieth century 
(Hickey and Seekings 2019).
The institutionalization of social assistance in Botswana did not, how-
ever, reflect the influence of DFID or any other international organiza-
tion or aid donor. It resulted from domestic factors, although it was 
precipitated in part by the decision of the WFP to withdraw from 
Botswana (see Chinyoka and Ulriksen, Chap. 10, this volume). The 
WFP’s withdrawal was a reaction to the mining-fuelled rapid economic 
growth in Botswana that lifted the country out of the ranks of 
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“low-income” countries. The withdrawal compelled the government of 
Botswana to choose between assuming full responsibility for welfare pro-
grams and retrenching them. Not only did the government take over the 
programs, but it expanded and institutionalized them further over the 
following decade.
The first clear statement of the government’s position was in its 7th 
National Development Plan of 1991, which recognized that Botswana 
suffered from “a structural poverty problem” in that poverty persisted 
even in years of good rain (Botswana 1991, 17). Social justice and the 
decline of extended family support required government action: 
“Government food aid, its drought relief and recovery programmes, and 
other aid measures targeted for the destitute are intended to supplement 
the incomes of the very poor in order to ensure that their disposable 
incomes, both cash and in kind, provide them with a minimum standard 
of living” (ibid., 33). The Plan institutionalized funding for drought relief 
and welfare.
The government assumed full responsibility for massive school and 
other feeding programs, introduced universal old-age pensions (in 1996) 
and then provision for orphans and reformed its policy on (other) “desti-
tutes”. These reforms preceded the embrace of social protection among 
international organizations and aid donors. In the 2000s, international 
organizations did lobby the government of Botswana to expand its cash 
transfer programs. The government resisted, although it did expand its 
workfare programs.
By the 2000s, Botswana was providing modest support, in cash or in 
kind, to half or more of the country’s population. The country’s elite wor-
ries endlessly about “dependency”, but the persistence of poverty—
despite economic growth—raises the political costs of retrenching 
programs. Social change resulted in pressure to expand provision. The 
introduction of old-age pensions in 1996 was in part a technical response 
to the challenge of poverty among the elderly, modernizing the existing 
and clearly insufficient provision of destitute relief in the face of dimin-
ishing familial support. It was also a political response to the BDP’s elec-
toral vulnerability. Having won elections comfortably hitherto, the BDP 
was shocked in 1994 when it won barely 53% of the vote. The expansion 
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of workfare in the late 2000s also reflected electoral anxiety (Seekings 
2019; Hamer 2016).
In other parts of Africa, reforms of social protection have generally 
been negotiated between external organizations and local political actors. 
External organizations rarely get far, unless their ideas appeal to—or fit 
with the existing ideas of—at least some important local actors (Hickey 
et al. 2019). In Botswana, the WFP’s withdrawal was an important factor 
pushing the government to institutionalize drought relief programs into 
a welfare state, but there is no evidence that the WFP or any other inter-
national organization shaped significantly this process of policy reform. 
The process in Botswana following the WFP’s withdrawal was an entirely 
domestic one. Indeed, when the World Bank and UNICEF did (later) 
propose the introduction in Botswana of a general child grant, the gov-
ernment of Botswana declined to do so (Chinyoka 2019).
Both the expansion of the welfare state in the 1990s and early 2000s 
and the subsequent rejection of a proposed child grant reflected domestic 
factors: the BDP government had expanded the welfare state in line with 
its conservative ideology of responsibility and in response of its perceived 
political interests, but its norms of responsibility did not entail usurping 
the responsibility of the family to provide for non-orphaned children nor 
did it perceive its political interests lying in such a reform (perhaps 
because it assessed that many voters shared these conservative views). The 
domestic politics of policy reform was, however, path dependent. The 
introduction of old-age pensions, most notably, was imaginable only 
because the idea of poor relief was deeply entrenched through the provi-
sion for destitutes and other, originally drought-driven programs.
 Conclusion
The cases of South Africa and Botswana entail two different but parallel 
paths to welfare states built primarily around social assistance programs. 
While the welfare state in Botswana is more conservative than the South 
African one in some respects—including the generosity of benefits, the 
role accorded to family and the preference for paying benefits in kind 
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rather than cash—the basic design is common to both. Social assistance 
programs provide for the elderly, disabled and some children, with work-
fare for able-bodied adults. Social insurance remains limited. It is tempt-
ing to assume that these neighboring countries have similar systems 
because of a shared history, including common external influences.
In neither South Africa nor Botswana, however, were foreign models 
imposed. Insofar as there was policy transfer, it was with considerable 
adaptation to local norms and conditions. External influences entailed 
primarily the diffusion of ideas which were combined with local ideas to 
shape policy outcomes. At different times in both cases, foreign ideas 
meshed with local factors to drive reform. In the South African case, at 
other times powerful external ideas served to constrain welfare state- 
building. In the case of Botswana, external actors in the 2000s proposed 
expansionary reforms that were resisted by the government.
Diffusion is less surprising in the South African case, where the welfare 
state originated in initiatives to provide for South Africans of European 
origin in ways comparable to provision in Europe itself. Even in this case, 
however, foreign models and ideas were adapted. Adaptation was required 
because the kinds of risks that were most pressing in the Southern African 
context were not the same risks that faced workers as a result of industri-
alization and urbanization in the more industrialized countries of Europe 
or Latin America. Welfare states in East and Southern Africa, including 
South Africa, were framed by changes in the countryside. This was most 
obvious in Botswana, where the welfare state originated in programs of 
drought relief, to tide rural households through periods in which they 
could not feed themselves. In South Africa, also, many of the “poor 
whites” of the 1920s and 1930s—and poor African people in the 1940s—
were in or from rural areas, and their poverty stemmed more from changes 
in rural areas (deagrarianization) than from industrialization and urban-
ization (see Künzler, Chap. 4, this volume). In both countries, local con-
ditions encouraged policy-makers to prioritize economic growth or 
“development” and to see welfare programs as providing a residual safety 
net. The similarities between public policies in South Africa and Botswana 
thus reflect, in part, similar local conditions.
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Policies in South Africa and Botswana developed along paths that led 
to a common focus on social assistance not primarily because they were 
exposed to the kinds of ideas associated with British public policy (and 
the similar developmentalism underpinning the WFP) but because those 
ideas could easily be adapted to fit local conditions and norms. In both 
cases, targeted social assistance allowed not only for the provision of sup-
port to selected deserving categories but also for the exclusion of other 
categories of people deemed not to be deserving on the basis of need, 
custom or capacity. Insofar as we can identify a common model of social 
protection in Southern Africa, this resulted not from the imposition of 
any specific foreign model but rather from a process of contestation over 
ideas and models and the adaptation of these to local conditions.
All three possible explanations of the policy outcomes in these two 
countries have some relevance. Foreign ideas about the state, welfare and 
“development”, rooted in or linked to Britain or its empire, were influen-
tial. The experiences of welfare reform (and wage regulation) in Australia 
and New Zealand and of drought relief in India and elsewhere, as well as 
British models, shaped reforms in Southern Africa. Institutional design 
was also consequential. The legacy of colonial institutions of indirect rule 
in Botswana meant that the post-independence state sought to legitimate 
itself through institutionalizing drought relief. Apartheid-style indirect 
rule in South Africa meant that the state was unable in the 1950s and 
1960s to retrench its social pension program. Finally, local conditions 
were of crucial importance. Botswana remained an agrarian society of 
small farmers for most of the twentieth century. Deagrarianization trans-
formed South Africa much earlier, but racialized policies and incomplete 
industrialization under apartheid meant that the market failed to replace 
the former agrarian safety net. In both Botswana and South Africa in the 
late twentieth century, high dependency rates resulted in strong pressures 
for the continued expansion of social assistance. British imperial influ-
ences on policy itself and on political institutions therefore combined 
with local conditions to steer apparently dissimilar territories down quite 
different paths to similar outcomes.
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The Colonial Legacy and the Rise 
of Social Assistance in the Global South
Carina Schmitt
 Introduction
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century there has been a rapid 
rise in social protection initiatives in many low- and middle-income 
countries (LMIC) that can be mainly attributed to a growing number of 
social assistance programs. Nowadays, around 70% of all developing 
countries have at least one social assistance program in place (Dodlova 
et al. 2016, 8). Social assistance programs are public and noncontribu-
tory schemes funded from general tax revenues to guarantee access to 
essential health care and basic income security to individuals and families 
in need (Leisering and Barrientos 2013; Midgley 1984a). The recent 
spread and expansion of social assistance reflects a shift away from 
contributory- based social insurances implemented in the early days of 
social protection in the Global South, providing benefits for workers in 
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the formal labor market. Social insurance, which still is the predominant 
form of social protection, typically covers only a very small, privileged 
group of society. The majority of the people are often excluded because of 
working in the informal labor market or of not being able to pay contri-
butions. Social assistance as noncontributory social protection is assumed 
to be better able than social insurances to expand coverage to the more 
vulnerable groups of the society and to face poverty and inequality 
(Dodlova and Giolbas 2015, 4; Overbye 2005; Eckert 2004, 472; 
Barrientos 2011). Figure 6.1 shows the spread of two main social assistance 
programs across LMIC, namely social pensions (left) and unconditional 
family support programs (right) over the last decades.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World 
Bank have also acknowledged the need for social assistance schemes 
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of social assistance1 requires a profound understanding of what is driving 
its introduction and why some countries follow the recent trend and 
adopt social assistance programs and others do not. Studies analyzing the 
spread of social assistance emphasize the importance of democratic 
institutions. Unlike autocratic settings, democratic institutions exert 
pressure on politicians to implement policies from which the majority of 
the population benefits. Since social insurance systems typically include 
only a small segment of society, democratic leaders have an incentive to 
expand social protection via noncontributory social assistance programs. 
However, I argue that this narrative only holds in the case of certain 
institutional preconditions. Whether a country has a social assistance 
program or not also depends on its colonial legacy. The colonial legacy 
has defined and still shapes the opportunities of governments for social 
policy reforms. Colonial empires differed in their imperial strategies and 
in their notions on the role of the state regarding social protection. 
These differences influenced early social protection legislation and still 
have consequences for today’s social policy-making.
Surprisingly, the colonial heritage of social protection has been almost 
completely left out of the equation in comparative social policy research 
(Kpessa and Béland 2013; Overbye 2005; Schmitt et al. 2015). This is 
astonishing considering the fact that most developing countries have a 
colonial history and a great majority of early social protection programs 
in former colonies were introduced before those countries gained 
independence (Schmitt 2015). Literature that discussed the effect of the 
colonial legacy mainly focused on political (Lange 2004) and economic 
development (Acemoglu et  al. 2001; Grier 1999; Englebert 2000). 
However, the omission of the colonial legacy in the analysis of determi-
nants and consequences of early and post-independent social protection 
precludes a systematic grasp of contemporary social problems.
To analyze the influence of the colonial legacy on the contemporary 
spread of social assistance, this chapter uses a sample of ca. 100 LMIC 
and estimates cross-section and binary time-series cross-section logit 
models. I focus on two of the most important social assistance programs, 
1 Social assistance and noncontributory social protection are interchangeably used in this chapter.
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that is, social pensions and unconditional family support schemes.2 
Moreover, I limit the discussion of the colonial influence to the British 
and French colonial powers. Both were the two main colonizers in 
the twentieth century—when social protection was put on the global 
agenda3 and became actively introduced into the debate on social affairs 
after World War II.
The empirical findings show that the French and British colonial powers 
influenced the social policy configurations of their former colonies in 
each specific way. The French imperial power enforced a strong social 
insurance principle during colonial times which still today decreases the 
likelihood of introducing social assistance programs in former French 
colonies. The effect of the French colonial legacy even outweighs the pos-
itive influence of democratic political institutions. On the other hand, 
former British colonies very early introduced social assistance programs, 
due to the poor law tradition and the compatibility to the British 
Beveridgean notion of the welfare state, which highly inspired the whole 
British Empire. The findings show that the colonial heritage of a country 
has to be taken into account when explaining different pathways of social 
protection in most LMIC. That does not imply that national factors are 
unimportant for social policy-making but rather that the colonial legacy 
influences the effects of domestic conditions. The colonial heritage is one 
factor shaping the possibilities of policy-making and the institutional 
choices a government has nowadays.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section elucidates the 
arguments why the colonial legacy should still have an influence on the 
recent spread of social assistance. The subsequent section presents details 
on the data and method applied. The then following section analyzes the 
2 CCTs (conditional cash transfers) are not considered, as—unlike unconditional programs—they 
are conditional to investments in education or health. Additionally, they are more heterogeneous 
for example, regarding the specific target they aim at and the policy field they belong to. They 
therefore follow a slightly different logic and are not easily comparable with the two other programs 
analyzed in this contribution.
3 Other central colonizers such as Spain abandoned their imperial projects already in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, and therefore before social protection was put on the global agenda and 
the labor question became urgent in the dependent territories. Further imperial nations such as 
Belgium, Portugal, Italy or Germany had only a few colonies or maintained their colonies for a 




influence of the colonial legacy on the expansion of social pensions and 
unconditional family support programs across the sample of LMIC. A 
final section presents a conclusion.
 The Colonial Legacy of Social Assistance
Many studies focusing on the emergence and rise of noncontributory 
social assistance emphasize the role of democratic institutions (Brooks 
2007, 2015; Dodlova et al. 2016). Democratic leaders aiming at extending 
social protection to groups that have been excluded from contributory 
social insurance are assumed to opt for social assistance. Noncontributory 
social protection is often the only available option toward more inclusive 
social protection because of being independent from formal wage employ-
ment, previous contributions and individual financial capabilities 
(Leisering and Barrientos 2013). Besides studies elucidating the favorable 
consequences of democracy, the diffusion literature emphasizes the 
importance of spill-over effects between neighboring countries. Countries 
are more likely to introduce social assistance if neighboring countries 
have done so before. However, spill-over effects and the influence of 
democracy are only part of the story. I argue that the colonial legacy has 
to be taken into account to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the 
expansion of social assistance and to explain why some LMIC have intro-
duced social assistance and others have not. In the following, I first briefly 
address why colonial powers became engaged into social policy-making 
at all and afterward elucidate why and how the French and British colonial 
Empires with their general colonial policies and welfare state principles 
do influence contemporary trends in social protection in LMIC.
 Colonialism and Social Policy
In the late nineteenth and in the first half of the twentieth century, the 
question of how to deal with social risks in the case of income loss was 
mainly restricted to the Western world. During much of this period, 
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colonial powers typically aimed at exploiting labor in their colonies and 
did not pay much attention to how workers in the colonies were pro-
tected in the case of work accidents and illness. Hence, colonial powers 
were not involved in the provision of social services in their colonies 
until the first decades of the twentieth century (Midgley and Piachaud 
2011). From the 1930s and 1940s onward, the labor question in 
dependent territories became increasingly relevant (Eckert 2004). Labor 
movements gained importance in many of the colonies, and a number 
of colonies experienced massive strikes, particularly during World War 
II and the immediate post-war period (Orr 1966). Moreover, social pro-
tection in the dependent territories increasingly became a topic of debate 
for international organizations, particularly the ILO. In 1944, the ILO 
member states agreed that the basic standards of labor policy defined by 
the ILO should also be applied to non-metropolitan areas (Maul 2012; 
Plant 1994; Kott and Droux 2013). In addition, the human rights 
declarations of the victorious allies of World War II were an implicit 
challenge to the imperial systems of European states. The colonial powers 
could no longer ignore increasing demands for social protection and 
aimed at a moral upgrade after World War II (Eckert 2004, 479–480). 
In sum, by midway through the twentieth century, not only was there 
pressure on the colonial powers from inside the colonies, in the form of 
rising demands for social protection, but also from the outside, for 
example in the form of soft pressure by international organizations. As a 
consequence, colonial powers became more and more engaged in social 
policies in their colonies.
Two colonial powers highly involved in the debate around social affairs 
after World War II were France and Britain. However, both differed 
widely with respect to their notions and concepts of the state, the labor 
question and social protection (Mahoney 2010). I argue that these differ-
ences still have consequences for today’s social policy-making and help to 
explain why some countries have introduced social assistance schemes 
and others not, independently, for example, of the economic prosperity 
and quality of democratic institutions.
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 British Colonization Strategy and Poor Law Tradition
In the 1940s, questions around social protection and the welfare of workers 
in dependent territories were also discussed in Great Britain. The debate 
in the British Empire was characterized by two main peculiarities which 
not only shaped the post-war debate on social protection in former 
British colonies but also are still relevant for contemporary social 
policy-making.
First, Great Britain practiced a decentralized colonization strategy and 
was committed to a passive view on the role of the state with regard to 
social protection in their colonies. It often incorporated the local elite 
and maintained traditional structures of social service provision, for 
example, for the elderly and other needy groups (Williamson and Pampel 
1991, 23). As a consequence, early social protection legislation in former 
British colonies was more heterogeneous than in many other empires, 
since colonies had a comparably large maneuvering room. For example, 
in the case of retirement schemes, countries and territories such as India, 
Nigeria and Tanzania introduced provident funds, Botswana, the 
Seychelles and Jamaica flat rate pensions, and Zambia and Yemen 
wage- related schemes (Schmitt 2015). Against the background of this 
decentralized colonial administrative structure, British officials did not 
force encompassing changes. Legislation was implemented by local political 
leaders in their colonies. The British officials were rather reluctant to 
actively push the implementation of specific social policies, and the 
colonial office often only emphasized the urgency of specific legislations 
(Eckert 2004).
Second, the debate on social protection in the dependent territories 
was influenced by the poor law tradition in Britain. The British Poor Law 
tradition dates back to the Elizabethan Poor Law Act of 1601 (Overbye 
2005). It was the first nation-wide poor relief regulation in modern times, 
which aimed at bringing the able-bodied poor to work. In 1834, a new 
poor law was enacted which tightened the old poor law that had become 
too expensive in the course of industrialization. The British poor laws 
resemble very much the current trend of social assistance in the Global 
South. Both are noncontributory in nature, and in both cases social 
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 policy is considered an instrument of poor relief rather than of income 
maintenance. Already in the early twentieth century the British poor laws 
served as a role model and inspired some progressive colonies which 
adopted these ideas and introduced poor relief programs and social assis-
tance schemes in line with the British model (see Künzler, Chap. 4, this 
volume). For example, Mauritius adopted a poor relief ordinance in 
1902, South Africa introduced a noncontributory and means-tested old 
age pension in 1928 (Seekings 2013, 311), and a poor relief ordinance 
was passed by Trinidad and Tobago in 1931 (Seekings 2013, 312; Midgley 
1984b, 22). These social assistance schemes often remained in place after 
decolonization or were even extended by the new governments and 
administrations, for example to colored people (Midgley 1984b, 27).
These two British specifics also shaped the debate on social protection 
in overseas territories in the 1940s. This debate was intensified by the 
Beveridge Report from 1942 which led to the formation of commissions 
on social affairs in several dependent territories across the entire British 
Empire (Surender 2013; Seekings 2008). After World War II, it was 
controversially discussed whether tax-financed social assistance schemes 
could be introduced throughout the British Empire. Some British 
officials, for example, in the Economic Department, favored noncon-
tributory over contributory schemes (Seekings 2011, 167), while others 
considered an implementation of comprehensive social assistance too 
expensive and therefore impossible to implement. Although the discus-
sions in the British Empire did not result in any systematic or uniform 
handling of social affairs in overseas territories and finally the British 
officials considered it unrealistic to adopt large scale social assistance 
schemes in all dependent territories, they brought the introduction of 
such schemes into the debate at a very early stage. This highly influenced 
the discourse about the labor question in British overseas territories. 
As a consequence, the implementation of social assistance programs was 
discussed much earlier within the entire British Empire than anywhere 
else. This early presence of ideas about social assistance and the early exis-
tence of social assistance schemes in the motherland, but also in some 
colonies, were to increase the likelihood of following the recent policy 
trend of introducing social assistance programs in former British colonies.
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When looking at the specific risks covered within the British Empire 
and in Great Britain itself, social assistance traditionally focused on 
elderly people. For example, in Great Britain the Old Age Pensions Act of 
1908, as the beginning of the system of modern state pension, stipulated 
the entitlement to a tax-funded old age pension for elderly people lacking 
sufficient income (see Seekings, Chap. 5, this volume). This retirement 
scheme is very similar to the current trend of social pensions. But also the 
early social assistance programs in Mauritius, South Africa and Namibia 
addressed the needs of the elderly. In contrast, family allowances remain 
“a contested part of a welfare system” (Pedersen 1993, 415). Especially in 
colonial societies during colonial times, Britain favored male breadwin-
ner wages. Family allowances were regarded as inefficient in African societies 
by British officials because allowances would not only finance children 
but often many other dependent relatives as well (Lindsay 1999, 802).
In sum, the poor law tradition with its focus on poor relief rather than 
on income maintenance for industrial workers and the early discussion of 
social assistance in the former British Empire were to enhance the prob-
ability that former British colonies implemented noncontributory social 
assistance programs (Seekings 2013). Moreover, the positive influence of 
the British colonial footprint on the introduction of social assistance was 
to especially apply to social pensions but less to family support schemes.
 French Social Insurance Tradition
In France, as the second major colonial power of the twentieth century, 
the debate regarding social protection also accelerated in the 1940s. Two 
main characteristics relevant for contemporary social protection made 
the debate within the French colonial empire different from that in other 
empires.
First, France followed a pro-active colonial policy, emphasizing the 
decisive role of the state in enhancing social and economic prosperity 
(Cooper 1996; Iliffe 1987). French officials held the view that the 
colonies could not develop themselves but rather needed the initiative of 
the French Administrative Authority (MacLean 2002). The French 
colonial power regarded “the colonies simply as a prolongation of the 
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mother- country beyond the seas” (Fieldhouse 1967, 308). The French 
imperial mission was characterized by the view that the Republic was one 
and indivisible. As a consequence, the French imperial system aimed at 
reproducing the French model in its colonies in all areas (see Becker, 
Chap. 7, this volume). In contrast to Britain, France centralized its power 
and, at least theoretically, made all basic and important decisions in Paris, 
where after 1894 colonial officials were trained in the École Coloniales 
(Fieldhouse 1967, 310). The consequence was an autocratic system of 
colonial government (Grier 1999, 319; Fieldhouse 1967, 308). Even 
though the French appointed Africans in order to fulfill administrative 
functions, these administrative elite owed their positions to France. The 
French aimed at producing an elite population in the colonies that was 
completely committed to the French culture, with a status comparable to 
that of French citizens. However, only a small portion of the native popu-
lation achieved this status and became citizens (Fieldhouse 1967, 315). 
The great majority kept their status as colonial subjects liable to the Code 
de L’Indigénat which determines the inferiority of colonial people.
Second, one basic characteristic of the French welfare state is the strong 
social insurance tradition (Kaufmann 2013, 155). It is largely based on 
the principle of occupational solidarity. This means that social protection 
is linked to the occupational status of the insured person, his or her 
earnings and in consequence the contribution record (Béland and Hansen 
2000, 512). Earning-related benefits based upon individual contribu-
tions are only provided to workers and their family in formal wage 
employment. Each risk is separately administered and managed within 
different social insurance schemes and often separated by different occu-
pational groups (Palier 2000, 116). For example, each profession has its 
own pension scheme, leading to a very fragmented pension system which 
is highly resistant to change. France itself did not have any comprehen-
sive social assistance system for people in need (Béland and Hansen 2000, 
52). The only exception was family allowances. France implemented the 
Code de la Famille in 1939, as the first “comprehensive legislation on family 
policy anywhere in the world which pays universal benefits to all French 
citizens and residents for the second child and subsequent children” 
(Béland and Hansen 2000, 52). One main reason for this  exceptional 
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character of family policy was France’s fear of a power imbalance and a 
military advantage for the German army due to the depopulation of 
France itself (Echenberg 1975, 179).
These two features characterized the debate on the introduction of 
social protection for workers in overseas territories in the 1940s. After a 
series of strike waves in French West Africa the French officials came to 
the view that conditions for workers had to be improved. From 1946 
onward, after formally abolishing the Code de L’Indigénat, that is, the 
inferiority of the native population, a committee at the Ministry of 
Overseas Territories was working on a plan to extend social protection to 
workers in the colonial states. However, officials had to define who a 
worker was and which rights were associated with this status. After six 
years of debate, the French Code du Travail for overseas territories was 
passed in 1952, as the key milestone of social protection legislation in the 
French colonies. The Code contained many specific regulations regarding 
social protection programs, and it strongly reflected France’s social insur-
ance tradition. For example, it stated that family allowances and systems 
to protect workers from illness and accidents should be introduced in the 
colonies. However, according to the Code du Travail only those workers 
were included who were part of the formal labor market or were citizens 
(Fieldhouse 1967, 312; Eckert 2004, 481). The Code du Travail therefore 
excluded customary workers, workers on the informal labor market or 
people “compensated by land or crops” (Cooper 1989, 754). Due to the 
centralized approach of France, the Code du Travail applied for all colo-
nies at the same time. After gaining independence, the former French 
colonies “all maintained the basic text and structure of the Code du 
Travail in 1952” and therefore the strong social insurance tradition of the 
welfare state (Cooper 1996, 464).
Regarding scheme specific differences, also family allowances played 
an exceptional role in the colonies (Eckert 2004, 482). As family allow-
ances were much more important in the French welfare system (Lindsay 
1999, 810), the Code du Travail also reflects the importance of support-
ing the nuclear family as part of the social protection of workers.
In sum, France had a very strong social insurance tradition, and the 
French administration clearly pushed for the establishment of social 
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security systems similar to the French social insurance model. As a 
 consequence, all former French colonies introduced social protection 
schemes which first of all followed heavily social insurance principles. 
This strong social insurance setting was to make it much more difficult 
for former French colonies still today to implement noncontributory 
social assistance. A complete shift from one system to another, with the 
abolishment of the old one, is highly unlikely and would come along 
with high transaction costs. This is illustrated by the fact that almost no 
country has abolished a social insurance scheme once it has been estab-
lished (ILO 2017). Therefore I assume that under otherwise equal condi-
tions former French colonies are less likely to have social assistance 
programs. Furthermore and against the background of the importance of 
family allowances and its exceptional character in France itself, French 
colonies are more likely to have introduced noncontributory family 
support schemes than social pensions.
 Summary
The main argument is that different imperial powers with different 
notions of the welfare state adopted different colonization strategies. For 
example, the French welfare state is characterized by the principle of 
social insurance and income maintenance rather than by poverty allevia-
tion as it is the case with the British welfare state. In France, the social 
question was considered a worker’s question, while in Great Britain it was 
more a poverty question (Kaufmann 2013, 100). These differences result 
in different logics of contemporary social policy-making. After having 
gained their independence, all French colonies maintained the social 
insurance nature of social protection that has been characteristic for the 
French notion of the welfare state. The strong social insurance tradition 
in former French colonies, reflecting the principles of the French welfare 
state, would require a complete modification of existing institutions, 
practices and power structures if social assistance schemes were supposed 
to be introduced. The costs of implementing the recent trend of social 
assistance are therefore disproportionally high, as the policy trend does 
not fit to the existing institutional setting. A strong social insurance tradition 
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may therefore be supposed to tremendously decrease the likelihood of 
having a social assistance. In contrast, in former British colonies the 
poor law tradition and the early debate on noncontributory social 
protection make social assistance a concrete, available policy option, as 
early bird countries such as South Africa have shown. Moreover, British 
colonies are more likely to have social pensions than family support 
schemes, since poor laws and early social assistance typically have focused 
on protecting the elderly. Family policy has not been a central issue of the 
British welfare state.
 The Rise of Social Assistance in the Global 
South: Data and Methods
The empirical analysis proceeds by two steps. First, I estimate cross- 
section logit models to explain which countries have a noncontributory 
social pension or a family support scheme for the most recent period of 
time, since this allows for integrating a broader set of control variables. In 
a second step, I estimate binary time-series cross-section (BTSCS) 
models which additionally allow for an analysis of the time dimension.
The dependent variable is the introduction of two of the most impor-
tant and most frequent noncontributory social assistance schemes, 
namely social pensions and unconditional family support schemes. Social 
pensions are noncontributory cash transfers paid regularly to elderly 
people (HelpAge International 2017). They are widely acknowledged to 
be one of the most effective tools to reduce old age poverty and invest in 
human capital development. Data on social pensions are taken from 
HelpAge International which provides a large database on social pensions 
in 107 countries. The information coming from HelpAge International 
is cross-validated with information provided by the ILO (2017) and 
Dodlova et al. (2016). Unconditional family support schemes are “trans-
fers targeted to low-income households or specifically to children” 
(Dodlova et al. 2016, 9). These schemes “range from a basic safety net for 
those below the poverty line to (universal) child support grants” (Dodlova 
et al. 2016, 9). Data for unconditional family support schemes are taken 
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from the Noncontributory Social Transfer Database which includes 
information, on a program-basis, about 186 programs in 101 countries 
(Dodlova et al. 2016).
In both cases the dependent variable is measured by a binary choice 
variable coded 0 if a country has not yet introduced a social pension or a 
family support scheme and 1 in the year when a country introduced the 
respective program. By now, around 50 LMIC (low- and middle-income 
countries) have a social pension in place, and a comparable number of 
countries are provided with a family support scheme. In the BTSCS 
models the countries are only considered until the event happens. Once 
a specific program has been introduced, the country is excluded from the 
analysis of the respective program. I estimate logit equations using a stan-
dard maximum likelihood procedure. Ordinary probit or logit rests on 
the assumption that the observations are temporally independent. 
However, the probability of introducing social assistance is not equal at 
any point in time but increases over time. Therefore, ordinary probit or 
logit would be misleading and the standard errors underestimated. I fol-
low the procedure suggested by Beck et al. (1998) in order to deal with 
time dependence. Beck et al. (1998) show that binary time-series cross- 
section data is identical with grouped duration data. They suggest esti-
mating the models including cubic splines, as natural cubic splines 
capture the time dependence. The estimated coefficients of the cubic 
splines can be used to trace the path of duration dependence. In compari-
son to time dummies, cubic splines have the advantage of providing a 
more parsimonious strategy. I alternatively checked t, t2 and t3 as a cubic 
polynomial approximation in the estimations (Carter and Signorino, 
2010). Moreover, robust standard errors clustered by country are used.
In the empirical analyses the influence of the British and French colo-
nial legacy as a central independent variable is captured by including 
dummies for British or French colonies. Moreover, I include the real 
GDP per capita (log.) as a control variable (Maddison Project Database 
2018) to measure a nation’s level of economic development. In line with 
functionalist theories, it is expected that there is a positive relationship 
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between affluence and the introduction of social protection (Wilensky 
1975). Moreover, I include the level of democracy, which in many studies 
is assumed to drive the introduction and emergence of social assistance. I 
use the polity index which ranges from −10 (autocracy) to 10 (full 
democracy) (Marshall et al. 2014). A further key variable is the dependency 
ratio, that is, the number of people above 65 and below 15 in relation to 
the total working-age population (World Bank 2015). A high depen-
dency ratio should be reflected in a strong demand for noncontributory 
social pensions and family support schemes. Additionally, it can be 
expected that the colonial legacy diminishes over time after gaining 
independence. Hence the longer a country is independent, the higher is 
the probability that it is able to follow the recent policy trend. Furthermore, 
the level of globalization, measured as the total of exports and imports in 
relation to the GDP, might exhibit a negative influence on the introduc-
tion of social assistance programs, due to the competitive pressure arising 
from embeddedness in the international market.4 As mentioned above, 
international organizations such as the ILO strongly promote the 
introduction of social assistance programs. I therefore include a dummy 
capturing whether a country is an ILO member or not. Furthermore, it 
is checked for ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003). It is argued 
that “ethnic diversity has led to social polarization and entrenched inter-
est groups in Africa and thereby should decrease the likelihood that a 
country introduces a universal noncontributory social protection scheme” 
(Englebert 2000, 9; Alesina et al. 2003).
In the cross-section analyses, all independent variables are calculated as 
an average across the ten years prior to the information of the dependent 
variable. In the BTSCS estimation I additionally check regional diffusion 
processes by including a spatial lag capturing the number of countries 
with a respective scheme that share a common border with the focal 
country. Basic descriptive statistics of the main variables included can be 
found in the appendix.
4 However, it might also push countries to meet international standards and introduce basic social 
protection programs.
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 Explaining the Existence of Social Assistance 
in the Global South
Did the spread of social assistance differ by colonial sphere? Table 6.1 
shows the empirical results of the logit regressions. In models 1 and 2 the 
introduction of social pensions is used as a dependent variable, and in 
Table 6.1 Introduction of social assistance—cross-section analyses










Former British colony 6.765∗∗∗ 1.428
(4.448) (0.748)
Former French colony 0.108∗∗ 0.486
(0.118) (0.282)
ILO 1.029 1.024 1.020 1.019
(0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0154) (0.0155)
Globalization 1.011 1.007 0.988 0.988
(0.00769) (0.00746) (0.00771) (0.00756)
Ethnic 
fractionalization
1.528 1.758 0.780 0.804
(1.886) (2.136) (0.853) (0.884)
Dependency ratio 0.885∗∗ 0.935 0.952 0.969
(0.0525) (0.0502) (0.0461) (0.0475)
GDP per capita 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.000173) (0.000141) (0.000146) (0.000140)
Time since 
independence
0.971∗∗∗ 0.983∗ 1.000 1.002
(0.0109) (0.00988) (0.00881) (0.00869)
Polity 1.171∗∗∗ 1.146∗∗ 1.006 0.997
(0.0662) (0.0614) (0.0439) (0.0445)
Percentage point change in odds
Former British colony 576.5 42.8
Former French colony −89.2 −51.4
Polity 17.1 14.6 0.6 −0.3
Corr classified 80.43% 77.17% 66.30% 65.22%
ML Cox Snell 0.32 0.30 0.11 0.12
Observations 92 92 92 92
Notes: Odds ratio are reported; standard errors in parentheses. The results for the 
cubic splines are suppressed to conserve space ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1; 




models 3 and 4 it is family support schemes. The first and the third model 
test the influence of the British colonial legacy, and the second and the 
fourth model test the French colonial influence. Odds ratio are displayed.
The results remarkably confirm the main hypothesis that the likeli-
hood whether a country has a social pension or an unconditional family 
support program is highly influenced by the colonial legacy. When look-
ing at the results for social pensions, the probability of a former British 
colony having a social pension is almost 7 times higher than in all other 
LMIC. On the other hand, being a former French colony decreases the 
likelihood of having a social pension scheme by 89.2 percentage points. 
The strong social insurance tradition, especially with regard to retirement 
schemes, seems to heavily influence the contemporary choices for social 
policy-making. The situation is slightly different with regard to family 
support schemes. Even though former French colonies are also less likely 
to implement these programs, the influence is less hampering than in the 
case of social pensions. This reflects the importance of family support 
schemes in the tradition of the French welfare state. In the case of the 
British colonies, the positive role of the colonial legacy for the introduc-
tion of social pensions is not observable with regard to unconditional 
family support programs. This represents the low British emphasis on 
family policies and the lacking tradition regarding this scheme.
The results regarding the level of democracy are also interesting. In line 
with previous research, democratic institutions seem to push the intro-
duction of social pensions. The likelihood of having a social pension 
increases by about 17 percentage points with a one unit increase in the 
polity index. However, the positive influence is only observable in the 
case of social pensions, but not in the case of family support schemes. 
Interestingly, the effect of democracy differs by colonial sphere. To illus-
trate the conditional effect of the colonial heritage, I calculated the effect 
of the regime type on the likelihood of introducing social pensions in 
dependence of the colonial legacy. Figure 6.2 displays the effect of demo-
cratic institutions for former French (right figure) and former British 
colonies (left figure), each in comparison to the rest of the sample. In the 
right figure it can be observed that an increase from the lowest possible 
value for the polity index (−10) to the highest one (10) only slightly 
enhances the likelihood of a former French colony (right figure, solid 
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Fig. 6.2 Effect of democracy by colonial sphere
line) to have a social pension scheme (by around 15 percentage points) in 
contrast to an estimated increase for all other LMIC by 60 percentage 
points (right figure, dash line). In the case of former British colonies 
(left figure, solid line), the marginal effect of democratic institutions on 
the predicted probability of having a social pension is similar to the 
non- British colonies (left figure, dash line). However, former British 
 colonies have a higher probability of having a social pension schemes 
than all other LMIC, independently of the level of democracy.
Table 6.2 shows the results of the binary time-series cross-section 
analyses.
The results of the BTSCS (binary time-series cross-section) models, 
which take the time dimension into account, confirm the results of the 
cross-section analyses. Being a former French colony decreases the likeli-
hood of introducing a social pension by around 90 percentage points. By 
contrast, ex-colonies of the British Empire introduce social pension 
schemes very early in comparison to all other LMIC (besides of French 
ex-colonies). More democratic countries are more likely to adopt social 
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Table 6.2 Introduction of social assistance—binary time-series cross-section 
analyses
Odds ratio









(Former) British colony 2.459∗∗ 1.496
(0.938) (0.489)
(Former) French colony 0.0923∗∗ 0.117∗
(0.0947) (0.130)
Neighbors with social 
pensions
1.696∗∗∗ 1.696∗∗∗ 2.233∗∗∗ 2.233∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.248) (0.665) (0.665)
Polity 1.186∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗ 1.022 1.065
(0.0470) (0.0445) (0.0282) (0.0560)
GDP per capita 1.000∗ 1.000 1.000∗∗ 1.000∗
(8.21e-05) (7.93e-05) (0.000105) (0.000206)
Dependency ratio 0.967 0.927 0.985 0.999
(0.0561) (0.0537) (0.0587) (0.0626)
Observations 3895 3895 4157 4157
Number of countries 99 99 111 111
Notes: Odds ratio are reported; standard errors in parentheses. The results for the 
cubic splines are suppressed to conserve space ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1; 
note that standard errors for odds ratio are calculated as follows: se(OR) = 
exp(_b[_var])∗_se[_var]
pension schemes, while this relationship does not hold in the case of 
family support schemes. The consideration of the time dimension 
allows testing for regional diffusion processes. The results strongly cor-
roborate the importance of regional diffusion. The likelihood that a 
country introduces social assistance increases with the number of sur-
rounding countries with the respective scheme.
 Conclusion
Social assistance is one of the most recent policy trends in the Global 
South, raising many expectations. Since social assistance is not based on 
individual contributions, it is assumed to be an effective instrument for 
reducing poverty and inequality and for expanding social protection to 
the most vulnerable groups of society. Indeed, there is some evidence of 
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these positive effects of social assistance. This evidence motivates interna-
tional organizations such as the ILO or the World Bank to promote the 
introduction of social assistance in developing countries.
When explaining the recent trend of social assistance, studies have par-
ticularly emphasized the role of democratic institutions. However, I have 
argued that this only holds in the case of certain institutional precondi-
tions which depend on the colonial legacy. Colonial empires differed in 
their imperial strategies and in their notions on the role of the state 
regarding social protection. These differences have influenced early social 
protection legislation and institutions but have still consequences for 
today’s social policy-making.
By analyzing the spread of social pensions and unconditional family 
support programs as two of the most important social assistance schemes 
in LMIC in a quantitative framework, I can show that former British 
colonies are more likely to introduce social assistance than all other 
LMIC. This reflects the British Poor Law tradition and the decentralized 
imperial strategy of Britain, which have led to a very early diffusion of 
ideas on social assistance across the Empire. In contrast, in the early days 
of social protection in the Global South all former French colonies imple-
mented social insurances in line with the strong social insurance tradition 
that characterizes the French welfare state. A shift from insurance-based 
social protection to tax-financed noncontributory social assistance would 
require a complete restructuring of existing institutions and would come 
along with tremendous costs. As a consequence, former French colonies 
did not follow the recent trend of introducing social assistance programs. 
The French colonial legacy even outweighs the positive influence of dem-
ocratic institutions for which many studies have produced evidence. 
These findings show that it is very important to take the colonial legacy 
into account when analyzing early but also contemporary social protection in 
the Global South. The results also demonstrate that it is not sufficient to 
simply promote a specific strategy of social protection but rather 
to consider the historical context to come to a better understanding of 
the causes and consequences of early and contemporary social protection. 
However, the results do not imply that national conditions are not important 
for policy-making but rather that domestic conditions unfold different 
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Colonial Legacies in International Aid: 
Policy Priorities and Actor Constellations
Bastian Becker
 Introduction
In the past century, international aid has become an essential part of the 
foreign policy toolkit. It is especially popular among former colonial 
powers which spend the majority of their aid budgets on countries 
that once were part of their empires (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Fuchs 
et al. 2014; Round and Odedokun 2004; Steinwand 2015). However, 
beyond this general pattern, little more is known about the colonial 
legacy of international aid. This is unfortunate because recent migration 
movements have reinvigorated debates about historical responsibilities of 
European countries. In this chapter I argue that the organization of colo-
nial empires shapes the ways in which former colonial powers provide aid 
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today, in particular policy priorities and actors involved in the  distribution 
of aid. This claim is supported by analyses of newly available, highly 
disaggregated data on aid flows.
In this chapter I focus on the two largest and most recent colonial 
empires, those of Britain and France.1 These cases are also interesting as 
they employed different colonial strategies. Whereas Britain often relied 
on indirect rule, using existing political structures to project its power, 
France more commonly used direct rule, imposing new structures with 
less consideration for local conditions (Gerring et al. 2011; Iyer 2010; 
Mamdani 1996). Indirect rule also led Britain to more strongly involve 
other actors, be they local, non-governmental or international. France 
instead relied on the newly built governmental capacities, and bureau-
cratic centralization fostered close ties between the metropolitan and 
colonial governments (Lee and Schultz 2012; Schmitt 2015; Schmitt, 
Chap. 6, this volume). To facilitate their colonial undertakings (and to 
decelerate their demise), both powers also promoted social protection 
policies (see also Schmitt, Chap. 6, this volume). These efforts were 
especially pronounced in the French empire, due to the application of 
metropolitan law in colonies and the goal to assimilate subjugated popu-
lations (Iliffe 1987; Wesseling 2004). Path dependency, due to lasting 
economic, political and social ties, suggests that these differences should 
also be reflected in how Britain and France provide aid today.
Research on colonial legacies of international aid was until recently 
limited to the analysis of aggregate aid flows. However, newly available, 
highly disaggregated data makes it possible to analyze aid flows in greater 
detail (see OECD 2018a). This data allows me to show that colonial lega-
cies are reflected in how former colonial powers distribute aid today. For 
example, both Britain and France focus aid to their former colonies on 
social protection, about 9 percentage points more than what they give to 
other countries. As expected, France strongly relies on governmental 
actors to channel aid to its former colonies (about 92%), whereas Britain 
uses governmental channels for a mere 22% of all aid. These differences 
cannot be accounted for by common explanatory factors, such as economic 
development, trade openness or democracy. These findings have important 
1 Note that in most instances below, country names refer to the respective governments.
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implications for our understanding of international aid today. They 
emphasize that policy priorities and the actor constellations promoted by 
aid might be harder to change than often expected.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section “Colonial Legacies in 
International Aid” introduces literature that informs our understanding 
of the colonial legacies of international aid, in particular concerning 
policy priorities and actor constellations. Section “Data” introduces the new 
aid data and other variables used in the analysis. Section “Analysis” pres-
ents the main results, followed by a final discussion in Sect. “Discussion”.
 Colonial Legacies in International Aid
It is well established that most donors provide more bilateral aid to former 
colonies than other recipient countries. This is certainly the case for the two 
former colonial powers this study focuses on, Britain and France. It is com-
monly argued that bilateral aid serves for maintaining political influence 
and economic relationships that developed during colonial times (Alesina 
and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Fuchs et al. 2014). However, 
not all scholars argue that self-interest determines aid disbursements to for-
mer colonies. Others point out that colonial powers increasingly assumed 
responsibility for the well-being of subjugated populations, due to growing 
cultural similarities (Schraeder et  al. 1998) and deliberations among 
domestic and international political circles (Lewis 2011; Pacquement 2010).
Most comparative work on colonial legacies of international aid focuses 
on the overall generosity of donors toward former colonies. This chapter 
seeks to reveal in greater detail how colonial legacies unfold. Therefore, 
two aspects of contemporary international aid take the center stage. 
First, the extent to which donors prioritize social protection, promoting 
activities such as health and education; and second, the actors involved in 
the distribution of aid, in particular aid directed at social protection. As 
the review below shows, the existing literature suggests that colonial 
legacies are likely to become manifest in these regards. Other than that, 
this choice is arbitrary, and it is likely that colonial legacies affect interna-
tional aid in many other ways. That said, focusing on policy priorities and 
aid actors offers a reasonable starting point for advancing knowledge 
about colonial legacies in international aid.
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 Policy Priorities: Social Protection
Colonial empires were first and foremost economic undertakings. Their 
primary aim was to exploit colonized territories to the benefit of their 
metropoles. Colonial powers like Britain and France therefore initiated 
economic structures and re-shaped existing ones to best suit this purpose. 
This was achieved by aligning policies with the overarching aim of 
economic exploitation. With regard to social protection, this implied a 
minimalist approach that focused on attracting Europeans to the overseas 
territories and on retaining a viable labor force within the colonies. There 
was little interest in what goods were demanded locally. As a result, 
colonial economies focused on mining and agriculture, cash crops in par-
ticular, and unsurprisingly they were strongly export-oriented.
Social protection was also promoted for non-economic reasons, 
especially during later years. Colonial administrators were concerned 
about the well-being and social status of Europeans and, at least to some 
extent, about the well-being of the subjugated populations (Lewis 2011; 
Pacquement 2010). Basic social services for the indigenous population 
were furthermore needed to reduce labor scarcity prevalent in many colo-
nies. Although unintended, migration in both directions led to a growing 
number of personal ties between metropole and colony, which increased 
the chances that social needs within the colonies were recognized and 
addressed (Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 2000). Furthermore, after 
World War I international organizations became active in colonial 
politics and policy-making, urging colonial powers to take more and 
more responsibility for the situation in territories dependent on them 
(Pearson 2018).
While the British and the French colonial empires both had the primary 
aim of economic exploitation, they differed widely when it comes to 
specific policy areas. Social protection is no exception. British adminis-
trations rarely provided benefits to anyone but government workers. 
Other schemes were initiated only if pre-existing local arrangements 
would not suffice and, as I discuss further below, if no other external 
actor, like missions or firms, stepped in. Mirroring social protection 
policies at home, France provided benefits to a wider set of workers, 
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including many of those in formal employment. More generally, France 
frequently extended metropolitan laws and rights to colonies, with the 
ultimate goal of assimilating subjugated populations (Iliffe 1987; Kpessa 
2010). At the same time, France’s interventionist approach often came at 
the expense of local practices and institutions, which were rarely promoted 
and often curtailed instead (Suret-Canale 1971).
Independence had little effect on the economic set-up of (former) col-
onies, in particular regarding sectoral composition and export orienta-
tion. Companies that previously enjoyed quasi-monopolistic positions 
lobbied for favorable trade agreements with former colonies and, where 
possible, continued their operations. They were supported by the former 
colonial powers which continued to shape and influence policy-making 
in the newly independent territories, for example by providing aid 
(Alesina and Dollar 2000; Fuchs et al. 2014). In fact, the provision of aid 
to advance trade interests is not limited to former colonies or the after-
math of independence but continues to be a wide-spread practice 
(Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Schraeder et al. 1998). The consequence 
for former colonies is that many remain dependent on international mar-
kets and continue to have strong trade links with their former colonizers 
(Abernethy 2000; Cardoso and Faletto 1979).
Besides the promotion of trade interests, donors (including former 
colonial powers) often prioritize aid to countries where social needs go 
unaddressed. Several studies have shown that most aid goes to countries 
with high levels of economic poverty (Dollar and Levin 2006; Easterly 
and Pfutze 2008; Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2006), whereas others have 
demonstrated a focus on countries with poor health outcomes (Bodenstein 
and Kemmerling 2015; Boschini and Olofsgård 2007; Schraeder et al. 
1998). Although these studies do not explore whether donors prioritize 
social needs of former colonies over those of other recipients, there are 
good reasons to suspect that this is the case. Donors might continue to 
be concerned about the welfare of formerly subjugated populations 
(Pacquement 2010), personal networks can put former colonies in politi-
cally advantageous positions (Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 2000), and 
international organizations sustain pressure on donors to assume respon-
sibility for territories they once ruled (Pearson 2018).
7 Colonial Legacies in International Aid… 
166
Colonial powers promoted social protection for intrinsic and, more 
commonly, instrumental reasons. However, little is known about whether 
early investments in social protection of many of today’s developing 
countries affect contemporary patterns of bilateral aid. While indepen-
dence brought major changes with it, it is also clear that many political, 
economic and social ties have survived. It can be argued that this is also 
the reason why many former colonial powers continue to promote social 
protection. Thus, the first hypothesis I test in this chapter is that donors 
prioritize social protection when providing aid to former colonies or, to 
put it differently, that compared to other recipients larger shares of aid to 
former colonies are directed toward social protection. I have also argued 
that the French colonial government assumed a more interventionist role 
in matters of social protection than Britain did in its empire. Thus, the 
second hypothesis I explore is that the prioritization of social protection 
is especially pronounced in the case of French aid.
 Actor Constellations
Colonialism is not a unitary phenomenon. Abernethy (2000) explains 
the rise of European colonial empires with the interplay of three decisive 
types of actors: governments, firms and missions. While these actors 
often had competing interests in Europe, their actions overseas proved 
highly synergetic. It is furthermore important to realize that each type of 
actor is internally split, consisting of an umbrella organization in the 
metropole and its representations abroad (Abernethy 2000). Beyond this 
basic set-up, important differences between colonial empires can be 
noted. The French empire followed a more centralized approach. This 
tied administrations in the colonies more closely to the French government 
and gave them less room to adjust laws and practices to local context 
(Lee and Schultz 2012; Schmitt 2015). Catholic France also had a more 
restrictive stance on the activities of Protestant missions. Instead, the 
British government early succumbed to lobbying by the British East 
India Company and allowed both Catholic and Protestant missions to 
operate within its territories (Woodberry 2012).
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A common conceptual distinction in scholarship on colonialism is 
that between direct and indirect rule (Gerring et  al. 2011; Iyer 2010; 
Mamdani 1996). The two kinds of rule mainly distinguish how local 
political institutions and elites are incorporated into the colonial empire. 
Direct rule implies the imposition of new administrative structures that 
overwrite existing ones. Locals that assume positions in the new admin-
istration are usually not members of the former elite. To the contrary, 
indirect rule implies the installation of a new administration at the head 
of existing structures. While this also imposes a clear hierarchy, power is 
projected through existing structures and in collaboration with estab-
lished local elites. Of course, this collaboration was not always voluntary 
and colonial administrators could, if they deemed it necessary, rely on 
military force and other more “collaborative” elites.
The French empire applied, with few exceptions, direct rule. The 
British Empire was mainly characterized by indirect rule. Direct rule in 
the French empire thus led to the establishment of governmental 
structures akin to those in mainland France. At the same time existing 
structures were dwarfed, placing greater relative weight on the new gov-
erning bodies. The dwarfing of existing structures was not limited to 
political institutions but included social and economic ones. This was 
often justified with ideas about “assimilation”, which had the ultimate 
goal to extent French citizenship to colonial subjects (Wesseling 2004). 
The British government, instead, accepted local actors and institutions, 
and if it facilitated economic exploitation, even promoted them 
(Midgley 2011).
The degree of centralization, type of rule and assimilation strategies 
also had implications for the provision of social protection in colonies. As 
regards other local practices and institutions, French administrations 
ignored, or even worked against, social protection arrangements 
established before colonization. Local medical practices, which were 
decried as “witchcraft”, are one such example (Suret-Canale 1971). 
Instead, colonial administrations in the French empire sought to trans-
plant arrangements from the metropole to colonized territories. While 
social protection spread widely only in the 1950s, after the creation of the 
French Union, it covered a wide range of social needs, such as illness, 
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maternity or work accidents (Iliffe 1987, 208). Due to the application of 
French law within colonized territories, social protection provided by the 
state often extended beyond government workers to also include workers 
in formal employment (Kpessa 2010).
British administrations were less committed to government-provided 
social protection. On the one hand, there was a high reliance on pre- 
existing local arrangements, which were only to be complemented if 
changes induced by colonization gave rise to new needs, for example due 
to labor migration (Kpessa 2010; Midgley 2011). On the other hand, 
British administrations more strongly involved other external actors in 
the provision of social protection. As such, missions were encouraged to 
establish schools and hospitals and were called upon to address various 
social risks through the establishment of provident funds (Dixon 1989). 
For both empires it must be said that externally initiated initiatives—
with the exception of missionary activities—were largely limited to 
Europeans and only gradually, if at all, extended to local populations. 
They were extended to local populations; this was usually done to pro-
tect the health and well-being of Europeans (Suret-Canale 1971; 
Wesseling 2004).
In the twentieth century, international organizations entered the field 
of social protection (Deacon 2007; Pedersen 2015). While their involve-
ment represented an emerging Western-centric consensus on the global 
stage, colonial powers were frequently opposed to specific initiatives. 
This is especially true for the French government, which—more often 
than the British government—regarded the involvement of interna-
tional organizations to be against its interests. Efforts by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) to abolish forced labor are 
one example. Even a public condemnation of French activities in the 
Congo at the 12th ILO conference in 1929 had no discernible effect on 
practices within the empire (Suret-Canale 1971, 244–55). France even-
tually committed to the abolition of forced labor in its colonies in 1946, 
a step Britain had taken more than a decade earlier (Daughton 2013; 
Maul 2007). Similarly, France also perceived the expansion of UN orga-
nizations as a threat and opposed the establishment of representations in 
its colonies (e.g. a regional office of the World Health Organization in 
Africa). The founding of the French Union itself, which implied the inte-
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gration of colonies into French  territory, can be seen as an attempt to 
countervail the mounting anticolonial pressures from international bod-
ies (Pearson 2018).
The preceding discussion shows that the two colonial empires, Britain 
and France, relied on different sets of actors for organizing their colonial 
empires (see Shriwise, Chap. 2, this volume). Direct rule, a highly cen-
tralized bureaucracy and the assimilation strategy in the French empire 
implied a strong reliance on and promotion of governmental capacities. 
This also entailed closer institutional ties between the metropolitan gov-
ernment and colonial administrations in the dependent territories than 
was the case in the British Empire. The government in London not only 
gave colonial administrations greater leeway, it also collaborated more 
intensely with other actors. As a result, the British Empire relied relatively 
less on governmental capacities. Therefore, my third hypothesis concerns 
the involvement of governmental actors vis-à-vis other actors in the dis-
bursement of bilateral aid: Relative to British aid, more French aid to 
former colonies is distributed through governmental channels (including 
the newly independent governments).
These differences between the empires are also found when it comes to 
social protection. While the French government took charge of activities 
such as education, health and pensions, the British government eagerly 
outsourced these activities to other actors, most notably missions, 
indigenous communities and firms. British authorities were also more 
likely to nurture ties with international organizations, whereas France 
often sought to shield itself from their influence. Whether relying on 
governmental capacities simply mirrors the general approach of the 
French government or is particularly pronounced with regard to social 
protection is an open question. To test this, hypothesis four states that the 
French reliance on governmental channels in distributing aid to former 
colonies is particularly pronounced with regard to social protection.
 Contribution
Earlier research on aid determinants has shown that colonial legacies lead 
to greater donor generosity. However, I have argued that colonial legacies 
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should also have an impact on what policy areas donors give aid to and 
on the actors that donor governments involve in the disbursement of aid. 
Until recently, these claims could not be tested comparatively, as aid data 
was only available in highly aggregated form. In the following, I draw on 
new disaggregated data that allows me to determine the distribution of 
aid across policy areas and actors. I test the four hypotheses developed 
above. First, the social protection share is higher with aid to former colo-
nies than with aid to other countries. Second, the social protection share 
of aid to former colonies is especially pronounced for French aid. Third, 
a larger share of French aid to former colonies, in comparison to British 
aid, is disbursed through governmental channels. Fourth, the French 
reliance on governmental channels is particularly pronounced for aid 
directed at social protection in former colonies.
 Data
Bilateral aid involves a donor and a recipient and thus constitutes a rela-
tional phenomenon. Therefore, the sample I analyze in the following 
consists of donor-recipient dyads, whereby bilateral aid flows between the 
two countries constitute the dependent variable. To avoid inducing biases 
through sample selection, it is important to consider all potential recipi-
ents, not only former colonies. Hence, I include all independent nation 
states, with the exception of high income countries, for which bilateral 
aid is virtually non-existent, into the sample. Put differently, the sample 
is composed of all pairs of low and middle income countries (LMICs) 
with each Britain and France.2 In the following analyses, donor identity 
is distinguished by a dummy variable, Donor: France, that takes value 1 if 
the dyad involves France and 0 if it involves Britain.
2 According to the World Bank, whether a country belongs to the groups of LMICs is determined 
based on its per-capita GDP, and thus changes in the classification are possible over time. In line 
with the treatment of other variables (see below), I calculate each country’s per-capita GDP (2011 
US$-PPP) by averaging over the five years preceding the CRS data, that is, 2003–2007. I then use 
the 2011 cut-off point of US $12,195 (see https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/
articles/906519-world-bank-country- and-lending-groups for details) to select the countries to be 
included in the LMIC sample.
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With the founding of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 
which includes most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) member states, data on bilateral aid has been 
collected systematically and facilitated the comparative analysis of aid 
activities. While the data allows research to explore developments from as 
far back as 1960, only highly aggregated data was available to researchers. 
It was therefore not possible to distinguish different types of aid flows, 
leaving many questions unanswered. Is aid provided in the form of grants 
or loans? What policy areas does it go to? And who is involved in its 
distribution?
This situation changed with the introduction of the OECD Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS), which made highly disaggregated aid data 
publicly available. The CRS is composed of project-level data with infor-
mation on individual aid agencies, types of finance, sectoral allocations 
and project descriptions. As such, the CRS allows researchers to address 
a much wider range of questions about international aid. One disadvantage 
of the new data is that it covers a much shorter period of time. Although 
the CRS was initiated in 1973, only data from 2007 onward is considered 
complete. As such, the CRS data is not as suitable for analyzing temporal 
developments as the more aggregated data. However, this carries no 
implications for the present chapter, as I am interested in cross- sectional 
differences. The CRS data is therefore ideally suited to exploring in how 
far contemporary bilateral aid reflects colonial legacies.
For the purposes of this chapter, I make use of the sectoral information 
the CRS provides in order to discern aid flows going toward the social 
sector, and thus social protection, from aid to other sectors. The three 
main sectors in the CRS data are “social infrastructure and services” 
(social sector), “economic infrastructure and services”, and “production 
sectors”. Other sectors include “multisector aid”, “action relating to 
debt”, and “humanitarian assistance”. The OECD defines social sector 
aid as “efforts to develop the human resource potential and ameliorate 
living conditions in developing countries. It includes but is not limited to:
• Education: Educational infrastructure, services and investment in all 
areas. Specialised education in particular fields such as agriculture or 
energy is reported against the sector concerned.
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• Health and population: Assistance to hospitals and clinics, including 
specialised institutions such as those for tuberculosis, maternal and 
child care; other medical and dental services, including disease and epi-
demic control, vaccination programmes, nursing, provision of drugs, 
health demonstration, etc.; public health administration and medical 
insurance programmes; reproductive health and family planning.
• Water supply, sanitation and sewerage: All assistance given for water 
supply, use and sanitation, river development, but excluding irrigation 
systems for agriculture.” (OECD 2018b, 10)
Furthermore, the CRS allows me to discern what actors are involved 
in the distribution of aid. Actors can be identified by relying on the 
information provided on delivery channels: “The channel of delivery is 
the first implementing partner. It is the entity that has implementing 
responsibility over the funds […]” (OECD 2010, 8). The CRS distinguishes 
five delivery channels: “public sector institutions”, “non-governmental 
organizations”, “public-private partnerships”, “multilateral organizations” 
and others. Public sector institutions include both donor and recipient 
governments as well as their agencies. It therefore enables me to distin-
guish aid that is distributed through governmental channels/actors from 
aid distributed in cooperation with other actors.
For each donor-recipient dyad, I calculate four indicators to characterize 
aid flows between them.3 First, I compute the total aid flow by summing 
over all projects in a given year. Second, I compute the social aid flow by 
summing only over projects aimed at social protection (i.e. social sector). 
Third and fourth, I compute, for total aid and social aid respectively, the 
share of aid disbursed through governmental channels. The computation 
is limited to aid provided as grants, which do not have to be repaid and 
therefore constitute a clear, unidirectional transfer.4 To avoid mistaking 
temporal fluctuations for cross-sectional differences, I compute each 
indicator for each complete year in the CRS data (2007–2016) and sub-
3 Aid given by country donors to multilateral donors with defined recipient country, so-called 
bi- multi aid, is included in the calculation.




sequently average them. The averages of each indicator are the dependent 
variables used in the following analyses.
When exploring in how far bilateral aid reflects colonial legacies, it is 
important to also account for other determinants of aid flows. Becker 
(2019) provides a comprehensive dataset on the geographic and temporal 
reach of all major European colonial empires. Based on the dataset, I 
determine the last colonizer for each country in my sample and create a 
dummy variable, colonial legacy, to indicate whether a given donor- 
recipient- dyad is characterized by a joint colonial history. As such, colonial 
legacy is a characteristic of the dyad, not of the recipient country. In addi-
tion, the following statistical analyses include a number of control vari-
ables. Unless pointed out otherwise, these variables are derived from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2018). All numeric variables 
are calculated by averaging data across the five years preceding the bilateral 
aid data I use (2003–2007). This approach ensures that results are not 
affected by short-term fluctuations and also takes into account that aid 
strategies take time to adjust to changing conditions in recipient countries.
Economic interests play an important role in international politics, 
and when it comes to aid it is often suggested that donors are interested 
in opening up markets and securing preferential access for their own 
firms. I therefore include a trade openness variable which captures the 
amount of exports and imports as percentage of the recipient’s 
GDP.  Others contend that aid aims at promoting certain values and 
norms in recipient countries, in particular democracy. To determine 
whether donors reward democratic practices in recipient countries, I 
include the Freedom House (2018) political rights score as democracy 
variable into the analysis (original scores inverted for more intuitive inter-
pretation). Most donors focus aid efforts on poor countries. This is com-
monly referred to as poverty focus. As many former colonies rank among 
the world’s poorest countries, it is also possible that a poverty focus rather 
than the colonial legacy explains why former colonies receive more or 
specific types of aid. In line with earlier scholarship, I use per-capita 
income as a proxy for the level of poverty. Although income per capita 
would preferably be calculated based on gross national incomes, I rely on 
gross domestic products (US $2011, PPP), due to greater data coverage.
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Furthermore, I control for population size and geographical region. 
Population size accounts for the frequent focus of international aid on 
large developing countries (McKinlay and Little 1979). Geographical 
region accounts for unobserved variation across continents, which might 
otherwise influence results. Table 7.1 displays descriptive statistics for all 
variables. For five recipient countries, and thus ten dyads, information on 
trade openness is missing; they are excluded from the following analysis.
 Analysis
As this chapter is interested in the colonial legacies of contemporary inter-
national aid, it is informative to take a look at how aid flows to former 
colonies differ from flows to other countries. Therefore, Fig. 7.1 depicts 
total aid flows by donor (Britain, France, EU) and recipient (British 
colony, French colony, other). Information on aid from EU institutions is 
included as a reference point. However, as it can be observed, the aid patterns 
Table 7.1  Descriptives of donor-recipient aid flows
Mean Median Min Max NA%
Total aid 28.30 2.14 0.00 381.26 0.00
Social aid 15.25 1.07 0.00 274.55 0.00
Total aid (% Gov.) 47.82 51.73 0.00 100.00 0.00
Social aid (% Gov.) 47.64 43.91 0.00 100.00 0.00
GDP per capita 4.87 3.86 0.55 12.15 0.00
Population size 39.72 7.12 0.01 1303.42 0.00
Trade openness 84.67 80.64 0.29 244.26 3.45
Democracy −3.91 −3.80 −1.00 −7.00 0.86
Colonial legacy 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Africa 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Americas 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Asia 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Europe 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Oceania 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Donor: France 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00
Note: The sample units constitute donor-recipient dyads (n = 232). Income per 
capita in thousands, Trade openness in percentage of GDP, Population size and 
poverty headcount in millions. Colonial legacy according to Becker (2019), aid 
data based on OECD CRS, Democracy derived from Freedom House and all other 
data based on WDI
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of both former colonial powers differ sharply from that of EU spending. 
The left panel reproduces the conventional finding that former colonial 
powers strongly favor countries that used to be part of their respective 
empire. Both the 45 British colonies and the 22 French colonies in this 
sample received an annual average of almost US $60 million aid in grants 
(between 2007 and 2016). Interestingly, both donors also provide particu-
larly little aid to former colonies of the respectively other donor; they are 
more generous toward countries not colonized by either of them. The 
right panel shows how much aid is spent on social protection. For former 
colonies, a bit more than half of all British aid is spent on social protec-
tion, whereas this figure is slightly less than half for French aid.
This chapter further inquires about the extent to which former colo-
nial powers rely on governmental actors for the distribution of aid, be it 
their own or by including recipient governments. Figure 7.2 shows the 
share of total aid (left panel) and social aid (right panel) being distributed 
through governmental channels. While patterns of government reliance 
are very similar for total and social aid, patterns between British and 
French aid diverge sharply. For both total and social aid, Britain relies 
much less on governmental channels, barely reaching 20% within its own 
former colonies. To the contrary, a majority of French aid is allocated 
Fig. 7.1 Average annual aid flow by donor and colonial legacy, absolute dis-
bursements (2007–2016)
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through governmental channels. In its former colonies, the average gov-
ernment share exceeds 90%, for total as well as social aid.
The descriptive figures lend some support to the above presented hypoth-
eses. French aid to former colonies appears to be more reliant on govern-
mental channels, and both donors provide higher shares of social aid to their 
own colonies, compared to colonies of the respectively other power (although 
not compared to other recipients). However, to determine whether these 
differences are not just coincidental or are confounded by other variables, I 
now turn to some more systematic tests of the hypotheses about colonial 
legacies in aid. Therefore, I estimate various linear models with different aid 
indicators as dependent variables. The main independent variable of interest 
is the colonial legacy of a dyad as well as its interaction with donor identity. 
Controls are included to account for potential confounding. The models are 
estimated by way of using a Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
approach, as this is better suited to situations where the sample constitutes 
the population and it is thus more meaningful to treat the data as fixed and 
the parameters as random (Western and Jackman 1994).
Bayesian models deviate from the standard frequentist approach in 
that they do not only provide a point estimate and standard error for 
each parameter but a complete posterior distribution. The mean of the 
Fig. 7.2 Average annual aid flow by donor and colonial legacy, share disbursed 
through government channels (2007–2016)
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distribution, here indicated as b, corresponds to the point estimate in 
frequentist statistics. Bayesian estimation usually refrains from strict null 
hypothesis testing. Instead one can infer the probability that a parameter 
is within a certain range directly from the posterior distribution. A 
helpful figure is the probability that the parameter is greater than zero, 
indicated here by % > 0. Values close to 100% indicate a very high prob-
ability that the parameter is greater than zero, whereas values close to 0% 
indicate a very high probability that the parameter is smaller than zero. 
Values not in the proximity of 0 or 100% indicate little or no evidence 
that the parameter is different from 0. Analogously to conventional 
Table 7.2  Linear model results: Total and social aid to former colonies
DV Total aid [US $m] Social aid [% total]
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
b % > 0 b % > 0 b % > 0 b % > 0
Intercept 20.38 99.50 18.68 98.80 31.96 100.00 32.40 100.00
Donor: France −6.48 17.50 −2.72 36.80 10.01 99.50 9.31 97.80
Colonial legacy 47.55 100.00 52.83 100.00 9.23 98.40 8.08 92.30
Donor: Fr.∗Col.
Leg.
−13.70 20.00 2.56 60.80
GDP per capita −2.58 1.60 −2.72 1.50 1.38 98.10 1.41 98.00
Population size 0.09 100.00 0.09 100.00 0.02 90.80 0.02 91.30
Democracy −1.09 30.80 −1.23 28.60 0.40 62.60 0.44 64.40
Trade openness −0.26 0.70 −0.26 0.60 −0.12 2.00 −0.12 1.50
Continent
America −10.02 20.30 −10.30 19.10 −17.66 0.30 −17.74 0.40
Asia 3.54 64.60 2.70 60.40 10.05 97.00 9.97 97.10
Europe 4.26 61.40 4.58 60.60 21.45 99.30 21.28 99.20
Oceania −32.17 1.20 −34.19 0.80 −28.71 0.00 −28.55 0.00
R2 0.328 0.331 0.254 0.254
n 222 222 222 222
Note: Unit of observation is a donor-recipient dyad. Social aid [% Total] indicates 
the share of total aid directed at social protection. Donor and Colonial legacy 
refer to the dyad, all other variables to the recipient: Income per capita in 
thousands (2011-US$, PPP), Population size in millions, Trade openness indicates 
the trade share of GDP (in %), Democracy ranges from −7 to −1, the Continent 
reference category is Africa. All continuous explanatory variables are mean- 
centered. b indicates the mean of posterior distribution, %  >  0 the share of 
posterior distribution greater than zero. MCMC estimation (Gibbs sampling, 
chain length = 1 m, burn-in = 1 m, thinning = 100)
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null hypothesis testing, one might focus on whether % > 0 is within 2.5 
percentage points of 0 or 100%.
Table 7.2 presents the first model results. Models 1 and 2 both have the 
total amount of aid as dependent variable, with the difference that only 
the second model includes an interaction term between colonial legacy 
(which indicates the presence of an earlier colonial tie between donor and 
recipient) and donor identity (which takes the value 1 to indicate France, 
and 0 for Britain). Both models largely confirm the findings of earlier 
studies. Donors give more aid to their former colonies (an additional US 
$47.55 million per year), more economically developed countries receive 
less aid and countries with larger populations receive more. While the 
parameter for the effect of democracy is unexpectedly negative, the evi-
dence is very weak (% > 0 close to 0.5). Surprisingly, countries with greater 
trade openness appear to receive less aid, rather than being rewarded for it. 
The interaction term in Model 2 indicates that there are no substantial 
differences in how much aid both donors provide to former colonies.
The dependent variable in Models 3 and 4 is social aid as a share of 
total aid. In line with the first hypothesis, Model 3 indicates that the 
social protection share of aid to the respective donor’s former colonies is 
about 9 percentage points higher than aid to other countries. Interestingly, 
the social protection share is positively related to income per capita, indi-
cating that richer countries receive relatively more international support 
for investments in social protection. Model 4 further explores whether 
there are any differences between British and French aid. While the esti-
mate of the interaction term points in the direction expected based on 
the second hypothesis, the evidence is too weak to be regarded as sup-
porting the hypothesis.
The second set of models concerns the involvement of government 
actors in the distribution of bilateral aid. The dependent variable in 
Models 5 and 6 is the share of all aid distributed through governmental 
channels. Model 5 indicates a positive effect of colonial legacies on the 
involvement of government actors. However, the interaction effect of 
Model 6 shows that this effect is entirely driven by France’s stronger reli-
ance on governmental channels for disbursing aid to its former colonies. 
The colonial legacy parameter itself (main effect), which in this model 
represents the effect on British aid, is effectively reduced to zero. These 
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results strongly support the third hypothesis about the reliance of French 
aid on governmental ties to former colonies.
Finally, Models 7 and 8 analyze colonial legacies in the share of social aid 
distributed through governmental channels. The results mirror those of 
the two previous models. The overall effect of colonial legacies is positive, 
but this is by and large due to France’s higher reliance on governmental 
Table 7.3  Linear model results: Aid disbursement through governmental channels
DV Total aid [% Gov.] Social aid [% Gov.]
Model (5) (6) (7) (8)
b % > 0 b % > 0 b % > 0 b % > 0
Intercept 24.96 100.00 27.89 100.00 21.17 100.00 23.28 100.00
Donor: 
France
50.78 100.00 45.12 100.00 55.69 100.00 51.65 100.00
Colonial 
legacy




20.69 98.70 14.76 94.60
GDP per 
capita
1.07 93.20 1.27 96.20 0.95 91.10 1.09 94.00
Population 
size
0.01 83.50 0.01 86.30 0.02 88.30 0.02 90.00
Democracy −0.30 40.80 −0.05 48.70 −0.38 38.20 −0.19 44.20
Trade 
openness
−0.18 0.20 −0.18 0.20 −0.17 0.20 −0.18 0.20
Continent
America −23.51 0.10 −23.46 0.10 −21.79 0.10 −21.78 0.10
Asia 5.18 81.90 5.78 85.10 5.00 81.60 5.38 83.70
Europe 12.57 91.40 11.78 89.90 15.33 95.40 14.75 94.60
Oceania −34.04 0.00 −31.61 0.00 −32.40 0.00 −30.71 0.00
R2 0.509 0.520 0.551 0.557
n 222 222 222 222
Note: Unit of observation is a donor-recipient dyad. Total aid [% Gov.] and Social 
aid [% Gov.] indicate the share of total respectively social aid disbursed through 
governmental channels. Donor and Colonial legacy refer to dyad, all other 
variables to recipient: Income per capita in thousands (2011-US$, PPP), 
Population size in millions, Trade openness indicates the trade share of GDP (in 
%), Democracy ranges from −7 to −1, the Continent reference category is 
Africa. All continuous explanatory variables are mean-centered. b indicates the 
mean of posterior distribution, % > 0 share of posterior distribution greater 
than zero. MCMC estimation (Gibbs sampling, chain length = 1 m, burn-in = 1 m, 
thinning = 100)
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ties to former colonies. That being said, the estimate of the interaction 
term, about 15 percentage points, indicates a similar, if not smaller, differ-
ence between the two empires than that identified for total aid (circa 21 
percentage points). As such, this result provides no support for the claim 
that the reliance on governmental channels diverges especially sharply for 
social aid to former colonies (fourth hypothesis) (Table 7.3).
 Discussion
Due to the increasing availability of highly disaggregated and standard-
ized data on aid flows, this chapter is able to draw a more nuanced picture 
of colonial legacies in international aid than earlier scholarship does. The 
well-established finding that colonial powers provide more bilateral aid to 
former colonies than to other countries was confirmed. In addition, I 
have demonstrated that a disproportionately large share of aid to former 
colonies supports social protection policies, funding activities related to 
health and education, amongst others. I have also shown that France, as 
it did during its colonial era, heavily relies on governmental actors to 
distribute aid. Instead, Britain relies to a much greater extent on non- 
governmental actors and international organizations when it comes to 
disbursing aid.
The analysis conducted in this chapter provided no support for two of 
the hypotheses I presented in the beginning. While both Britain and 
France provide more aid for social protection in their former colonies, 
this pattern is not more pronounced in the French case. Compared to 
other countries, the share of aid supporting social protection is 9 percent-
age points higher for former colonies. Other than expected, I also found 
that France’s stronger reliance on governmental actors is equally 
 pronounced for aid aimed at social protection and for aid in total. As 
such, France does not rely particularly much on governmental actors 
when it comes to promoting social protection in its former colonies.
Although this chapter shows that certain colonial structures are 
reflected in contemporary patterns of bilateral aid, it does not elucidate 
the process underlying this continuity. The assumption of path depen-
dencies, resulting from inertia in social, economic and political ties, for 
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example, is certainly a meaningful starting point, but one that needs to 
be furthered explored. Equally important, one might wonder why bilat-
eral aid carries no resemblance of other colonial structures. What, for 
example, happened to the unique approach to social protection in 
the French empire? Did France shed its goal to assimilate populations of 
(formerly) dependent territories? Does the success of international 
organizations, charities and civil society actors provide France with leeway 
to disburse aid through non-governmental channels despite its neglect of 
these actors during colonial times? Future research should also be 
concerned with such discontinuities. They constitute the “negative 
image” of continuities and are therefore just as important for understand-
ing colonial legacies.
Shedding light on the processes underlying colonial legacies in inter-
national aid also needs to cope with questions about the motivations of 
donors to provide aid to former colonies. Earlier scholarship has employed 
various strategies to explore motivations for aid, mainly focusing on 
whether aid varied with contextual factors, either cross-sectionally or lon-
gitudinally. Some, for example, have analyzed whether aid goes to where 
it is most needed, for example low-income countries, or whether it com-
plements donors’ trade relationships. I have argued above that the social, 
economic and political ties that emerged under colonialism can affect the 
motivations of donors to provide aid. This argument finds support in the 
empirical evidence presented in this chapter, in particular the emphasis 
on social protection in aid to former colonies. This argument could be 
further probed by incorporating colonial legacies into existing cross- 
sectional and longitudinal research strategies.
The emphasis in this chapter was on donors as external actors in 
LMICs and on how their engagement is defined by colonial legacies. 
Donors do, however, not operate within a vacuum. Their actions affect 
the strategies and behavior of other actors, domestic and external. And 
the actions of these other actors affect donors in turn. I have speculated 
about one example above, the multiplication of actors concerned with 
social welfare, which might be one reason why social protection practices 
by colonial France did not leave a lasting mark. National governments of 
recipient countries are another highly influential actor when it comes to 
the distribution of international aid. They assume a decisive role in the 
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negotiation and coordination of aid packages, and just like in the case of 
donors, their strategies and bargaining positions are likely to carry a colo-
nial imprint. As such, for understanding colonial legacies in international 
aid it is not sufficient to study only donors, but it is important to consider 
the constellation of actors and dynamics between them.
A final point refers to the generalizability of the presented findings. 
The analysis here has focused on the two largest and most recent colonial 
empires, Britain and France. How do the findings then apply to other 
colonial empires, such as those of Spain and Portugal, who controlled 
vast swaths of the world throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies? What policies did they prioritize, what actor constellations did 
they promote and do colonial legacies prevail until today or have they 
been eroded over time? Exploring similarities and differences across and 
within colonial empires, and the duration of colonial legacies in interna-
tional aid, are another avenue for future research.
References
Abernethy, David B. 2000. The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European 
Overseas Empires, 1415–1980. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. 2000. Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom 
and Why? Journal of Economic Growth 5 (1): 33–63.
Becker, Bastian. 2019. Introducing COLDAT: The Colonial Dates Dataset. 
Working Papers (2), SOCIUM/CRC1342.
Berthélemy, Jean-Claude, and Ariane Tichit. 2004. Bilateral Donors’ Aid 
Allocation Decisions a Three-Dimensional Panel Analysis. International 
Review of Economics & Finance 13 (3): 253–274.
Bodenstein, Thilo, and Achim Kemmerling. 2015. A Paradox of Redistribution 
in International Aid? The Determinants of Poverty-Oriented Development 
Assistance. World Development 76: 359–369.
Boschini, Anne, and Anders Olofsgård. 2007. Foreign Aid: An Instrument 




Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto. 1979. Dependency and 
Development in Latin America. Trans. Mattingly Urquidi. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
Daughton, J.P. 2013. ILO Expertise and Colonial Violence in the Interwar 
Years. In Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and 
Beyond, ed. Sandrine Kott and Joelle Droux. Palgrave Macmillan: International 
Labour Office.
Deacon, Bob. 2007. Global Social Policy and Governance. Los Angeles and 
London: Sage Publications Ltd.
Dixon, John. 1989. A Comparative Perspective on Provident Funds: Their 
Present and Future Explored. Journal of International and Comparative Social 
Welfare 5 (2): 1–28.
Dollar, David, and Victoria Levin. 2006. The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign 
Aid, 1984–2003. World Development 34 (12): 2034–2046.
Easterly, William, and Tobias Pfutze. 2008. Where Does the Money Go? Best 
and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid. Journal of Economic Perspectives 22 
(2): 29–52.
Freedom House. 2018. Freedom in the World 2017: The Annual Survey of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties. Ed. A. Puddington. New York and Washington: 
Rowman & Littlefield.
Fuchs, Andreas, Axel Dreher, and Peter Nunnenkamp. 2014. Determinants of 
Donor Generosity: A Survey of the Aid Budget Literature. World Development 
56: 172–199.
Gerring, John, Daniel Ziblatt, Johan Van Gorp, and Julian Arévalo. 2011. An 
Institutional Theory of Direct and Indirect Rule. World Politics 63 
(3): 377–433.
Iliffe, John. 1987. The African Poor: A History, No. 58. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Iyer, Lakshmi. 2010. Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-term 
Consequences. The Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (4): 693–713.
Kpessa, Michael W. 2010. Ideas, Institutions, and Welfare Program Typologies: 
An Analysis of Pensions and Old Age Income Protection Policies in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. Poverty & Public Policy 2 (1): 37–65.
Lahiri, Sajal, and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller. 2000. Lobbying by Ethnic Groups 
and Aid Allocation. The Economic Journal 110 (462): 62–79.
7 Colonial Legacies in International Aid… 
184
Lee, Alexander, and Kenneth A. Schultz. 2012. Comparing British and French 
Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon. Quarterly Journal 
of Political Science 7 (4): 365–410.
Lewis, Joanna. 2011. The British Empire and World History: Welfare 
Imperialism and ‘Soft’ Power in the Rise and Fall of Colonial Rule. In 
Colonialism and Welfare: Social Policy and the British Imperial Legacy, ed. 
J. Midgley and D. Piachaud, 17–35. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
McKinlay, Robert D., and Richard Little. 1979. The US Aid Relationship: A 
Test of the Recipient Need and the Donor Interest Models. Political Studies 
27 (2): 236–250.
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the 
Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Maul, Daniel Roger. 2007. The International Labour Organization and the 
Struggle against Forced Labour from 1919 to the Present. Labor History 48 
(4): 477–500.
Midgley, James. 2011. Imperialism, Colonialism and Social Welfare. In 
Colonialism and Welfare: Social Policy and the British Imperial Legacy, ed. 
J. Midgley and D. Piachaud, 36–54. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Nunnenkamp, Peter, and Rainer Thiele. 2006. Targeting Aid to the Needy and 
Deserving: Nothing But Promises? The World Economy 29 (9): 1177–1201.
OECD. 2010. DAC Statistical Reporting Directives. Accessed 7 February 2019. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/38429349.pdf.
———. 2018a. Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities. OECD International 
Development Statistics. https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en.
———. 2018b. Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing 
Countries 2018: Disbursements, Commitments, Country Indicators. 
OECD. https://doi.org/10.1787/fin_flows_dev-2018-en-fr.
Pacquement, Francois. 2010. How Development Assistance from France and 
the United Kingdom Has Evolved: Fifty Years on from Decolonisation. 
International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de dével-
oppement 1 (1): 51–75.
Pearson, Jessica Lynne. 2018. The Colonial Politics of Global Health: France and 
the United Nations in Postwar Africa. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Pedersen, Susan. 2015. The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of 
Empire. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Round, Jeffery I., and Matthew Odedokun. 2004. Aid Effort and Its 
Determinants. International Review of Economics & Finance 13 (3): 293–309.
 B. Becker
185
Schmitt, Carina. 2015. Social Security Development and the Colonial Legacy. 
World Development 70: 332–342.
Schraeder, Peter J., Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor. 1998. Clarifying the 
Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and 
Swedish Aid Flows. World Politics 50 (2): 294–323.
Steinwand, Martin C. 2015. Compete or Coordinate? Aid Fragmentation and 
Lead Donorship. International Organization 69 (02): 443–472.
Suret-Canale, Jean. 1971. French Colonialism in Tropical Africa: 1900–1945. 
New York: Pica Press.
Wesseling, H.L. 2004. The European Colonial Empires, 1815–1919. 
Pearson/Longman.
Western, Bruce, and Simon Jackman. 1994. Bayesian Inference for Comparative 
Research. The American Political Science Review 88 (2): 412–423.
Woodberry, Robert D. 2012. The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy. 
American Political Science Review 106 (2): 244–274.
World Bank. 2018. World Development Indicators (WDI). Accessed 28 May 
2018. https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development- 
indicators.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons 
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the 
copyright holder.
7 Colonial Legacies in International Aid… 
Part III
The Influence of Donors on Social 
Protection
189© The Author(s) 2020
C. Schmitt (ed.), From Colonialism to International Aid, Global Dynamics of Social 
Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38200-1_8
8




In the past decades, the bulks of development assistance received by 
the Global South have been channeled through bilateral aid agencies, 
multilateral development banks, United Nations (UN) programs and 
other donor structures and international financial institutions (IFIs). 
Donor assistance is especially important, as in most cases the national 
governments’ resources are not sufficient to meet specific sectoral targets 
agreed upon by the international community and ratified by developing 
countries (Hagen-Zanker and McCord 2013).
This considerable support and the close relationship between the two 
sides lead to a state in which international donors may exert substantial 
influence on the pro-poor policies of recipient countries (e.g. Kilby 
2006; Khan et al. 2018). Donors often have opportunities to consult on 
the design and implementation of social policies, provide expertise for 
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 different contexts, impact national policy agendas through external funding 
and direct their priorities to national policy-makers. Additionally, there is 
evidence that donor influence might be strong in areas such as health 
policy (Groves and Hinton 2013), even in the absence of sizable funding. 
Hence, the IFIs not only provide funds for reducing poverty and vulner-
ability but also may shape the long-term course of development.
However, while scholars and practitioners acknowledge the contextual 
differences in poverty alleviation and development outcomes across 
recipients, the specific role of donors in the formulation and implemen-
tation of social policies they finance and support in poor countries 
remains unclear. Unlike previous research on the effects of the institu-
tions of recipient countries, the systematic policy patterns across donor 
organizations have been little explored.
This chapter is one of the first attempts to quantitatively investigate 
systematic patterns of the role of donors in determining the social policy 
agendas of recipient countries. More specifically, we reveal the impact of 
IFIs on the types and designs of social assistance programs in developing 
countries. We argue that international organizations such as the World 
Bank, European Commission, United Nations International Children’s 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and other IFIs can encourage or pressure 
national governments to adopt specific types of pro-poor policies or even 
define the components of social transfer programs according to their own 
agendas. We hypothesize that IFIs increase the adoption of social trans-
fers in total and, in addition, may choose specific types of programs or 
certain mechanisms of targeting. For example, they may promote condi-
tional social transfers because they imply human capital investments by 
beneficiaries.1 The donors can provide substantial technical expertise and 
other resources for increasing administrative capacity so that national 
policy-makers can afford to operationalize more complex programs. At 
the same time, IFIs may also pursue strategic interests in the provision of 
social assistance, especially in the form of specific policies such as public 
works programs. We will discuss some of these potential trade-offs in 
social policy-making.
1 Conditions are behavioral rules that should be compiled by beneficiaries for collecting social 
transfers. As conditions are typically introduced for education and health care, conditional pro-
grams are regarded as poverty alleviation policies with encouraged investments in human capital.
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We use two main sources of information. We extract the data from the 
non-contributory social transfer programs (NSTP, Version 1.1, 2017) 
and UNU-WIDER Social Assistance, Politics and Institutions (SAPI, 
Version 1.0, 2018) data sets on social transfers in the developing world. 
In total, we consider 155 programs in 84 countries, 35% of which have 
at least one donor involved. The period considered covers the period 
from 1960 to the year of program adoption, which allows us to focus on 
the adoption process of social transfer programs and the role of donors in 
this process. The sample consists of countries with at least one program 
in operation.
We focus on the types of programs, conditionalities, targeting mecha-
nisms and the details of donor assistance. We classify all programs accord-
ing to four types: unconditional social pensions, family allowance, 
conditional cash transfers (CCTs) and employment guarantee schemes. If 
a program shows elements of two or three types, it is assigned to every 
applicable type. In addition, we contrast conditional and unconditional 
transfers in order to trace the extent to which donors care about con-
ditionalities as an instrument for human capital investment. Then we 
distinguish between six targeting mechanisms: community-based, 
categorical, geographical, means testing, proxy means testing and self- 
targeting. We test the hypotheses that IFIs may prefer specific types of 
social transfer programs, in particular conditional versus unconditional 
schemes, or certain selection mechanisms that are used to target those 
among the extreme poor that are most deserving of social benefits. 
Donors may influence the choice of social transfer programs in order to 
prioritize their own policy agenda or to facilitate program implementa-
tion and operationalization based on their own administrative capacities.
We find that donors have several preferences concerning the choice of 
both program type and targeting method. In particular, we show that 
IFIs promote CCTs, family support programs and public works pro-
grams, whereas social pensions remain popular in all developing coun-
tries, regardless of donor assistance. We also find different preferences 
among the donors. While the World Bank follows the general pattern 
and favors all program types except social pensions, UNICEF typically 
promotes family allowances. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
the donors’ policies are in line with their own organization’s priorities. 
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Interestingly, conditionalities are promoted only by the World Bank and 
not by all donors, as might be expected. This might be due to enforcement 
difficulties and the limited state capacity in recipient countries. Regarding 
targeting, community-based programs prove to be the most favored ones, 
as external donors need to rely on the expertise of local community mem-
bers. We also show that proxy means testing is promoted by the World 
Bank. This might be explained by the close relationship between the 
World Bank and recipient countries, or by the large administrative and 
technical capacity required for implementing proxy means tests, which 
can be provided by the World Bank. UNICEF and the UK Department 
for International Development (DFID) more frequently use categorical 
and geographical targeting, as they primarily favor family support programs. 
Similarly, the World Food Programme (WFP) more frequently applies 
geographical targeting and self-selection mechanisms. These findings 
generally support the hypothesis that international donors exhibit a coercive 
nature when it comes to social policy diffusion in developing countries.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next two Sections give an 
overview of the relevant literature and theoretical considerations. We 
then present the data and the methodology. The following Section reports 
the impact of donors on the types of social assistance. Then we present 
our findings on how the donors influence the design of social transfer 
programs, in particular targeting mechanisms. The last Section discusses 
policy implications and contains concluding remarks.
 Relevant Literature
Despite broad research on the effectiveness of foreign aid and the reasons 
behind persistent poverty in developing countries, little is known about 
the donor-side factors affecting long-term development. Given the 
donors’ power in shaping the goals of social policy, implementation and 
effectiveness of aid programs, a systematic investigation of their strategic 
interests, capacities and pursued policy models becomes vital for under-
standing the failures and inefficiency of aid in developing countries.
It has been shown that the quality of donors may significantly influ-
ence both the volumes of development assistance and its effectiveness. 
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For example, Minasyan et  al. (2017) demonstrate that only quality- 
adjusted aid leads to increasing GDP per capita in recipient countries. 
The authors base their findings on the donor performance index of the 
Center for Global Development. However, such overall rankings of aid 
donors, even across sectors, may be misleading due to measurement errors 
and construction biases. A more detailed analysis of the components of the 
donor-recipient relationship helps to gain a better understanding of how 
donor characteristics and policies influence development outcomes.
Some evidence on the impacts of donor qualities is available from the 
literature focusing on the political economy of foreign aid. Fuchs and 
Richert (2018) show that the personalities of ministers in a donor country 
may affect foreign aid giving. Female ministers with previous experience 
in development cooperation provide a higher quality of development 
assistance. Additionally, Hicks et al. (2016) present evidence that female 
political representation in donor countries increases foreign aid.
Furthermore, political ideology and dominant party platforms in 
donor countries matter for aid allocation (Dreher et al. 2015; Milner and 
Tingley 2010; Thérien and Noel 2000; Cashel-Cordo and Craig 1997). 
Dreher et  al. (2015), for example, analyze the shifts in the dominant 
political orientation of German governments back and forth from conser-
vative to socialist in 1973–2010 and find that the socialist leadership 
decreases aid commitments. On the other hand, Brech and Potrafke 
(2014) show that left-leaning governments increase bilateral aid, espe-
cially if it is allocated to least developed countries. Milner and Tingley 
(2010) also demonstrate that the allocation of US aid depends, among 
other things, upon the left-right ideological predisposition of legislators 
voting for the distribution of aid. Fuchs et al. (2014) conclude that eco-
nomic interests, colonial past, terror incidents and aid inertia determine 
donor generosity. Harrigan et al. (2006) argue that aid allocations to the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are likely to be influenced by US 
interests in the region. Donor ideology can also influence aid delivery 
strategies. In particular, Allen and Flynn (2018) find that more liberal 
governments tend to channel aid through non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), probably with the purpose of inducing a direct effect 
on poverty alleviation in recipient countries, while more conservative 
8 International Donors and Social Policy Diffusion in the Global… 
194
governments prefer government-to-government channels that take 
economic and geopolitical interests into account.
Many other studies have explored how donors’ interests shape the 
influx of foreign aid into recipient nations, as well as the effectiveness of 
that aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy 2006; Dreher et al. 2008; 
Faye and Niehaus 2012; Hicks et al. 2016; etc.). In particular, Faye and 
Niehaus (2012) show that countries that are more politically aligned with 
donors receive more aid during election years, whereas there is no such 
effect in less aligned recipient countries. Dreher et al. (2008) conclude 
that the type of aid provided by the US depends on its ability to induce 
political support by recipients. Several other studies present evidence that 
“political” aid is allocated to meet political goals or to please political 
allies. Vreeland and Dreher (2014) demonstrate that United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) membership is a critical factor for the distribu-
tion of foreign aid. In particular, developed countries may direct financial 
flows to UNSC members who, in return, provide political support. 
Dreher et  al. (2009) find a positive relationship between temporary 
UNSC membership and the number of World Bank development 
projects implemented within a country, although the total aid budget of 
these projects does not change significantly. Dreher et al. (2018) find that 
aid to countries temporarily serving on the UNSC is less effective compared 
to aid received at other times. Moreover, Dreher et  al. (2019) present 
evidence that the amount of development assistance provided by the 
Chinese government is determined by co-ethnicity and favoritism that is 
based upon the birth regions of African leaders. It is therefore obvious 
that the argument regarding the influence of recipient qualities and donor 
interests in aid allocation has found large support in the literature on 
foreign aid (Becker, Chap. 7, this volume).
Additionally, the literature further elaborates on the policies pursued 
by international donors. For example, Bodenstein and Kemmerling 
(2015) work out in detail that donors face a dilemma when choosing 
between the total volume of aid and the amount of aid given to  individual 
poor countries. This corresponds to a trade-off between coverage and cost 
of redistribution in wealthier countries. Efficient targeting becomes criti-
cal in such contexts. Fuchs and Öhler (2019) show that private donors 
follow the same aid allocation pattern of their respective home country. 
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This result highlights the donor coordination within donor countries. 
Acht et al. (2015) present evidence that, if faced with high corruption 
and low quality of governance within recipient countries, international 
donors may change their strategies and decide to bypass corrupt state 
actors by delivering social assistance through NGOs and other non- 
state actors.
These findings, however, are only based on the total volumes and 
sector components of foreign aid. Only scant evidence exists regarding 
the impact of donors on the adoption and diffusion of social transfer 
schemes in developing countries. For example, Maclure (1995) provides 
an analysis of two health programs in Burkina Faso that induce new 
bonds of donor dependency. Takala (1998) reveals the consistency 
between national education sector policy documents in four African 
countries and the World Bank’s educational policy agenda.
These results, though illuminating, are based on qualitative research. 
Quantitative research on social transfers is much more scarce and 
generally concerns determinants of social transfers related to politics and 
governance, such as regime type (Dodlova et al. 2017) or rent seeking 
(Reinikka and Svensson 2004; Olken 2006; Dodlova et al. 2018b). To 
our knowledge, there does not yet exist any comparative analysis of 
the impact of both the characteristics of donors and policy preferences 
concerning the design of non-contributory social transfer programs.
Nevertheless, the growing diversity in donor strategies and approaches 
requires a closer look. A thorough comparative analysis of specific social 
policies, such as non-contributory social transfers, is necessary in order to 
better understand the contributions by and constraints for donors in 
terms of their social policy-making strategies in recipient countries. We 
conduct such an analysis in this chapter.
 Theoretical Considerations
Our main research question aims at the extent to which the adoption and 
diffusion of social transfer policies in recipient countries are shaped by 
external donors and IFIs. To achieve this goal, we formulate three main 
hypotheses based on previous research and theoretical considerations. 
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It is difficult to a priori disentangle the IFI’s incentives and preferences, 
but it is possible to discover in retrospect which types and design elements 
of social policies are prioritized by international donors. The research 
hypotheses are thus formulated so as to reveal empirical patterns of donor 
interventions in the social policies of developing countries.
First, we argue that the type of social transfer chosen can be partially 
influenced by the interests of international organizations pursuing their 
own policy agendas. For example, UNICEF promotes family allowances 
and child grants, the WFP contributes to the expansion of school 
feeding programs and United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees 
(UNHCR) supports refugees and internally displaced people. It has been 
recognized that international donors target resources according to their 
own priorities (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2016).
 1. IFIs promote specific types of social transfer programs, which is partly 
explained by their own policy agenda priorities and/or fields of technical 
expertise.
Second, international institutions may support human capital 
development as a part of their long-term development strategies more 
often than national policy-makers who are more concerned with meeting 
short-term needs and addressing current vulnerabilities (Browne 2006). 
Conditional cash transfers would then be more preferred by donors than 
unconditional cash transfers, as the former are distributed only if certain 
pre-selected requirements, or the results of these requirements, are met. 
Often related to education, health or parental support for children below 
18, conditions might concern behavioral changes (such as school atten-
dance) or performance (such as graduation). Such conditions entice ben-
eficiaries to invest in human capital accumulation.
This helps to formulate the second hypothesis:
 2. International donors more often favor conditional cash transfers in 
order to support human capital accumulation.
To confirm this prediction, we can check whether international orga-
nizations more frequently finance conditional cash transfers (CCTs). 
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Some scholars have already illustrated this phenomenon, especially in 
Latin American countries. For example, according to Parker and Todd 
(2017), Mexico’s Prospera, which was introduced in 1997, has influenced 
the design of CCTs in over 60 countries around the world, primarily with 
the support of the World Bank.
IFIs may play a key role in supporting certain types of social policies, 
not only because they provide substantial financial assistance but also 
because they possess the necessary expertise with poverty alleviation 
policies (see Devereux and Kapingidza, Chap. 11, this volume). This 
allows recipients to adopt more complex pro-poor policies that require a 
higher administrative capacity. This partly confirms Hypothesis 2, as the 
introduction and enforcement of conditionalities may be costly or socially 
challenging. For example, Schubert and Slater (2006) argue that contex-
tual differences between Africa and Latin America in public service provi-
sion, capacity and the benefit-cost ratio of the conditionalities may have 
led to the broad expansion of CCTs in Latin America, while their intro-
duction has remained inappropriate in a lower-capacity African context. 
Consequently, we cannot directly test which channel is more influential 
with the promotion of CCTs by international donors: prioritizing human 
capital development or institutional capacity building. We can, however, 
isolate the effect of capacity and expertise by focusing on one element of 
the program design, such as beneficiary selection or targeting. This 
element of the design indeed requires a substantial administrative capac-
ity and operationalization. Thus, the donors’ contributions to the imple-
mentation of the program lead to the formulation of the next hypothesis 
about the type of targeting mechanisms used for determining the eligibility 
of beneficiaries and providing them with transfers:
 3. IFI support allows recipient countries to implement more complex 
targeting mechanisms.
The components of the donor-recipient relationship prove to be relevant 
for the policy choices of recipient countries. The frequency of communi-
cation, usefulness of policy advice, and helpfulness in implementation 
may serve as proxies for technological expertise and professional support 
provided by donors in recipient countries.
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The next section introduces the data and preliminary descriptive evidence 
which already highlights some findings that are further confirmed by the 
quantitative analysis in the following Sections.
 Data
Several recent data sets are used for analyzing the impact of donors on the 
design of social policy in developing countries. First, we extract the infor-
mation on social transfers from the non-contributory social transfer 
programs (NSTP) data set Version 1.1 created by Dodlova, Giolbas and 
Lay (2017, 2018a). The database contains the main elements of the 
design of more than 186 social transfer schemes in 101 developing coun-
tries from 1960 to 2015. The second source is the UNU-WIDER Social 
Assistance, Politics and Institutions (SAPI) database. It provides the 
detailed characteristics, institutionalizations and budgets of 221 social 
assistance programs in developing countries from 2000 to 2015. More 
specifically, from both databases we extract information on the types of 
social transfers and targeting mechanisms used to define the beneficiary 
base as well as information on the donors or partial assistance provided 
by the IFIs, which is available for every social transfer program. This 
allows us to compile a data set which covers the most prominent trends 
in donor influence on social policy diffusion in developing countries.
We primarily base our results on the NSTP database, as it provides 
more detailed information on the types of donors participating in the 
adoption and/or funding of social assistance programs. Based on this 
information, we determine that about 35% of programs have been initi-
ated or partially funded by at least one donor. Among the most  influential 
donors are the World Bank, UNICEF, EU Commission, WFP and DFID 
UK. Our empirical analysis investigates the heterogeneity of influence by 
these donors. The main variables of interest are the dummies specifying 
that at least one donor participates in financing a social transfer program 
or a particular donor participates in the funding process. Thus, the cod-
ing is based on a donor’s financial contribution to a social transfer policy. 
In total, we have six dummies, one for any donor contribution and one 
additional dummy for each of the major IFIs: the World Bank, UNICEF, 
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EU Commission, WFP and DFID UK. If a program is funded by two or 
more donors, then each dummy for a respective donor equals 1.
We focus on the impact of international actors on three main outcomes:
• type of social policy (CCTs, family support, social pensions, pub-
lic works);
• conditionalities (conditional vs. unconditional programs);
• targeting method (community-based, categorical, means testing, proxy 
means testing, geographical, self-targeting).
Following Barrientos (2013), Ellis, Devereux and White (2009), and 
Coady et al. (2004a, b), we distinguish between four main types of social 
assistance and six targeting mechanisms. Specifically, we consider social 
pensions or old-age grants, unconditional family support, CCTs and 
employment guarantee schemes or public works programs. Based on the 
NSTP and SAPI databases, we present all types of social transfer pro-
grams based on this classification in Table 8.1. If a program shows ele-
ments of several types, this is taken into account by coding every type of 
transfer with a dummy variable. We focus on CCTs which imply that 
beneficiaries should not only keep edibility rules but also follow certain 
behavioral rules. In both data sets, the share of CCTs with at least one 
donor involved is quite high compared with other types of transfers. 
Table 8.1  Number of programs with and without donor assistance by type in the 
year of starting them
NSTP
No donor With donor Total
CCT 45 18 63
Pension 39 4 43
Family support 48 24 72
Public works 12 10 22
SAPI
No donor With donor Total
CCT 21 39 60
Pension 57 5 62
Family support 32 29 61
Public works 9 13 22
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Furthermore, in the SAPI data set the number of CCTs involving donor 
assistance is even higher than the number of CCTs without any donor 
assistance. There is consistency between the two data sets in the number 
of pensions and family allowances with and without donor involvement. 
IFIs are more active in assisting CCTs, family support programs and 
public works programs but not social pensions.
Figure 8.1 more clearly illustrates that IFI involvement in the assistance 
of social transfer schemes is quite heterogeneous. Support by the EU 
Commission and the WFP includes only two types of programs, namely 
family allowances and public works. Social pensions are assisted by the 
World Bank and UNICEF, while CCTs are only promoted by the World 
Bank, DFID UK and UNICEF.
Six targeting methods were identified. Categorical and geographical 
targeting combine all transfers based on a group characteristic such as 
age, gender, social status or place of residence. For example, social pen-
sions make extensive use of the categorical selection of beneficiaries. 
Geographical selection is often applied to identify entire regions with the 
highest poverty rates, lowest consumption measures or extreme food defi-
cits. Self-targeting implies that all citizens have an opportunity to receive 
assistance if they apply, however in principle, only those most in need 






Donor Assistance and Type of Transfer
d_cct d_pensions d_family d_publicworks
Fig. 8.1 Donor assistance and type of transfer. (Compiled by the author on the 
basis of the NSTP database. If a program is supported by two or more donors, 
then a donor with a large share of assistance is considered)
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should benefit from the program. Less needy individuals are discouraged 
from participating in the program by offering beneficiaries an inferior 
good, such as yellow maize, or by setting the wages for public works 
below the market level. Other types of targeting are implemented with 
the purpose of assessing the income level and identifying the potential 
beneficiaries, based on whether their income falls below a certain cut-off. 
Under means testing the households self-report their incomes or a pro-
gram official categorizes them into income or poverty groups. The infor-
mation provided might be verified through tax records or asset ownership, 
or it might not be verified at all—though this may increase targeting 
errors. Proxy means testing is similar to means testing but is more justified, 
as it is based on more than one indicator of income and typically makes 
use of the observable characteristics of the households to construct a 
wealth or income score. The score is then used to determine the house-
hold’s eligibility for social assistance. The community-based approach is 
applied if a group of community representatives or head of a community 
decides on household eligibility for benefits. This method can make tar-
geting more efficient, as it relies on local expertise and better information 
on poverty within a community at a lower cost. Additionally, the final 
decisions are generally more supported by the community members, 
which allows for avoiding potential conflicts among program participants 
and non-participants.
Targeting methods also differ among the programs with and without 
donor assistance. Figure 8.2 shows that means testing is practically unused 
by programs with donor assistance. Donors are typically involved in pro-
grams with proxy means testing, community-based, or geographical tar-
geting, and a bit less in categorical and self-targeted schemes. Furthermore, 
a combination of targeting methods is more often used for programs with 
donor assistance, which might be due to a higher capacity requirement. 
Figure 8.3 displays the choice of targeting methods by different donors. 
The World Bank uses all methods, but proxy means testing dominates 
and geographical and community-based targeting are used extensively. 
UNICEF and DFID UK also apply all methods of beneficiary selection, 
except means testing.
This descriptive evidence already provides some insights into the 
preferences of international donors in terms of social policies. We are 
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now going to empirically test each hypothesis, using the data on non- 
contributory social transfer schemes in developing countries. The next 
Section presents the econometric methodology used for checking the 
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Fig. 8.2 Donor assistance and targeting methods. (Compiled by the author on 
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Fig. 8.3 Targeting methods employed by different donors. (Compiled by the 




To estimate the influence of donors on the types of programs implemented 
and targeting methods employed we use a duration model focusing on 
the transfer adoption process. We conduct the empirical analysis at a 
program level and cut the sample at the starting year of program operation. 
This approach allows us to mitigate endogeneity and serial correlation 
problems. Once a transfer program is in place, it is presumably difficult 
to stop its operation. Moreover, IFIs are typically involved from the year 
a transfer program begins and continues to support the program, due to 
long-term relationships between donors and recipient countries. Thus, 
our approach emphasizes donor assistance at the year of the adoption of 
a transfer program. We introduce a binary variable that equals 1 if any 
donor is involved in the year of the adoption of a transfer program and 0 
otherwise. All years after the adoption of a program are coded as missing.
This approach is chosen primarily because, during the operation of a 
program, it is hard for donors to terminate assistance. National govern-
ments prove resistant to donor exit after program implementation because 
of the implied reduction in budget and loss of administrative support. In 
the NSTP data set, the information on donors remains constant over 
time. In the SAPI data set, only six programs have ‘survived’ after the 
donors’ exit.
Our dependent variables are dummies for each of four types of social 
transfer programs and for each of six types of targeting methods. We 
assume that specific types of transfers or targeting methods illustrate 
donor interests in shaping social policies in developing countries. The 
period considered is from 1960 to the year of the adoption of each 
program. Hence, we focus on the adoption process of social transfer pro-
grams and the role of donors in this process. We include in the sample 
only those countries where at least one program has been in operation.
Among different controls included in all specifications, there are 
country- economic and demographic characteristics taken from the World 
Bank Development Indicators Database. The level of GDP per capita in 
millions (constant USD) is included to capture the fact that richer coun-
tries introduce more social transfer programs. To account for the popula-
8 International Donors and Social Policy Diffusion in the Global… 
204
tion structure, three standard demographic controls are used: total 
population (in mln.), share of the population living in urban areas and 
age- dependency ratio. A rising age-dependency ratio means that fewer 
people belong to the labor force and, consequently, that fewer people pay 
taxes and finance redistributive and pro-poor policies. Dependence on 
the agricultural sector and natural resources are captured by the value 
added in GDP that comes from agriculture and by total natural resource 
rents, respectively. All of these control variables are taken in logarithms 
and one period lags.
To measure the regime type, we make use of the polity variable of the 
Center for Systemic Peace’s POLITY IV project by Marshall, Gurr and 
Jaggers (2017). It extends until 2016 and assesses countries on a scale 
from −10 for a strong autocracy to +10 for a fully consolidated democ-
racy. We take into account a diffusion process by controlling the total 
number of programs of each respective type or targeting method within 
a region in a previous year. We also control whether any other programs 
have previously been introduced in the country by including the num-
ber of social transfer schemes in operation in a previous period. We 
model unobserved heterogeneity by including country and time fixed 
effects. Our main empirical strategy is a standard linear probability 
model, because of fixed effects which add a set of dummies with a linear 
relationship. We also consider a logistic model, but the results do not 
differ  significantly and our findings remain robust to the choice of the 
functional relationship.2
 Do Donors Promote Specific Types of Social 
Transfer Programs?
Our first hypothesis states that IFIs can contribute to social policy diffusion 
by promoting specific types of transfer. In Table  8.2 we summarize the 
results from all regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy for a 
social transfer of a specific type, and the main control variable of interest is 




Table 8.2  Coercion by donor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CCT Pension Family support Public works
Any donor 0.306∗∗∗ 0.031 0.451∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.037) (0.081) (0.070)
GDP per cap 0.010 0.008 0.013 −0.007
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009)
Population −0.058 −0.047 −0.057∗ −0.021
(0.037) (0.033) (0.036) (0.021)
Urban population −0.006 −0.014 0.007 0.012
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014)
Age dependency 0.001 −0.003 −0.061∗ −0.025
(0.032) (0.029) (0.031) (0.021)
Agriculture VA −0.006 −0.010 −0.006 −0.003
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007)
Resource rents −0.002 −0.002 −0.007∗ 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Polity dummy 0.006 0.003 −0.002 −0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of any 
transfer program
0.018∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.002 0.013∗∗
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Number 
of CCTs – region
0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)














Observations 4088 4088 4088 4088
R-squared 0.175 0.047 0.220 0.150
Number of programs 155 155 155 155
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a dummy for at least one donor participating in financing the social trans-
fer program. All other variables to the right are taken in one period lags.
The results make clear that donors can drive social policy diffusion in 
developing countries and have some preferences for certain poverty 
reduction policies. IFIs mostly favor CCTs, family support programs and 
public works, whereas social pensions are typically adopted without any 
donor assistance.
The fact that social pensions are primarily initiated by national govern-
ments is confirmed by many case studies (e.g. Devereux 2007; Niño- 
Zarazúa et al. 2012). National governments can adopt social pension not 
only for poverty alleviation but also for strategic motives. For example, 
Devereux (2007) argues that in West Africa social pensions were intro-
duced in order to buy opposition and minority support. There is little 
evidence that IFIs invest extensively in social pensions, with the exception 
of humanitarian assistance in fragile regions. Therefore, the question of 
how international donors contribute to the expansion of social pensions 
remains unclear and probably requires further investigation.
Donor involvement increases the probability of adopting a CCT by 
30%, a family support program by 45% and an employment guarantee 
scheme by 21%. The number of any social transfer programs in operation 
in a country in a previous period and the number of programs of a 
Table 8.2  continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CCT Pension Family support Public works
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
All specifications are duration models with the considered period from 1960 until 
the year a program starts. The main variable of interest is the dummy for whether 
at least one donor provides financial or other assistance in order to implement a 
social transfer program. All specifications include time and country fixed effects as 
well as control variables such as log GDP per capita, log population, log urban 
population, log age dependency, log resource rents, log value added from 
agriculture and a democracy dummy defined by polity2 greater than 5. We also 
control social policy diffusion by including the number of any transfer programs 
in operation in a country in a previous year and the number of respective social 
transfer programs in a region in a previous year. All other variables to the right, 
with the exception of the donor assistance dummy, are taken in one period lags. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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 respective type within a region in a previous period are quite significant 
but do not crowd out the significant effect of donor involvement.
McCord (2012) also argues that public works programs, in particular, 
have been developed through the use of donor funds. She states that IFIs 
find a way to deal with structural economic transformations by providing 
additional jobs to stabilize labor markets and ensure subsistence agricul-
ture. These initiatives lead to improvements in infrastructure and means 
of livelihood for the extreme poor in many developing countries. Along 
with significant employment and welfare benefits, another reason why 
public works programs are popular among donors is political stability 
and the higher degree of social cohesion they may induce (e.g. Buhuwania 
et al. 2019).3
Donors finance pro-poor policy because non-contributory transfers 
provide not only short-term support that decreases vulnerability but also 
investments in long-term sustainable development. This is especially 
applicable to CCTs, which involve investments in human capital 
accumulation by ensuring school attendance or regular health check-ups. 
Family allowances are also promoted by donors, as they provide support 
for pregnant women, young children, orphans, dependent household 
members and others. Investments in early childhood are extremely 
important, as they have long-term effects on poor families and thus may 
contribute to sustainable development from a long-term perspective (see 
Chinyoka and Ulriksen, Chap. 10, this volume).
Moreover, there is heterogeneity in the policy interests of various 
donors. Table 8.3 reports the estimation results of the main independent 
variables serving as dummies for donor types. The findings confirm that 
donors contribute to pro-poor transfers according to their own policy 
agenda priorities. While the World Bank promotes all programs except 
for social pensions, UNICEF assists only family support programs, 
including cash transfer programs for vulnerable children and pregnant 
women in Togo, Sierra Leone, Uganda and other African countries. This 
makes evident that UNICEF prioritizes unconditional transfers in order 
to meet short-term needs in health and education. The same policy 
3 However, there is only limited quantitative evidence on increasing social capital as a result of 
public work programs. In addition, there are even controversial findings based on the qualitative 
analysis (see, e.g., Vajja and White 2008). Further research on this issue would be required.
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strategy is pursued by the EU Commission. UNICEF’s and EU 
Commission’s support for family allowances increases by 25% and 45% 
in comparison with any donor assistance.
Interestingly, DFID UK, the EU Commission and the WFP do not 
favor CCTs and instead prefer direct investments in human capital such 
as family support and public works programs. In general, conditionalities 
are promoted only by the World Bank, which might be due to the difficulty 
of enforcement and lower state capacity in recipient countries. In case of 
CCTs, the effect is even higher for the involvement of the World Bank 
than for any donor involvement and makes as much as 40%. Other case 
studies confirm this finding. According to Pick et al. (2019), the World 
Table 8.3  Coercion by donor type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CCT Pension Family support Public works
World bank 0.410∗∗∗ 0.019 0.318∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗
(0.103) (0.034) (0.094) (0.088)
DFID UK 0.154 0.084 0.490∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗
(0.141) (0.106) (0.156) (0.165)
UNICEF 0.160 0.069 0.700∗∗∗ 0.190
(0.133) (0.114) (0.149) (0.130)
EU Commission −0.053∗∗ −0.014 0.923∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗
(0.024) (0.015) (0.030) (0.272)
WFP −0.033∗ −0.040 0.221 0.651∗∗
(0.019) (0.028) (0.284) (0.258)
Observations 4088 4088 4088 4088
Number of programs 155 155 155 155
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
All specifications are duration models with the considered period from 1960 until 
the year a program starts. The main variable of interest is the dummy for 
whether a certain donor or international organization provides financial 
assistance to implement a social transfer program. All specifications include time 
and country fixed effects as well as control variables such as log GDP per capita, 
log population, log urban population, log age dependency, log resource rents, 
log value added from agriculture and a democracy dummy defined by polity2 
greater than 5. We also control for social policy diffusion by including the 
number of any transfer programs in operation in a country in a previous year 
and the number of respective social transfer programs in a region in a previous 
year. All other variables to the right, with the exception of the donor type, are 
taken in one period lags and their coefficients are not displayed. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Bank is regarded as a key donor and has influenced the expansion of 
CCTs in developing countries.4 In particular, because of the World Bank’s 
support for CCTs, Prospera was able to become the model for the design 
of CCTs in more than 60 countries around the world (Parker and Todd 
2017). CCTs also require some behavioral rule compliance and thus 
might not be optimal under emergency conditions, so most donors do 
not consider such programs to be among the necessary tools for social 
protection. CCTs prove to be more effective in promoting long-term, 
sustainable development, so the involvement of the World Bank can also 
be explained by its priority for developing infrastructure, communities/
cities and strong institutions. These interests are also confirmed through 
the promotion of public works by the World Bank and the EU 
Commission, which is also in line with the high priority both place on 
building infrastructure and developing communities and cities.
These findings confirm our hypotheses that donors differ in their social 
policy diffusion strategies. They mostly adopt policies according to their 
own agenda and promote specific policies such as CCTs to expand their 
technical expertise to developing countries. However, donor funding 
preferences can be analyzed further, for example, by using their contribution 
toward achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) or qualitative 
case studies (see Künzler, Chap. 4, this volume; Chinyoka and Ulriksen, 
Chap. 10, this volume; Devereux and Kapingidza, Chap. 11, this volume).
 Is Donor Involvement Associated with Specific 
Targeting Methods?
Table 8.4 shows donor influence on the design of social transfer  programs, 
specifically the targeting method used to determine the beneficiary base. 
Interestingly, the preferences of almost all international organizations are 
consistent for programs that use community-based targeting. This way of 
beneficiary selection is strongly favored by all donors except for the 
WFP. Community-based targeting is considered to be one of the most 
4 https://www.oecd.org/dev/inclusivesocietiesanddevelopment/Lessons_learned_social_develop-
ment_partners_for_social_protection.pdf.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































effective methods, as it allows for the use of local information regarding 
the level of poverty and helps with avoiding social conflicts. On the other 
hand, as this type of targeting does not always yield an unbiased selection 
of the most vulnerable individuals, it can also increase local capture 
(Conning and Kevane 2002).
Any donor participation is an insignificant predictor of means test-
ing targeting, which is typically employed in programs funded by 
national governments. This result is driven by the fact that very few 
means testing programs are adopted with any donor involvement (see 
Fig.  8.2). Thus, our evidence confirms that national governments 
broadly use this method of beneficiary selection, probably because of 
its clarity and relatively easy operationalization.
At the same time, proxy means testing is promoted by donor involve-
ment, and especially by the World Bank, which is probably related to the 
technical expertise and administrative capacity required. Because of its 
non-transparency, proxy means testing allows for the exclusion of any 
political manipulations and rent seeking and so might be preferred by the 
World Bank in order to assure the efficiency and impartiality of social 
transfers.
DFID UK and UNICEF often use categorical targeting, as they pri-
marily focus on family support programs. More specifically, the involve-
ment of DFID UK and UNICEF increases the probability of using 
categorical targeting by 30%. Geographical targeting is applied by the 
World Bank, UNICEF and the WFP to target the poorest and most vul-
nerable regions. This method might be especially efficient for targeting 
areas in the aftermath of shocks and crises, which is a priority for both 
UNICEF and the WFP. For example, the WFP’s assistance is associated 
with the more frequent use of geographical targeting by about 60%. The 
promotion of self-targeted programs by the WFP might also be related to 
the offering of inferior quality food in times of crisis. The probability of 
using this type of beneficiary selection in case of the WFP also makes as 
much as 60%.
Technical assistance and expertise of international donors might be 
essential for applying specific targeting methods to social protection poli-
cies. Donors can contribute to the development and implementation of 
the Management Information Systems (MIS), the Harmonized Targeting 
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tools and the Unified Beneficiary Registries (UBR). For example, Malawi’s 
Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) has benefited from UNICEF’s 
support of the pilot project and further from the assistance of the German 
Institute for International Cooperation (GIZ) and KfW Development 
Bank in the design and implementation of the targeting system.5 SCTP 
uses a mix of categorical, community-based targeting and proxy means 
testing. Another good example is a Yemen Emergency Crisis Response 
Project (ECPR) that has provided transfers to the citizens of Yemen 
during an active conflict using geographical and multi-layered proxy 
means testing targeting. The project was grounded on the pre-existing 
national system of social transfers in a close interaction with the Yemen 
Social Fund for Development (SFD) and the Public works Project (PWP). 
The operational introduction of a complex system of targeting became 
possible with the support of the World Bank, UNDP and UNICEF.
Regarding the targeting mechanisms, the basic intuition is that the 
more influential donors are, the more can they promote more complex 
systems of beneficiary selection. This might be the case for the World 
Bank, which has abundant operational capacity and about 180 branches 
in developing countries. This can also help with explaining its preference 
for proxy means testing, which can be very effective for detecting the 
chronically poor (Grosh et  al. 2008) but is difficult to realize, as it 
requires high institutional and statistical capacity. Hence, we can con-
firm our third hypothesis and therefore emphasize the importance of 
donor support in the design and implementation of social policies in 
recipient countries. Community-based targeting is preferred by all 
donors, probably due to the necessity of involving community agents 
and local chiefs in targeting and monitoring, but also for controlling 
their performance in order to avoid potential eligibility manipulation 
and local capture. Categorical selections are low-capacity measures that 
are widely used by DFID UK and UNICEF, but this is probably related 
to their general policy agendas that prioritize support for poor families 
and children. Geographical targeting is popular among almost all 
donors, but it is typically applied together with other selection methods 




ations are based on development performance and help with highlighting 
how certain aspects of donor-recipient interactions shape social policy in 
developing countries.
 Discussion and Conclusion
The revelation of policy patterns pursued by international donors may 
help to a better understanding of development policy failures and with 
improving future development interventions. These findings provide 
important insights into how donors influence social policies, specifically 
non-contributory social transfer schemes.
Our findings suggest that IFIs have some preferences concerning 
which transfer types and targeting mechanisms are adopted. At the same 
time, their impacts appear to be generally in line with long-term develop-
ment goals. Donors promote programs which either support families in 
emergency situations or imply investments in long-term human capital 
accumulation, such as CCTs or employment guarantee schemes. There is 
also some heterogeneity among donors. While the World Bank more fre-
quently develops CCTs, UNICEF focuses primarily on family allowances 
to small children and pregnant women. This is consistent with the general 
goals and strategies of these financial institutions. It is interesting to note 
that social pensions, including old-age grants and disability pensions, are 
not favored by any donor. This reflects the general perspective that these 
policies are meant for short-term emergency assistance and are therefore 
not designed to structurally alleviate poverty.
In addition to the type of social transfer program, specific targeting 
methods are also promoted by different IFIs. Policy effectiveness might 
be fully undermined if the identification of the extreme poor and the 
selection of transfer beneficiaries are not correctly carried out. Hence, the 
choice of targeting method might be strategic, as donors typically finance 
social policies under the condition that social assistance is adequately 
distributed. This intuition is partly confirmed by our results, as interna-
tional donors support either very transparent methods of selection, such 
as categorical or geographical targeting, or complex identification 
methods such as proxy means testing in order to avoid eligibility manip-
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ulation. Self-selection remains a popular method among donors, which 
is consistent with the high share of CCTs supported by IFIs. However, 
the most promoted method, community-based targeting, typically 
ensures better access to information on poverty status at the local level. 
Administrative costs and information asymmetries can be reduced by 
using community agents such as local chiefs or leaders of social or reli-
gious groups instead of official agents who are better qualified but less 
informed. The main threat connected to this type of targeting is that the 
community agents may pursue their own interests rather than base their 
analyses on the actual needs of the people (Coady and Skoufias 2004). 
This is also confirmed by Dodlova et  al. (2018b) who show that 
community- based targeting is quite popular in rent-seeking societies. 
International donors should take such threats into consideration when 
supporting social policies in developing countries.
Valuable lessons can be learned from these insights. First, international 
donors should keep an eye on policy formulation. For example, Khan 
et al. (2018) find that donors have three different channels of influencing 
health policies in Cambodia and Pakistan: financial resources, technical 
expertise and indirect financial and political incentives. Depending on 
the stage of the policy process, donors may provide financial, technical or 
evaluation expertise. Second, donors can significantly improve the imple-
mentation of any social policy, sometimes at low costs. For example, the 
WFP was able to build an information database to improve the process of 
identifying the most vulnerable populations in Colombia in 2004 and 
2005. In addition to officially IDPs, the WFP could take into account 
other vulnerable populations through Church networks and community- 
based interventions that were designed specifically to identify families 
affected by conflict and food insecurity. Also, donors can contribute to 
monitoring and evaluations which appear quite critical in tracking aid 
allocation. Hence, donors have all of the resources and expertise needed 
to design innovative, effective social policy interventions in developing 
countries.
What is most important is that international donors support the pol-
icy initiatives of national governments without taking the leading role in 
their implementation. The keystone of donor interventions should be 
their complementarity to national initiatives rather than their substitu-
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tion for them. In particular, donor interventions should not replace the 
functions of national governments and should allow them to build their 
own capacities.
Our results confirm that donors contribute particularly to national 
transfer policies that require a higher level of technical support or opera-
tionalization, such as CCTs or proxy means testing targeting. Implicitly, 
this illustrates that donors are adequately cautious about contributing to 
social policy assistance. This conclusion is consistent with other literature 
on social policies. For example, also Holmqvist (2012) stresses that donor 
policies should not serve as leverage for institutionalizing permanent 
social protection systems but rather support recipient countries by their 
initiatives. He also gives an overview of different strategies donors can 
pursue for their funding while still providing national governments with 
enough flexibility to design and implement social policies.
We implicitly assume that donors may drive the formulation and 
implementation of certain policies according to their own interests and 
priorities. For example, donors may promote specific aid allocation pat-
terns to achieve major Millennium Development Goals (Thiele et al. 
2007). However, our findings would be perfectly in line with the view 
that recipient countries are strategic in their involvement with respective 
donors. From this perspective, donors behave as benevolent actors and 
social planners, and national governments appeal to them for help with 
specific policies. It would be interesting to investigate this hypothesis via 
case studies and other qualitative research. Our findings may also serve as 
a starting point for further research, comparing the positive and negative 
consequences of donor influence on poverty alleviation policies in devel-
oping countries. This contribution notably does not focus on how donor 
involvement influences the efficiency of social transfer programs. For 
example, Devereux and White (2010) argue that domestic policy-makers 
are shown to have suggested more efficient initiatives for social policy 
models than have international development actors. More efficient poli-
cies imply nationwide coverage, broad political support and, oftentimes, 
long-term sustainability. However, the technical expertise and institu-
tional capacity provided by donors might be essential for program imple-
mentation. Hence, there should be a balance between national interests 
and donor influence. Another potentially interesting topic for explora-
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tion is donor involvement in countries with different political regimes. 
According to Dodlova (2018a), in non-democracies almost 40% of pro-
grams are co-financed by donors as opposed to 17% in democracies. This 
suggests that donor influence on social policy in non-democracies is more 
relevant for a sustainable development, as they are more traditional and 
less open to policy innovations. Hence, our results can be considered a 
first step toward investigating many other issues related to donor involve-
ment and influence on social policy in developing countries.
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The World Bank and the Contentious 
Politics of Global Social Spending
Rahmi Çemen and Erdem Yörük
 Introduction
There has been an aggregate increase in social protection expenditures 
over the past several decades in most of the Global South and North, 
despite the expectations of the welfare state retrenchment literature 
(Korpi and Palme 2003; Scruggs and Allan 2008). Most countries in the 
Global South, especially the so-called emerging market economies, have 
opted for creating or expanding innovative welfare programs (i.e. condi-
tional cash transfers, free health care for the poor, food aid and public 
works programs), while old age pension expenditures, care services and 
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social assistance programs continue to expand in the Global North. 
When explaining welfare state expansion, most contemporary studies 
tend to emphasize structural factors, such as aging, previous development 
strategies, political institutions and the rise of the services sector (Haggard 
and Kaufman 2008; Pierson 2001; Rudra 2002). Without denying 
the importance of structuralist explanations, we contend that the con-
temporary literature has largely under-examined how social expenditures 
are influenced by the political concerns of national and supranational 
institutions, such as the containment of social unrest. There are a few 
previous works that tackle similar inquiries; however, they test the oppo-
site direction of the relationship we are interested in: the effect that wel-
fare has on contentious politics (see i.e. Burgoon 2006; Dunning 2008; 
Pierson 2001; Taydas and Peksen 2012; Weiss 2005). In this chapter, we 
set out to make a contribution by testing the extent to which social unrest 
affects public social expenditures.
There are reasons to believe that international financial institutions 
(IFIs), such as the World Bank, may be playing a mediating role in the 
relationship between contentious politics and social spending. The World 
Bank claims that many new social policies (such as social pensions and 
conditional cash transfers) in borrowing countries are a result of techno-
cratic (read: non-political) imposition (Brooks 2004; Radin 2008). Yet, 
van Gils and Yörük (2017) show that political objectives have played a 
critical role in the content of World Bank recommendations, including 
the prevention and containment of social unrest. In that sense, they show 
that World Bank social policy recommendations are not solely based on 
technocratic concerns over poverty alleviation and development but are 
fueled by the Bank’s own political concerns about political stability. Thus, 
these observations have led us to question whether the social policy rec-
ommendations of IFIs, such as the World Bank, are mostly targeted at 
countries experiencing greater amounts of social unrest. Moreover, we are 
curious as to whether the World Bank’s recommendations are taken into 
consideration more seriously by borrowing countries if they are chal-
lenged by social unrest.
We, therefore, hypothesize that social unrest is a key factor which 
translates structural effects into actual welfare policies, as part of a benev-
olent government strategy to contain further unrest. Furthermore, we 
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suspect that this process is facilitated by the intervention of IFIs. The 
results of our statistical analysis, on a sample of 48 countries from the 
Global North and South for the years between 1989 and 2015, indicate 
that social expenditures are, to a significant degree, positively related to 
social unrest, thus providing evidence of the social containment hypoth-
esis. The results for our second hypothesis are less clear, as there is no 
evidence of a direct effect of the World Bank on social spending. However, 
in several models we find that the effect of certain types of social unrest 
(i.e. general strikes) is significant if interacted with World Bank social 
policy recommendations (WBSPRs). Thus, there is some evidence of a 
relationship between World Bank social policy interventions and govern-
ment decisions to increase social spending as a reaction to social unrest. 
Taken together, we interpret these results as a sign that social unrest plays 
a role in how policymakers translate structural forces into actual social 
policies, as well as providing some insights into the conditions in which 
policymakers choose to diffuse social policy recommendations from IFIs, 
such as the World Bank.
 Explaining Welfare State Development
The explanations for modern welfare state development since the nine-
teenth century can be classified into two main clusters: structural and 
political explanations. For the mid-twentieth century development of 
welfare in the West, structuralist theories suggest that the welfare state 
expanded as a “natural” response to industrialization and urbanization 
(a.k.a logic of industrialism thesis) (Cowgill 1974; Form 1979; 
Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Pampel and Weiss 1983) or to resolve the crisis 
of under-consumption following the Keynesian logic (Garraty 1978; 
Janowitz 1977; O’Connor 1973; Offe 1984). Scholars oriented toward 
political explanations have argued that demographic and economic 
exigencies do not automatically lead to changes in welfare policies. 
Rather, socio-structural factors are translated into social policies through 
political conflict and struggles. These scholars considered the mid-
twentieth- century welfare expansion as part of a strategy to contain political 
disorder and mobilize popular support (Dawson and Robinson 1963; 
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Jennings 1979; Olson 1982). For instance, in-depth investigations of the 
urban riots in the United States during the 1960s provide evidence of the 
state using welfare programs for controlling, containing and potentially 
repressing insurgent populations (Gurr 1980; Isaac and Kelly 1981; Offe 
1982; Piven and Cloward 1971).
Unlike the previous literature, that delicately fused structural and 
political perspectives, dominant arguments concerning the contempo-
rary developments of the welfare state have largely focused on how 
national governments take a number of structural factors into account 
when formulating social policies, such as globalization, rising poverty, 
unemployment, deindustrialization, aging and the rise of the services sec-
tor (Cerutti et al. 2014; Fernández and Jaime-Castillo 2012; Gough et al. 
2004; Hemerijck 2012; Iversen 2001). This structuralist focus has not 
only characterized the studies on the original Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, but also greatly 
influenced the scope of questions asked in research on the Global South. 
For instance, research on the welfare-globalization nexus has often 
painted a gloomy picture, suggesting that a “race to the bottom” is taking 
place1 (Avelino et al. 2005; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Rudra 
2002; Wibbels 2006), the logic being that developing countries lack the 
domestic mediating factors of globalization found in the original OECD 
countries (for instance strong democratic institutions) (Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008; Rudra 2008). The overall evidence has largely contra-
dicted the claims of a “race to the welfare bottom” in the Global South, 
such as an overall increase in public spending and the proliferation of 
new social welfare programs (Hulme et al. 2012). Thus, we argue that the 
globalization-welfare nexus literature provides a good example of the 
need to take into consideration factors which mediate structural effects 
into actual social policies, such as political effects and their interaction 
with international/external actors.
With regard to the influence of external actors, a number of studies 
have begun to place greater emphasis on the political concerns of supra-
national organizations, such as the World Bank, when explaining the 
1 The “race to the bottom” hypothesis can be generally summarized as stating that high universal 
welfare standards are incompatible with market competition (Mishra 1996; Wibbels 2006).
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 formulation of social policies in the Global South (Brooks 2015; Simpson 
2018). The official discourse of the World Bank is that its objectives are 
not political, but that it seeks to solve social ills, such as the alleviation of 
poverty (Litvack 2011; World Bank 2015). However, previous research 
has demonstrated that these claims do not match up to reality (van Gils 
and Yörük 2017). A number of studies have found clear references to 
political concerns in the World Bank’s policies (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004; Benjamin n.d.; Goldman n.d.; Van de Laar 1976). For instance, 
van Gils and Yörük (2017) provide systematic evidence of the World 
Bank making politically motivated social policy recommendations, 
such as the prevention and containment of social unrest. While it is not 
surprising to see political rhetoric in the World Bank’s policy recommen-
dations, these recommendations are subsumed under the Word Bank’s 
global “equitable growth” strategy. Thus, it appears that the World Bank 
does not see poverty alleviation as an end in and of itself, but rather as a 
means to reduce social unrest which could adversely affect the interests of 
donor governments (see Dodlova, Chap. 8, this volume).
This conclusion fits to the fact that the World Bank is a rationally 
structured bureaucratic institution with well-defined interests and goals. 
Furthermore, the Bank has to negotiate with member organizations in 
order to achieve these goals and maximize bureaucratic interests. This 
dependency structurally leads the Bank toward a conservative direction 
and to policy recommendations that are often politically driven. 
Therefore, when member states have exigencies for the containment of 
domestic unrest, the Bank is driven to provide blueprints for this course 
of action. Also, recommending social assistance for political containment 
is appealing because customers, as political actors, tend to internalize 
World Bank policy suggestions that would work politically at home. 
Therefore, recommendations that are politically helpful may find clients 
easier (Toye 2009).
The World Bank’s donor states have a strong influence on the Bank’s 
policymaking (Weaver and Leiteritz 2005), with the US remaining the 
most influential state (Fleck and Kilby 2006; Morrison 2013). Hence, 
the Bank acts as an overseer of global political stability, primarily due to 
the support from donor governments who may have their long-term 
security interests defended when considering stabilization goals which 
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should, in turn, lead to less migration or terrorism (Keukeleire and Raube 
2013, see also Shriwise, Chap. 2, this volume). Donors impose their 
interests through (1) direct appointment of the leadership cadres of the 
Bank, (2) donating the majority of funds, and (3) the threat of denying 
Bank funds access to the national private capital markets in case the Bank 
declines donors’ interests (Weaver 2008).
In sum, we turn to the careful fusion of structural and political factors, 
common among mid-twentieth-century welfare scholars, to explain 
recent trends in global welfare provision. According to this literature, the 
containment of social unrest is a political factor which translates the 
structural pressures for welfare expansion into actual increases in welfare 
spending. Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that IFIs, such as the 
World Bank, play a mediating role in the relationship between conten-
tious politics and social spending by facilitating the containment of 
social unrest.
 Data and Methods
To answer our research questions, we conduct a panel data analysis on a 
sample of 48 countries from the Global North and South, across multiple 
world regions, for the years between 1989 and 2015.2 Our sample does 
not include low-income/poor countries which run the risk of introducing 
a type 2 error to our analysis; as least developed countries have less capac-
ity and resources to increase social protection spending even if policy-
makers prefer to address unrest through benevolent means. When 
referring to emerging market economies, we generally refer to countries 
which show many features of advanced industrialized economies (i.e. 
high levels of economic growth, open markets, etc.) but at the same time 
lack many of the common features of these countries (i.e. high GDP per 
capita, low unemployment and consistent socio-political stability). 
Although seeking to only include countries which match these character-
istics approximates what we are referring to as an emerging market econ-
omy, we are nonetheless forced to deal with the difficulty that a commonly 
2 For a full list of countries, see Appendix.
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accepted definition which would delineate emerging market economies 
(EMEs) from least developed economies does not yet exist. Thus, to bet-
ter identify a sample of cases, we include countries as EMEs if they are 
listed on any one of three popularly applied lists: International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) and the Emerging 
Market Bond Index Global (EMBI Global) by J.P. Morgan.
Table 9.1 provides summary statistics of our data. Our dependent vari-
able is social protection spending, measured as a percentage of GDP.3 Most 
data for the dependent variable come from the OECD social expenditure 
database (SOCX). The OECD data are complemented with our own 
calculations based on national government records and surveys, applying 
the OECD methodology. We are mainly concerned with the effect of two 
key independent variables, as well as with their interaction. First, we cre-
ate an index variable for social unrest4 composed of the total number of 
events per year for three major sources of social unrest: general strikes, 
riots and anti-government demonstrations. All three of these measures 
come from the cross-national time series (CNTS) domestic conflict event 
data.5 The CNTS data currently offers the most reliable cross- national 
measures for the entire period of interest.
The second independent variable of interest is IFI influence. As an indi-
cator of donor diffusion of policy ideas does not currently exist, we create 
a new measure based on the number of WBSPRs. This measure is based 
on a survey of a total of 447 World Bank social policy related documents 
and reports.6 The core of the WBSPR measure counts the number of 
3 Social protection expenditure comprises public cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods 
and services and tax breaks for social purposes. Benefits may be targeted at low-income households, 
the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed or young persons. To be considered “social”, programs must 
involve either the redistribution of resources across households or compulsory participation.
4 The specific weights for the social unrest index are roughly in line with how CNTS scores their 
own weighted conflict index. The values entered are general strikes (20), riots (35) and anti- 
government demonstrations (10). We then multiplied the value for each variable by the specific 
weights; multiplied that sum of products by 100 and divided the result by 3.
5 Events for these data are recorded through a comprehensive coding of newspaper articles. With 
regard to sources, the CNTS user’s manual notes that “while no bibliographic references are utilized 
in connection with these data, most are derived from The New York Times” (12).
6 These include Country Focus reports, Economic and Sector work reports, Project Documents and 
documents from the Publications and Research department, including working papers. These are 
thus analytical as well as operational reports.
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World Bank social policy recommendations given to a specific country in 
a given country-year.7 This score is then added to the number of relevant 
regional reports. Finally, the World Bank occasionally publishes several 
highly influential policy documents which apply to every recipient coun-
try for the year in which the document was published. Thus, a single 
point is also added to every country-year in which an influential multi- 
country document is published. The equation to calculate the WBSPR 
variable is as follows:
 
WBSPR total single country social policy recommendatio( ) =
it
S ns








S ential multi country social policy recommendations-( )
it  
The issue with measuring WBSPR as an interval variable is that it 
assumes that a one report increase leads to a single unit increase in the 
effect on social protection spending. As an extreme example, in the year 
2013 we measure a total of 17 WBSPRs for China, up from 6 recom-
mendations the previous year. Thus, as an interval variable, it is assumed 
that the World Bank impact is 11 times greater in 2013 than in 2012. 
However, it is unlikely that 17 reports have a much greater influence on 
social policy than 6 reports. Thus, for all our models we apply WBSPR as 
a simple dummy variable, (1) if there was a report in a given country-year 
and (0) if not.
As one of the few studies which cross-nationally analyzes the World 
Bank’s influence on social assistance, Brooks (2015) measures the World 
Bank leverage as the proportion of loans to country GDP.  While this 
approach may yield general insights concerning the financial leverage of 
the Bank, financial flows are most likely one out of several mechanisms 
through which the World Bank exerts influence on policy choices. Other 
7 To create this measure, we build on a previous dataset which followed a two-stage keyword search 
method (van Gils and Yörük 2017). In the first stage, documents on social policies are identified 
from the World Bank’s online archive. In the second stage, these documents are searched for 
twenty-four specific keywords that are likely to indicate the World Bank’s interest in political objec-
tives. NVivo 10 is used to code all relevant documents.
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studies have laid the groundwork for cross-national statistical analysis by 
descriptively measuring the total number of World Bank social policy 
recommendations across all countries (van Gils and Yörük 2017). This 
approach moves beyond the World Bank’s financial leverage by measuring 
the diffusion of ideas and best practices. In this sense, measuring policy 
recommendations serves as a proxy for the extent to which the World 
Bank serves as a source of information, such as through specific policy 
reports identifying the changes the Bank would like to see implemented 
as well as technical support for their implementation. Thus, we use 
measures of both recommendations and financial flows8 to measure the 
influence of the World Bank, although most models apply WBSPR, as 
this more closely approximates what we are attempting to measure.
Several control variables are included to rule out alternative factors 
which might affect social protection spending. First, democracy is often 
hypothesized to be positively related to social protection and welfare 
measures (Rudra and Haggard 2005), although previous studies have also 
questioned this relationship (Dietrich and Bernhard 2016). Thus, in line 
with standard best practices, we include the Freedom House democracy 
scores as our measure of democracy. We also control for bureaucratic 
quality, which comes from the International Crisis Risk Group (ICRG), 
in order to gauge the degree to which a bureaucracy is professional, trans-
parent and effective. The bureaucratic quality measure ranges from 0 to 
4, from the lowest levels of bureaucratic quality to the highest. Including 
this measure is important, as it serves as our proxy of state capacity. States 
with higher capacity should find it less difficult to translate the prefer-
ences of policymakers into actual policies.
Along with political factors, we control for several macro-economic 
variables. As our measure of wealth, we include GDP per capita in con-
stant 2010 dollars9 (Lequiller and Blades 2014). Including wealth in our 
8 The measure of financial flows measures the amount of public and publicly guaranteed multilat-
eral loans (World Bank International Debt Statistics). This measure includes loans and credits from 
the World Bank, regional development banks and other multilateral and intergovernmental agen-
cies. However, as can be seen in Table  9.1, there is a significant amount of missing values for 
this data.
9 World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
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model should be significantly related to social policy, all else being equal, 
as a greater share of resources can be allocated to social welfare programs. 
Additionally, we include GDP growth, thus controlling for the possibility 
that any variation in the dependent variable (which is measured as a 
 percentage of GDP) is caused by differences in growth rates. For reasons 
discussed previously, we control for trade as a proxy for globalization, 
measured as exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP (IMF Statistics 
Department 2018). Lastly, we control for the old age composition of the 
population as a factor which should drive up the demand for greater 
social protection spending (population ages 65 or greater (% of total)) 
(United Nations 2018).
We use time-series generalized least squares (GLS) regression analysis 
to test the relationship between social protection spending, social unrest 
and WBSPR. To increase the robustness of our findings, we apply both 
random-effects and fixed-effects models. To control for potentially 
exogenous time trends, which could produce spurious relationships, we 
include a year-count variable (omitted from output tables). The equation 
for the model used in the analysis is as follows:
 
sacit it it k it= + + + ( ) + +a b b S b e1su 2wbspr controls u– , – –1 2 1 1  
In the above equation, all independent variables are lagged by one year, 
since we expect their effect to take place after a short period, but not 
instantly. In alternate model specifications we also test the effects of social 
unrest using a two-year lag. Adding a two-year lag helps us to assess the 
interaction between WBSPR and social unrest, as we expect unrest to 
take place prior to the World Bank making a social policy recommendation. 
In other words, the logic goes as follows: at time A social unrest occurs → 
at time B the World Bank recommends increases in social policy → at 
time C countries react to the unrest and WBSPR by increasing social 
protection spending. The next section presents our findings.
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 Results
The results for our first four models can be found in Table 9.2. As can be 
seen in all the models, social unrest is positively related to social expendi-
tures. While the effect of this variable is relatively small, this result is in 
line with our hypothesis that social containment plays a role in  translating 
structural pressures into actual social policies. Models 2–4 include vari-
ables to measure the World Bank effect. In Models 2 and 3, the WBSPR 
variable is included to measure the diffusion of World Bank social policy 
ideas, whereas the total of multilateral loans is included in Model 4, as a 
measure of World Bank financial leverage. In all three models, the effect 
of international donors is insignificant. Thus, at first glance, it appears 
that the World Bank is not related to public social expenditures. All other 
signs of the coefficients in Table  9.2 point in the expected direction, 
except for bureaucratic quality. However, in alternative models, using 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (i.e. regulatory quality 
and government effectiveness) as the proxy of state capacity, the signs 
point in the expected positive direction. As these measures are strongly 
correlated with our measures of GDP and democracy, and thus potentially 
cause problems of multicollinearity, we keep bureaucratic quality as our 
main measure of state capacity, but with a skeptical eye toward how its 
inclusion affects our results.
Table 9.3 delves further into the interaction between social unrest and 
the World Bank. Throughout the models in Table 9.3, we include each 
component area of social unrest used to calculate the previous index vari-
able and interact it with WBSPR. As can be seen in Model 5, including 
the different areas of social unrest without any interactions yields statisti-
cally significant results for general strikes and anti-government demonstra-
tions. This supports the argument that governments tend to expand social 
policy as a strategy to contain different types of social unrest. Another key 
result of Model 6 is the positive significant relationship of the interaction 
between general strikes and WBSPRs. One way of interpreting this finding 
is that high levels of strike activity are related to the diffusion of World 
Bank social containment practices. While both general strikes and anti- 
government demonstrations are positive and significantly related to social 
spending, we do not observe a similar interaction effect between the 
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Table 9.2  Social expenditure and social unrest
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Social unrest index 0.00008∗∗∗ 0.00009∗∗∗ 0.00008∗∗∗ 0.00006∗
(3.55) (3.66) (3.43) (2.18)





Trade (%GDP) −0.02342∗∗∗ −0.02328∗∗∗ −0.02094∗∗∗ −0.02014∗∗
(−4.70) (−4.67) (−4.19) (−3.23)
GDP per capita, 
PPP (Logged)
1.89691∗∗∗ 1.80392∗∗∗ 1.12940∗ 2.70511∗∗∗
(4.32) (4.08) (2.36) (4.05)
GDP growth −13.88796∗∗∗ −13.86662∗∗∗ −13.56768∗∗∗ −14.10258∗∗∗
(−9.54) (−9.54) (−9.39) (−7.73)
Bureaucratic 
quality
−0.81088∗∗ −0.80297∗∗ −1.01979∗∗∗ −0.97802∗∗
(−3.18) (−3.15) (−3.91) (−3.00)
FH democracy 
score (Reverse)
0.21083∗ 0.20110∗ 0.16033 0.40395∗∗∗
(2.54) (2.42) (1.92) (4.02)
Old age 
dependency
0.57483∗∗∗ 0.57242∗∗∗ 0.51949∗∗∗ 0.48899∗∗∗









Constant 124.91549∗∗ 106.24240∗ 33.4094 126.83635
(2.9) (2.41) (0.69) (1.94)
Observations 914 914 914 676
Groups 48 48 48 36
R2_Within 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43
R2_Between 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.86
R2_Overall 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.8
Note: Random-effects GLS regression, standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
WBSPR and anti-government demonstrations or riots. This might suggest 
that governments in this sample of countries implement World Bank 
practices only if there is a concrete material challenge emanating from the 
labor movement.
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Table 9.3  Social expenditure, social unrest and the World Bank
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8






Riots (Total) 0.001 0.098
(0.02) (1.56)
General strikes x WBSPR 0.382∗
(2.05)
AGD x WBSPR 0.027
(0.77)
Riots x WBSPR 0.024
(0.27)
WB social policy 
recommendation 
(Dummy)
−0.463 −0.461 −0.595∗ −0.518
(−1.58) (−1.57) (−1.96) (−1.68)
Trade (%GDP) −0.024∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
(−4.76) (−4.95) (−4.67) (−4.71)
GDP per capita, PPP 
(Logged)
1.891∗∗∗ 1.862∗∗∗ 1.824∗∗∗ 1.708∗∗∗
(4.25) (4.19) (4.15) (3.87)
GDP growth −13.575∗∗∗ −13.334∗∗∗ −13.934∗∗∗ −13.988∗∗∗
(−9.32) (−9.13) (−9.58) (−9.57)
Bureaucratic quality −0.813∗∗ −0.815∗∗ −0.783∗∗ −0.778∗∗
(−3.19) (−3.19) (−3.07) (−3.04)
FH democracy score 
(Reverse)
0.204∗ 0.209∗ 0.205∗ 0.195∗
(2.45) (2.51) (2.47) (2.34)
Old age dependency 0.568∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
(16.21) (16.1) (16.5) (16.39)
Constant 112.545∗ 102.328∗ 108.274∗ 94.665∗
(2.53) (2.32) (2.46) (2.15)
Observations 914 914 914 914
Groups 48 48 48 48
R2_Within 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.41
R2_Between 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
R2_Overall 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.75
Note: Random-effects GLS regression, standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
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Given the weak significance of the interaction terms, this raises the 
possibility that the World Bank is not able to effectively transfer its social 
policy practices to states which would benefit most from the social 
containment strategy. This could explain the disconnect between a highly 
significant social unrest effect and the lack of a World Bank effect, despite 
the evidence that the Bank forwards a social containment strategy. 
Nevertheless, we remain optimistic that World Bank social policy inter-
ventions are related to government reactions to social unrest through 
welfare provision. We therefore turn to a marginal effects analysis in order 
to better understand how social expenditure changes at different levels of 
change in social unrest.
As can be seen in Figs. 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3, the results of the marginal 
effects analysis provide some support for the interaction results of general 
strikes and WBSPRs, highlighted in Model 6. According to the marginal 
effects analysis, there is a positive effect for WBSPRs in countries with 
more than five general strikes in a given country-year. A similarly positive 
Fig. 9.1 Average marginal effects of WBSPR I
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trend can be seen in the interaction of anti-government demonstrations 
and WBSPRs, although this effect remains within the margin of error.
In sum, the results of the analysis indicate that public social spending 
and social unrest in general, and general strikes and anti-government 
demonstrations in particular, are significantly and positively related to 
each other. We also observe that in the case of general strikes this positive 
effect on social expenditures is heightened if interacted with WBSPRs. 
We interpret these findings to indicate that social protection spending is 
extended by policymakers by following the recommendations of the 
World Bank, as a securitization strategy to contain labor unrest. In 
general, we suggest that the securitization of social welfare policies 
depends on an understanding by policymakers that contentious groups 
may transform grievances into further political activism. Therefore, 
alleviating these grievances through social spending is seen as an “instru-
ment” rather than an end in itself, to undermine the conditions of this 
radicalization. Finally, we take these findings to suggest that, at least in 
the case of general strikes, the World Bank does not solely consider the 
well-being of people when making social policy recommendations but 
also as a means of achieving similar political objectives.
 Conclusions
There has recently been a global surge in public social spending. In this 
chapter we argue that social unrest is a key “political” factor that drives 
this expansion, translating “structural” pressures into social expenditures. 
We analyzed a cross-national panel dataset of 48 advanced and develop-
ing countries between the years 1989 and 2015. Our results indicate that 
social unrest, in general, and general strikes and anti-government demon-
strations, in particular, have a positive relationship with social expendi-
tures. We also find that when general strikes are interacted with WBSPRs, 
there is a positive interaction effect. This suggests that governments are 
more likely to translate WBSPRs into an expansion of social expendi-
ture in countries with a higher number of general strikes. We take 
these findings to indicate that social policies are adopted and extended by 
policymakers, at least partially, as a benevolent strategy to contain social 
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unrest. Finally, the results provide some support for the argument that 
international institutions, such as the World Bank, do not solely consider 
the well-being of people as an end in itself but also as a means of promot-
ing political stability.
Although we remain optimistic about the World Bank’s role in the 
process outlined above, we are forced to deal with the fact that our results 
generally indicate a weak or insignificant relationship between WBSPR 
and social protection spending. As donors such as the World Bank are 
mainly interested in promoting social policy changes in certain programs, 
such as poverty relief, it is possible that these ideas are being diffused to 
policymakers without making a statistically significant short-term impact 
on overall social spending. Recent regional studies have begun to investi-
gate this and have indeed found a significant relationship between the 
World Bank’s influence and the adoption of specific social welfare pro-
grams, such as conditional cash transfers (Simpson 2018). We therefore 
encourage future works to further investigate the mechanisms underlying 
the relationship between social spending and the World Bank’s influence 
through more regional and in-depth case study analyses.
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ditional or unconditional cash transfers, public works, feeding schemes or 
combinations of these—have spread across the Global South. In many of 
these countries, the “primary and most consistent advocates of social pro-
tection appear to be global actors” (Rudra 2015, 468). It is the transna-
tional actors—multilateral agencies like the World Bank and the United 
Nations, as well as bilateral ones such as the Department for International 
Development (DFID)—who have been most enthusiastic about the pov-
erty-reducing potentials of social protection, and it is largely through their 
encouragement that national governments have adopted social protection 
programs (Deacon 2007; McCord 2009; Hickey and Seekings 2017).
In reaction to global social policy research, which emphasizes the role 
of transnational actors with promoting social policy (e.g. Deacon 2007, 
2013; Kaasch 2013), there is increasing attention to the importance of 
domestic politics in sub-Saharan Africa. External organizations cannot 
merely impose policy ideas but need to link these ideas to national policy 
processes and to connect with domestic policymakers (Foli 2016; Ulriksen 
2019). Social protection policies are unlikely to take off, let alone be 
maintained, if they do not fit the developmental ideas of national elites or 
otherwise appeal to key domestic actors (Niño-Zarazúa et  al. 2012; 
Lavers and Hickey 2016; Hickey and Seekings 2017; Hickey et al. 2019). 
Even in sub-Saharan African countries committed to the adoption of 
social protection, many of the national governments have been rather 
unenthusiastic about programs they perceive to have the potential of 
creating dependency and of imposing a threat to salient values of 
self- reliance and family kinship (Ulriksen 2019; Seekings 2019). 
Consequently, elites in sub-Saharan Africa have often, at least initially, 
resisted the introduction of social protection programs, and as far as they 
have been persuaded by donors this has been if the proposed policies fit-
ted the strategies and ideas of national elites.1
While the social protection reform processes have been incremental 
and the expansion of coverage slow (even if the number of programs has 
increased substantially), most African governments have gone along with 
1 For instance, in Ethiopia and Rwanda social protection programs are strongly supported by 
national governments, as they are seen as being important for maintaining political stability and 
legitimacy (Lavers and Hickey 2016).
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the global social protection agenda although there is also a perception that 
the “global” agenda is dominated by a “Western preoccupation with the 
rights of individuals” (Seekings 2019, 7). Not so in Botswana. As we 
argue in this chapter, the welfare policy regime in Botswana has not 
fundamentally shifted away from its familial focus based on the conserva-
tive ideology of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), despite vari-
ous attempts by transnational actors (Seekings, Chap. 5, this volume). As 
explained elsewhere, welfare policies in Botswana are residual and family-
oriented, their main components being workfare for the able- bodied and 
supplementary feeding schemes for designated vulnerable groups; only 
selected groups (e.g. orphans) who have ceased to be supported ade-
quately by kin may receive some direct support by the state (in cash and/
or in kind) (Seekings 2016a, c; Ulriksen 2017). Politically, the ruling 
BDP has been in power since independence in 1966, and although sup-
port has declined over time and some political competition has made the 
BDP introduce broader social protection policies (most noticeably the 
old age pension of 1996), the party has maintained a strong conservative 
ethos in policy-making, emphasizing family, self-reliance and hard work 
(Ulriksen 2012, 2017; Seekings 2016b).
Being today a higher-middle-income country largely independent of 
international aid, the potential influence of transnational actors may be 
perceived as being limited. However, there have been pivotal moments 
when Botswana was extremely reliant on external support, such as during 
the drought crises of the 1960s (see Seekings, Chap. 5, this volume), dur-
ing the AIDS pandemic of the 1990s, which hit Botswana particularly 
hard, as well in the 2010s when transnational actors across sub-Saharan 
Africa started to promote social cash transfers. In this chapter we focus on 
the latter two critical moments when one would expect the influence of 
external actors to be substantial. Furthermore, we concentrate on child 
welfare policies—the Orphan Care Programme and the non- introduction 
of a general cash grant—as the well-being of children is an important 
issue to both the government and transnational actors. Our analysis high-
lights that although transnational actors have succeeded with persuading 
the government to change aspects of the Orphan Care Programme, the 
transnational actors have been unable to fundamentally sway the govern-
ment to pursue an individual, rights-focused welfare policy paradigm. 
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Instead, the government maintains a conservative welfare ideology which 
centers on the family and self-reliance as important virtues of social security. 
The case studies are based on an in-depth qualitative analysis presented in 
more detail in Chinyoka (2019). Before we explore the two cases, we first 
provide an overview of child welfare policies in Botswana.
 Child Welfare Policy in Botswana
In Botswana, the state plays an active role in providing social protection 
through investment in goods and services including education, housing, 
water and sanitation (Nthomang 2007, 3). The government funds self- 
help poverty reduction programs particularly in urban areas. The poor, 
however, rely on kinship care by the family, albeit with limited family 
capacity, and work-based social provision such as public works programs.
Botswana is a case of a “familial child welfare regime” where public 
provision for children reflects a primary commitment to the family: 
Botswana provides transfers in the form of coupons for orphans but not 
for non-orphaned children, however poor they are; instead, poor families 
with children are supported through workfare or other (mostly in-kind) 
payments to adults, and through feeding schemes. The familial primarily 
in-kind benefits are generous per household but ungenerous per person 
relative to the national and international poverty lines. Social protection 
benefits are not based in statutory provisions.
To elaborate, children in Botswana are supported by several programs 
(see Table  10.1). The Orphan Care Programme (OCP) provides direct 
benefits for orphans and vulnerable children, reaching about 5 percent of 
all children in 2013; the OCP transfers were US $0.90 per person per day 
(in December 2017), which is ungenerous relative to the international 
poverty line of US $1.90 per day. Children also benefit directly from gov-
ernment school feeding programs, initiated in the mid-1960s and taken 
over by the government from the World Food Programme in 1997 (see 
Seekings, Chap. 5, this volume). These are operated at primary and sec-
ondary levels, and in some cases from the registration of children’s parents 
as destitute persons. There are special provisions for the children of remote 
area dwellers (under the Remote Area Development Programme).
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There are a number of other programs where children are indirect ben-
eficiaries, such as the Community Home-Based Care, Vulnerable Group 
Feeding, Old Age Pensions, Destitute Persons, and Ipelegeng (a public 
works program). Generally, these programs offer in-kind benefits that are 
relatively generous and family-based in that beneficiaries receive a family-
based food basket/coupon determined by family size. Notable exceptions 
are the Old Age and World War Veterans pensions which are cash-based 
benefits, but there are strong expectations that such benefits are shared 
among families, not least because—partly due to the AIDS pandemic 
covered in the next section—many children are still taken care of by their 
grandparents or other elderly relatives (Dahl 2014). The government’s 
provision of family-based benefits reflects the political elite’s ideas about 
reinventing family bonds and the cultural practice of sharing scarce 
resources, including food, in times of need. Social policy, hence, is rooted 
in the cultural attributes of kinship (Durham 2007).
In the following, we focus on the OCP (Orphan Care Programme), as 
this is the only policy directly targeting children; moreover, it was intro-
duced at a pivotal moment when transnational actors played a critical 
role in Botswana, due to the HIV/AIDS crisis. The main actors in the 
policy bargaining processes were political elites in government preferring 
targeted in-kind transfers and workfare programs, UNICEF pushing for 
the introduction of cash transfers and universalization to include all chil-
dren, the World Bank supporting poverty targeting and the introduction 
of cash transfers and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) advocating for full government funding of all 
social cash transfers.
 Case 1: The Orphan Care Programme
Since the diagnosis of HIV in Botswana in 1985, the country has contin-
ued to have high prevalence rates. In comparison to its Southern African 
neighbors—South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe—also affected by the 
advent of HIV and AIDS in the 1990s, Botswana was one of the hardest 
hit, with high numbers of AIDS-related deaths, triggering an unprece-
dented increase in “AIDS orphans”. A total of 110,000 and 120,000 children 
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lost their parents to AIDS in 2003 and 2005, respectively (UNICEF 
2005). An estimated 77 percent of registered orphans and 16 percent of 
all children in 2007 were AIDS orphans (Central Statistics Office 2009b, 
55). Many Batswana children grew up “as double orphans, in single par-
ent families or even in child-headed households” (UNICEF 2012, 17).
Festus Mogae, President of Botswana from 1998 to 2008, viewed 
HIV/AIDS as “the biggest problem facing post-colonial Botswana”, as it 
became an economic and security threat to the nation (Kaboyakgosi and 
Mpule 2008, 302). The government, in collaboration with international 
donors, mounted a strong HIV/AIDS intervention, achieving universal 
access to HIV treatment by the end of 2011 and halving new HIV infec-
tions for infants between 2009 and 2012, thereby making important 
progress toward achieving an AIDS-free society (GoB and UNDP 2010), 
although “its capacity to sustain the response [was] being stretched to the 
limit”.2 Mupedziswa and Ntseane (2012, 60) argue that “the pandemic 
threatened the socio-economic fabric of Botswana society, with bread-
winners succumbing to the virus in large numbers, in the process leaving 
behind thousands of orphans and vulnerable children requiring 
assistance”.
The concern about AIDS orphans prompted the government to pre-
pare and adopt a National AIDS Policy in 1998 to reduce “the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on society” through, among other activities, “provisions for 
orphans”, reviewing the Destitute Policy “to make special provision for 
children orphaned due to AIDS” and “to make provision for distressed 
children of parents infected with HIV as well as those sick with AIDS” 
(MLG 2006, 3). The following year, the Short-Term Plan of Action (STPA) 
on Care of Orphans in Botswana was formulated and, based on this, the 
OCP was initiated to provide orphans with in-kind benefits to cover their 
immediate basic needs.
The year 1999 was a turning point in the social policy history of 
Botswana, as the STPA was the first and only policy directly targeting 
children since independence. The STPA’s main objective was “to respond 
to the immediate needs of orphans, that is, food, clothing, education, 
2 UNDP website http://www.bw.undp.org/content/botswana/en/home/countryinfo.html; accessed 
30 March 2016.
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shelter, protection and care”. In keeping with the BDP government’s 
approach of delivering services to the needy, the STPA emphasized that 
the government will support “community-based responses to the orphan 
problem” (MLG 1999, 15), suggesting support of the familial and com-
munity approaches that existed before the AIDS era (for more details on 
this see Chinyoka 2019; Seekings 2016a). Although the OCP’s ultimate 
goal was to remove orphans from the poverty trap (Ntseane and Solo 
2007, 93), its immediate aim was to “offset the burden of [families/kin] 
taking on additional mouths to feed” (Dahl 2009, 29). Hence, the OCP 
promoted kin-based orphan care.
The value of the food basket remained unchanged, with P21,600 per 
orphan, irrespective of the geographical location of their home from 
1999 until 2009. In 2010, the value increased and ranged between 
P50,000 (US $41) and P65,000 (US $76) depending on geographic 
location (urban, peri-urban or rural). The amount was supposed to be 
“adjusted for inflation at the beginning of each financial year but it has 
not been reviewed since 2010 due to affordability concerns, to allow 
more children to be enrolled on other programmes, particularly the 
increasing children in need of care (vulnerable children)” and to “direct 
more financial resources towards income generating projects for families 
with children to increase their chances of self-reliance”.3
Donors were influential in the outreach of the OCP. Although the 
government-PEPFAR4 funding partnership was that of a government- 
supported partnership, the pressure to target orphans was unusual for a 
higher-/middle-income country. This pressure is attributed to the fact 
that until 2013 OCP was funded by USAID under the PEPFAR pro-
gram through the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA). 
Although the government was committed to the OCP, its willingness to 
financially support the program was absent until the 2010s, and the gov-
ernment took over only in 2014 when it started funding OCP from the 
ministerial budget. While donors were heavily involved in funding the 
3 Quotes from interviews in Gaborone, cf. Chinyoka 2019.
4 PEPFAR: The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief is an initiative by the US government 
to address the global HIV/AIDS pandemic and was launched by President George W.  Bush 
in 2003.
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OCP, they did not contradict but rather supported the government’s nar-
row targeting of AIDS orphans, which resonated with the BDP’s con-
servative ideology, as we will explain in the following.
From the outset, the OCP is not means-tested; all families with 
orphans under 18 years are eligible for the program. An orphan is nar-
rowly defined as “a child below 18 years who has lost one (single parents)5 
or two (married couples, whether married in civil or traditional mar-
riages) biological or adoptive parents”. The STPA further defines “social 
orphans” as “children who are abandoned or dumped or whose parents 
cannot be traced” (MLG 1999, 9). This definition excluded children liv-
ing with single parents, such as the mother only but with “absent fathers”, 
who constituted 35 percent and 16 percent of orphans according to a 
broader definition (see below) in 2001 and 2008, respectively (Central 
Statistics Office 2001, 2009a).
The orphan definition contrasts with other definitions both within 
Botswana and internationally. The Botswana Central Statistics Office 
(now Statistics Botswana) defined orphans as children under 18  years 
who have lost one or both parents or whose parents’ survival status is 
unknown, while the UNICEF/UNAIDS/USAID (2002, 31) state that 
“an orphan is a child below the age of 18 years who has lost one or both 
parents”. The latter definition was adopted by Botswana’s neighbors, 
South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The narrow STPA orphan defini-
tion applied by the government excludes children falling under the 
“orphan” category according to the international definition. Thus, in 
Botswana, a child born out of wedlock can lose one parent through death 
and will not be regarded as an orphan. For instance, “single” orphans 
(either maternal or paternal) are not recognized in Botswana. To compel 
absent fathers to provide for their children, “[d]eserted children born out 
of wedlock were excluded from the definition of an eligible orphan, and 
therefore excluded from benefits under STPA unless there was clear proof 
that the child’s father had indeed died” (MLG 2006, 4). As a result of this 
disparity, orphan rates were estimated at 7 percent and 17 percent in 
2008, applying the Botswana and the international definitions, respec-
5 This definition only refers to children who had a single parent and lost that parent through death 
and excludes children who had two parents (unmarried) and lost one parent through death.
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tively (MLG 2008). By accepting the government’s narrow definition of 
orphans, the example reveals the donors’ inability to push the government 
to agree to international standards; the donors also (inadvertently) con-
sented to many children being excluded from the program.
Furthermore, although the OCP was a programmatic response to 
AIDS and the associated social and demographic changes, its implemen-
tation was residual and conservative. It was residual given the narrow 
definition of orphans and conservative because orphans were supported 
within a family, indirectly promoting the extended family (familial). 
Even though some rich families caring for orphans might have benefitted 
from the OCP since it was not means-tested, many orphans joined their 
extended families in the rural areas when their parents died, and most of 
the caregivers were likely to be elderly and poor (Dahl 2014). The liveli-
hoods of these poor caregivers depended on the food baskets and were, 
like other beneficiaries of food aid for the poor, BDP loyalists (Ulriksen 
2017). Overall, Mogae seems to have intensified his response to AIDS, 
but the response (introduction of the OCP) also buttressed his election 
campaign for the 1999 elections. Without specifying the strategies to be 
taken, Mogae underscored that “[t]he BDP will continue to pursue new 
strategies to mitigate the effects of HIV/AIDS and arrest the spread of the 
virus”.6
The government had spearheaded social transfer provision especially to 
orphans through the STPA, without a major focus on vulnerable chil-
dren. The exclusion of vulnerable children during the formulation of 
STPA was, as a result of the plan, being “largely guided by a rapid assess-
ment of orphans” without considering “the distribution and magnitude 
of problems facing orphans (not to mention other vulnerable children)” 
(MLG 2006, 6). A 2005 MLG (Ministry of Local Government)-
UNICEF-supported evaluation concluded that “STPA has managed to 
reach virtually all eligible orphans with food packages” that “helped to 
protect not only the nutritional status of the orphans, but also other chil-
dren in orphan caregiving households, and even caregivers” (MLG 2006, 
15). The evaluation established that “orphan” food was shared among 
6 BDP 1999 Election Manifesto, p1, accessed 16 August 2015, https://sadcblog.files.wordpress.
com/2011/07/bdp-1999-manifesto-botswana.pdf.
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family members, suggesting that the OCP basket was already a “family 
basket” although the government did not initially see it as such. While 
acknowledging that the move from an orphans to an OVCs (orphans and 
vulnerable children) orientation was already under way, as some vulner-
able children in destitute families were supported under the Destitute 
Persons Programme, the evaluation recommended that the OCP “move 
from an orphans focus to an OVC focus” (ibid., 17).
Based on these recommendations, the MLG, supported by USAID/
PEPFAR, commissioned a National Situation Analysis on OVCs in 
mid-2007. The OVC situation prompted the MLG through the Social 
and Community Development departments at council level to start reg-
istering “vulnerable children” who were not benefitting from any other 
social assistance programs under the Destitute Persons Programme. A 
vulnerable child was defined as a “person below the age of 18 years who 
is in any situation or circumstance which is or is likely to adversely affect 
the child’s physical, emotional, psychological or general well-being, 
which prevents the enjoyment of his or her rights, and who is in need of 
protection”. The number of registered vulnerable children benefitting 
and receiving similar support as orphans has been increasing. The num-
ber increased from 25,483 in 2008 to 29,033 in 2009 and to a peak of 
34,633 in 2010. By October 2015 the number had decreased to 33,681, 
as more children exited the program compared to entrants. Entrants were 
few, due to the shortage of social workers who were overwhelmed by 
other duties than assessing referred children.7
Donors played a significant role in advocating for the expansion of 
support to vulnerable children other than orphans. The 2006 STPA eval-
uation and the 2008 Situation Analysis on OVCs were primarily funded 
by UNICEF Botswana and USAID/PEPFAR, respectively. Through the 
evaluation UNICEF, as an international United Nations (UN) agency 
advocating for universal coverage of global child social protection, suc-
cessfully lobbied for a shift among policy-makers from focusing on 
orphans to including other vulnerable categories. The government recog-
nized the expansion as a way to strengthen disintegrating family  structures 
struggling to provide for children. While the USAID/PEPFAR would 
7 Information received in the course of interviews with key stakeholders.
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have preferred a continuation of merely orphan-targeting (which reveals 
some disagreement among donors as will be discussed in the penultimate 
section), the USAID went along with the government inclusion of other 
vulnerable categories, as political and financial buy-in of the expansion 
was important as a part of its exit strategy. At the time of the expansion, 
the OCP was principally funded by USAID. USAID’s strategy was first 
to have the government enrol vulnerable children on the tax-funded 
Destitute Persons Programme and later allow the government to take 
over OCP. While the government immediately adopted the expansion 
recommendations, it took over OCP funding only in 2013.
The USAID-funded situation analysis on OVCs (orphans and vulner-
able children) became “a precursor to the development of a National 
Policy on Orphans and Vulnerable Children”, still a draft, that would 
guide the expanded provision of essential services to vulnerable children 
(GoB 2013). The draft policy is destined to provide an overarching 
framework to support and guide the delivery of comprehensive, inclu-
sive, “age appropriate, integrated and quality responses to all vulnerable 
children”, contrasting previous OVC responses which tended to sepa-
rately focus on orphans and other groups of vulnerable children and did 
not tend to be well guided, coordinated or monitored (GoB 2013). The 
policy, like Zimbabwe’s harmonised social cash transfer, is set to pro-
mote a family care approach to the care and support of OVCs. However, 
the strategic emphasis of the policy on social protection is “targeted 
interventions and services provided on the basis of assessed needs and 
vulnerability”, presenting both the “government’s intention to promote 
and protect the rights” of Botswana’s most vulnerable children and its 
minimalist approach to social provision for families with children. The 
proposed policy has gone through two drafts (2009 and 2013) but is—at 
the time of writing—still awaiting cabinet review, perhaps because the 
government wants to “discourage dependency” and would rather sup-
port OVCs caregivers through employment and self-employment initia-
tives to strategically limit the number of vulnerable children depending 
on government support.
The reforms of the OCP to expand the program on vulnerable chil-
dren indicate a slight but not clear shift to poverty targeting, reflected by 
the means test (chronically ill or unemployed guardians), but the provi-
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sion remained familial, in that the program targeted no individual chil-
dren but families with vulnerable children. Furthermore, despite the 
augmented wider range of “vulnerable” children, many children contin-
ued to be excluded from the category because the government remained 
anxious about both “dependency” and “affordability”. The BDP adminis-
tration expected that the situation of vulnerable children would improve 
and that the registered numbers would decrease once their parents or 
caregivers were empowered through poverty eradication programs such 
as Ipelegeng and other government-funded income-generating activities. 
According to that view, against all evidence reported by social workers on 
the deteriorating situation of vulnerable children, the ongoing increase in 
the number of vulnerable children was considered temporary and did not 
warrant a stand-alone, long-term policy intervention.
In sum, transnational actors heavily supported AIDS programs in 
Botswana and were able to push the government to expand the focus 
from orphans to vulnerable children. However, the donors did not con-
tradict the government’s narrow definition of orphans nor its emphasis 
on family-oriented food baskets. As we shall see in the following, another 
push by transnational actors was the idea to introduce a social cash transfer.
 Case 2: Introduction of Cash Grant Versus 
Rationalization of the Food Basket
Like elsewhere on the African continent (and beyond), transnational actors 
have sought to promote poverty-targeted cash transfers in Botswana as 
alternatives to the largely in-kind, family-based benefits. However, to no 
avail. As we explain in the following, the Botswana government rejected, in 
turn, the proposals coming forth (first for a child support grant [CSG] and 
thereafter for a family cash-transfer program) and instead adjusted the 
existing programs fitting its conservative ideology. These proposals came in 
the context of a poverty-targeted program that would cover all families in 
absolute poverty being absent; a program that was favored by international 
actors, particularly UNICEF and the World Bank.
The first proposal by transnational actors was a child support grant 
(CSG). The process started in 2009–2010 when the government, through 
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the Department of Social Services in the Ministry of Local Government 
(MLG), supported by UNICEF and Regional Hunger and Vulnerable 
Programme (RHVP), commissioned a countrywide situation analysis 
and development of a framework for social protection led by a team of 
international and national social protection experts. The international 
consultants were led by Frank Ellis, a UK-based social protection special-
ist whose earlier work in Southern Africa and elsewhere had advocated 
for universal, rights-based cash transfers. The local consultants were Dolly 
Ntseane, an academic, seasoned researcher and consultant in social policy 
and social work, based at the University of Botswana, and Tebogo Seleka, 
the Executive Director of Botswana’s leading independent development 
policy think tank with a history of poverty reduction strategies (the 
Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis [BIDPA]). The team 
identified emerging social protection needs for children and developed a 
Social Development Policy Framework for Botswana (see Devereux et al. 
2010; Ellis et al. 2010).
The consultants proposed a CSG with the purpose of “curb[ing] the 
hunger, malnutrition, social exclusion and other forms of deprivation to 
which many children are vulnerable, especially in poorer families and 
most seriously in their pre-school years, with potentially lifelong conse-
quences”. Like in South Africa, the CSG “would involve payment of a 
regular monthly cash grant, (adjusted annually for inflation), to the primary 
caregivers of children” (Turner et al. 2011, 97) and would cost 1.2 per-
cent of GDP (similar to South Africa) in 2010 (but with the anticipated 
cost dropping to 0.7 percent by 2020, as the GDP grew and poverty 
declined) (Devereux et al. 2010). Anticipated to make a broader-based 
assault on poverty and “substantially limit the costs of providing emergency 
relief in the event of shocks and disasters such as drought” (Turner et al. 
2011, 100), the proposed CSG (child support grant) could be introduced 
incrementally, beginning with the youngest age group (e.g. 0–6 years) 
and gradually extending it to all those under 18 years. The CSG initial 
transfer would be set at “P100 per month (with subsequent annual con-
sumer price index linking)” and means-tested “through specifying an 
appropriate index-linked upper earnings limit for the primary carer and 
spouse, and/or targeting it to poorer parts of the country, in order to 
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concentrate benefits on the most needy” (Ellis et al. 2010, 13). The ratio-
nale for the grant was its potential to combat the “vulnerability and 
inequality that is offered by the patchwork of existing social assistance 
measures” (ibid., 11).
Despite support from bureaucrats in the Department of Social 
Protection, who thought the CSG “would reduce the administrative 
burden of screening deserving children as well as reduce workload for 
overburdened social workers”,8 the BDP government rejected the CSG 
proposal. The cabinet argued against the CSG, as “not every child requires 
government assistance and universalism will cause dependency and lazi-
ness which is against government policy that is encouraging graduation 
and self-reliance through participation in government funded poverty 
eradication self-help programmes”.9
This view was also expressed by the then President, Ian Khama, who 
had reminded “the nation at large that … we need to rekindle our spirit 
of self-reliance” in his 2009 inauguration address to the National 
Assembly (Khama 2009, 5). Makgala (2013) argues that the ethos of 
 self- reliance and self-help has been part of the Batswana tradition but was 
being eroded and replaced by overdependence on the state. Khama’s 
speech seemed determined to preserve this ethos. Continuing with the 
current narrowly targeted safety nets would reduce excessive reliance on 
government support at the expense of boipelego (Setswana word for self- 
reliance). The rejection also reflects the government’s view of the poor, 
that it should only support those that are poor and not able to support 
themselves and their families through labor. Contrary to evidence from 
“Mexico’s PROGRESA programme and South Africa’s CSG”, ascertain-
ing that cash transfers “actually reduced dependency by making it possi-
ble for recipients to look for and find paid employment” (Devereux et al. 
2010, 71; Surender et al. 2010), the Botswana government perceived that 
introducing the CSG would mean that even the “working poor” families 
would benefit if their income fell below the established eligibility thresh-
old, which would discourage people from working for their families. 
UNICEF, RHVP and other partners had sought to provide evidence 
8 Interview, cf. Chinyoka 2019.
9 Interview, cf. Chinyoka 2019.
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for the development of “A Social Development Policy Framework for 
Botswana” to put the CSG on the political agenda but lacked political 
support from the conservative BDP government that preferred to continue 
addressing poverty through economic growth rather than introducing a 
more inclusive child grant.
Perhaps as a strategy to reject the proposed CSG by transnational 
actors, the government instead pursued a rationalization of the OCP 
food basket in 2010. Until 2010 each orphan registered under the OCP 
would receive his or her food ration. A household with three orphans 
would receive three food baskets. Rationalization implied that a “family” 
food basket was provided based on the number of household members. 
In other words, the basket depended on family size rather than eligible 
individuals, suggesting a further shift from individual to family focus. 
The food basket per each benefitting household was calculated according 
to family size and age of household members. Using this formula, one 
orphan plus two family members were entitled to one food basket, one 
orphan plus three or four family members would receive one additional 
food basket and one extra food basket would be allocated for every two 
additional household members.
This familialist approach was compelled by the government’s concern 
about reported wastage of surplus food especially in houses with many 
orphans receiving “more than enough”, about an increase in the abuse 
(reselling) of food baskets and about the financial sustainability of the 
program. There was a need to “rationalise and redistribute” rations from 
recipient families perceived to be abusing food for other needy groups. 
The government was aware of the increasing number of OVCs in 
Botswana (cf. case 1) and realized that many of the households with 
orphans, who were already receiving a food basket, also included other 
“vulnerable” children; the government rationalized the food basket to 
allow both orphans and vulnerable children to benefit from the basket 
without having to introduce a transfer specific to vulnerable children.
Rationalization also implied a reduction in “destitute” families, as 
OCP beneficiary households would not qualify for government support 
under the Destitute Persons Programme. Consequently, it was effective 
in ensuring that poor families accessed basic needs but created another 
problem. For, when it came to families that were not considered under 
 I. Chinyoka and M. S. Ulriksen
261
the Destitute Persons Programme but had rationalized food baskets 
(because they had orphans), vulnerable children in such households were 
at risk of falling into destitution or remaining destitute. While “orphan 
households” benefitted from the food component, vulnerable children in 
the same households fell short of school fees and other education-related 
assistance only available to orphans and needy students or children. This 
exclusion error was a deliberate mechanism, on the part of the govern-
ment, to reduce the number of poor families depending on government 
provision; as a government official explained: the rationalization of the 
program is “working for us”. Rather than introducing an unconditional 
child grant targeting all children under 18 years living in poor families, 
the government opted for rationalizing the OCP food basket as, comple-
mented by the already rationalized food basket for destitute persons, 
more poor people were already receiving government support.
Despite the government’s rationalization of the food basket and clear 
rejection of the proposed child cash transfer, transnational actors contin-
ued to make proposals. This time attempts were made to better align 
policy proposals with the BDP’s preferences, but the proposals were still 
rejected. In 2013 the World Bank collaborated with BIDPA to assess 
Botswana’s social protection system, focusing on social assistance pro-
grams to inform the country’s “future social protection and labour strat-
egy and help achieve the goals of Vision 2016”, which encompasses 
lifting “84,000 families (336,000 people) from absolute poverty by 2016” 
(Tesliuc et al. 2013, 3). Even with the existing safety nets, a large number 
of families were still living in absolute poverty, while the programs, at the 
same time, drew significantly on the government’s budget at a time where 
“revenues from mining are projected to decline”, and hence there was a 
need to “increase the cost effectiveness of existing programmes” (Tesliuc 
et al. 2013, 3). This could be achieved through “a better weaving of the 
safety net through the introduction of a last resort, poverty targeted pro-
gramme”: a Family Support Grant (FSG). Such a program would eradi-
cate poverty in a budget-neutral way, as it would be funded from 0.4–0.6 
percent of GDP redirected from sponsorships and scholarships programs 
that accounted for 1.4 percent of GDP in 2012–2013.
The proposed FSG would offer “a benefit of P85 per capita per month 
(equivalent to P340 for an average family of four) to cover all families 
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living in absolute poverty that were not reached by the existing programs in 
2013”. The grant was intended to be implemented gradually, as its design 
was to be developed in 2013, piloted in 2014 and fully rolled out by end 
of 2015 (Tesliuc et al. 2013). Three options for the FSG introduction 
were recommended: the first two options suggested “replacing existing 
Destitute Persons and Orphan Care programmes with the FSG that 
would continue to cover poor and lower-middle income families taking 
care of either orphans or have destitute persons”; the main difference in 
the two options would be the extent of coverage, the first option being 
estimated to cover 24 percent of the population and the second option 
32 percent of the population. A third option was a “complementary 
FSG” which entailed offering “P85 per capita per month to all families 
identified by the proxy-means test as the 24 per cent poorest, but only to 
family members who are not already covered by other individual, more 
generous programmes”. Beneficiaries of the Destitute Persons, Orphan 
Care, Old Age Pensions or Ipelegeng programs would be excluded in the 
third option. Depending on the option taken, the first alternative would 
be budget-neutral, while options two and three would cost 0.2 or 0.35 
percent of the GDP, respectively. The grant was meant to target families 
in absolute poverty only, and beneficiary households would be selected 
through a proxy-means test, receive cash benefits and be expected to 
adhere to conditions, as the government would only provide cash to 
“poor families contingent on them investing in human capital such as 
keeping their children in school or regularly taking them to health cen-
tres” (Tesliuc et al. 2013, 77).
Although the FSG was to be a family-based poverty-targeted program 
resonating with the BDP government’s preferences for kinship- based 
benefits, the proposed implementation mechanisms contrasted the BDP’s 
preferred social assistance design. The BDP favored programs that tar-
geted the indigent and provided a safety net as opposed to a poverty- 
targeted grant. The government mistrusted beneficiaries for their abuse of 
cash benefits, and consequently the World Bank’s proposal of a cash-
based benefit was met with resistance. A conditional FSG also did not 
appeal to the BDP administration as, historically, the government did 
not impose conditions on social allowances. Moreover, if introduced, the 
grant was considered more “permanent” than most of the safety nets, 
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safe for the Old Age Pension and was likely to promote rather than dis-
courage dependency, hence contrasting the principle of self-reliance. The 
BDP found it “politically difficult” to replace existing programs (options 
1 and 2) and seemed concerned about the financial sustainability (option 
3) of endorsing the FSG. Olebile Gaborone, Permanent Secretary in the 
Office of President and Head of the Poverty Eradication Unit, distanced 
himself and the government from the FSG, saying, “They [donors] are 
just talking about it and courting us [government] to pilot it but I don’t 
see that happening. We are not part of it at the moment.”
In sum, despite evidence suggesting that poverty-targeted cash trans-
fers were more likely to reduce child and household poverty, the BDP 
rejected the CSG and FSG proposals. The BDP administration priori-
tized market-based poverty reduction (through labor), with the state pro-
viding a safety net largely through in-kind assistance to the “very poor 
and vulnerable groups in society” (Seleka et al. 2007, 2). These policies 
reflect the norms of the policy-making political elites within the ruling 
party. The BDP’s preference for self-help contradicts the provision of 
cash-based support to all poor families with children proposed by inter-
national agencies and donors. Hence, these proposals were rejected. “The 
BDP celebrated rural life, self-help and community, weaving these into a 
conservative ideology of social justice that decried excessive inequality 
and legitimated targeted interventions” (Seekings 2016b, 13). The political 
ideology has perpetuated familial in-kind transfers, preferring modest 
food rations to cash on the assumption that children will be supported by 
their working parents or caregivers.
 Resistance to Proposals by 
Transnational Actors
Why did the government of Botswana resist donor-led proposals for 
improving child welfare, and how were they able to rebuff the transna-
tional actors’ advocacy for broader and individual rights-based programs? 
Although Botswana is a higher-middle-income country, transnational 
actors are still important partners to the government in many fields, 
10 The Limits of the Influence of International Donors… 
264
including child welfare policies. Nevertheless, previous research has 
highlighted how Botswana—together with countries like Ethiopia and 
Rwanda—has been able to maintain control over its own policy agenda 
(Whitfield and Fraser 2010). Not only is the political context such that 
the BDP government experiences relative weak opposition from other 
political parties and civil society, the bureaucracy is also strong, central-
ized and professional; the state capacity scores for Botswana ranking 
among the highest in Africa.10
Crucially for our question, Botswana has a tradition of managing aid 
resources centrally within the Ministry of Finance and of fully integrating 
them into its own national development plans. The government refused 
to accept donor-led coordination, such as in the context of Consultative 
Group meetings, and instead preferred to negotiate with the donors indi-
vidually (Maipose 2009). Lack of donor coordination is quite common, 
as donors both compete and cooperate to achieve their goals. However, 
the centralized domestic management of aid negotiations in Botswana 
has perhaps further exacerbated the relative weak influence of transna-
tional actors. In our analysis, uncoordinated and competing policy posi-
tions were evident in a number of cases. For instance, the transnational 
actors up to 2013 had conflicting views about the Orphan Care 
Programme and about whether to continue targeting orphans only or to 
expand on other vulnerable children, and, with respect to the cash grant, 
the World Bank showed no support for the otherwise proposed CSG and 
instead suggested the FSG. Thus, our findings of the limited influence of 
transnational actors correspond with G. Maipose’s conclusion from his 
study, that “the government has refused aid when it was viewed as not 
being in the interest of the country, or when it was seen to be incompat-
ible with already identified national priorities” (Maipose 2009, 115).
Having now dealt with the “how” question, we still remain to discuss 
why the government of Botswana has not been persuaded by the arguments 
of transnational actors which refer to proven poverty-reducing effects as 
well as intrinsic values such as the rights of the child. One might be 
10 Botswana is the second least corrupt country (https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018) and 
among the top performers on the world governance indicators (http://info.worldbank.org/gover-
nance/wgi/index.aspx#reports).
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tempted to assume that because countries like Ethiopia and Rwanda 
(otherwise also relatively strong in their negotiations with donors) have 
adopted social protection schemes, it is because these governments share 
the same visions as the transnational actors. However, like Botswana, 
these two countries have not tended to formulate visions for develop-
ment just to be in line with donor priorities (Whitfield and Fraser 2010; 
Furtado and Smith 2009; Hayman 2009), and recent in-depth studies 
indicate that the introduction of social protection schemes is primarily to 
secure political legitimacy and that Rwanda and Ethiopia share visions of 
productive development and self-reliance, which also sits well with the 
conservative ideology present in Botswana (Lavers 2019a, b).
In fact, there are indications that political elites across many African 
countries adhere to conservative ideas of family, work and dependency 
(Seekings 2019). Countries like Uganda and Zambia have adopted social 
protection programs, but there are also debates on welfare dependency 
and issues of deservingness (Pruce and Hickey 2019; Bukenya and Hickey 
2019). A relatively aid-dependent country like Tanzania has also intro-
duced a poverty-targeted conditional cash-transfer program as promoted 
by donors. Yet, as in the other cases, current research indicates a strong 
reluctance by the Tanzanian government to fully take over the funding of 
the program, which is perceived by many as giving free handouts and 
encouraging laziness and dependency.11 Tanzania’s founding father, Julius 
Nyerere, promoted ideas of self-reliance and hard work, and this tradition 
seems to stick deep (Ulriksen 2019), as does the conservative welfare ideol-
ogy in Botswana.
 Conclusion and Implication of Findings
This volume focuses on the potential role of external national and trans-
national actors in driving social policy-making in the Global South, 
going back as far as to the influence of colonial empires (e.g. Schmitt, 
Chap. 6, this volume; Künzler, Chap. 4, this volume). The volume also 
11 http://ps.au.dk/forskning/forskningsprojekter/political-settlements-and-revenue-bargains-in-
africa/; M Ulriksen can be contacted for more details.
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emphasizes the limits of such external influences, and the case of child 
welfare policies in Botswana is a good example hereof. Transnational 
actors had some success with lobbying the government to expand the 
OCP from being purely orphan-focused to also including vulnerable 
children but the ultimate goal of introducing a poverty-targeted cash 
grant was not achieved.
The Botswana government has maintained a conservative welfare ide-
ology even at a time when rights-based cash transfers are promoted glob-
ally. Although the government in Botswana has perhaps been more 
persistent and consistent in following its ideology, and freer to do so, 
other sub-Saharan African countries also show signs of only reluctant 
support for the globally appraised social protection floor (Seekings 2019) 
with a (renewed) interest for values such as self-reliance, hard work and 
community spirit (Ulriksen 2019; Hickey et al. 2019). This (traditional) 
emphasis on the collective—the extended family, the community—seems 
at odds with the rights-based approach entailed in the social protection 
floors which highlight the rights of individuals toward the state. 
Consequently, although many African governments have initially 
accepted social protection programs promoted by transnational actors, 
the commitment may not stick so deep. The litmus test of the “Global 
Rise of Social Cash Transfers” lies in its sustainability, based on government 
funding rather than external support, and some governments—like the 
one in Botswana—may prefer, and insist on, kinship- rather than rights-
based welfare policies in the long run.
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External Donors and Social Protection 
in Africa: A Case Study of Zimbabwe
Stephen Devereux and Samuel Kapingidza
 Introduction
More than half the countries in Africa have adopted social protection as 
a policy instrument since the late 1990s. External actors have been instru-
mental in this rapid diffusion of social protection policies and programs 
across the continent. These external actors, also called “transnational 
actors”, “development partners” or the “international development com-
munity”, include bilateral donors (e.g. the UK Department for 
International Development [DFID], Irish Aid), multilateral agencies 
(e.g. the European Union [EU]), United Nations (UN) agencies (e.g. the 
International Labour Organization [ILO], United Nations Children’s 
Fund [UNICEF]), international financial  institutions (IFIs) (e.g. the 
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World Bank) and international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs) (e.g. Concern Worldwide, Save the Children).
The success of this policy diffusion process can be observed in the rap-
idly increasing number of social protection programs implemented and 
national strategies drafted in numerous African countries. Rather than 
emerging from the domestic political discourse, however, typically these 
programs and strategies have been introduced by external actors, using a 
combination of “carrots” (financial assistance and technical support) and 
“sticks” (conditionality on loans, or threats to withhold aid). This natu-
rally raises questions about whether a social protection policy process 
reflects the priorities of domestic (national) or external (transna-
tional) actors.
External actors have greatest potential to dominate a policy process in 
countries that are politically weak and financially constrained. The prom-
ise of free or concessional external funding to boost domestic spending 
on social programs gives development partners “soft power” to decide 
how their funds will be spent, often relegating the government to a pas-
sive recipient. This power asymmetry explains why many of Africa’s poor-
est countries have implemented almost identical social protection policies 
and cash transfer programs in recent years. Most of these policies and 
programs were designed by international consultants and financed by 
international development agencies, drawing on ideas generated and 
tested in other countries.
Zimbabwe is a case in point. The evolution of the flagship harmonised 
social cash transfer (HSCT) program was almost entirely donor-driven, 
from design to piloting to rolling out and then scaling down. Similarly, 
the development of the National Social Protection Policy Framework 
(NSPPF) was pushed by a range of UN agencies and bilateral donors, 
who disputed among themselves over which direction the policy should 
take, while the government was little more than a passive observer. 
Zimbabwe is selected as our case study because it has received less atten-
tion in this literature than comparable countries such as Zambia, where 
the influence of external actors is better documented (Kuss 2015; Pruce 
and Hickey 2017). Moreover, the case of Zimbabwe is atypical in that 
external actors managed to influence the social protection policy process 
despite the international isolation of the government of Zimbabwe. 
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Sanctions imposed on the Mugabe regime by the EU and USA meant 
that major bilateral agencies would not fund the government directly, 
while outstanding arrears to IFIs meant that the government would not 
be bailed out. Instead, donors funded the social protection policy process 
through UNICEF. This is contrary to other African countries where 
donors funded the government directly to introduce or expand social 
protection. Finally though, Zimbabwe is unusual because, as we will 
show, the process of introducing social protection seems to have stalled, 
for reasons that have important lessons for analysts of social policy as well 
as for other African governments and international agencies.
This chapter first identifies several specific strategies that external actors 
have deployed to encourage or induce the introduction and expansion of 
social protection by African governments. Then the application of these 
strategies in Zimbabwe is reviewed, drawing on the insights and percep-
tions of external actors and national stakeholders who were directly 
involved in this policy process. Finally, we conclude by proposing a 
checklist of indicators that can be monitored to assess the extent to which 
a social protection policy process is “donor-driven” rather than “nation-
ally owned”.
 Strategies of External Actors
In this section we discuss four strategies that are commonly used by exter-
nal actors to persuade African governments to adopt social protection 
(see Devereux 2018): (1) building evidence: demonstrating the effective-
ness of social protection through impact evaluations; (2) building capac-
ity: strengthening the human resources and management systems for 
delivering social protection; (3) financial support: contributing toward the 
development and operational costs of social protection programs and (4) 
policy support: providing technical inputs to the process of developing 
social protection policies.
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 Building Evidence
In the early 2000s donor agencies designed, financed and implemented 
social cash transfer (SCT) pilot projects at local level in several African 
countries, either alone or in collaboration with national governments and 
NGO partners. The primary objective was to improve the well-being of 
project beneficiaries—cash transfer recipients and their families. However, 
an equally important secondary objective was to persuade governments 
to implement cash transfer programs at national level. The implicit the-
ory of change was that demonstrating the positive impacts of cash trans-
fer projects would convince African governments to take over the 
management and financing of these projects, and scale them up to 
national coverage.
For this reason, external actors invested heavily in monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) of these pilot projects. One of the first was the Kalomo 
District Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme in Zambia, implemented by 
the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) 
from 2003, with technical and financial support from German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ). Monitoring of beneficiaries recorded positive 
changes in household food security, livestock ownership and other indi-
cators after they joined the scheme (MCDSS and GTZ 2007).
In the mid-2000s several more pilot projects were launched by inter-
national NGOs with donor funding in southern Africa, usually running 
for one to two years and experimenting with different modalities—cash 
versus food, electronic payments, cash transfers in emergencies and so on. 
Examples include “Food and Cash Transfers” in Malawi, “Emergency 
Drought Response” in Swaziland and “Cash and Food Transfers Pilot 
Project” in Lesotho. All these projects were evaluated by independent 
researchers who were commissioned by the implementing NGO 
(Concern Worldwide, Save the Children and World Vision, respectively), 
and paid by the donor agencies who financed each project (Irish Aid, 
World Food Programme and DFID). Findings were disseminated 
through research reports, seminars and workshops, and “lesson learning” 
briefing papers intended to influence policy-makers (cf. Devereux 2008). 
However, these were not rigorous impact evaluations—not all had  control 
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groups, for instance—which made it impossible to attribute any positive 
changes observed, with confidence, to the project intervention alone.
As the number and scale of social protection programs grew, so did the 
size and sophistication of the evidence base. Randomized control trial 
(RCT) evaluations were commissioned that assessed prograe design and 
implementation features (e.g. targeting options) and impacts (e.g. on 
poverty reduction), using statistically significant sample sizes and multi- 
round panel surveys (baseline, midline, endline) of treatment and control 
households. Donor agencies synthesized the findings of these evaluations 
in reports and books that were intended to advance thinking and pro-
mote best practice on social protection among external actors and espe-
cially among policy-makers in African countries. Seminal publications 
since 2010 include:
 1. Cash Transfers Evidence Paper (Arnold et al. 2011), written by advisory 
staff in the Policy Division of the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID);
 2. The Cash Dividend: The rise of cash transfer programs in Sub- Saharan 
Africa (Garcia and Moore 2012), a World Bank book written by an 
in-house economist and a consultant;
 3. Cash Transfers: What does the evidence say? (Bastagli et al. 2016), a rig-
orous review commissioned by DFID from the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI);
 4. From Evidence to Action: The story of cash transfers and impact evalua-
tion in sub-Saharan Africa (Davis et  al. 2016), an edited book co-
funded by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) and UNICEF.
“From Evidence to Action” is an output of the UN-funded Transfer 
Project, which commissioned evaluations of social cash transfer programs 
in eight countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, South 
Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This was not independent academic 
research, it served an overt advocacy agenda. In their “Foreword”, the 
Director-General of FAO and the Executive Director of UNICEF write: 
“These pages also document the ways in which the Transfer Project has 
influenced the policy debate in each of the eight countries … FAO and 
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UNICEF have long recognised the critical importance of working as stra-
tegic partners to strengthen the case for social protection” (Davis et al. 
2016, 6).
 Building Capacity
An important component of the effort to propagate social protection 
throughout Africa has been investment by external actors in building the 
capacity of policy-makers and practitioners from governments and agen-
cies in understanding, designing and delivering social protection pro-
grams and systems. Capacity-strengthening has taken several forms, from 
study tours to training workshops to embedding expatriate technical 
advisors within government ministries. The justification given for this is 
technical—external actors are filling essential capacity gaps. “Poor coun-
try governments typically lack the technical, fiscal, management and 
logistical capacity to manage complex programmes effectively, hence the 
need for external support” (Holmes and Lwanga-Ntale 2012, 16).
But social protection is not simply a technocratic issue, it is ideologi-
cally inflected and different stakeholders have adopted very different 
positions, which also influence the direction that capacity building takes. 
Two of the leading providers of social protection advisory services—the 
World Bank and ILO—also run their own training courses. Although the 
training offered by both agencies sounds very similar, the World Bank 
focuses on the “safety net” component of social protection, while the ILO 
favors a rights-based approach.
World Bank: From the early 2000s the World Bank ran an annual 
training course in Washington designed around its “social risk manage-
ment” framework. This evolved into the “Social Safety Nets Core Course”, 
a two-week course that “builds on the latest developments in safety nets 
as integral part of social protection systems, to provide participants with 
an in-depth understanding of the conceptual and practical issues involved 
in the development of social assistance or social safety net programs”. The 
target audience is: “Policymakers and policy analysts from Government 
agencies, NGOs involved in the implementation of social safety nets, and 
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operational staff from the World Bank and from bilateral and multilateral 
donor agencies.”1
ILO: The ILO runs a number of social protection training courses at 
its International Training Centre in Turin, Italy. The “Academy on Social 
Security” is a two-week course “on the governance, financing, reform and 
extension of social protection systems”. The target audiences are “(1) 
managers, planners, advisers and professionals working in social security 
institutions, (2) policy-planners and officials from key ministries respon-
sible for the development and monitoring of social protection systems, 
(3) representatives of the social partners involved in the governance of 
social security institutions and (4) practitioners and consultants of UN 
agencies working on social protection”.2
An innovative donor-funded initiative that explicitly linked social pro-
tection evidence-building and capacity building to policy advocacy was 
the Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme (RHVP), which ran 
from 2005 to 2011 and was funded by DFID and the Australian Agency 
for International Development (AusAID). The ultimate indicator of 
RHVP’s success was its impact on policy and practice in six countries: 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
“RHVP wants to change mindsets, practice and policy to ensure that the 
chronic vulnerability that southern African countries are experiencing 
year on year is reduced.”3
RHVP linked evidence-building explicitly to policy advocacy: two of 
its “overlapping components” were “evidence gathering (the research 
component), and policy advice and advocacy (feeding new ideas into 
policy processes in country governments)” (Ellis et al. 2009, 10). Under 
its Regional Evidence-Building Agenda, RHVP commissioned case stud-
ies of 15 social protection programs (cash transfers, public works, school 
feeding, etc.) in the six countries, which were published in a book titled 
“Social Protection in Africa” (Ellis et al. 2009). RHVP focused its capac-
ity building efforts on national and regional Vulnerability Assessment 
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analysis and reporting. Unusually, RHVP also engaged directly with par-
liamentarians, by running policy awareness workshops for the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum and 
sponsoring Members of Parliament to attend social protection training 
courses.
An assessment of RHVP’s policy influence concluded that it had con-
tributed to “significant increases in the level of attention and funding 
given to social protection by International Development Partners (IDPs), 
and improvements in the sophistication of their approach” (Jones 2011, 
3). However, RHVP failed in two of its objectives: to establish a regional 
Centre of Excellence on social protection, and to transfer its website 
(wahenga.net) to a national institution or university. This arguably reflects 
not only limited technical capacity but also persistently shallow political 
commitment to social protection within the region. Once the impetus 
provided by external financing and expatriate technical support ended, so 
did the structures and activities that RHVP had instigated.
 Financial Support
Many African governments were initially reluctant to introduce social 
protection programs, arguing that they are too expensive, especially if 
they involve regular (e.g. monthly) transfers of meaningful amounts of 
cash to all poor people (or all older persons, etc.) in the country on a 
long-term or permanent basis. External actors responded to the “unaf-
fordability” argument in two ways.
First, donors and international financial institutions paid for social 
protection programs themselves, but with the expectation that govern-
ments would eventually take over the financing. This can be conceptual-
ized as a “funding seesaw”. External actors initially provide 100% of the 
funding needed for social assistance programs—as is the case with the top 
seven countries in Fig.  11.1, six of which are low-income economies. 
Over time a shift is expected to occur, away from external financing 
toward domestic financing. In the bottom six countries in Fig.  11.1, 
100% of social assistance funding comes from the government. Five of 
these countries are middle-income economies and one (Seychelles) is a 
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Fig. 11.1 Share of governments and donors in social assistance funding in Africa. 
(Source: World Bank 2018, 18. Note: Social assistance programs include “uncondi-
tional and conditional cash transfers, noncontributory social pensions, food and 
in-kind transfers, school feeding programs, public works, and fee waivers” (World 
Bank 2018, 5))
282
high-income economy.4 This illustrates a familiar paradox, that countries 
with the greatest need for social protection have the least resources to 
deliver it.
Second, external actors tried to convince skeptical governments that 
they are wrong: social protection is affordable, even in low-income econ-
omies. According to ILO’s World Social Protection Report 2017–19, 
spending on social protection as a percentage of GDP ranges from 4.5% 
in sub-Saharan Africa (with high variation within the region, from 0.1% 
in Chad to over 7% in Lesotho and Mauritius) to 18% in Western Europe 
(peaking at 23% in Finland and France) (ILO 2017). Although it might 
be expected that high-income economies have lower poverty rates and 
therefore less need for social protection, it could also be argued that pov-
erty is low in these countries precisely because they spend more on redis-
tributive measures that protect their citizens against falling into poverty.
This is also the basis of the “investment case” for social protection. 
External actors argue that social cash transfers to poor people builds their 
human capital by improving their nutrition, health, access to education 
and so on. This creates a virtuous cycle: poor children whose families 
receive social transfers have more chances of growing up and breaking the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty (see Chinyoka and Ulriksen, 
Chap. 10, this volume). Far from being wasteful public expenditure on 
consumption, by this reasoning social cash transfers can reduce poverty 
and stimulate economic growth (Barrientos and Scott 2008). This argu-
ment is favored by agencies, such as the World Bank, that see social pro-
tection as a poverty reduction instrument rather than as a human right.
Another argument often made against the fiscal unaffordability posi-
tion is that spending decisions are political choices, not an inflexible tech-
nical rule. The ILO has identified several ways in which fiscal space for 
social protection can be increased, including:
 1. reallocate public expenditures (e.g. remove fuel subsidies or cut defense 
spending);
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 3. reduce illicit financial flows (which amount to more than ten times 
official development assistance globally);
 4. borrow or restructure existing debt (e.g. renegotiate loans or apply for 
debt relief );
 5. expand contributory social security coverage and revenue (e.g. incen-
tivize participation of self-employed workers in formal social security 
schemes) (Ortiz et al. 2015).
Although examples can be found where governments have imple-
mented these options—more often in Latin America and Asia than Africa 
(Ortiz et  al. 2015)—donors remain the main source of financing for 
social protection in most countries where the agenda has been introduced 
by external actors.
 Policy Support
In the year 2000 not a single African country had a National Social 
Protection Policy (NSPP) or Strategy (NSPS). As recently as 2010, only 
five countries had promulgated their NSPP or NSPS. But in 2011, 5 
more countries joined this group, doubling the total to 10, and by 2017 
this number had trebled to 30, more than half of all African countries. 
Half of these are in West Africa (n = 15), the same as the combined total 
in Southern Africa (n = 6), Central Africa (n = 5), East Africa (n = 4) and 
North Africa (n = 0) (Devereux 2018). This is intriguing, because West 
Africa is often perceived as lagging behind East and Southern Africa in 
terms of social protection programming.
Some of Africa’s oldest social protection programs are in Southern 
Africa—such as social pensions in South Africa (1928) (Seekings, Chap. 
5, this volume) and Namibia (1949)—yet neither country has an NSPP 
or NSPS, nor does Botswana, which introduced a social pension more 
recently (1996). In West Africa, it appears that social protection policies 
have generally preceded programs, while in southern Africa, programs 
have preceded policies. This might be because the introduction of social 
protection in Southern Africa pre-dates the recent wave of donor- 
supported social protection, while in West Africa social protection poli-
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cies were developed with external support as part of a recent push by 
external actors to accelerate take-up of social protection in these “late 
adopter” countries. In South Africa, Namibia and Botswana, social pro-
tection programs have been well established for several decades, they are 
tax-financed and they receive very little technical or financial support 
from development agencies.
At first glance the proliferation of policies within the last decade might 
appear to endorse the view of social protection as a nationally owned 
process, but there are at least two reasons to question this interpretation. 
First, almost every African NSPP or NSPS draws inspiration from four 
conceptual frameworks, all products of the “Global North” rather than 
the “Global South”. Second, most of these national strategy and policy 
documents were produced with substantial inputs from international 
consultants, who were commissioned by development agencies to per-
form this function on behalf of national governments.
The first conceptual framework for social protection was “Social Risk 
Management”, devised around the turn of the century by the World 
Bank (Holzmann and Jørgensen 1999). Social Risk Management formal-
ized the World Bank’s view of social protection as an extension of “social 
safety nets”—a term they still prefer—and was extremely influential in 
the early 2000s, but was later superseded by more holistic approaches and 
is referenced in only two current African social protection policies.
Another early framework was the “Life-Cycle Approach”, which was 
popularized by UNICEF and ILO (Garcia and Gruat 2003) and remains 
useful because it disaggregates social protection needs into age cohorts—
pre-school, school-age children, youth, working-age adults and older per-
sons—as well as cross-cutting categories such as persons with disability 
and pregnant and lactating women. The Life-Cycle Approach is the orga-
nizing framework for six African social protection policies.
In 2004 the UK Institute of Development Studies (IDS) proposed 
“Transformative Social Protection”, which advocates for taking a social 
justice perspective (beyond managing livelihood shocks and life-cycle 
risks) by adding “transformative” measures such as anti-discrimination 
campaigns to the three foundation pillars of “protection” (social  assistance), 
“prevention” (social insurance) and “promotion” (livelihood support) 
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(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). Transformative Social Protection 
is referenced by 12 social protection policies or strategies in Africa.
Most recently, the ILO formulated the “Social Protection Floor”, a 
rights-based approach that argues for guaranteed access to essential health 
care and income security for all, throughout the life-cycle. (Note that the 
four conceptual frameworks overlap and complement each other, they 
are not mutually exclusive.) The Social Protection Floor was ratified by all 
member states of the International Labour Conference in 2012 (ILO 
2012). To date the Social Protection Floor has been adopted by five 
African policies or strategies.
The fact that most African NSPP or NSPS documents favor imported 
models, instead of building on indigenous concepts of reciprocity and 
informal social support systems, reflects the reality that the recent wave of 
social protection policy formulation has been driven primarily by exter-
nal actors rather than emerging out of context-specific domestic agendas. 
Many African social protection policy documents are facilitated or even 
drafted by expatriate experts, who are contracted by and represent the 
interests of the international development community. The 
“Acknowledgements” of Ghana’s NSPP includes this paragraph:
The policy process benefited extensively from the technical and financial 
support of international partners. The Ministry particularly appreciates the 
collaboration with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
European Union (EU) and the World Bank in this exercise. Also, the ana-
lytical assistance received from the Economic Policy Research Institute 
(EPRI) from South Africa and the Socieux Team was of considerable ben-
efit. The Ministry’s gratitude is extended to United Nations Agencies, 
Bilateral Partners of Ghana and international and national non- 
governmental organizations who contributed effective feedback and dem-
onstrated continued interest in the policy. (Government of Ghana 2015, 4)
Some external actors even put their logo on the cover of the social 
protection policies and strategies they sponsored, alongside the national 
coat of arms. One example is The Gambia, which displays the logos of 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNICEF on 
the cover of its National Social Protection Policy (NSPP). Another case is 
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Liberia, which has the logos of UNICEF, EU, World Food Programme, 
World Bank, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), African 
Development Fund and Concern Worldwide on the cover of its NSPP 
and NSPS.
Despite the impression this gives of unity among development part-
ners, it is important to note that there are deep ideological divisions 
between them about the purpose and appropriate design of social protec-
tion. For example, because of its mandate, UNICEF supports child 
grants and pro-poor access to essential services such as education and 
health care. The World Bank promotes conditional cash transfers, which 
it perceives as an investment in human capital for long-term poverty 
reduction, and poverty targeting to maximize efficient use of scarce pub-
lic resources. The ILO believes in a universal human right to social pro-
tection, and advocates for a guaranteed “social protection floor” for all. As 
seen below, some of these differences were played out in Zimbabwe. 
When external actors are divided about a policy agenda they are propos-
ing to bankroll in a country, this further undermines the government’s 
capacity to lead and own the process.
 External Actors and Social Protection 
in Zimbabwe5
Although a fairly standard set of instruments has been introduced or pro-
moted across Africa under the “new wave” of social protection post-2000, 
the impetus behind this policy process varied from country to country. In 
Ethiopia, for instance, large-scale social assistance in the form of the 
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) was launched in 2005 as an 
antidote to persistent food insecurity and vulnerability to famine. In 
Lesotho and Swaziland, social pensions were introduced around the same 
5 This section draws on interviews conducted in Zimbabwe between 2016 and 2018 as part of PhD 
research (Kapingidza 2018). Officials from the government and external agencies were interviewed 
as  key informants and  focus group discussions were held with  cash transfer beneficiaries. 
Participation was voluntary and informed consent was obtained. Names of research participants are 
not revealed, to uphold the principles of confidentiality and anonymity in research.
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time in response to HIV and AIDS, motivated by the recognition that 
older persons were assuming care responsibilities for large numbers of 
orphaned children. In other countries such as Zambia and Malawi, social 
cash transfers were piloted and later scaled up as a policy solution to 
chronic rural poverty. In Mozambique and Ghana, cash transfers are 
intended to address urban as well as rural poverty.
In Zimbabwe, the main driver for introducing new forms of social 
protection was the catastrophic economic collapse that peaked in the late 
2000s. International development agencies played a leading role in pro-
moting social protection as an instrument to fight rapidly rising levels of 
poverty and vulnerability. Donor influence was prominent in the estab-
lishment of the harmonised social cash transfer (HSCT) in 2011, which 
overshadowed existing interventions to become the flagship national 
social protection program, and in developing the National Social 
Protection Policy Framework (NSPPF) which was passed in 2016. 
Zimbabwe’s development partners used “policy transfer” strategies they 
had developed elsewhere in Africa to drive the social protection agenda in 
Zimbabwe, including building evidence and capacity, and providing 
financial and policy support.
 Building Evidence
A common strategy used by external actors to promote adoption of 
social protection by African governments was to run a small-scale pilot 
project, usually delivering cash transfers to poor people in a few rural 
communities, then commission an impact evaluation to demonstrate 
the project’s effectiveness in improving beneficiaries’ well-being, with the 
intention of persuading the government to implement the project at 
national scale. The same strategy was pursued in Zimbabwe.6 Given the 
fact that social cash transfers were initiated relatively late in Zimbabwe, 
6 Significantly, a chapter on Zimbabwe in ‘From Evidence to Action’ (Davis et al. 2016), the FAO/
UNICEF book on cash transfer impact evaluations mentioned earlier, is subtitled ‘Using evidence 
to overcome political and economic challenges to starting a national unconditional cash transfer 
programme’ (Seidenfeld et al. 2016).
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learning and evidence generated in other African countries was available. 
Documentation of experiences, impacts and best practices in Kenya, 
Zambia and elsewhere was shared with the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Services (MoLSS).7
Apparently convinced by the evidence from other countries that cash 
transfers “work”, the MoLSS requested the donors to commit to funding 
a full-scale national cash transfer program, but they refused, arguing that 
they needed to test the model in Zimbabwe first.8 “Team Consult”, led 
by Bernd Schubert (a German consultant who had earlier led the estab-
lishment of similar social cash transfer pilot projects in Mozambique, 
Zambia and Malawi) was contracted to support the Department of Social 
Services to “design a national government owned and coordinated cash 
transfer programme which targeted food poor and labour constrained 
households” (Schubert 2010, 8). Team Consult was recruited by the 
MoLSS but paid by UNICEF, which allowed UNICEF to play an over-
sight role over the process. This had implications for ownership of the 
process.
Starting with a pilot of just 111 households in Goromonzi district in 
Mashonaland East province in 2011, cash transfers were rolled out to 
about 19,000 households in 10 districts in 2012 (MoLSS and UNICEF 
2012), extending to 16 districts in 2013 and 20 districts (2 per province) 
in 2014 (see Table 11.1). A positive initial evaluation of the HSCT led by 
Bernd Schubert, who was again hired by UNICEF (Schubert 2011), 
prompted an expansion in coverage and further evaluations. Leading 
research institutes, the American Institutes of Research and the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in partnership with the University of 
Zimbabwe’s Centre for Applied Social Sciences, were contracted by 
7 Interview with government official #2.
8 Interview with government official #3.
Table 11.1 Coverage of the HSCT program in Zimbabwe, 2011–2017
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Beneficiaries 111 18,940 33,200 55,509 55,509 23,000 23,000
Districts 1 10 16 20 20 8 8
Source: Kapingidza (2018), compiled from MPSLSW and donor official 2
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UNICEF to evaluate the program. Funding came from United Nations 
agencies (UNICEF, FAO), a multilateral agency (EU) and European 
bilateral agencies (DFID, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency [SIDA] and Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation [SDC]). The 2014 and 2017 
evaluation reports (AIR 2014; UNC 2017) generally registered positive 
impacts of the HSCT.
However, despite this evidence of the feasibility and effectiveness of 
cash transfers, the Government of Zimbabwe has been consistently reluc-
tant to take over full responsibility for funding the HSCT, despite its 
desire, as expressed in the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio- 
Economic Transformation (ZimAsset),9 to reach a target of 100,000 
households by 2015 and 200,000 by 2018 (UNCT and GoZ 2014). 
Coverage actually peaked in 2014 and 2015, when the HSCT paid cash 
to 55,509 households (Table 11.1), 10% of the national total of 539,000 
households, in 20 of Zimbabwe’s 59 districts (UNCT and GoZ 2014).
 Building Capacity
In Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, strategic investment in capacity- strengthening 
became a vehicle for external actors to ensure that they channeled techni-
cal assistance toward their preferred programs and policies. Thus, techni-
cal support to the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare 
(MPSLSW)10 was intended to influence adoption of the HSCT. Capacity 
building involved the international agencies sponsoring government staff 
to attend training on social protection, both within the country and 
abroad. Some MPSLSW officials were funded to participate in courses at 
the ILO’s International Training Centre in Italy (discussed above), to 
build their theoretical comprehension of social protection and their tech-
nical capacity to implement social cash transfers.11
9 ZimAsset is the national economic strategy for 2013–2018.
10 The MoLSS reverted to its former name of MPSLSW after the end of the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) in 2013.
11 Interview with government official #3.
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Another capacity-strengthening strategy applied by UNICEF and 
other agencies was to establish a Coordination Unit for the HSCT within 
the Department of Social Welfare in the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Services. The Unit was funded through donor resources. It played a sec-
retariat role but it also monitored implementation of the HSCT. “They 
were actually in charge of running that programme although there were 
other officers within the ministry who were seconded, overseeing also 
what was going on for capacity resource transfer, so that when this Unit 
leaves the programme sails on smoothly.”12
While donors claim that the ministry now runs the HSCT, since the 
Coordination Unit was disbanded in 2014, the ministry’s role is limited 
by the fact that approximately 90% of funding still comes from donors 
and the program has been drastically downscaled due to donor fatigue 
(see Table 11.1). Given the support it received from the donors, the Unit 
became envied as it was better resourced than other departments in the 
ministry. Anderson and Therkildsen (2007, 9) note that “parallel admin-
istrative systems to handle the implementation of donor supported activ-
ities—such as donor controlled management units—undermine 
ownership”. The Unit did strengthen administrative capacity to deliver 
the HSCT, but it did not create much government ownership.
 Financial Support
The evolution of the HSCT and the development of the NSPPF reflect 
how external actors have used their financial leverage to influence the 
social protection agenda in Zimbabwe. At inception, the HSCT was 
100% donor-funded and to date the program is still almost totally depen-
dent on external funding.13 The setting up of the HSCT does not reflect 
genuine local ownership and broad participation. The program was initi-
ated and funded by donors and established in parallel to government-run 
national programs like the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) 
and Public Assistance. MoLSS only provided implementation structures 
12 Interview with a former government official.
13 Interview with donor official #1.
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for the HSCT, while external agencies’ funding of the program gave them 
unprecedented power to play an influencing and oversight role.
Financing decisions provide an unequivocal indication of strategic 
interests and priorities. As in other African countries, donors in Zimbabwe 
have consistently shown more interest in supporting social cash transfers 
than other forms of social protection. Conversely, financial commitment 
from the government is negligible, violating an agreement with develop-
ment partners to co-fund the HSCT on a 50:50 basis. “The government 
never fulfils its mandate to fund 50% of HSCT according to what we 
agreed.”14 The Child Protection Fund (CPF), administered by UNICEF, 
is the funding mechanism for the HSCT from the donors’ side. DFID is 
the major donor and contributes 75% of the total cost.15 In its first phase, 
DFID, EU, Netherlands, SDC and SIDA co-funded the HSCT. However, 
the Netherlands and the EU pulled out during the first phase.
Because donors do not fund the government directly, a private security 
company called Securico collects the money from UNICEF and dis-
burses it to the communities for payment; the ministry only witnesses the 
payment.16 Deloitte and Touche initially did auditing until UNICEF 
persuaded the donors to opt for government auditors,17 because the use 
of private security and private auditing firms is expensive and does not 
build government capacity.
Phase II of the HSCT (June 2016–May 2019) faced a massive decline 
in external funding that was compounded by the ongoing lack of dis-
bursement of funds from the government. DFID, the largest funder of 
the HSCT since its inception, halved its funding to £20 million, from 
£38 million in Phase I. Donor frustration over government’s lack of com-
mitment to take over funding of HSCT largely explains this downscaling 
of donor support. This reflects the dangers of heavy reliance on external 
funding. No program can be sustained indefinitely by donors, as they are 
accountable to their own constituencies and their priorities are constantly 
shifting between programs, sectors and countries.
14 Interview with donor official #1.
15 Interview with donor official #2.
16 Interview with government official #3.
17 Interview with donor official #3.
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Phase II of the HSCT therefore has a more limited scale. Only 23,000 
households have been reached in the current phase, as compared to 
55,000 households targeted in the last years of Phase I. Geographically, 
the number of districts covered have been reduced from 20 to 8 (see 
Table 11.1). Beneficiaries in districts that have been dropped from the 
program were not aware that their benefits were about to be abruptly 
stopped, because the government did not communicate this to them.18 
Moreover, funding prospects for the HSCT beyond 2019 are uncertain.
Donors also funded the development of the NSPPF from the begin-
ning to its launch, in a process that fell far short of government or national 
ownership. “Ownership implies that the recipient government’s political 
objectives dominate the development agenda, and that transparent local 
political decisions are made based on broad involvement and participa-
tion of local stakeholders. This requires that government, parliament and 
other political institutions make decisions about policy and resource allo-
cation serviced and advised by the civil service without distorting donor 
interference” (Anderson and Therkildsen 2007, 9).
The process of developing the NSPPF was supported by the World 
Bank, UNICEF, DFID, ILO, FAO, UNDP and all members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
CPF donor group (GoZ 2016). The World Bank funded the first draft 
and when their funding ended, UNICEF came on board and funded the 
process until the cabinet approved the policy.19 The government did not 
contribute to the costs of policy development. The dominance of devel-
opment partners in social protection financing is illustrated in Fig. 11.2.
 Policy Support
The idea of developing a national social protection policy framework for 
Zimbabwe was first mooted by UNDP in 2009, but momentum only 
accelerated from 2014.20 There was a realization within government and 
development partners that the lack of a policy made it difficult to 
18 Interview with donor official #2.
19 Interview with government official #3.
20 Interview with government official #1.
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 coordinate social protection activities. According to a former government 
official, “In the absence of an overall policy framework, social protection 
remains ad hoc, piecemeal and of little impact, if any. Harmonisation 
and coordination are virtually not feasible.”21 National development 
strategies, including ZimAsset, lamented the lack of a social protection 
policy.22 Although a number of relevant policy instruments were in place, 
notably the Social Transfer Policy Framework, the Basic Education 
Assistance Module Manual and Public Works Guidelines, those tools and 
related programs remained isolated and loosely coordinated.23
The need for a policy became more urgent after the HSCT program 
was launched in 2012. “We realised there were other social protection 
issues that were not covered by the cash transfer programme. So the push 
for the NSPPF became vocal again as stakeholders desired to finalise the 
policy document. So UNICEF brought resources to finalise the policy.”24
The policy framework was eventually approved by the Cabinet in 
November 2016 and launched in December 2016. However, the process 
was overly dependent on external funding and for this reason it stopped 
and started multiple times, whenever an external agency ran out of funds 
or interest, until another interested external agency stepped up to take 
21 Interview with a former government official.
22 Interview with government official #2.
23 Interview with government official #3.
24 Interview with government official #3.
Fig. 11.2 Sources of financing for social protection in Zimbabwe, 2010 to 2015. 
(Source: Government of Zimbabwe and World Bank 2016, 15)
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the lead. After 2009, UNDP “disappeared from the agenda and we got 
stuck for a while. Later on UNICEF came on board but disappeared 
again. When UNICEF reappeared later they never stopped and have 
been at the forefront until today.”25
The government failed to commit any funds to the policy formulation 
exercise, so external actors drove the process by virtue of being the 
funders. Consequently, the Government could not control what it did 
not fund and only played a facilitatory role. Overall, the process was 
never smooth within the government itself, between the government and 
external agencies, or between the agencies themselves, as different inter-
ests took center stage.
Inter-agency politics also affected the process, as UNICEF tried to 
advance its own agenda while also needing to incorporate other agencies’ 
interests. A number of bilateral and multilateral agencies were jockeying 
for influence. While they were generally comfortable with the role played 
by UNICEF in managing CPF and providing technical assistance to the 
government, they had different agendas and approaches. For example, 
the ILO wanted to accelerate the policy process, whereas the UNICEF 
favored a more consultative and inclusive approach.
I remember arguing with colleagues in ILO who were pushing the process 
to be very fast but we said no, we want a national dialogue based process 
where we try as much as possible to ensure that we involve a wider spec-
trum of people. At each stage you could get people who would say they 
were never involved, so we would take time to get their input and assure 
them that it was never too late. So the process itself was quite long.26
There was also tension between UNICEF and the World Bank, which 
pushed hard for conditional cash transfers, which UNICEF does not 
believe in, partly because imposing conditionalities violates the human 
right to social protection.
25 Interview with government official #1.
26 Interview with donor official #3.
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We were quite strategic. When we started to push government we quickly 
put in resources and brought everyone to the table. I think we played the 
politics right. We actually requested the World Bank to second a consultant 
to the team developing the policy just to manage the political dynamics, 
but it was clear that they were not the drivers of the process. We made sure 
that the government was in the driving seat, and we provided a lot of back-
stopping to ensure that they were the ones in charge. We did not get swayed 
into the World Bank’s thinking on social protection. Their thinking on 
cash transfers has always been conditional.27
UNICEF used the “soft power” conferred by its position as the leading 
funder of the NSPPF to take control of the policy process, and to resist 
attempts by other stakeholders to pull the policy in different directions. 
The policy space became a battlefield for external actors led by UNICEF, 
the World Bank and ILO, as each tried to impose their ideas on how best 
to program social protection in Zimbabwe. Given this reality, the claim 
by development partners that the government drove the process is 
disingenuous.
Due to the leading role of UNICEF and its strategic management of 
the politics of the policy process, it is hardly surprising that the content 
of the final NSPPF document reflects UNICEF’s influence. The NSPPF 
adopts three approaches to social protection:
 1. Social protection as a human right: social protection is an entitlement 
that the State has an obligation to provide as enshrined in interna-
tional conventions;
 2. Systems approach to social protection: poor and vulnerable people are 
heterogeneous and have different forms of vulnerabilities that require 
different types of support; and
 3. Multi-sectoral approach to social protection: a holistic approach is needed 
that makes cross-sectoral linkages and is anchored in a life- cycle 
approach, to enhance coordination and harmonisation (Government 
of Zimbabwe 2016, 24–25).
27 Interview with donor official #3.
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These three guiding principles mirror UNICEF’s Global Social 
Protection Strategic Framework, which takes a human rights approach, 
aims to support the development of nationally owned integrated social 
protection systems that are grounded in a multi-sectoral approach, and 
uses the life-cycle approach to disaggregate vulnerabilities and social pro-
tection needs (UNICEF 2012).
 External Influence and the National Context
The Zimbabwean case is unusual in the sense that the social protection 
policy process was introduced by external actors during a period of sig-
nificant political and socioeconomic uncertainty. The collapse of the 
Zimbabwean economy, with GDP falling by more than 40% between 
2000 and 2008, when inflation reached an unprecedented 500 billion 
percent (World Bank 2011), resulted in poverty and unemployment rates 
of 72% and 80% respectively (World Bank 2014). Western governments 
imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe in the early 2000s over the “fast 
track land reform” program and, consequently, international bilateral 
engagements ceased (Seidenfeld et  al. 2016). Outstanding arrears to 
international financial institutions further complicated the crisis, as 
Zimbabwe could not qualify for a bail-out.
However, after the formation of the Government of National Unity 
(GNU) in 2009, western governments and development agencies, led by 
the British, reached a “common consent” with the Government of 
Zimbabwe to initiate the HSCT program. The international community 
had a positive perception of GNU, which reflected a compromise between 
President Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF) and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC). Significantly, the Minister of Labour and Social Services in the 
GNU was a member of the MDC, which was more appealing to the 
international community than ZANU-PF. Upon her appointment to the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Services (MoLSS) in 2009, “everything 
had gone down, there was nothing at Pensions and it was difficult to say 
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there was a social protection system in place except a few haphazard 
interventions”.28 She presided over the inception of the HSCT and its 
implementation until the GNU ended in 2013. Initiatives to develop a 
national social protection policy also started during the GNU.
Indeed, the recovery in the social sectors during the GNU period is 
owed to donor support that culminated in multi-donor funding mecha-
nisms like the Child Protection Fund (CPF), Education Transition Fund 
(ETF) and The Health Transition Fund (HTF). UNICEF managed these 
three funds as the political context (sanctions and debt arrears) only per-
mitted donors to fund interventions through the United Nations family.
Why donors are not funding Government directly is a political issue. 
Relations with the West are frozen and the money is coming from the 
West. So donors are more comfortable supporting government pro-
grammes but not giving government the money. Even when we have the 
money we have restrictions insofar as what money can be channelled 
through government systems.29
The political context is unique in the sense that the external actors sup-
ported the development of the social protection policy and the HSCT 
through UNICEF, instead of through budget support to the government. 
This is contrary to other countries like Zambia and Kenya (see Künzler, 
Chap. 4, this volume), where direct donor financing of social protection 
through the government yielded more political buy-in, as evidenced by 
significant expansion of cash transfers coverage and increasing funding 
from the government. The attempt to persuade the government of 
Zimbabwe to adopt the HSCT as the flagship social protection interven-
tion to replace existing safety net programs reflects similar experiences in 
other African countries, as does the influential role played by UNICEF, 
DFID, ILO and World Bank—four of the leading global agencies work-
ing on social protection in Africa.
28 Interview with a former cabinet minister.
29 Interview with government official #3.
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 Conclusions
The rapid rise of social protection as a development policy agenda in 
Africa, as reflected in the ever increasing numbers of strategies, programs 
and poor or vulnerable people reached by social cash transfers and related 
interventions, can be seen as a success story for African governments who 
have adopted and implemented these ideas. But it is equally a success 
story for the external actors who have driven this agenda energetically 
across Africa, with substantial investments of financial resources and 
technical expertise, for the past two decades. Using an array of instru-
ments of “soft power”, the international development community has 
cajoled and supported African governments to introduce and scale up 
cash transfer projects, to formulate and promulgate national social pro-
tection policies or strategies and to build increasingly complex social pro-
tection systems.
Reflecting on the Zimbabwean experience, which in many respects 
mirrors that of other African countries, allows us to identify several indi-
cators of the extent to which a social protection policy process can be 
characterized as “donor-driven” rather than “nationally owned”. These 
indicators include:
 1. whether the policy process is conceived, designed and facilitated 
mainly by external actors through their advisors and consultants, or is 
truly led by government policy-makers and officials;
 2. whether consultation processes are tokenistic and dominated by elites, 
or wide-ranging and genuinely inclusive of grassroots organizations 
and poor people (i.e. prospective beneficiaries);
 3. whether external actors favor specific instruments (e.g. SCT) rather 
than other instruments that may be favored by African governments 
(e.g. agricultural input subsidies);
 4. if a donor-supported pilot project becomes a flagship national pro-
gram, to the detriment of existing national programs that do not 
receive donor support;
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 5. whether evaluations of social protection programs are commissioned by 
external actors and conducted by international research institutes, or 
commissioned by the government and conducted by local researchers;
 6. the proportion of social protection spending that is financed by exter-
nal actors, versus domestic resource mobilization and government 
commitment to co-financing that is actually disbursed.
Social protection in Zimbabwe fails the test of national ownership on 
all six criteria. The Zimbabwean case illustrates the influential role of 
external actors in the social protection policy transfer process. In par-
ticular, it reveals how development partners working in African coun-
tries are political actors who use their financial leverage and technical 
expertise to advance their interests in the social protection agenda, while 
claiming neutrality and presenting their policy advice as being grounded 
in technical analysis and empirical evidence. Ultimately, institutionaliz-
ing social protection in African countries is not a consensus-building 
exercise, but a contestation and negotiation among a range of develop-
ment partners—each of which strives to impose its preferred approach 
on the policy process—as well as between these external actors and the 
national government.
The story of social protection in Zimbabwe to date is instructive. 
Although the international actors deployed the strategies they had applied 
successfully in several other African countries to induce the adoption of 
cash transfer programs, these strategies appear to have failed in Zimbabwe, 
because the process of its introduction was flawed. One clear implication, 
for Zimbabwe and elsewhere, is that negotiations between national gov-
ernments and international actors about which policies and processes 
international actors support in a country must be based on genuine 
consensus- building about policy priorities, agreed modalities, realistic 
timelines and division of responsibilities in terms of financing and imple-
mentation. Otherwise there is a real risk, as the Zimbabwe case reveals, of 
social protection programs being introduced and then withdrawn, and 
the biggest losers from a failed social protection policy process are those 
who were supposed to benefit—the poor and vulnerable.
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Political scientists have established compelling scholarly evidence that 
transnational actors (TNAs) such as international organizations (e.g. the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund [IMF] and United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO]), advo-
cacy networks and epistemic communities can have a significant effect on 
state policies, on the creation of international norms and on the subse-
quent diffusion of these norms into domestic practices (Boli and Thomas 
1999; Checkel 1997, 2005; Evangelista 1995; Finger and Princen 2013). 
Predominantly, the transnational policy diffusion literature focuses on 
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the institutionalist approach which holds that political institutions “medi-
ate, filter, and refract the efforts by transnational actors and alliances to 
influence policies in the various issue-areas” (Risse 2007, 269). According 
to this hypothesis, political institutions are necessary and sufficient gate-
ways toward successful policy diffusion (for a discussion see Orenstein 
2008). The main task of TNAs, therefore, is to seek strategic engagement 
with domestic, institutionalized political actors and to create among them 
winning coalitions for the acceptance of new policies and norms. In this 
chapter, using the example of disability and gender-based policies in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), we suggest that key actors involved in transnational 
social policy diffusion have overemphasized the role of political institu-
tions. This is the case because TNAs focus their mobilization on the 
engagement with powerful institutionalized domestic actors to foster suc-
cessful policy diffusion. However, while institutional factors are impor-
tant and might be enough to foster success in some policy domains, they 
fail to explain why some transnational networks operating in the same 
institutional context succeed, while others fail (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
As Risse (2007, 270) argues, the political- institutional approach to trans-
national mobilization stresses “formal aspects of political and social insti-
tutions rather than the substantive content of ideas and norms embedded 
in them”. We selected disability and gender policy domains because of 
two reasons: first, because the study is about the success and failure of 
policy diffusion, we needed two policy areas with contrasting success 
rates. Disability and gender policies, despite facing significantly similar 
social barriers, show contrasting policy diffusion success rates in southern 
Africa. Moreover, we aimed at comparing two policy areas whose appear-
ance on the transnational scene is not punctuated by large temporal gaps. 
International issues of advocacy, disability, and gender became central at 
about the same time (2000 for Millennium Development Goals [MDGs] 
with MDG 8 specifying gender equality and 2006 for the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [CRPD]). This situation makes it 
easier to compare the simultaneous fate of disability and gender policies 
in SSA. Second, both policy areas face similar ideational challenges (e.g. 
cultural-cognitive biases, stereotypes and marginalization).
In this chapter, therefore, we develop an alternative approach to trans-
national mobilization built on ideational factors (e.g. cultural contexts, 
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identities, norms, symbols and language) to explain the variation of TNA 
success with policy diffusion. Simultaneously, we lay out ideational fac-
tors shaping social policy diffusion in SSA and demonstrate the necessity 
of an ideational approach.
Our theoretical approach, contrary to the predominantly supply- 
driven institutionalist approach, is driven by symmetrical interactions 
between the supply of policy ideas and the demand for these ideas in the 
policy diffusion process. Our approach, anchored in the role of ideas in 
policy diffusion, claims that policy diffusion is significantly impacted by 
local ideational factors beyond the reach of formal political institutions. 
As both supply and demand matter for policy diffusion, we argue that the 
bricolage and translation of ideas are important for achieving successful 
policy diffusion. While translation is about adapting foreign ideas to a 
particular normative or institutional setting, so that they can blend 
(Clarke et al. 2015), bricolage is about combining different pre-existing 
ideas and institutional components to create something new 
(Campbell 2004).
 An Ideational Framework
 Bricolage, Translation and Policy Transfer
To conceptualize a policy diffusion approach that goes beyond the domi-
nant political-institutional perspective discussed above, we propose an 
ideational approach (Parsons 2007) that finds expression by way of brico-
lage and translation (Campbell 2004). This new framework stresses the 
importance of ideational persuasion (see Fig.  12.1) for transnational 
actors seeking to bring about domestic policy change while minimizing 
the risk of resistance on the part of domestic actors (elected officials and 
the electorate).
To understand ideational processes, we can turn to Parsons (2007) 
who couches a typology for explaining political behavior according to 
two logics: the logic of position (structural and institutional) and the 
logic of interpretation (psychological and ideational). The logic of 
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 position “explains by detailing the landscape around someone to show 
how an obstacle course of material or man-made constraints and incen-
tives channels her to certain actions” (Parsons 2007, 13). On the other 
hand, the logic of interpretation “explains by showing that someone 
arrives at an action only through one interpretation of what is possible 
and/or desirable” (Parsons 2007, 13). According to Parsons, therefore, 
explanations of political behavior can be classified as one out of four types 
contained in the two logics above: structural, institutional, psychological 
and ideational. According to the logic of interpretation, the difference 
between ideational and psychological forces is stark: the former are his-
torically constructed and the latter are about hard-wired cognitive pro-
cesses. What we abstract from Parsons is the concept of ideational 
explanations. For Parsons (2002, 48), ideas—which give ideational expla-
nations of their name—are “claims about descriptions of the world, 
causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions”. Ideas 
are constructive interpretative lenses through which actors make sense of 
their material, social and political environment.
Parsons argues that ideational claims are particularistic in that they rely 
on the consequences of prior contingent actions, and that they trace the 
causes of action to some historically constructed practices, norms and 
ideas through which individuals interpret the world. However, as Parsons 
(2007, 97–98) notes, “people may invent a stunning range of beliefs and 
practices, but they do not quite do so in infinitely flexible ways”. Ideational 
foundations, though amenable to alternative persuasion through fram-
ing, foster stable sociological identities. As Trebilcock (2014, 39) argues, 
because societies’ ideational positions are relatively stable over time, they 
“serve as an important foundation to which policy proposals must gener-
ally be tied, in one form or another, in order to gain popular acceptance”. 
The fact that these beliefs are to some extent flexible makes it important 
to consider translating policy proposals for local appeal to a sense of nor-
mative fairness and appropriateness (see Trebilcock 2014). It is this need 
for framing in policy diffusion that necessitates the next part of our ide-
ational framework.
The concepts of bricolage and translation at the core of our ideational 
framework are derived from Campbell’s work on institutional change. In 
his analysis of how various ideas can shape institutional change, Campbell 
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(2004) discusses translation and bricolage, two mechanisms according to 
which different ideas and institutional elements are combined and 
reframed in particular institutional contexts. On the one hand, Campbell 
argues that when new ideas are introduced into a new cultural and insti-
tutional context through diffusion processes, these ideas are typically 
translated into local practice to varying degrees. From this perspective, 
translation is about adapting foreign ideas to a particular normative or 
institutional setting so that they can blend in (Clarke et  al. 2015). 
Bricolage, on the other hand, is about combining different pre-existing 
ideas and institutional components to create something new (Campbell 
2004). In other words, bricolage relates to the capacity of actors to create 
something new out of the ideational and institutional legacies that already 
exist in their environment (Campbell 2004; Carstensen 2011).
Bricolage and translation in policy diffusion in SSA are necessary to 
enhance policy diffusion. Empirically, because of its unique historical, 
cultural, economic, religious and political experiences that collectively 
shape social and political existence in a unique way, the SSA social con-
text does not render itself adequately amenable to the Western-centric 
legislative approach without addressing preliminary contextual and cul-
tural factors. As illustrated, existing models of concentrating on legisla-
tive procedures and targeting political institutions for envisioned 
transformation have proved futile and even counterproductive, demand-
ing alternative approaches. In practice, social norms cannot change over-
night through the prescription of legislation. Unfortunately, as Grech 
(2011, 93) argues, the Global South has since colonial times been “con-
strued as a blank slate, waiting for outside intervention”. Social norms, 
likable or not, constitute identities and meanings that cannot be sup-
planted through legislation alone. As Scott (2005) argues, cultural knowl-
edge is an essential component of policy design and meaning.
Contrary to the institutional approach, the translation and bricolage 
of ideas offer a more viable and tenacious promise as a mechanism for 
cultural and ideological policy change in the Global South. This change 
works both through strategic social agents at the societal level and, 
although later, through political institutions. While political institutions 
are often susceptible to political and economic manipulation by the pow-
erful, they are socially ill-positioned to drive such bottom-up ideational 
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innovation. Figure 12.1 illustrates the difference between the two diffu-
sion approaches. In the words of Miljan (2012, 5), “a program, law, or 
regulation hardly ever ‘solves’ a problem in the sense of eliminating the 
conditions that inspired demands for action. When a problem does dis-
appear, the reason often has less to do with government action than with 
changing societal conditions—including the emergence of new problems 
that push old ones below the surface of public consciousness”.
Without any ideational fix, therefore, law enforcement is powerless. 
Political actors, often perceived as elitists, are ineffective with engender-
ing changes of norms embedded in existing cultural and religious identi-
ties. In their place, we propose the deployment of strategic social actors 
whom we call civic educators as translators and bricoleurs (i.e. ideational 
entrepreneurs): traditional leaders, religious leaders, teachers, issue-based 
advocates, journalists and other social entrepreneurs. It is among com-
munities, families, social groups and associations that ideological frames 
are constituted and sustained. In her argument about when a subject 
ripens for public attention, Miljan (2012) demonstrates how, in industri-
alized democracies, a change of cultural attitudes preceded the political 
agenda to address unequal social conditions of males and females, for 
example equal pay for equal work. It was cultural change, not legislation 
per se, that necessitated the revolution for gender equality. Subsequent 
legislative efforts supported the ideational transformation that was a 
result of a policy discourse.
Civic educators are strategically positioned to reinforce or alter social 
beliefs, to challenge epistemological positions and to help re-align norms, 
values and “truths”. Simply put, they are well-positioned to actively pro-
mote ideational transformation. For example, in the Global South trans-
national actors can work through community players such as community 
leaders and heads of religious organizations incorporating endogenous 
norms, values and ideas. This is more impactful in reversing trends such 
as child marriage and domestic violence.
A potential entry point for championing ideational and policy influ-
ence in the Global South is an appeal to the pre-existing communitarian 
sense of solidarity, family care and social cohesion. For instance, Grech 
(2011) acknowledges the importance of family ties for offering solidarity 
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and social support in the Global South. Communal solidarity provides a 
profound opportunity for social policy development in the region.
 Supply and Demand in Policy Diffusion
While some scholars believe that political institutions are necessary and 
sufficient gateways toward successful policy diffusion (Risse 2007), others 
see a stronger symbiosis between formal rules/laws that constrain and 
shape social action and the embedded informal norms that legitimate 
those formal rules (Campbell 2004; North 1994; Scott 2005). The latter 
ideational approach stresses that institutional change does not simply 
mean a change of policy instruments, but, most profoundly, a change of 
norms that underpin the objectives of these instruments and provide 
them with legitimacy.
We argue that this constructivist and ideational approach, which has 
two implications for policy diffusion, suggests a two-faceted policy diffu-
sion process: supply and demand. Before explaining this in greater detail, 
we are going to deal with the implications of our constructivist and ide-
ational approach. First, because policies—as formal rules and precepts—
are institutional realities, their change must seek to alter not just the 
instrumental aspects represented by formal rules but also the normative 
aspects including social expectations, customs and belief systems. These 
social factors, which Parsons (2007) calls ideational factors, matter sig-
nificantly for policy diffusion because every society is defined by its own 
sets of persistent cultural ideas. These ideas define societies, and they cre-
ate and establish social interests that societies live by and would not will-
ingly sacrifice because policy instruments have changed.
Without ideational strategies that socialize and rationalize the new 
precepts, no punitive law would easily engender any change of core social 
norms. This, therefore, raises an important issue about framing in policy 
processes. As Baumgartner and Jones (1991, 1046) demonstrate in what 
they call “policy imaging”, the framing of policy ideas is crucial not only 
for the justification of new policies but also for the legitimation of alter-
native world views.
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Second, the degree of policy change is only as profound as the policy 
proposers’ scope of engagement with diverse social actors who legitimate 
a given political idea. If Hall’s (1993) third level of policy change (para-
digm shift) is desired, context-specific ideas that determine social objec-
tives and goals according to which institutions and policies are designed 
must be taken into account. To do this, any meaningful activism should 
be based on a coherent and contextual understanding of institutions, 
their rules and operations. The assumption that institutions have a uni-
versal character often leads to the pitfall that they could resolve all social 
problems regardless of cultural and normative circumstances (Haang’andu 
2018). In this case, social scientists have shown that the logic according 
to which the change of formal rules (or policy instruments) is sufficient 
for changing human behavior is flawed. Douglas North (1994), for 
example, argues that while it is easy to change formal rules overnight, 
informal norms, which are the anchor for belief, identity, knowledge and 
behavior, usually change only gradually. The logic here is that institutions 
are birthed through social interactions and that they are often a represen-
tation of the people’s cultural-cognitive values and informal beliefs (see 
also Campbell 2004, 1–9). Institutions and their enforcement build on 
and reinforce informal norms and beliefs. They create reciprocal expecta-
tions and standards because of repeated human behavior and in response 
to them. In other words, they create a culture.
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that transnational 
policy diffusion should be mindful of two important components of dif-
fusion: the supply and the demand components (see Fig. 12.2). These 
two components have implications for understanding power relations in 
policy diffusion and for determining the success and failure of policy dif-
fusion. The supply side simply means that a policy entrepreneur identifies 
a situation (problematic or not) requiring a policy response and proposes 
a solution. For example, the observation that socio-economic and politi-
cal benefits are unequally distributed among men and women has led to 
the emergence of feminist solutions.
However, supplying policy ideas should be balanced with the demand 
side. The demand side has two components: inactive demand and active 
demand. The inactive demand side is primarily guided by what Campbell 
(2004, 94) refers to as “public sentiments”. It means that if an outsider 
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attempts to change them, public normative resistance is imminent, poten-
tially seeing such attempts as ideological and cultural intrusion. From this 
perspective, the inactive demand is where a given society does not actively 
seek change to its status quo, but an outside policy proposer seeks to initi-
ate change based on perceptions of a situation the outside actor sees as 
problematic. The policy proposer must prove through a compelling indi-
cator that there is need for a change of the status quo. As Kingdon (2003, 
93) argues, “constructing an indicator and getting others to agree to its 
worth become major preoccupations of those pressing for policy change”. 
For instance, society A could have traditional gender relations it does not 
see as problematic, although actor B (a TNA) considers them a problem. 
On the whole, transnational actors and policy proposers see problems 
beyond their jurisdictions and promote solutions, assuming or believing 
that a perceived problem borders on a universal principle or that their 
proposed solution is responsive to their diagnostic (see Shriwise, Chap. 2, 
this volume, but also Chinyoka and Ulriksen, Chap. 10, this volume).
The demand side also has an active component where a given policy 
community actively seeks policy solutions for a perceived problem. Still, 
this demand for policy solutions could be either endogenously or exoge-
nously created. Moreover, the interactions of the supply and demand 
sides of policy diffusion inherently entail power relations, whether sym-
metrical or asymmetrical. For policy diffusion to be legitimate, policy 
entrepreneurs must be aware of the potential for ideational domination. 
The next section specifies why and how power matters in policy diffusion 
and how, if not properly managed, it could result in ideational asymme-
tries and policy impositions.
 Power and Policy Diffusion: Implications for Political 
and Ideational Asymmetries
Although international organizations often present transnational policy 
ideas and norms as being neutral, universal and disinterested, political 
scientists have demonstrated that transnational policy diffusion is charac-
terized by power contestations (Waltz 2000; Shriwise, Chap. 2, this vol-
ume). A perspective on the idea of power that has sparked academic 
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controversy is the one by Steven Lukes (2004). Lukes holds a neo-Marxist 
view according to which power is relational and asymmetrical. It is power 
over others. According to him, power is the ideological capacity to mis-
leadingly shape the preferences of other actors, in order of reinforcing 
their domination (Béland 2010). Contrary to Lukes’ conception of power 
as “power over”, Morriss (2006, 126) argues that “our primary under-
standing of power is as ‘power-to’” and that “it follows from this that 
‘power’ is best thought of as the ability to effect outcomes, not the ability 
to affect others”. Understanding the conceptual distinction between 
Lukes’ “power over” and “power to”, which refers to the capacity to shape 
outcomes (Morriss 2006), is crucial for our understanding of transna-
tional policy diffusion.
While transnational players are autonomous actors, their policy ideas 
are seldom those without the backing of powerful countries that finance 
their operations (see Shriwise, Chap. 2, this volume; Mioni and Petersen, 
Chap. 3, this volume). While many times TNAs have openly used their 
control over these institutions to manipulate global political outcomes 
(which Lukes suggests as “power over”), transnational policy is almost 
always characterized by power asymmetries. Although transnational pol-
icy diffusion, as Hall (1993) puts it, is always about “powering” and “puz-
zling”, achieving policy outcomes through the manipulation of formal 
political institutions, particularly on matters socially and culturally 
entrenched, is seldom a viable way of diffusing policy. In the case of dis-
ability policy, the failure has more to do with assumptions of Western-
centric norms that overshadow the predominance of local cultural ideas 
in influencing collective identities that could stifle policy diffusion. As 
Campbell (2004) suggests, policy change should address not only cogni-
tive but also normative ideas, bearing in mind the background and fore-
ground variables affecting the acceptability of policy change.
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 Case Study: Transnational Policy 
Diffusion in SSA
A couple of key points emerge from the preceding discussion that point 
to the inadequacy of the political-institutional framework and stress the 
need for our alternative ideational approach. To illustrate the usefulness 
of this approach, we apply it to transnational disability policy diffusion in 
SSA, which we then compare with diffusion in the field of gender equal-
ity. By way of these factors outlined below as part of our general frame-
work, we demonstrate how the policy diffusion process could be 
enhanced.
The reason why we selected disability policy to illustrate the benefit of 
our approach is twofold. First, it is a field in which the limits of the tra-
ditional-institutionalist approach to social policy diffusion are easy to 
identify (Haang’andu 2019). Second, it is a field where the supply side to 
social policy diffusion has been overemphasized without paying attention 
to the demand factors. Disability literature is dominated by a strong 
Western-centric institutionalist approach that has effectively marginal-
ized the role of local ideas in building strong social policy responses to 
disability. As some scholars have acknowledged (e.g. Devlieger 1999; 
Grech 2011; Meekosha 2011; Soldatic and Grech 2014), despite account-
ing for over 80% of persons with disabilities worldwide, the Global South 
remains at the periphery of “development policy, research and programs, 
and virtually excluded from the Western-centric disability studies” (Grech 
2011, 87). In addition, they argue that the “universalization” of Western- 
founded disability paradigms, which in our model is denoted by the sup-
ply component, has negative impacts, especially on the Global South 
where experiences of disability are profoundly different.
What we see in SSA in the two policy domains under consideration is 
a contrast between how gender policy entrepreneurs designed a very well- 
orchestrated diffusion approach addressing both the demand and the 
supply sides, while the disability policy entrepreneurs stagnated at the 
supply side, weakly addressing the demand side. Where the supply side is 
emphasized, especially if policy ideas border on power relations, policy 
change evokes ideational asymmetries, something Grech (2015) calls 
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epistemic violence. Often, this leads to ideational acquiescence and con-
quest. In Haang’andu’s (2019) study, disability policy participants agreed 
that cultural barriers such as beliefs in ancestral curses, myths about the 
causes of disability and religious beliefs were strong, but also that organi-
zations of persons with disability (PDOs) are fragmented. This means 
that the two demand components (active and inactive) of the disability 
policy framework are unviable. While the inactive component of the 
demand side of gender policy was equally non-viable (by being ideation-
ally guarded), its active demand component facilitated dynamic changes 
to the two demand ends (active and inactive) to increase cultural recep-
tiveness at the supply end. This process is key to the legitimation of pol-
icy change.
Moreover, in SSA, disability policy diffusion is an understudied topic 
that requires a more systematic approach, something we offer in the fol-
lowing sub-sections. In these sections, where useful, we compare policy 
diffusion in the field of disability with the situation prevailing in the area 
of gender equality. We do so because gender equality as an issue provides 
a revealing contrast with disability policy as far as the study of diffusion 
patterns is concerned. First, because the chapter is about the success and 
failure of policy diffusion, we needed two policy areas with contrasting 
success rates. Moreover, we selected two policy areas whose appearance 
on the transnational scene is not separated by a large time difference. 
These two became prominent on the transnational scene at about the 
same time, the year 2000 for gender, as one of the eight United Nations’ 
MDGs, and the year 2006 for the CRPD. The fact that they have had 
fairly an equal time for implementation legitimates a comparison. Second, 
both policy areas face similar ideational challenges (e.g. cultural-cognitive 
biases, stereotypes and marginalization). Our interest here is not why 
gender equality and not disability has made it among the core MDGs. 
Instead, our goal is to compare policy processes that transnational actors 
and their domestic allies have undertaken to reverse women’s marginal-
ization and those that transnational actors and their allies have deployed 
the past two decades in disability advocacy. How did transnational actors 
transcend the political processes to attend to sociological causes such as 
child marriages, gender-based spousal violence, sexual cleansing/HIV 
and female genital mutilation? These are entrenched social/cultural issues 
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that formal political processes alone could not resolve. Considering that 
transnational disability actors face similar ideational challenges, how 
could gender policy diffusion processes shed light on disability policy 
diffusion?
 Individual Rights, Communitarianism and Policy 
Diffusion: Contesting Universality
In a statement disputing the assumed universality of a Eurocentric dis-
ability discourse, Grech (2015, 11) writes:
Despite the attempts by a handful of materialist disability theorists to 
engage with the so-called ‘majority world’ […], it becomes immediately 
clear that these efforts appear to be limited to writing in, or making the 
Global South fit into their dominant perspectives as opposed to learning 
about this complex and hybrid space in its own right […]. For some, the 
objective may well be the transfer and exportation of discourse, in this case 
the strong social model of disability to everyone, everywhere, with the 
objective of reinforcing its universality as a global narrative and perhaps 
reasserting the power of those generating and selling it.
Indeed, the current transnational disability discourse is imbued in 
Western knowledge and ideological, theoretical, cultural and historical 
assumptions (Grech 2015), with little sensitivity to different ideational 
local contexts. One such method is the rights-based approach to disabil-
ity that seeks to valorize the individual against the collective. One of the 
biggest challenges with transnational human rights-oriented policy diffu-
sion in Africa is the overlooking of historically entrenched collective 
identities which are essentially non-individualistic. Many African schol-
ars have written on the Bantu philosophy of Ubuntu (e.g. Christians 
2004; Mji et al. 2011; Wiredu 2008) that so profoundly characterizes the 
Bantu people of SSA. The term ubuntu is common among many Bantu 
languages across the continent and it translates as “humanity for others” 
(Christians 2004, 241). In the Zulu language, for example, ubuntu 
derives from a maxim umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, which translates as “a 
person is a person through other persons” (Christians 2004, 241; see also 
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Mji et al. 2011) or I am because we are. As Christians (2004, 241) explains, 
ubuntu “means that a person depends on personal relations with others to 
exercise, develop and fulfil those capacities that make one a person […]. 
Personhood comes as a gift from other persons”. Central to the concept 
of ubuntu is the understanding that human beings are intrinsically social 
beings and that their dignity is integrated in rationality and morality 
(Christians 2004).
Contrary to this approach by disability advocates, in his comparative 
study on disability and gender policy advocates in Malawi and Zambia, 
Haang’andu (2019) finds that while the promotion of gender equality 
was central to the objectives of feminist TNAs, persuading endogenous 
ideational factors was equally important. The most notable intermediary 
TNAs and local organizations engaged with transforming social norms 
were traditional leaders, teachers, religious leaders and husbands. 
Haang’andu (2019) shows that TNAs and their partners used framing 
techniques to persuade ideational, cultural and knowledge leaders toward 
alternative frames of gender relations. This helped, prior to the attain-
ment of effective institutional frameworks, with altering entrenched soci-
etal ideas maintained in the context of belief systems and practices that 
placed women at the periphery.
The comparison demonstrates that cultural identity, unlike Western 
individualism, is more of involuntary acquiescence. People are born into 
a culture they can individually hardly control. Individuality versus com-
munitarian comparatives has serious implications for the applicability of 
legal and judicial frameworks that stress individual rights against com-
mon values. In entrenched Western democratic societies, where individ-
ual liberties and freedoms are central to civilization, court systems and 
litigation are effective. In these societies, judicial processes through insti-
tutionalized courts are strong and binding for all parties involved. The 
institutional court system as we know it today, as a pinnacle of individual 
emancipation, is an abstraction of the Western civilization. The judiciary, 
as an arm of government, is a colonial inheritance. Like other colonial 
institutions of governance in Africa, the concept of the Western-centric 
judiciary is still struggling to entrench itself in African political cultures.
This has created two problems. First, the sense of communal solidarity, 
collective responsibility and shame is more binding than the doctrine of 
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individual exoneration through judicial victories (Haang’andu 2018). 
Second, judicial impartiality in Africa remains a significant problem. 
Some scholars have argued that judicial systems in developing countries 
are generally weak (Besley and Persson 2014). In a robust study on the 
adjudication of electoral disputes in SSA, O’Brien Kaaba (2015) docu-
ments the challenges of judicial neutrality throughout Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In all SSA countries, constitutions allow presidents to appoint 
judges, often without tenure of office, leaving the judges’ security of office 
to the caprices of politicians: the result has been that judges are often 
politically pliable. In the rare cases when judges exhibit independence 
and rule against government officials, their verdicts are ignored, publicly 
ridiculed and sometimes judges are removed (Haang’andu and 
Béland 2019).
The foregoing two points have far-reaching implications for policy dif-
fusion in SSA, when we bring the example of gender equality to the fore 
as a comparative device. First, women and persons with disabilities, like 
everybody else, hold collective purposes more than individual “rights”, 
contrasting the experience of Western civilizations (see also Grech 2011). 
These social ties shape the experience of gender relations and the disabil-
ity experience in a way that creates unique opportunities and challenges 
for policy intervention. Our experience of research in Malawi and Zambia 
shows that women are overly reticent about gender-based abuses because 
of this cultural-blanket. In many cases when reports are filed, they are 
often withdrawn, and cases can be withdrawn to preserve collective 
“integrity”. Second, although courts have mostly acted efficiently in case 
of gender-related violations where they have been allowed to, the impli-
cation of weak judicial systems for the transnationalization of disability 
norms is that there is no predictability as to whether court systems would 
act as credible remediation for disability causes. In SSA, where govern-
ment executives frequently influence the judiciary or defy judicial rul-
ings, it is difficult to imagine that courts would—contrary to Vanhala’s 
(2010) arguments for the relevance of courts in Canada and in the United 
Kingdom—be credible means to champion disability “rights”, especially 
12 Transnational Actors and the Diffusion of Social Policies… 
322
when judicial outcomes have punitive financial implications on arms of 
government (Haang’andu 2018).1
 Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Policy Diffusion
One of the conspicuous characteristics of many SSA societies is cultural 
heterogeneity. Political scientists have theorized about the implications of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization when it comes to the building of institu-
tions. One of the arguments brought forward is that ethnolinguistic frac-
tionalization complicates institution-building and policy change (Besley 
and Persson 2014; Mauro 1998). In an ethnolinguistically fractionalized 
society, the diversity of cultural ideas makes it difficult to impose a 
homogenous policy across the country. The assumption that gender 
equality norms, disability knowledge and policy ideologies founded in 
one part of the world would seamlessly localize in ethnolinguistically 
fractionalized SSA is problematic (Haang’andu 2018).
Because of their ethnolinguistic fractionalization, many SSA societies 
are ideationally and culturally fragmented and require more complex 
strategies of disability and gender policy response than the Western uni-
versalistic agenda. The existential realities of persons with disabilities in 
SSA are, in terms of both challenges and opportunities, uniquely shaped 
by local ideational factors that might not be amenable to a universal pol-
icy prescription. Building universal disability regimes that command vol-
untary multi-ethnic acceptance is much more complex than the 
transnationalization of unquestioned Western-based ideologies 
(Haang’andu 2018).
In his study on Malawi and Zambia, Haang’andu (2019) finds that an 
important obstacle to disability policy diffusion in SSA is the lack of 
TNAs and their partners’ strategic engagement with grassroots actors to 
initiate a critical ideational shift that both backs the change in formal 
laws and rules and, at the same time, puts pressure on social factors sus-
taining existing frames about disability. Gender activists and their TNA 
1 This is a good project for future investigation. There is the need to study how effective courts have 
been in adjudication disability and gender cases in SSA. It is not the priority of this research to 
delve into such details.
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partners have applied this model. While fighting for legislative reform 
(laws, budget inclusiveness, increased electoral participation, more repre-
sentation in appointed senior government positions, etc.), they took to 
the grassroots to sell and rationalize alternative ideational images and 
frames about male-female relations. Gender activists and disability activ-
ists in SSA face similar social obstacles: inhibitive social and religious 
belief systems, stereotypes, contested status and so on. Like gender TNAs 
and advocates acknowledged in Haang’andu (2019), framing requires 
skillful engagement with oppositional and often-entrenched cultural 
images that people could be defensive about. It also requires persuasion 
rather than conquest.
As Grech (2011, 89) aptly observes, when disability knowledge and 
policy is grounded on Western-centric ideologies and experiences, “it 
implies that it is theoretically ill-equipped to deal with majority world 
views and the nuances of majority world contexts (historical, social, eco-
nomic and political)”. Given the cultural-cognitive embeddedness of 
both gender relations and disability in SSA countries, it is important to 
understand that whatever policy interventions are made, they must con-
front the harsh reality of the deep ideational understanding of gender 
relations and disability (Haang’andu 2018). As such, activist efforts in 
these contexts need to employ effective discursive (or rationalization) 
frames toward the public through carefully selected strategic intermediar-
ies (i.e. civic educators) to convince them that reform is necessary 
(Kingdon 2003). Like any other societies, SSA societies have unique cul-
tural idiosyncrasies that are difficult to change overnight. Many countries 
in SSA have a strong adherence to social collectivism and family ties (for 
disability in the Global South in general, see Clare Barker and Stuart 
Murray 2010; Grech 2011).
In his research on Zambia, Haang’andu (2019) found that over 90% 
of domestic child sexual defilement cases were perpetrated by close rela-
tives and not by unknown strangers. He found that the greatest obstacle 
to fighting sexual violence and rape of women and young girls is not the 
lack of punitive laws but that families decide to protect violators to pre-
vent “family shame”. In this example, despite the existence of punitive 
legislative provisions, social norms, beliefs and practices (which Elinor 
Ostrom (2014) refers to as evolutionary and cultural social norms that 
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create reciprocal expectations) stifle the prosecutorial prospects. While 
most of the cases remain unreported due to these social justifications, in 
some instances victims report violations but withdraw complaints yield-
ing to family and societal pressure, to avoid “family shame”. Often, fami-
lies prefer secret domestic dispute settlement to judicial proceedings that 
could potentially result in the arrest and persecution of one of their kith 
and kin, sometimes the family breadwinner. Haang’andu (2019) found 
that familial protectionist tendencies exacerbate the sexual abuse of girls 
and women. Women with disabilities, whom some African societies 
believe to possess spiritual powers to cure sexually transmitted diseases, 
are at a higher risk.
How should activists confront such socially entrenched barriers? Any 
gender or disability activism that insists on the supremacy of individual 
rights is not only incongruent to the experience of gender relations or of 
persons with disabilities in this context, but it is counterproductive. 
Given all the historically created and sustained social expectations, it is 
unlikely that women or individuals with disabilities—so embedded 
within this social fabric—would seek litigious measures against their 
immediate family, community or ethnic group for perceived violations.
Where powerful policy proposers use their economic incentives to 
manipulate and obtain compliance, ‘power over’ could secure a change of 
policy instruments but not of social identities, norms and practices. With 
transnational actors playing dominant roles in financing development 
policies in both gender and disability in SSA, these countries are faced 
with the challenge of “puzzling and powering”. Presented with treaties at 
the international level, disregarding their capacity and desire to imple-
ment the provisions, these countries’ dispositions to accept policy pro-
posals are constantly determined by the “powering” dynamics of 
appeasement and the fear of retributions. For example, in September 
2018, the British Government, along with the Swedish, Irish and Finnish 
governments, suspended donor aid to Zambia after the Zambian govern-
ment had misappropriated over $4 million meant for social cash transfer 
programs for poor people and people with disabilities. Therefore, the split 
of control between transnational actors who wield financial power and 
state actors who organize their local systems threatens the viability of real 
paradigmatic change in policy diffusion in general. Although there are no 
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absolute solutions to this problem, aligning both actors’ goals through 
ideational bricolage and translation provides a strong remedy. Bricolage 
and translation offer an ideational approach that both presents legitimacy 
for locals and satisfies the universalistic aspirations of the TNAs.
 Bricolage and Translation of Ideas
At first, to make disability policy pathways that might break up the socio-
logical and cultural foundations of African societies, disability activism in 
SSA should be informed by the endogenous understanding and experi-
ence of society. In other words, both translation and bricolage should be 
cognizant of endogeneity. Using bricolage and translation, we can begin 
to build an Afrocentric disability activist paradigm whose foundations 
derive from African cultures themselves. To start off the bricolage process, 
we acknowledge that typically African societies are characterized by a cul-
ture of reciprocity, dignity, humanity and mutuality in the interest of 
building and maintaining communities with justice and communal car-
ing (Gyekye 1997). Bricolage entails the incorporation of these pre- 
existing endogenous attributes into policy responses. For example, the 
institutionalist introduction of designated homes for persons with dis-
abilities, such as mental health clinics and hospices, negates the entrenched 
community predisposition of caring for “disadvantaged” members of 
society. A welfare system created through bricolage that seeks to address 
the needs of persons with disabilities in such a context would be respon-
sive to pre-existing societal attributions and combine them with other 
policy elements. The abovementioned African philosophies present pro-
found opportunities for the reconceptualization of a context-responsive 
model of disability activism within the SSA context. Because it is among 
communities, families and sociological groups and associations that dis-
ability frames are constituted and sustained, it is also from among them 
that ideational spinners for conceptual shifts should emerge. The preoc-
cupation of transnational activists with political processes of disability 
policy change and rights promotion misses this point.
Unlike bricolage that maximizes pre-existing attributes for anchoring 
policy change, translation is predominantly supply-driven. Because the 
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supply aspect of policy ideas could easily be perceived as an imposition or 
as the supplanting of a status quo and, therefore, trigger oppositional 
public sentiments, it requires a careful framing and translation of ideas. 
While political institutions play a significant role in the policy process, 
they are ill-positioned to mediate the framing and translation of supply- 
driven ideas to how to reconcile them with entrenched non-formal 
cultural- cognitive beliefs and attitudes. Instead, it is civic educators (tra-
ditional leaders, religious leaders, community leaders, teachers, etc.) that 
are best placed to be ideational entrepreneurs. Civic educators, particu-
larly in the African context, are strategically positioned to reinforce or 
alter social beliefs, to challenge epistemological positions and to help re- 
align norms and values. The pitfall of the Western-centric disability activ-
ism is both its assumed universalistic disability knowledge paradigm and 
its methodological approach that, despite ideational variation, seeks an 
institutional expansion of individual rights in a deeply communitarian 
society.
To amplify the mechanisms of policy translation, let us consider a con-
crete gender-related example that enriches our comparative analysis of 
the two policy domains under consideration. In the early 2000s, transna-
tional activists sponsored and supported a vibrant gender activism in 
Africa that resulted in a plethora of women-led activist organizations 
(Haang’andu 2018). At inception, there was a strong focus on criminal-
izing certain social ills; for example, spouse inheritance, sexual cleansing, 
gender-based violence, the marriage of underage girls and so on. Certain 
male-female interactions that are commonly taken for granted in African 
societies came under scrutiny, and many were deemed violations of wom-
en’s rights. Although these efforts were obviously important for trying to 
deter the abuse of women and for enhancing women’s rights, transna-
tional and domestic organizations that worked to reverse these trends in 
many African countries eventually realized, after decades of working 
through legislative avenues of government with little success, that work-
ing through community leaders such as chiefs and heads of religious 
organizations, incorporating endogenous norms, values and ideas, was 
more impactful for reversing the trends. In fact, in some cases, simply 
enforcing the law was counterproductive because societies became more 
reticent about the occurrences of some of these ills. For example, the 
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Zambia National Women’s Lobby, the largest women’s movement in 
Zambia with a wide regional range in southern Africa, acknowledged 
during an interview that they had learned that they needed to desist from 
framing their messages as “promoting women’s rights” during their cam-
paigns to make an impact on the heavily patriarchal Zambian society 
(Haang’andu 2019). The justification for using alternative frames was 
that the patriarchal Zambian society would be aversive to such language 
and, therefore, resistant to transformation. Yet, the result of its advocacy 
was the attainment of communities that developed a new sense of respect 
for women and their contribution to society and the condemnation of 
the physical and emotional abuse of women in marriage as well as the 
increased appreciation of education for girls. The organization also reiter-
ated the importance of working through informal structures as opposed 
to concentrating on legislation. This point was reiterated by a senior 
Zambian government official during an interview: “we do not want to be 
a police state. We need transformation of attitudes and not mere forced 
compliance to legislation”.
This illustration serves to stress a couple of points. First, understanding 
ideational and cultural contexts is fundamental for activism on sociologi-
cally entrenched phenomena like gender and disability. Assumptions of 
universal categories only serve for stifling progress in ideational transfor-
mations. To maximize their impact, transnational activists therefore need 
to avoid assuming that a knowledge paradigm generated in one cultural-
cognitive context meets universal resonance and, instead, seek niches for 
bricolage and identify effective intermediaries for translation.
Second, while the strengthening of institutions is important and in 
fact essential for a sustained policy, political institutions are not always 
the best entry points for socially effective policy change. The above illus-
tration shows that informal community structures could be more 
impactful with proliferating alternative worldviews and with reversing 
historical frames about taken-for-granted social experiences. In African 
settings, elected leaders, frequently construed as “seasonal visitors” who 
show up near election time, are often less trusted than community and 
religious leaders when it comes to norms-related issues. Traditional eth-
nic leaders and religious leaders wield both political and ideational 
authority over communities. They are influential normative spinners 
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and can function as strategic ideational entrepreneurs for new knowl-
edge shifts. They are better placed socially to be carriers of new disability 
frames and to be agents of ideational change than conventional political 
institutions.
 Conclusion
The contribution our ideational approach makes to transnational policy 
diffusion is threefold. First, using the examples of disability and gender 
social policies, it strives to explain the limitations of the institutionalist 
approach to transnational policy. More broadly, focusing on both, the 
supply and the demand sides, the framework strives to determe the cir-
cumstances under which TNAs succeed and/or fail to diffuse transna-
tional norms in an ideationally charged socio-political environment. 
Second, the framework abstracts the implications of underlying power 
factors in policy diffusion. Here we propound the ideational and policy 
implications of a policy exchange situation that is characterized by power 
asymmetries. Third, our framework bridges complex public policy con-
cepts to devise an explanatory framework for social policy diffusion that 
could be applied to many policy situations. Through Parsons’ (2007) 
notion of ideational explanations, we have abstracted ideational compo-
nents of SSA societies and how they define these societies’ identities. 
Using Campbell’s (2004) concepts of bricolage and translation, we devise 
a comprehensive and inclusive approach to policy diffusion that institu-
tions could adopt to strengthen their own chances of success in diffusing 
social policies.
This constructivist argument we advance for disability policy diffusion 
based on ideational considerations, and against a purely positivist 
political- institutional approach, adds a novel approach both to disability 
literature and to transnational policy diffusion thought. The approach 
stands in contrast to the dominant and often-unquestioned political- 
institutional paradigm of the transnationalization of the disability dis-
course which, if anything, overlooks context-specific cultural and 
ideational factors by assuming the universality of Western geopolitical 
ideologies, norms and interests. Through a strong emphasis on the 
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 importance of ideas, social meanings, as well as historical and cultural 
identities in disability policy design and implementation, this study con-
tributes to constructivist theory-building in public policy research.
While this chapter, to a large extent, breaks new ground in social pol-
icy diffusion, the framework could benefit from further research work. 
First, future research could focus on concrete comparative cases drawn 
from SSA countries while representing internal political and cultural 
variations (e.g. colonial legacies), to find out: (1) if political historicity 
has any influence on policy diffusion behavior by TNA; and (2) if colo-
nial legacies have significance for local societies’ disposition to exogenous 
influence. Second, future research could compare what the dynamics of 
policy diffusion are between more ethnically heterogeneous societies and 
those less ethnolinguistically fractionalized. Here, it would be useful to 
investigate whether less fractionalized societies are more or less cohered to 
social identities such as culture, belief systems and norms. It would also 
be useful to know whether such societies are ideologically more amenable 
to political-institutional influence than the more heterogeneous ones.
Further research could also examine differences in the progression of 
disability policy design and implementation among various SSA coun-
tries, ascertaining sets of key players and their respective influence both 
in policy advancements and sociological ideational reforms at the 
local level.
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Low- and middle-income countries are engaged in a large expansion of 
social protection institutions, but especially social assistance. Some com-
parative research on the growth of social assistance has attributed this 
expansion to the influence of transnational actors, particularly multilater-
als (Peck and Theodore 2015; Yeates 2018).1 This chapter challenges this 
widely held view, for which a review of the findings and approaches of the 
1 This is an abridged list; see the text for further references.
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current comparative literature fails to find strong support. Addressing 
this issue is important because it raises fundamental questions about the 
focus, scope and methods of comparative research on emerging welfare 
institutions in low- and middle-income countries. Interdependencies, 
transnational actors included, are likely to have a stronger influence on 
the shape of welfare institutions in low- and middle-income countries 
than they did in the development of welfare states in long-standing 
industrialized countries. The chapter argues that a focus on institutions as 
opposed to policies, better data and quantitative methods as well as a 
clearer conceptualization of the role of transnational actors will take us 
further toward theorizing emerging welfare institutions in low- and 
middle- income countries.
In low- and middle-income countries, social assistance consists of pro-
grams and policies providing budget-financed and rules-based transfers 
to households and individuals, with the aim of facilitating sustained exit 
from poverty.2 Based on data from the World Bank’s ASPIRE data-
base (The Atlas of Social Protection Indicators of Resilience and Equity), 
the 2015 State of Safety Nets Report stated that social assistance reached 
2  billion people in low- and middle-income countries (World Bank 
2015).3 A regional breakdown from the same data confirms that social 
assistance is the predominant component of social protection in low- and 
middle-income countries when measured in terms of range.
This expansion of social assistance has far-reaching implications for 
emerging welfare institutions. One of these is the likely balance between 
social insurance and social assistance components within social protec-
tion. Expectations that social insurance institutions would come to dom-
inate social protection in low- and middle-income countries, based on 
the development of similar institutions in Europe and on long-standing 
International Labour Organization (ILO) advocacy, would need to be 
heavily discounted. The scope and scale of social assistance institutions in 
2 Social assistance is heterogeneous across, and within, national and sub-national contexts 
(Barrientos 2013).
3 A global count using the Social Assistance in Low and Middle Income Countries database 
SALMIC (Barrientos 2018) puts the range of social assistance at below 1 billion. The World Bank 
measures safety nets, which combine social assistance and emergency and humanitarian assistance. 
In sub-Saharan Africa and perhaps elsewhere, short-term public works and school feeding pro-
grams, arguably emergency assistance, bulk up the World Bank estimates.
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low- and middle-income countries belies the residual and compensatory 
role of social assistance in European countries. A strong focus on social 
investment, innovations in information tracking of vulnerable popula-
tion groups, impact evaluations and the emergence of dedicated Ministries 
of Social Development, all these indicate a distinctive institutional devel-
opment in low- and middle-income countries.
The expansion of social assistance has coincided with an increased 
interest in growing interdependencies in policy-making, including social 
policy (Obinger et  al. 2013). It is a fact that economic liberalization, 
migration and global value chains, among others, work to limit the 
explanatory power of research focusing exclusively on domestic social 
protection policy. Comparative research, paying attention to interdepen-
dencies, stands a better chance to understand emerging welfare institu-
tions everywhere, but especially in low- and middle-income countries.
Disproportionate attention given to the role of transnational actors in 
current comparative research on emerging welfare institutions in low- 
and middle-income countries might turn out to be counterproductive. 
First, it biases the focus of comparative research toward short-term poli-
cies as opposed to long-term institutions, and overwhelmingly on the 
processes of policy adoption and diffusion. The research question implicit 
in this approach is “what makes policies move transnationally?” This is in 
contrast to “what explains the shape of emerging welfare institutions in 
low- and middle-income countries?” Whereas the former can be answered 
with little or no engagement with domestic conditions, the latter requires 
a deeper engagement with domestic politics. Second, distance has encour-
aged a focus on ideational factors in social policy adoption, especially the 
ideational flows associated with international organizations (Béland 
2016; Béland and Orenstein 2013; Jenson 2010). Third, an excessive 
focus on the agency of transnational actors diverts attention from discuss-
ing appropriate comparative methods, both qualitative and quantitative.4 
4 Peck and Theodore eloquently describe the problem: “[T]he persistent challenge was to avoid 
slipping into a form of sampling, as it were, on the dependent variable, and merely affirming some 
anticipated account of policy hypermobility, as articulated by the most powerful players (many of 
whom had interests in promoting such narratives). We had to avoid becoming dupes of the policy 
networks themselves” (Peck and Theodore 2015, Loc254). From my reading, they were not entirely 
successful.
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Some of these shortcomings are acknowledged in the literature. Yeates 
(2018) discusses current gaps in appropriate tools and approaches. 
Obinger et al. (2013) undertake a balanced assessment of qualitative and 
quantitative methods applied to the studying of social policy diffusion 
and transfers. They note the scarcity of “empirical analysis of the exact 
conditions and mechanisms of diffusion and transfer” (Obinger et  al. 
2013, 122).
This chapter argues that disproportionate attention paid to ideational 
flows from international organizations imposes a reductive perspective 
which moves us away from theorizing emergent welfare institutions in 
low- and middle-income countries. This is partly due to deficiencies in 
the conceptualization of transnational actors and their influences and 
partly to the challenges faced by comparative methods, data included. In 
this chapter, alternative conceptualizations of the role of transnational 
influences are sketched. It makes a case for refocusing comparative 
research on explaining the shape of emerging institutions in low- and 
middle-income countries, paying greater attention to the influence of 
interdependencies on domestic factors and encouraging quantitative 
comparative methods.
The chapter is organized around three further sections and a conclu-
sion. Section “Comparative Research on Social Assistance” provides a 
brief review of methods and findings in the scarce comparative literature 
on the expansion of social assistance in low- and middle-income coun-
tries. Section “Social Policy Adoption and Emerging Institutions” dis-
cusses two “canonical” examples of transnationally driven social policy 
diffusion: provident funds and individual retirement accounts. They 
demonstrate that a focus on transnationally driven policy transfers might 
not tell us very much about the emerging welfare institutions in low- and 
middle-income countries. Section “Conceptualizing Transnational 
Actors” sketches a conceptualization of the role of transnational influ-
ences and actors in social policy, distinguishing phenomenological from 
realist perspectives. A final section presents conclusions.
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 Comparative Research on Social Assistance
This section aims at providing a very brief review of available comparative 
research on emerging social assistance in low- and middle-income coun-
tries. The section focuses solely on multi-country studies and on their 
methods and key findings.5 This literature is scarce and predominantly 
based on qualitative methods. Its bulk focuses on policy diffusion and 
policy transfers. To my knowledge, few comparative studies seek to 
explain emerging social assistance institutions (Leisering 2019; Schmitt 
et al. 2015; Schmitt 2019; Dodlova et al. 2018; see Schmitt, Chap. 6, 
this volume).6
Quantitative studies are scarce, which is largely due to the paucity of 
reliable data. Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2009) are interested in factors 
explaining the timing of the adoption of conditional income transfers in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Relying on a survival model and on 
data for 21 countries in the region, they find that inequality, the level of 
development, state capacity and the durability of the political regime all 
contribute to earlier adoption, but economic growth is identified as a 
potentially delaying factor. Their key finding is that, after controlling for 
these factors, the ideology of the executive plays no significant role, sug-
gesting that “the convergence we see when it comes to poverty-fighting 
strategies may have to do with dilemmas that all Latin American govern-
ments must face, whatever their own or their supporters’ ideologies and 
policy preferences” (Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2009, 47). By contrast, 
5 Single country studies on the expansion of social assistance contribute significantly to our 
understanding of the processes involved but are not reviewed here. In Latin America, single 
country studies focus on identifying preferences of social assistance programs and potential 
electoral implications. These studies rely on standard regression techniques, using attitudinal or 
experimental household survey data. More recently, Zucco has collected and analyzed experi-
mental data (Zucco et al. 2019). In sub-Saharan Africa, two research programs on the politics 
of social protection (led by Jeremy Seekings at the University of Cape Town and by Sam Hickey 
and Tom Lavers at Manchester) have produced scores of single country studies (Hickey 
et al. 2020).
6 Haggard and Kaufman (2008) and Huber and Stephens (2012) develop theoretical accounts of 
social policies and institutions in middle-income countries and Latin America, respectively, but do 
not focus on the recent growth of social assistance. Two studies provide information on the emer-
gent institutions themselves in Latin America (Székely 2015; CEPAL 2015).
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Borges (2018) finds that left ideology has contributed to the diffusion of 
conditional income transfers in Latin America.
Borges Sugiyama (2011) discusses the spread of conditional income 
transfer programs in Latin America, applying a Cox event history model 
to data from Latin American countries, combined with a qualitative 
study of the role of transnational actors. The quantitative component 
finds that a variable capturing neighborhood effects is the only significant 
independent variable. The model finds no support for variables capturing 
“policy bargaining” explanations (needs, capacity and governing coalition 
ideology). The qualitative component finds that international organiza-
tions display multiple and overlapping effects on diffusion: “They help 
shape international norms and then reinforce them through funding 
arrangements” (Borges Sugiyama 2011, 264).
Brooks (2015) applies a logistic regression-weighted lag-dependent 
variable model to a cross-section sample of social assistance programs, 
with the objective of identifying correlates of conditional income transfer 
program adoption. Her findings are summarized as follows: “the recent 
shift toward cash transfers for the poorest citizens in the developing world 
has emerged through a deepening of democracy, macroeconomic condi-
tions, and horizontal channels of communications across nations that 
enable governments to discern whether such design is a reasonable invest-
ment of financial and institutional resources for their country” (Brooks 
2015, 575). Regarding the role of the World Bank (captured by a variable 
indicating the total bank funding flowing to the specific country), she 
finds no statistically significant correlation with conditional income 
transfer adoption but a significant correlation if all types of cash transfers 
are included. Brooks’ findings are challenged by Simpson (2018) who 
relies on non-parametric measures of association and an updated cross- 
section sample of programs. If anything, this study demonstrates that 
findings are highly dependent on particular samples and analytical 
methods.
The absence of comprehensive comparative data on social assistance 
was a major challenge, but several new datasets now available should 
facilitate comparative research. They include the World Bank’s ASPIRE 
database (World Bank 2016), the non-contributory social transfer 
program dataset NSTP (Dodlova et  al. 2018), the Floor-Cash dataset 
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(Weible et al. 2015) and Social Assistance in Low and Middle Income 
Countries (SALMIC) (Barrientos 2018).
Qualitative studies rely almost exclusively on expert interviews and 
documentation. The sample of countries is largely ad hoc, and expert 
interviews are heavily weighted toward transnational actors and agency 
officials. Process tracing and network analysis are sometimes employed, 
but counterfactuals are seldom discussed.
The findings from qualitative studies on Latin American conditional 
income transfers and those focusing on sub-Saharan Africa show some 
subtle differences. Fenwick (2013) examines Brazil and Argentina and 
finds that transnational actors played a secondary role with conditional 
income transfer adoption. As she puts it, “what matters most is what type 
of feedback effect intersects with transnational policy ideas” (Fenwick 
2013, 162). Martínez Franzoni and Voorend (2011) compare the adop-
tion of conditional income transfers in Chile, Costa Rica and El Salvador. 
They stress the role of the international epistemic community and the 
consensus on how best to deploy antipoverty programs; “[h]owever, dif-
ferences in each program’s design hint at cross-national differences and 
the role of domestic factors in adapting policy recommendations to 
national environments” (Martínez Franzoni and Voorend 2011, 285). 
Garay (2016) provides a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the 
growth of social assistance in four Latin American countries (Mexico, 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile). She finds no evidence in support of the 
view that transnational actors have played a significant role in the expan-
sion of social assistance in these countries. In sum, qualitative studies on 
Latin America acknowledge transnational actors but discount their influ-
ence on the growth of social assistance.
Hickey and Seekings (2020) and Hickey et al. (2020) provide a per-
spective on the adoption and diffusion of social assistance in sub- Saharan 
Africa. Their research relies on qualitative methods, complemented by 
process tracing and the analysis of documentation. Hickey and Seekings 
(2020) focus specifically on the role of donors with the expansion of 
social assistance. Their approach to policy diffusion is in line with the 
global social policy perspective, including an emphasis on ideational fac-
tors. In their view, “the global SCT [Social Cash Transfer] agenda has 
been created by international organizations” (Hickey and Seekings 2020, 
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17). Hickey et al. (2020) extend their analysis to including domestic pol-
icy factors in the adoption of social assistance.7 They find that transna-
tional influences have been important in some countries, but not 
everywhere. Their process tracing analysis failed to “uncover evidence 
that these external agreements did more than legitimate—to some 
extent—the possibility of social protection” (Hickey et  al. 2020, 11). 
They conclude that “whether or not national governments introduce or 
expand social assistance programmes depends primarily on politics within 
each country” (Hickey et al. 2020, 10).
The brief review of the comparative literature on the emergence of 
social assistance in low- and middle-income countries suggests the fol-
lowing points: (1) the bulk of available research focuses on policy adop-
tion; (2) quantitative methods are scarce, perhaps due to the paucity of 
reliable data; (3) qualitative methods rely on key informant interviews 
and documentary analysis, sometimes complemented by process tracing; 
(4) apart from a subset of aid-dependent countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
the literature does not find strong support for the view that the influence 
of multilaterals can explain the expansion of social assistance programs in 
low- and middle-income countries.
 Social Policy Adoption 
and Emerging Institutions
A focus on transnationally driven social policy diffusion might not con-
tribute significantly to our understanding of emerging institutions in 
low- and middle-income countries. Policy adoption and policy transfers 
emphasize short-term, perhaps fleeting, government decision-making. 
Instead, the study of institutions focuses attention on longer-term redis-
tributive patterns and commitments embedded in norms and practices 
and consistent with economic, social and political conditions. In the con-
7 “Foreign donors operate as a distinct faction (or factions) within political settlements, whose 
power and influence do not simply flow from the importance of the resources they provide but, 
vitally, depend on the evolution of aid relations over years and the strategies African governments 
have devised to manage these donors” (Hickey et al. 2020, 7).
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text of the recent expansion of social assistance, a focus on policy adop-
tion reflects the short-term focus of transnational actors and international 
assistance. A brief review of two past examples of transnationally driven 
social policy transfers—provident funds and individual retirement 
accounts—will help clarify this point.
Colonial administrators were central to the adoption of provident 
funds in several British colonies in the 1950s and 1960s. Provident funds 
are compulsory saving schemes in which workers and employers make 
payroll contributions to a fund attracting uniform rates of interest. 
Workers can withdraw their savings and interests accrued for specified 
purposes: retirement, medical expenses, education expenses and housing. 
Colonial administrators “pushed” provident funds as a scaled-down ver-
sion of social insurance, in the belief that the colonies lacked the capacity 
to support the latter (McKinnon et al. 1997). Provident funds were also 
appropriate to conditions in which labor moved between colonial territo-
ries as it enabled savings portability (Parrott 1968).
Provident funds were first adopted in Asia (Indonesia and Malaysia in 
1951, India in 1952, Singapore in 1953, Sri Lanka in 1958); the Middle 
East (Egypt in 1955, Iraq in 1956) and later Africa (Nigeria in 1961, 
Tanzania in 1964, Zambia, Ghana and Kenya in 1965, Uganda in 1967) 
and finally in the Caribbean and Pacific Islands in the early 1970s.
The adoption of provident funds matches a “canonical” model of 
transnationally driven policy diffusion and transfer. Yet, with few excep-
tions, provident fund diffusion sheds very little light on existing welfare 
institutions in the countries concerned. Most of the colonies replaced 
provident funds by social insurance soon after independence. In Africa, 
provident funds collapsed under spiraling debt and public deficits in the 
1980s. Singapore and Malaysia represent a handful of examples of coun-
tries maintaining provident funds as their core welfare institution.
Pension reform in 12 countries in Latin America in the 1990s led to 
the replacement of defined benefit pay-as-you-go pension schemes with 
individual retirement accounts (Mesa-Lago 2007). Later, pension reform 
spread to ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Policy transfers 
associated with individual retirement accounts have been studied closely 
(Orenstein 2011; Weyland 2008). Strong support and advocacy from the 
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World Bank appeared to provide another “canonical” case of transnation-
ally driven policy diffusion (Béland and Orenstein 2013).
In Latin America, individual retirement accounts remain in place in 
only nine countries. They are largely residual institutions in terms of the 
share of contributors in the labor force, except for Chile and Costa Rica 
(Kritzer et al. 2011). In Central and Eastern Europe, individual retire-
ment accounts introduced in the late 1990s and 2000s differed in impor-
tant respects from the Latin American reforms, as they did not replace 
public pension systems but served as a complementary second pillar. The 
2007 global financial crisis led to pension reform reversals (Whitehouse 
2012). Hungary renationalized individual retirement accounts, and para-
metric reforms in most of the other countries have rebalanced public and 
private pension system components, strengthening the former.
These examples show that a focus on transnationally driven social pol-
icy adoption, whilst valuable in their own domain, might not take us very 
far with developing theories capable of explaining the shape of emerging 
welfare institutions in low- and middle-income countries.
 Conceptualizing Transnational Actors
Theories seeking to explain the development of welfare institutions in 
long-standing industrialized countries have focused attention on under-
lying economic and political conditions. Welfare institutions are studied 
as the outcome of processes of social stratification and coalition politics 
(Castles et  al. 2012). For example, the influential work by Esping- 
Andersen and the power resources school (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; 
Korpi 1980) distinguished three main types of welfare regimes: a social 
democratic regime in the Nordic countries, a conservative regime in 
Central Europe and a liberal regime in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The 
distinctiveness of these welfare regimes is explained as the outcome of 
alternative class coalitions between workers and the middle class, leading 
to distinct institutional patterns. The nature of participation of the mid-
dle classes in redistributive coalitions emerges as key to the distinctive 
pattern of welfare states (van Kersbergen and Vis 2014). Theories of the 
development of welfare institutions in long-standing industrialized coun-
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tries did not pay significant attention to external factors, but more recent 
research on welfare state retrenchment takes account of globalization and 
regional integration (Manow 2001).
 Integrating Transnational Actors
Theories of emerging institutions in low- and middle-income countries 
will need to address the specific forms of stratification and coalition poli-
tics present in low- and middle-income countries. In addition, they will 
need to pay particular attention to cross-national interdependencies and 
transnational actors. This section focuses on the latter.
The Introduction advanced the view that comparative literature on the 
expansion of social assistance has overstated the role of transnational 
actors, particularly multilaterals (see Chinyoka and Ulriksen, Chap. 10, 
this volume). The discussion in earlier sections argued that this bias has 
implications for the formulation of core research questions and for the 
effectiveness of qualitative methods. Uncritical assessments of the influ-
ence of transnational actors in the expansion of social assistance are rein-
forced by deficits in the conceptualization of the role of transnational 
actors in social policy. Theories of welfare institutions in long-standing 
industrialized countries have taken great care to conceptualize the role of 
key actors: trade unions, left parties, middle classes and employers. Yet 
transnational actors, especially multilaterals, are seldom the subject of 
serious scrutiny in discussions on welfare institutions and social policy in 
low- and middle-income countries. In literature, transnational actors 
appear either as binary variables in quantitative studies or as exogenous 
agents or stakeholders in qualitative studies. Which interests do they rep-
resent? What is the source of their power or influence? What is their 
ideology? Are they an economic class? These prior methodological ques-
tions, helping to conceptualize transnational actors, are seldom consid-
ered systematically. This section discusses two alternative perspectives.
A good starting point is Meyer’s (2010) distinction between phenom-
enological approaches on the one hand and realist approaches on the 
other. Realist approaches explain welfare institutions in terms of power 
and interests. Policy models are “constructed to their advantage by pow-
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erful and interested actors” (Meyer 2010, 11). Instead,  phenomenological 
approaches emphasize the role of cultural processes of the dissemination 
of world norms and values, in the context of which actors implement 
highly standardized and scripted narratives. We will return to realist 
accounts below, but it will be helpful to review how Meyers’s world society 
perspective would explain the role and influence of transnational actors.
 Phenomenological Accounts of Transnational Actors
In Meyer’s world society, national and supranational bureaucracies and 
policy networks disseminate, design and implement world norms. These 
norms “are universalistic, but also provide a universal orderly control sys-
tem” (Meyer 2010, 11). In this phenomenological perspective, “institu-
tionalised systems construct the actors as well as their activities” (2010, 2) 
where “the actor on the social stage is a scripted identity and enacts 
scripted action … [whilst] the institutional system—the organizations 
and cultural meanings that write and rewrite the scripts—become cen-
tral” (Meyer 2010, 11).8 The primacy of universalistic norms entails that 
models “of the modern actor stress cooperation in a global or universal 
order and good global citizenship” (Meyer 2010, 11).
Meyer explains the growth of professional and organizational struc-
tures as a means of combining constructed universalistic actor scripts by 
a context in which “no state-like authority can arise to organize perceived 
interdependencies and moderate conflict … And their social authority 
derives from their disinterested reflection of transcending purposes, not 
from their own interests” (Meyer 2010, 6). Professional and expert indi-
viduals and their bodies are “disinterested Others”. “They represent such 
collective and putatively universal goods as the environment, generalized 
human rights, or principle of rationality and progress” (Meyer 2010, 7).
The disjunction between these universalistic models and actual prac-
tice reinforces supranational interventions. “Everywhere there are injus-
8 Although not directly relevant for the focus of this chapter, Usui (1994) tests the word society 
perspective by way of using data on social security legislation and attendance to ILO Conferences. 
The findings “suggest that the world institutional environment is a strong force in the universalisa-
tion of social welfare policies” (Usui 1994, 271).
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tices and inconsistencies made visible through forms of scrutiny including 
scientific measurement and investigation. The injustices in a stateless 
world, call for further expansion in the imagined capacities and responsi-
bilities of human and organizational actors” (Meyer 2010, 13).
This perspective is reflected in the global social assistance models devel-
oped in von Gliszczynski and Leisering (2016) and Leisering (2019). 
They understand global social policy models as models originating from, 
and associated with, international organizations. Their legitimacy rests 
on their claim to represent universal world cultural values and ideas rather 
than vested interests, they are “disinterested others”. According to Meyer, 
they focus on “cognitive and normative models of SCT devised by inter-
national organisations rather than actual social cash transfer programmes” 
(von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016, 326). They find that “in the 2000s 
international organizations established a new field of global social policy, 
SCT, defined by way of four models—social pensions, family allowances, 
conditional cash transfers and general household assistance” (von 
Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016, 337).
Global social policy also assigns a central role to transnational actors in 
the formation of social policy in low- and middle-income countries 
(Deacon 1997). While acknowledging the influence of domestic factors 
on social policy, its core aim is to “restate the importance of a focus on the 
specific social policy recommendations which certain global players make 
to countries concerning their national social policies” (Deacon and 
Stubbs 2013, 6). Its main focus is “on the one hand, the ideas, discourses 
and programmes of social policy developed by international (multilat-
eral) organizations, and on the other hand the influence of transnational 
policy actors on domestic policy change” (Yeates 2018, 28). The justifica-
tion of this central focus on transnational actors rests on the view that 
they “shape policy agendas globally, and can change the course of institu-
tional pathways by exercising coercive and persuasive resources that initi-
ate and progress policy initiatives” (Yeates 2018, 29).
Global social policy shares with world society a globalist approach, but 
it places a stronger emphasis on the agency of transnational policy actors, 
whereas they are simply scripted others in world society. Global social 
policy and world society also emphasize a primary role for discourse in 
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the construction of policy models (Tag 2013).9 This connects directly to 
a series of recent papers discussing ideational dimensions of social policy 
(Béland 2016; Béland and Orenstein 2013; Jenson 2010). Ideational 
accounts of social policy reforms are well in line with the emphasis on 
discourse in world society and global social policy perspectives. Ideational 
processes “help construct the social and economic problems most public 
policies are designed to address… [and] help actors define their interests, 
which are shaped not only by material conditions but through interpreta-
tions of these conditions” (Béland and Orenstein 2013, 127). The main 
premise justifying the interest in ideational processes in social policy 
reform is that they influence domestic policy, especially ideational pro-
cesses among multilaterals.10 Ideas matter because they result in pol-
icy change.
Applying ideational perspectives to international organizations, Béland 
and Orenstein (2013) provide an interesting characterization. First, inter-
national organizations are “open systems” in the sense that they interact 
freely with their environment, without the restrictions of a worldview or 
core interests and preferences.11 Second, international organizations have 
a measure of autonomy with respect to the countries they serve. Third, 
their lack of “hard” power gives a prominent role to ideational processes 
in defining their influence on domestic policy.12 This characterization of 
the “power” of international organizations is a close relative of the “disin-
terested Other” in Meyer’s world society, however with an added empha-
sis on the role of contestation and learning in global social policy.
9 Deacon and Stubbs refer to discourse as the “most slippery of concepts”. They define it as “the 
inter-subjective production of meaning” and as “order of ideas and practices which frame the con-
text within which specific policy debates are situated” (Deacon and Stubbs 2013, 15).
10 “Examining changing ideational and discursive processes within international organizations mat-
ters because studies have shown that these processes can have a direct influence on domestic policy. 
This makes the analysis of how ideas and discourse evolve within international organizations one of 
the most important frontiers of global policy theory” (Béland and Orenstein 2013, 127).
11 “In contrast to advocacy think tanks, which identify with relatively stable ideological creeds and 
policy paradigms, international organizations can and do change” (Béland and Orenstein 
2013, 137).
12 Taking on board international organizations’ “lack of veto power … and the limits of financial 
conditionalities, ideational processes are the most central means through which they attempt to 
shape domestic policy” (Béland and Orenstein 2013, 127).
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This characterization resonates with the international organizations’ 
own reflective view of their place in the world—one they miss few oppor-
tunities to project.
 Realist Accounts of Transnational Actors  
and Influence
Realist accounts of transnational actors and influences in social policy 
in low- and middle-income countries depart from the basic proposition 
that social policy reflects the “distribution of preferences and their politi-
cal organizations” in their respective polities (Haggard and Kaufman 
2008, 359). External factors are important because they influence the 
political and economic conditioning of domestic preferences, and in 
some cases directly through exercising power over jurisdictions (e.g. 
structural adjustment in Latin America, the Soviet Bloc).13 Transnational 
influences are one of the factors capable of influencing domestic 
social policy.
What explains the particular preferences and interests of transnational 
actors? In realist perspectives, international organizations are primarily 
theorized as reflecting the preferences of hegemonic countries or groups 
of countries. When discussing pension reform in Latin America, for 
example, Huber and Stephens (2012) underline the crucial role of inter-
national financial institutions (IFIs). The spread of pension is explained 
by the fact that “neoliberal ideology penetrated the policy-making circles 
in many Latin American and (European) countries … There is clearly a 
material basis to the hegemony of neoliberalism in the form of control by 
advanced countries of the IFIs” (Huber and Stephens 2012, 252). This is 
disputed by Haggard and Kaufman (2008) in their study on social policy 
reforms in middle-income countries in Latin America, East Asia and 
Eastern Europe. They argue that the hegemonic influence of the USA has 
largely subsided compared to the earlier Cold War period. While acknowl-
edging that social policy shows some convergence in a neoliberal  direction, 
13 “There is a plethora of ways in which ‘the international’ operates on states: war and security cal-
culations; cleavages over economic openness; the influence of international organizations; and the 
diffusion of policy ideas” (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 348).
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they see “very little evidence that international political forces … are lead-
ing to a homogenization of social policy” (Haggard and Kaufman 
2008, 350).
Some studies on the influence of international organizations on the 
recent expansion of social assistance in low- and middle-income coun-
tries echo Huber and Stephens’ description of the dominance of neolib-
eralism in pension reform. Teichman (2007), for example, finds a 
consistent thread from neoliberal ideas to the IFIs’ endorsement of con-
ditional income transfers. Conditional income transfers, and more gener-
ally tax-financed social assistance, are assessed as being consistent with a 
residual view of social and public policy present in neoliberalism.
Discussing social policy in Latin America, Huber and Stephens (2012) 
find a shift in the position of international organizations as regards social 
spending. They suggest “the IFIs, particularly the World Bank, have 
abandoned their Washington Consensus position and now advocate 
investments in human capital and reductions in poverty and inequality” 
(Huber and Stephens 2012, 261). Arguably, this is consistent with the 
IFIs’ advocacy of safety nets and especially conditional income transfers.14
In the context of a realist perspective on the role of transnational actors 
in the expansion of social assistance in low- and middle-income coun-
tries, a key question is whether the IFIs’ potential shift in preferences 
reflects a shift in the domestic preferences of long-standing industrialized 
countries or a shift in the latter’s preferences regarding social policy in 
low- and middle-income countries. The former follows from proposals 
for reforming welfare states in a social investment direction (Hemerijck 
2013). The latter would be consistent with long-standing industrialized 
countries’ concerns with conflict (e.g. “fragile” states) or transnational 
migration. A shift in the preferences of transnational actors for social 
policy in low- and middle-income countries might also be explained by 
potential contestation among international organizations, perhaps reflect-
ing differences across long-standing industrialized countries, leading to a 
14 I say arguably because it is not clear that, in the context of social policy, the World Bank has a 
preference for investment in human development (conditional cash transfers). If anything, the 
safety net operational work of the Bank is a mixed bag.
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paradigm shift.15 An alternative reading is that the change in the social 
policy preferences of international organizations reflects changes in 
domestic social policy among emerging economies.16 It is worth restating 
the fact that the World Bank built on experiences about conditional cash 
transfers made in Brazil, Mexico and Bangladesh.
 Transnational Actors and Social Assistance Expansion
This brief review was meant to shed light on alternative conceptualiza-
tions of the role of transnational actors in domestic policy. Can they help 
us understand the recent expansion of social assistance in low- and 
middle- income countries?
World society phenomenological accounts would suggest, as von 
Gliszczynski and Leisering (2016) do, that transnational actors are best 
conceptualized as “disinterested Others” devising and implementing a 
universalistic script. The evolution of global social policy suggests a certain 
degree of convergence with world society. Earlier versions of global social 
policy (Deacon 1997) show multiple references to the hegemony of the 
Washington Consensus advanced by realist perspectives, but growing 
reliance on ideational approaches in later versions (Deacon and Stubbs 
2013) moves it closer toward the universalistic script in world society 
(Tag 2013).
The findings from the review of comparative studies in section 
“Comparative Research on Social Assistance” and the broader literature 
on the growth of social assistance challenge phenomenological perspec-
tives in important ways. The multiplicity of scripts (e.g. policy instru-
ments), the indeterminacy of transnational advice and influence (e.g. 
contrasting assessment of conditional income transfers) and the lack of 
15 See Jenson (2010) for a comparison of the diffusion of social investment policies in the OECD 
and Latin America, the latter emphasizing the growth of conditional income transfers. Pritchett 
(2002) provides a perspective on the role of contestation within the World Bank to explain the 
incidence of impact evaluations and, generally, evidence gathering.
16 Researchers have suggested that conditional income transfers could in principle appeal to both 
neoliberal and progressively oriented policy-makers (González de la Rocha and Escobar 2012; 
Brooks 2015). In fact, conditional income transfers have been supported by left-of-center and 
right-of-center coalitions in Latin America.
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evidence concerning the very influence of multilaterals—all work to chal-
lenge phenomenological accounts. This is significant because phenome-
nological perspectives provide, albeit implicitly, much of the grounding 
for ideational studies on social assistance diffusion in low- and middle- 
income countries.
Realist perspectives on the influence of transnational actors conceptu-
alize international organizations in terms of the preferences and power of 
hegemonic early industrializers.17 The influence of transnational actors 
on domestic policy flows from the global power of long-standing indus-
trialized countries. Realist accounts have interpreted the growth of social 
assistance as an extension of neoliberal policies pushed by hegemonic 
long-standing industrialized countries. Again, comparing this perspective 
with the main findings from the review of comparative studies in section 
“Comparative Research on Social Assistance” suggests that they are sig-
nificant. Chief among them is the fact that conditional income transfers 
did not emerge from the prescriptions of IFIs in indebted or aid-depen-
dent countries, but instead they emerged from domestic policy innova-
tions in Brazil and Mexico.
An alternative realist approach is to suggest that there has been a shift 
in the preferences of hegemonic actors toward social investment, consis-
tent with the view put forward by Huber and Stephens (2012). It is per-
haps too early to assess this hypothesis. There is growing interest and 
discussion around social investment in European countries (Hemerijck 
2013) but, aside from long-standing social policy in the Nordic coun-
tries, it would be difficult to describe these developments as a paradigm 
shift at this point in time. Social investment is hardly a priority in 
the USA.
Perhaps the main conclusion that can be drawn from this section is 
that further research is needed to construct a persuasive account of the 
17 From a realist perspective, the view of multilaterals as “ideas brokers” does not take us very far 
with theorizing their role. Whatever explanatory power multilaterals could offer in theorizing 
emerging welfare institutions in low- and middle-income countries could be captured more directly 
by the core interests and preferences they intermediate. This would also apply to contestation 
among transnational actors. Contestation reflecting the preferences of grouping (factions) among 




role of transnational actors in the expansion of social assistance in low- 
and middle-income countries (see Shriwise, Chap. 2, this volume).
 Conclusions
The rapid growth of social assistance in low- and middle-income coun-
tries has highlighted the need to develop theories capable of explaining 
emergent welfare institutions in these countries. Comparative research is 
essential to this project. It is urgent to identify with precision the forms 
of stratification explaining the shape of emerging institutions. It is also 
important to pay attention to interdependencies, especially as these are 
likely to have stronger influence on the shape of the emerging welfare 
institutions in low- and middle-income countries than they did in the 
expansion of welfare states in long-standing industrialized countries.
To date, the scarce comparative literature has paid considerable atten-
tion to the role of transnational actors. Prominent studies attribute the 
expansion of social assistance, conditional income transfers in particular, 
to the influence of transnational actors, especially multilaterals. This con-
tribution has challenged this widely held view. Transnational actors are 
highly visible in international policy debates and in some cases in domes-
tic debates in low- and middle-income countries, especially in aid- 
dependent countries. However, the view that the expansion of social 
assistance is explained by the influence of multilaterals finds limited sup-
port in the literature reviewed in this contribution.
It is important to address this issue because it carries implications for 
the focus, scope and methods of comparative research. A disproportion-
ate focus on transnational actors biases comparative research in ways that 
might turn out to be counterproductive. Its implicit research question—
what makes policies travel?—crowds out more fundamental questions 
about the causal factors giving shape to emerging welfare institutions in 
low- and middle-income countries (Schmitt et  al., Chap. 14, this vol-
ume). A brief review of two “canonical” transnationally driven social 
policy reforms, provident funds and individual retirement accounts, has 
demonstrated the need to look beyond short-term transnationally driven 
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policy diffusion processes in order to explain the shape of medium- and 
longer-term institutions in low- and middle-income countries.
The discussion in the contribution has questioned the, at best partial, 
conceptualization of transnational actors in the comparative literature. 
Transnational actors often appear as binary variables in quantitative 
research or as exogenous actors in qualitative studies. The contribution 
has sketched alternative phenomenological and realist perspectives on 
transnational actors and assessed their potential contribution to under-
standing the role of transnational actors in the emergence of welfare insti-
tutions in low- and middle-income countries. Further research is needed 
to refine these perspectives before they can shed light on the role of trans-
national actors in shaping emergent welfare institutions.
The way forward for comparative research on emerging welfare institu-
tions in low- and middle-income countries involves more of the follow-
ing: study of institutions, study of domestic factors in the context of 
political and economic interdependencies, quantitative comparative 
analysis, attention to counterfactuals and better data.
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This volume has traced the role played by external actors in social protec-
tion in the Global South, from colonialism to international aid. The 
authors aimed at elucidating whether and how external actors and trans-
national relationships have influenced the formation, development and 
transformation of social protection arrangements. In this critical assess-
ment and outlook, we first summarize the main findings of the book 
volume in a synthesized way (see section “Synthesized Summary”). 
Subsequently we discuss and critically evaluate our findings (see section 
“Discussion and Critical Evaluation”). A final section provides an out-
look on potential future avenues for research (see section “Outlook”).
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This book volume focuses on the role of external actors and transnational 
relationships from a more theoretical perspective in Parts I and IV, while 
Parts II and III present more empirically oriented chapters. The chapters 
of this book have contributed to studies on social protection in the Global 
South by ascertaining the types of external actors involved, how they 
exert their influence over time (see section “External Actors and Their 
Strategies from Colonialism to International Aid”), what their main 
objectives and preferences with regard to social protection look like (see 
section “External Actors’ Objectives and Preferences Regarding Social 
Protection”) and how they interact with domestic actors and in what 
ways their influence is conditioned, limited or translated by national fac-
tors (see section “Interaction with Domestic Factors”).
 External Actors and Their Strategies from Colonialism 
to International Aid
External actors have played a major role in policy-making from the very 
outset. Those contributions which focused on colonial times highlighted 
the role of European colonial actors, either comparing the British and the 
French colonial empires (Schmitt, Chap. 6, this volume; Becker, Chap. 7, 
this volume) or comparing cases within one of the empires (Mioni and 
Petersen, Chap. 3, this volume; Künzler, Chap. 4, this volume; Seekings, 
Chap. 5, this volume). Across empires, distinct imperial strategies led to 
differing approaches to social protection, despite the shared objective to 
decelerate the demise of the respective colonial empire (Becker, Chap. 7, 
this volume). Whereas the French focused on income maintenance of 
waged labor and the social insurance principle in their colonies (as 
reflected by the Code du Travail of 1952), the British Poor Law tradition 
led to an early diffusion of social assistance concepts (Schmitt, Chap. 6, 
this volume). Moreover, while the British typically used indirect rule, 
involving also non-state actors, the French employed more direct rule 
during colonial times. This is reflected by France’s strong reliance on gov-
ernmental actors for the distribution of aid to former colonies still today 
(Becker, Chap. 7, this volume).
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Strategies also differed within empires. For example, the British incor-
porated their territories into the colonial economy in different ways. 
Kenya’s incorporation as a “labor reserve economy” and Tanganyika’s as a 
“cash crop economy” led to higher taxation (and later more extensive tax- 
financed social protection) in the former than in the latter (Künzler, Chap. 
4, this volume). Moreover, colonial actors were not homogeneous, such 
that colonial officials in the colony at times also acted in disagreement 
with those in the metropole for instance (Künzler, Chap. 4, this volume). 
In South Africa, the colonial-era design was retained despite the ruling 
elite’s strong reservations about it, and as a result, the system of combining 
social assistance with ‘semi-social insurance’ was transferred from the pre- 
to the post- independence period. In addition to direct influence by colo-
nial actors, Seekings (see Chap. 5, this volume) stressed the role of more 
indirect external influence through the diffusion of ideas. In the case of 
South Africa, these ideas came from Britain, Australia and New Zealand 
through white elites “embedded in imperial networks” (117).
International organizations started to become more significant exter-
nal actors after the period of colonial rule. For instance, Mioni and 
Petersen (see Chap. 3, this volume) found that the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) played a more important role in social reforms in 
newly independent Burma than in colonial Malaysia. In both countries, 
it was the Cold War context—rather than the common British colonial 
heritage—that determined the timing of early social welfare reforms 
(Mioni and Petersen, Chap. 3, this volume). Other international organi-
zations that became increasingly active in social protection in the Global 
South include multilateral agencies, like United Nations (UN) agencies 
(e.g. the World Food Programme in Botswana), or the international 
financial institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and bilateral ones, such as the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID). Moreover, additional external actors 
like international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), advocacy 
networks and epistemic communities have become more and more 
involved. On the African continent, the four leading global agencies 
working in social protection today are United Nations International 
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), DFID, ILO and the World 
Bank (Devereux and Kapingidza, Chap. 11, this volume).
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Often times, these international organizations employ a combination 
of financial leverage (i.e. providing or withholding aid) with technical 
support, expertise and policy recommendations (Dodlova, Chap. 8, this 
volume; Çemen and Yörük, Chap. 9, this volume; Devereux and 
Kapingidza, Chap. 11, this volume). Furthermore, strategies followed by 
contemporary external actors include, for example, setting norms and 
standards and building evidence (Devereux and Kapingidza, Chap. 11, 
this volume). However, the instruments at their disposal are at least at the 
surface those of “soft” rather than “hard” power, such that their influence 
may also be transmitted more indirectly and through ideational processes 
(Seekings, Chap. 5, this volume; Devereux and Kapingidza, Chap. 11, 
this volume; Haang’andu and Béland, Chap. 12, this volume; Barrientos, 
Chap. 13, this volume). Problematically, the policy ideas and norms dis-
seminated by (contemporary) external actors are often presented as being 
neutral and universally applicable, despite being rooted in Western ide-
ologies and likely to be shaped by Western political interests (Haang’andu 
and Béland, Chap. 12, this volume).
Moving from colonialism to international aid, certain changes and 
continuities among external actors involved in social protection-making 
can be observed. In Malaysia, for example, the British-run colonial gov-
ernment acted as a ‘gatekeeper’ against interference by international orga-
nizations in its territory, yet in newly independent Burma, not part of the 
British Commonwealth, the ILO was able to play a greater role. Here also 
national governments, other than those of the colonial metropole such as 
the US, began to play a part in social protection-making, in particular 
during the Cold War (Mioni and Petersen, Chap. 3, this volume). 
Nonetheless, the British maintained their post-independence influence 
through other channels, such as concentrating the work of their DFID in 
former British colonies (Seekings, Chap. 5, this volume). In fact, Becker 
was able to show that the colonial past affects the ways in which former 
colonial powers distribute aid still today, that is, to which sectors and 
through which actors international aid is distributed. Thus, aid is one 
way through which former colonial powers continue to exert their influ-
ence, particularly in the field of social protection (Becker, Chap. 7, this 
volume).
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 External Actors’ Objectives and Preferences Regarding 
Social Protection
There are various reasons for external actors to get involved in the field of 
social protection in countries of the Global South. They may be motivated 
by political objectives, like seeking to promote political stability as an anti-
revolutionary/anti-protest strategy. In Burma and Malaysia during the Cold 
War period, social reforms constituted part of anti- communism strategies. 
While the US, the UK and the ILO initially pursued differing agendas—
the US being focused on its geo-strategic concerns; the UK on upholding 
the British Empire (later the Commonwealth); and the ILO on its more 
technical agenda—their interests eventually converged,1 allowing for high 
levels of coordination among them (Mioni and Petersen, Chap. 3, this vol-
ume). Containing social unrest was found to also be motivating social pro-
tection recommendations by the World Bank nowadays (Çemen and Yörük, 
Chap. 9, this volume). Haang’andu and Béland, but also Barrientos, stressed 
that the objectives of international organizations may in fact reflect the pref-
erences of hegemonic countries that contribute to their resources (Chaps. 
12 and 13, this volume). The ILO’s activities in Burma and Malaysia, for 
instance, were also largely influenced by prevailing Western ideological con-
cerns (Mioni and Petersen, Chap. 3, this volume).
However, international organizations may also differ with regard to 
their objectives. Künzler, for example, found that in both Kenya and 
Tanzania there was disagreement among the donor community on models 
for both pensions and health in the early 2000s. As a result, domestic poli-
tics appear to have played a more significant role, particularly in the case 
of the latter. In areas where there is less disagreement than in the field of 
education, donor influence tends to be greater (Künzler, Chap. 4, this 
volume). In Zimbabwe, on the other hand, inter-agency disagreements on 
how to best implement social protection turned the political arena into a 
“battlefield for external actors”, namely the World Bank, UNICEF and 
the ILO (Devereux and Kapingidza, Chap. 11, this volume, 295). Part of the 
reason for this is that different international organizations may prefer dif-
1 Not least due to the intertwined nature of communist uprisings and decolonization as well as the 
ILO’s proximity to Western ideologies.
14 Critical Assessment and Outlook 
362
ferent types of social protection. The World Bank, for instance, is the most 
prominent supporter of conditional cash transfers (CCTs), while UNICEF 
and DFID typically prefer unconditional family support schemes, and the 
ILO pursues a rights-based approach to social protection (Seekings, Chap. 
5, this volume; Dodlova, Chap. 8, this volume; Devereux and Kapingidza, 
Chap. 11, this volume). Social pensions, on the other hand, are pushed to 
a lesser extent by external actors (Dodlova, Chap. 8, this volume). 
International organizations were also found to differ with respect to other 
program design questions. Whereas DFID and UNICEF are more likely 
to promote categorical targeting, the World Bank favors proxy means test-
ing, among others (Dodlova, Chap. 8, this volume).
In the past, French colonial rulers supported family allowances to 
strengthen the core family, whereas social pensions are more likely to be 
found in (former) British colonies (Schmitt, Chap. 6, this volume). What 
is more, the early decision of the French to implement insurance-based 
social protection in its territories continues to decrease the likelihood of 
tax-financed, non-contributory social assistance being introduced in for-
mer French colonies today, as restructuring existing institutions would 
involve great costs. Conversely, the greater incidence of social assistance 
programs in former British colonies (in contrast to French ones) is linked 
to the Poor Law tradition guiding British colonial social policy (Schmitt, 
Chap. 6, this volume).
Despite external actors engaging in a broad range of social protection, 
including famine relief, pensions, health, disability policy and education, 
there has been an increasing focus on non-contributory social protection 
schemes, i.e. social assistance (or social cash transfers). This has signifi-
cantly affected the balance between social assistance and social insurance 
in countries of the Global South (Barrientos, Chap. 13, this volume). 
Moreover, donor-financed social cash transfers have been criticized for 
their short-term focus as opposed to aiming for long-term social protec-
tion institutions—a dissonance that is also reflected by research on social 
protection in the Global South. Building sustainable, long-term institu-
tions for social protection “requires deeper engagement with domestic 
politics” (Barrientos, Chap. 13, this volume, PAGE). Consequently, it is 
crucial to pay close attention to their interplay with domestic factors 
when examining the role of external actors.
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 Interaction with Domestic Factors
On the one hand, there are instances in which the sway of the external 
actors supersedes that of domestic factors. In other instances, domestic 
factors considerably constrain and/or shape the scope of external influ-
ences. The legacy of French colonial rule, for instance, with its emphasis 
on the social insurance-based model appears to outweigh the positive 
influence of democratic institutions for the adoption of social assistance 
schemes (Schmitt, Chap. 6, this volume). In present times, external actors 
exert greater influence in countries that are dependent on aid and/or 
politically weak. The introduction of social protection reforms through 
external actors in Zimbabwe, for example, coincided with the country’s 
economic collapse and significant domestic political uncertainty in the 
late 2000s (Devereux and Kapingidza, Chap. 11, this volume). Despite 
being largely independent of international aid, also Botswana was more 
susceptible to external support at key moments in its history, such as the 
drought in the 1960s or the AIDS crisis in the 1990s, when external 
actors were able to promote their agendas more efficaciously (Chinyoka 
and Ulriksen, Chap. 10, this volume). Similarly, UNICEF took advan-
tage of the intensified political competition during the run-up to Kenya’s 
national elections in 2002 to garner political support for its proposed 
child grant (Künzler, Chap. 4, this volume).
Moreover, social protection recommendations by the World Bank 
alone do not appear to have a strong direct effect on social protection 
spending in emerging economies. Yet, if preceded by certain cases of 
social unrest, general strikes in particular, policy recommendations by the 
World Bank are found to reinforce the positive relationship between 
social unrest and social protection spending (Çemen and Yörük, Chap. 9, 
this volume). In other words, domestic “social unrest plays a key role in 
how policy- makers translate structural forces into social policies and 
whether they choose to diffuse recommendations from IFIs” (PAGE). 
Furthermore, the influence of external actors appears to lessen when their 
agendas run contrary to domestic priorities. While having successfully 
lobbied for an unconditional cash transfer aimed at children in Kenya, 
external actors faced resistance from the Tanzanian government, whose 
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affordability and long-term sustainability concerns led it to prefer pro-
ductivist elements and conditions (Künzler, Chap. 4, this volume). In 
fact, in many sub-Saharan African countries indigenous concepts of 
informal social support and reciprocity do not combine easily with the 
emphasis on the individual inherent in the rights-based approaches of 
many Western external actors (Chinyoka and Ulriksen, Chap. 10, this 
volume; Devereux and Kapingidza, Chap. 11, this volume; Haang’andu 
and Béland, Chap. 12, this volume). The government of Botswana, for 
instance, has resisted the introduction of a poverty targeted cash grant, 
instead of emphasizing family/community, self-reliance and hard work 
(Chinyoka and Ulriksen, Chap. 10, this volume). Across the sub-Saharan 
region, the transnational disability movement has also failed to take into 
account context-specific norms and experiences of disability by falsely 
assuming the universality of Western paradigms (Haang’andu and 
Béland, Chap. 12, this volume).
Preceding the more recent wave of donor-supported social protec-
tion, the pre- and post-independence social protection models in 
Southern Africa were also not merely imposed by external actors but 
rather resulted from combinations of external ideas and predominant 
norms among local elites, adapted to local conditions (Seekings, Chap. 
5, this volume). In the Cold War context in South East Asia, Western 
ideas on social reform were also adapted to local conditions, such as 
pronounced nationalism in independent Burma, and the quest for 
legitimatizing the state during transition from colonial rule to indepen-
dence in Malaysia (Mioni and Petersen, Chap. 3, this volume). 
Accordingly, Burma’s development plan in the 1950s was formulated in 
a way as to appeal to both foreign donors and potential nationalist crit-
ics. More generally, Haang’andu and Béland (Chap. 12, this volume) 
conclude that foreign external ideas can be adapted or translated to fit 
domestic conditions (ideational translation) or they can be combined 
with local norms to create new ones (ideational bricolage). The way in 
which external actors interact with domestic (f )actors has important 
implications for social policy-making and its longevity in the 
Global South.
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 Discussion and Critical Evaluation
 Learning from Quantitative 
and Qualitative Approaches
Following recent developments in the discipline, we approached the 
influence of external actors by way of quantitative and qualitative meth-
ods. Quantitative methods provide a bird’s eye perspective, while qualita-
tive methods delve into the intricacies of specific cases. Several well-known 
differences between the two methodological camps became also manifest 
in this volume. Where quantitative analyses often make strong assump-
tions about external actors and mechanisms, qualitative analyses shed 
light on how actors shape preferences and make specific choices. For 
example, Dodlova (Chap. 8, this volume) uses a quantitative approach 
that finds a correlation between specific social protection programs and 
the involvement of specific donors. However, on the basis of quantitative 
studies it is not possible to empirically assess whether this is a result of 
different donor preferences or whether recipient countries are strategic in 
the involvement of respective donors. As a consequence, the author 
points out that “it would be interesting to investigate this hypothesis on 
the basis of case studies and other qualitative research” (p. XX). Chapter 
10 by Chinyoka and Ulriksen offers exactly such a qualitative study, 
attesting to the important role of domestic governments, especially their 
ideological stances. Similarly, Haang’andu and Béland (Chap. 12, this 
volume) argue that local demand for (external) social policy ideas is deci-
sive for them to be implemented sustainably.
Similar comparisons, although with regard to colonial legacies, can be 
made regarding the quantitative chapters by Becker (Chap. 7, this vol-
ume) and Schmitt (Chap. 6, this volume), and the two qualitative chap-
ters by Künzler (Chap. 4, this volume) and Seekings (Chap. 5, this 
volume). Both Becker and Schmitt sketch a broad picture, highlighting 
divergent preferences and institutions across colonial powers, in particu-
lar Britain and France. In contrast, the two qualitative chapters both 
compare social protection trends within the British Empire, each com-
paring two former colonies. This allows the authors not only to show how 
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legacies of the British Empire become manifest in specific cases, but also 
to shed light on differences within the British empire, the importance of 
contextual factors and how these factors can condition colonial legacies.
While the attention to detail of qualitative studies facilitates the explo-
ration of the agencies of different actors, quantitative studies more com-
monly aim at testing the generalizability of specific claims. As such, they 
capture average effects across a variety of geographic regions or determine 
statistical relationships over long timeframes. Case-specific insights such 
as those uncovered in the chapters by Chinyoka and Ulriksen (Chap. 10, 
this volume), Künzler (Chap. 4, this volume) or Seekings (Chap. 5, this 
volume) can inform quantitative studies that test their applicability more 
broadly. Whether such testing is possible depends much on data avail-
ability and on how easily concepts unveiled by qualitative research can be 
operationalized for quantitative measurement. The latter challenge is 
especially pronounced in relation to qualitative research in the construc-
tivist tradition (e.g. Haang’andu and Béland, Chap. 12, this volume).
With regard to most aspects, the chapters within this book volume, 
even though applying different methodological approaches, succeed with 
speaking to each other. They sometimes reinforced each other’s findings, 
at other times prompting further debate. While such debates often origi-
nate at the divide between quantitative and qualitative research, it is 
important to note that such debates can also be evidenced within each 
camp. For example, the qualitative studies by Künzler (Chap. 4, this volume) 
and Seekings (Chap. 5, this volume) attest to the importance of colonial-
ism for the formation of social protection-making, but Mioni and 
Petersen (Chap. 3, this volume) find that this effect can be eclipsed by 
other factors, in particular Cold War politics. However, these debates are 
necessary to identify the national and international conditions for the 
influence of external actors on social protection pathways.
 Taking Scope and Context into Account
In this book volume, the more quantitatively oriented chapters look at a 
broad set of countries, each covering the majority of the Global South. 
The qualitative chapters, with the exception of Mioni and Petersen 
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(Chap.  3, this volume) who compare two South East Asian countries 
(Burma and Malaysia), zoom in on different African countries or regions. 
These qualitative chapters provide a close look at actors’ motivations, 
strategies and relationships that cannot be achieved by macro-quantita-
tive approaches. Even though most qualitative chapters have focused on 
African countries, some expectations regarding the transferability of 
insights from these African case studies can be formulated. On the one 
hand, bilateral donors and international organizations are involved in the 
design of social protection and a wide range of other policies, all across 
the Global South, even if to varying degrees. While the role of contextual 
factors should not be underestimated, the centralized character of these 
actors provides some reason to believe that corresponding insights from 
African case studies might apply more broadly. On the other hand, there 
are colonialism and Cold War dynamics and the long-term legacies of 
actors involved in both. While almost all countries in the Global South 
were affected by colonialism at some point, the intensity it reached in 
Africa was not as common in other world regions. This is especially true 
for Latin America, which the Portuguese and Spanish colonized well 
before the ‘Scramble for Africa’.
Second, the influence of colonialism and Cold War on social protec-
tion in dependent territories and the succeeding nation states is far from 
being uniform. Quantitative chapters point out to broad differences 
between colonial empires, especially the British and French. Qualitative 
chapters emphasize complex interactions with pre-existing conditions 
and how external influence is translated into local ideas and action. At the 
same time, there can be other important influences, such as the Cold 
War, that drown out or moderate the effect of colonial dependencies. As 
such, even if colonialism and colonial legacies are a unique feature of 
social protection-making in the Global South, it necessitates further 
research into interrelationships with other influences.
Such interrelationships between external actors and domestic factors 
are not limited to the pre-independence period. On the one hand, many 
colonial effects are likely to carry on, as, for example, Becker (Chap. 7, 
this volume) has shown for international aid provided by former colonial 
powers. On the other hand, contemporary actors have their own goals 
and interests and similarly adjust their behavior to domestic conditions. 
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The chapter by Çemen and Yörük (Chap. 9, this volume) on World Bank 
activities provides one such example. In addition to a new set of actors, 
there are other important differences between pre- and post-independence 
periods. For example, the sovereign control of external governments over 
territories in the Global South has largely vanished. Even though often 
these external governments still play a dominant role in countries that used 
to be under their control, they now have to compete for influence. How 
this new competition has altered these actors’ responses to domestic condi-
tions is an open question. While it goes beyond the scope of the present 
volume, research in this direction would provide further valuable insights.
 External Actors in the Global South and Global North
This volume, with its focus on the role of external actors for social protec-
tion in the Global South, also aimed at counterbalancing comparative 
social policy research that is heavily tilted toward industrialized econo-
mies in the Global North. This leads to the question of whether social 
protection-making in the Global South underlies rules and processes 
which are fundamentally different from what we know from the Global 
North in the light of the findings in this book volume.
When summarizing the chapters of this book volume, we do confirm 
that social protection-making is different in some respects. Those chap-
ters focusing on the long-lasting influence of colonial and Cold War 
superpowers show that for decades foreign governments tried to interfere 
in political, social and economic affairs of dependent territories or coun-
tries in the Global South. This included past but also contemporary social 
protection-making. At least colonial influence is not so heavily present in 
much of the Global North. Other chapters in this volume point out the 
importance of international organizations and donors in social protection- 
making in the Global South today. These actors provide ideational and 
financial resources to promote a variety of policies, including social pro-
tection. While some of these actors also influence policy-making in the 
Global North, they tend to be most involved and effective in the 
Global South.
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Moreover, most chapters in this volume have focused on external gov-
ernmental and intergovernmental actors. While these actors play a cen-
tral role on the international stage, be it historically within colonial 
empires or currently in the field of international development, they are 
not the only relevant ones. Research on welfare state development in the 
Global North emphasizes labor market questions and thus the role of 
firms. Economic actors such as companies should also play a decisive role 
in the Global South, where national governments compete for interna-
tional investments and, more historically, where, for example, the large 
trading companies used to put strong demands on colonial 
governments.
Furthermore, it is worth reiterating and developing Barrientos’ (Chap. 
12, this volume) earlier warning that external actors, especially interna-
tional organizations, have strongly invested in advising and guiding pol-
icy-making and implementation. Therefore, they should also have an 
interest in research on their role in the Global South.
Additionally, there is the risk of researchers overemphasizing the role 
of external actors. Many international organizations provide data sources 
that greatly facilitate research but also focus on topics these organizations 
are interested in.2 As the impact of many external actors is considered to 
be global, or at least to affect a set of countries, it is also often easier for 
researchers to focus on the actions of external actors rather than to explore 
the actions of local actors who reside at multiple sites. As some chapters 
did in this volume, case studies—qualitative and quantitative—are a 
strategy that should be more frequently pursued. While they are time- 
consuming, costly and data is less available, they are important for shed-
ding more light on domestic processes and on how local actors adjusted 
to independence and work with external actors today.
While social protection-making in the Global South is different from 
that in rich democracies, it is important to be cautious about overstating 
its uniqueness. A search for similarities with the Global North might be 
also fruitful and provide explanatory power (Kpessa and Béland 2013). 
In this volume, an example of such work is the chapter by Çemen and 
2 At the same time other external actors, presumably fearing law suits or economic losses, might be 
eager not to provide any data for research purposes.
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Yörük (Chap. 9, this volume) who include countries from the Global 
South as well as the Global North in their analysis. Their findings suggest 
that the relationship between social unrest, World Bank involvement and 
social spending is comparably similar in both world regions.
 Outlook
The chapters in this volume suggest several avenues for future research 
that may help to further specify changes and continuities with regard to 
the role of external actors in social protection arrangements in the Global 
South amid the shift from colonialism to international aid. This section 
discusses the future outlook in relation to transnational approaches to 
research design and methodology, geographic scope of research on social 
protection in the Global South, and transnational dynamics and actor 
constellations that shape, and are shaped by, social protection.
 Transnational Approaches to Research Design 
and Methodology
From a conceptual standpoint, taking a transnational approach to research 
designs makes it possible to see how external actors and transnational rela-
tionships interact with domestic circumstances in ways that affect social 
protection arrangements in the Global South. From an analytical stand-
point, while context is important to consider when analyzing social policy-
making processes, greater emphasis needs to be placed on the identification 
of causal mechanisms, with attention to policy instruments, institutions 
and ideas in ways that are generalizable in order to contribute to theory-
building. As illustrated by both Becker (Chap. 7, this volume) and Dodlova 
(Chap. 8, this volume), the presence of a policy instrument promoted or 
pushed by external actors such as development assistance/foreign aid pro-
vides a clear entry point through which to examine transnational processes 
affecting social protection in the Global South. Furthermore, the critical 
reflections by Haang’andu and Béland (Chap. 12, this volume) and 
Barrientos (Chap. 13, this volume) highlight the importance of viewing 
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ideational and  institutional mechanisms with a transnational lens first from 
the perspective of countries and peoples in the Global South, which draws 
attention to those aspects of social protection that are more deeply embed-
ded rather than superficially imposed on countries.
Moreover, quantitative methods have distinct advantages in generaliz-
ability. However, generalizability is not only about sample size and aver-
age effects but also about the extent to which a finding in one context is 
applicable to another. The use of comparative methods of both the quan-
titative and qualitative varieties has the potential to make substantial 
theoretical contributions if thoughtfully designed. While it is important 
to keep pushing for higher quality comparable data on social protection 
systems throughout the Global South, strategically employing equivalen-
cies in research designs also offers a way in which to extend the number 
of cases as well as a means of supporting pattern identification across dif-
ferent contexts in qualitative work. Together this could lead to theoretical 
advances in both quantitative and qualitative work that were previously 
unattainable.
Finally, this volume presents a clear call for more historical research in 
the social sciences. The findings by Schmitt (Chap. 6, this volume) sug-
gest that colonial legacies play a key role in explaining differences in social 
protection arrangements in the Global South today, in ways that the shift 
to an international order has occluded. This is a critical methodological 
point. Transnational approaches to historical research help to ensure that 
external actors and transnational relationships influencing social protec-
tion arrangements during colonial times are not omitted from consider-
ation, mistaken for being “new”, or considered to be strictly domestic in 
nature. For instance, while the growth and role of non-governmental 
organizations have been increasingly recognized in recent literature on 
development and social protection, less attention has been paid to the 
way in which this growth is part of a broader shift away from religious 
missions and toward the secularization of third sector organizations, 
which began during colonialism and continued in the course of the twen-
tieth century (Woodberry 2012; Dromi 2016). In sum, understanding 
how, in what ways and to what extent historical legacies affect current 
social protection arrangements requires an awareness of the ways in which 
transnational actors and relationships have impacted social protection 
arrangements over time.
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 Geographic Scope
While many of the chapters have focused on Africa specifically, there is a 
need to expand understandings of the transition from colonialism to 
international aid to other regions, including Latin America, Asia and the 
Middle East. Moreover, international organizations but also colonial 
empires were often organized according to region. However, little is 
known about how regional geographies and organizations address cross- 
border challenges and affect social protection arrangements (Riggirozzi 
and Yeates 2015; Yeates 2014). For example, the foreign offices of colo-
nial powers were often organized according to region, but also UN agen-
cies are internally organized geographically. The effect of this on policy 
implementation remains largely unknown. Also, a growing number of 
regional organizations, ranging from the African Union to the League of 
Arab States to the South American Common Market, have all played a 
role in social policy-making throughout their member states. Additionally, 
there are countries and regions such as the Middle East or specific African 
and Asian states that are simply lesser examined in the literature, due to a 
lack of available data, language barriers, among other non-random 
factors.
Also, while this volume has focused predominantly on transnational 
relationships between the Global North and Global South, South-South 
cooperation and an increase in the number of middle-income countries 
(Surender and Urbina-Ferretjans 2015), transitioning from being recipi-
ents to donors, such as China, serves as a reminder that the future of 
transnational asymmetries may run from East to West as much as from 
North to South (Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender 2013). New lines of 
global conflict and contestation are likely to continue to shape the emer-
gence of social protection; regional and sub-regional pockets of differen-
tiation related to social protection, also referred to as “micro-paradigms” 
(von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016), may emerge in line with current 
global trends and norms of social protection.
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 Transnational Dynamics and Actor Constellations
This volume identified a shift in the transnational dynamics of social 
protection when moving from colonialism to the post-independence era. 
Current evidence suggests that the transformation of dependent territo-
ries into sovereign national states across the Global South might have 
empowered transnational actors. As territories throughout the Global 
South became sovereign nation states, former colonial powers were 
unable to utilize hard power instruments within these territories to 
achieve their aims. As a result, transnational actors, particularly intergov-
ernmental organizations and international non-governmental organiza-
tions (Boli and Thomas 1997), were incentivized to exercise influence 
through soft power mechanisms.
Moreover, transnational actors such as intergovernmental organiza-
tions are not the only external actors that matter. As demonstrated par-
ticularly clearly in the case of Mioni and Petersen (Chap. 3, this volume), 
external influential national states might also behave transnationally. 
Superpowers such as the US and the former Soviet Union shaped the 
emergence of social protection arrangements in the Global South during 
the Cold War in line with their foreign policy interests and objectives. 
Considering how key states in the Global North view social protection 
within their foreign policy context may help to better understand the 
policy positions of international governmental organizations on social 
protection in the Global South. This is partly due to the fact that trans-
national actors appear to be of a dualistic nature. On the one hand, they 
are autonomous actors in their own right that may behave according to 
their own interests. On the other hand, they were largely created by, con-
tinue to receive financial support from, and may at times operate as 
instruments of powerful countries in the Global North. A better under-
standing of the interrelationships between influential nation states and 
international organizations, which also draw attention to the critical role 
of ideas and discourse in framing social protection in policy debates, 
would greatly enrich the state of the art.
Moreover, in line with Barrientos (Chap. 13, this volume), who 
emphasizes the importance of considering the drivers behind the emergence 
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of domestic welfare institutions supporting social protection in the Global 
South, it may be important to re-examine the role of employers in the for-
mation of social protection arrangements. From an historical standpoint, 
this requires considering the role and interests of concessional companies, 
as highlighted by Künzler (Chap. 4, this volume), in the formation of social 
protection arrangements during colonial times. The construction of labor 
markets and social protection in the Global South has clearly been impacted 
not only by colonialism but also by capitalism. While we know that social 
protection has been introduced in the Global South in a way that has been 
less clearly coordinated with domestic industrialization, we need to know 
more about the mechanisms through which employers exert influence on 
the structure of labor markets and social protection policies in the Global 
South as well as why, how and in what ways this legacy persists to date.
Considering transnational actor constellations and the ideas and insti-
tutions that influence their dynamics helps to address several gaps in the 
literature on social protection in the Global South by way of (1) specify-
ing the linkages and asymmetries between external and domestic actors, 
factors and influences; (2) understanding how these relationships affect 
domestic policy-making environments in the Global South and (3) clari-
fying the mechanisms behind the introduction and reproduction of social 
protection arrangements. The emphasis placed on the need for transna-
tional approaches (Shriwise, Chap. 2, this volume) should not be reduced 
to a focus on transnational actors alone (Barrientos, Chap. 13, this volume) 
nor should it exclude the examination of domestic/national actors and 
factors. The study of transnational actor constellations and their dynam-
ics could help us to fill critical gaps in the literature. In so doing, we can 
gain a better understanding of the role of external actors for social protec-
tion-making in the Global South.
Finally, this work has critical implications for policy-making in the 
present. Careful research designs that are highly generalizable and the 
appropriate amalgamation and integration of findings across time and 
space can improve the quality of policy advice generated by academics, 
transnational actors and epistemic communities. For instance, the check-
list generated by Devereux and Kapingidza (Chap. 11, this volume) serves 
as one example of a policy tool that can be iteratively refined in light of 
 additional findings across a number of cases and contexts over time. 
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Theoretically situating case studies is critical to ensure coherent and plu-
ralistic theoretical development on the emergence of social protection in 
the Global South in ways that help policy-makers to move beyond the 
simple recognition that context matters. In so doing, it becomes possible 
to produce better guidance that supports evidence-informed policy- 
making and supports more sophisticated approaches to advancing human 
and social rights in complex policy-making environments.
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